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# THE CONTEMPORARY REVIEW

VOL. XVIII.



THE  
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VOLUME XVIII. AUGUST—NOVEMBER, 1871

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
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# THE CONTEMPORARY REVIEW.

## THE BEARING OF INFALLIBILITY ON RELIGIOUS TRUTH.

*What is Revelation?* By the Rev. F. D. MAURICE, M.A., Chaplain of Lincoln's Inn.

*Theological Essays.* By the Rev. F. D. MAURICE, M.A., Chaplain of Lincoln's Inn.

*Essays, Theological and Literary.* By RICHARD HOLT HUTTOX, M.A. Vol. I.

*First Principles of Ecclesiastical Truth.* By J. BALDWIN BROWN, B.A.

*Einführung in die Philosophie.* Von Dr. FROESCHAMME, ordentlichem Professor der Philosophie. München. 1898.

**B**ARELY a year has elapsed since the close of the Vatican Council; twelve months, each day of which has brought with it some portentous event. Have there ever been such months before since the world began? The Pope dethroned, the Emperor ignominiously dismissed, the German empire revived, the utter collapse of what was thought to be the greatest military power in the world, a red republic in Paris, and the beautiful city itself at this moment a heap of smoking ruins set on fire by its own people. Yet amidst all the hurry and tumult which have thrown Europe into a state of feverish excitement, the world has not forgotten the Vatican Council. The interest which is felt in its decision is not confined to the Catholic Church. Protestant journals still eagerly welcome any news about its effects in Catholic countries. The submission of each

bishop is duly chronicled, and every act of rebellion hailed with applause. By the light of burning Paris, men still watch every move of the combat going on between the Archbishop of Munich and Dr. Döllinger.

I cannot think that all this attention has its source in mere curiosity. At least I am sure that the most thoughtful men in England take an almost personal interest in the proceedings of the Catholic Church. They see that the future of Christendom must be materially affected by the fate of Rome. There are those outside the Church who look with dismay upon the confusion worse confounded which has overrun Christianity, and the chaotic state of doubt which they see around them, while they still cling to the hope that a bright era is coming in which modern ideas will be found not inconsistent with faith, and the religion of Christ will develop itself into some new phase of splendour and triumph. These men must see that the tenets of such a vast body of Christians as is in union with Rome must immensely influence their future Church, and that, whether the new dogma be for the restoration or the destruction of the Roman system, it must play a great part in the religious history of the universe. Things seem to be brought to an issue. At a time when the spirit of the age is clearly against all infallibilities, when even Protestants are treating the notion of an infallible Bible as a remnant of idolatry, when the infallibility of the Apostles is denied and the ignorance of Christ Himself affirmed, at such a moment the Church of Rome calmly commits itself to a dogma which puts her infallibility into a more prominent light than ever, and which makes its operations more rapid and more stringent. Now I trust it may not be useless to put before earnest men the real results of the measure. The smoke of the great battle has cleared away, and we may tranquilly estimate its effects. The almost universal submission of the bishops of the minority has taken away the last pretext which could with any plausibility be adduced against its being a law of the Church. It is now time to show that it was not a wanton throwing down of the gauntlet to the age, not the act of desperate men angry with the consciousness that they had lost their grasp on the modern mind. It was not the act of narrow minds and narrow hearts, of a faction wrapped up in the petty interests of their own little party, and through their ignorance, reckless of the effect of their acts on the great world at large. It was called for by the internal state of the Church itself. This, however, is not all; there is not a decree of the Council which does not allude to some opinion, which has its followers amongst Englishmen. The questions discussed and decided went to the very roots of Christianity. Nay, they are the very questions discussed among ourselves. They affect what has been called our common Christianity. I shall principally

occupy myself with showing that a movement has been going on outside as well as inside the Church which called forth the decisions of the Vatican Council. Above all, I wish to point out that the principles condemned at Rome are prevalent in England, and are a peril for all Christianity as well as for the Catholic Church.

So exclusively has attention been called to the definition of the Papal Infallibility, that hardly anyone has noticed the fact that the Council, besides defining that dogma, has passed many decrees upon the very first principles, not only of the Christian faith, but also of natural religion. Every one of these decrees has its history, and refers to some opinion put forward of late years by influential writers both within and without the pale of the Church. Among these first principles thus affirmed is the infallibility of the Church; and it is not a little remarkable that, as far as I am aware, for the first time, the Church has used the term infallibility in the decree of a Council. She has thus officially in a marked way claimed immunity from error through the guidance of the Holy Ghost. Of course, no Catholic ever doubted it. It has been taken for granted in every act of the Church since the Council of Jerusalem said, "It has seemed good to the Holy Ghost and to us." The whole authority claimed by the Church to be the exclusive teacher of Christianity, would be the most monstrous of spiritual tyrannies, if she did not believe herself to be preserved from error. She would deserve the worst curse ever pronounced upon Babylon and Antichrist, if she assumed jurisdiction over the consciences of Christians without power from on high. Accordingly her infallibility has been a first principle, not tacitly assumed but affirmed loudly by all Catholics. Nevertheless, it is certainly remarkable that, as far as I know, for the first time an Œcumenical Council calls the Church infallible. If any fact is historically certain it is that from the very first dawn of Christianity, its teachers claimed infallibility. It was no mediæval invention. It is to be found in St. Irenæus as surely as in St. Gregory VII. Now, however, at the moment that the Catholic Church recognises that the very first elements of Christianity as a supernatural revelation are called in question, it puts forward its infallibility as the indispensable condition of that supernaturalness. It declares that the great misery of the age is a principle which it calls naturalism, and which it places side by side with rationalism.

I cannot help thinking that this is worthy of the attention of all Christians, even of those who disbelieve the claims of the Council. Catholics are often reproached with arguing in favour of the infallibility of the Church on *a priori* grounds, drawn from its necessity, while they ignore the facts of the history of the Christian religion. If, however, it is a patent fact that even good and earnest men, whose whole life is meant to be a protest against secularism, are forced

by the exigencies of their position whenever they give up infallibility to reduce the Christian faith to the level of natural religion, then it is a legitimate conclusion that infallibility and the supernaturalness of Christianity go hand in hand. In no better way can the issue be tried than by an examination of the views advocated by the authors of the English books which stand at the head of this article. They indignantly repudiate the charge of rationalism. Their whole system is meant to be a reaction against the rationalistic tendencies of the age. They protest with all their might that it is possible to be thorough children of the nineteenth century and yet children of Christ. Their whole soul vibrates in union with the emotions of their contemporaries, and yet they hold it not incompatible to have a love for Christ as a living reality and a Person. They look full in the face all the facts which seem to tell against Christianity, yet still they would say, Is not Christ also a fact? In spite of all the disintegrating effects of modern criticism, in spite of the hardness of logic, it is a fact that on this earth one walked and preached and was crucified who called Himself and was the Son of God. Let criticism do its worst, we will only lay the foundations of revelation deeper down in the very heart and conscience of man. Let all infallibilities be laid in ashes, we have an intimate certainty which transcends them all. What are dogmas and propositions but empty formulas which can only hurt the infinite truth while they pretend to grasp it? We can well spare them since the Infinite Himself has His hold upon us. It would be absurd to class men who use such language with vulgar rationalists. If, however, efforts so well meant and so honest, supported as they are by abilities of no common order, utterly fail in finding a supernatural basis for Christianity without infallibility, we are surely entitled to argue that the attempt is impossible. If such a gospel can be found, then let it run its course and be glorified. If fallible apostles can succeed, let them go forth and preach to this confused nineteenth century. It sadly wants an angel with healing in his wings; for its whole head is sick and its heart faint. If, however, in such hands the Gospel of Jesus Christ turns out to be no supernatural revelation, we may be sure that no one else can succeed. The experiment has been made on no vile body. If such things are done in the green tree, what will be done in the dry? What if this new gospel, with its hatred of formulas, turns out to be itself a formula? If rationalism, like the shirt of Nessus, clings to such a Hercules as this, and the efforts of the hero only succeed in tearing the flesh from his bones, then I fear the fiery poison adheres to his very marrow. After such a failure, it might be well to try the old paths. What if the old despised infallibility of the Council should turn out to be true?

The position of the school to which I allude is rather difficult to seize. It is not easy to comprehend its almost fierce denial that revelation consists of propositions "about God," coupled with the affirmation that it consists of the action of God unveiling Himself to man, as though the one excluded the other. Its passionate denunciations of dogma are hard to reconcile with its speculative, almost metaphysical, theology. As far as my present subject is concerned, I should describe it as an attempt to substitute a mystical intuition for the infallibility not only of the Church, but of Scripture and the apostles. There is supposed to be in the human soul a God-consciousness, a real contact between God and the spirit of every human being; in consequence of this the doctrines of revelation are so nearly akin to the conscience of mankind, that an infallible authority to impose them originally, or to transmit them when revealed, becomes superfluous. What need is there of a divinely guided organ of revelation when God reveals Himself immediately to the soul? Such an organ is not only useless, but impossible; for the divine truth is too great for words, even too wide for conception. The treasure of truth which we possess is so immense, that only a small portion of it can be realized and be coined into a medium of transmission. This incomprehensible greatness of the truth secures us from rationalism; on the other hand, we can dispense with such a mechanical instrument as an infallible Church, because God spiritually educates the individual Christian, and the truths themselves, however mysterious, are so conformable to human nature, that they are embraced and understood with the least possible external evidence. The constitution of man is already so inflammable to divine truth that it bursts into flame with the smallest spark. Thus the profoundest doctrines of Christianity are neither more nor less supernatural than the dictates of the human conscience. The divinity of the Eternal Word and the Incarnation are both so wrapped up in the very constitution of man, that they can make their own way by their native conformity to the needs of man. They come to their own, and, sooner or later, their own will receive them.

A most tempting system this to many minds. Here is a gospel which protests against rationalism, which allows an immediate intercourse with God, which admits of enthusiasm for the person of Christ, and yet escapes from the bonds of dogma and the thralldom of infallibility. Most tempting if it were but consonant to facts; most religious if it were not compelled by the very force of its principles to degrade Christianity from its dignity as a supernatural revelation. In fact, the school of Mr. Maurice has never retracted its adherence to the sentence of William Law, quoted with approbation by Mr. Erskine: "Christianity is not a system of doctrine enforced on us

by God, of which we could know nothing except from the Scriptures; but is *the natural religion* to which all our faculties are adapted."

It is to the facts of the Christian religion alone that I appeal for a proof that an infallible authority is the organ of its transmission. Of course, I do not deny that God might have revealed Himself to man in any way that He chose, and that man ought to be too thankful to accept the way. He might have made that revelation by means of a spiritual contact with individuals. He might have unveiled Himself in an ineffable transcendent mode, too great for words, too mighty for propositions. That He has done so is alleged without proof, nay, against all facts. This revelation of Himself reaches us through human testimony, and through that alone. Not for a moment do I forget the action of the Holy Ghost on the soul, without which "no man can call Jesus Lord." But what I affirm is, that the whole of the contents of the revelation, the thing revealed, is proposed for our acceptance through the lips of men. It is preached to us through human words and propositions. That the words are not exhaustive, that the thoughts which they suggest are far deeper than language, I gladly allow and affirm. Nevertheless the faith, the thing to be believed, has ever been transmitted and propagated by the witness of men. "How shall they hear unless one preach to them? How shall they preach unless they are sent?" That the message conveyed, that every doctrine of the glorious Gospel, however mysterious, finds echoes in the human heart, is quite true; but let us remember that they are echoes. Earth takes up with a glad shout the good news, and the mountains tell it to each other; but they only reverberate what they are told, and that most imperfectly. They report the last syllables, and the broken accents, if left to themselves, die away and are lost for ever. What, however, I insist upon now is, that the message itself which awakes the echo came entirely from without, and for that reason was necessarily, and was in point of fact, transmitted in human words and sentences. The remarkable thing is, that in the system which I am criticizing the echo is the important thing, and the voice plays a far inferior part *in the conveyance of the message itself*. It is not only that the external evidence is reduced to a minimum, depreciated, and almost railed at as a potential tyrant, if allowed to be too strong; it is not only that in order to the acceptance of the message a weight is thus thrown on the internal evidence which is far greater than it can bear; but the message itself conveyed, the thing revealed, the contents of the revelation are treated as though far more discovered in the heart, than conveyed to it from without. The fact of the Incarnation, for instance, is looked upon as though it raised reminiscences in the

human conscience of what it knew all along must be necessarily, nay, as a recognition of what in reality and in effect had been, than as a totally new and stupendous act of the mercy of God, which eye had not seen, nor had it entered into the heart of man to conceive. Of course, I do not forget that the echo in this case is the living intellect and conscience; but if it is to be an echo at all, it must content itself with "syllabing men's words;" it must not originate the divine. Of course, the beauty of Jesus seizes upon every human faculty, till the whole man cries out in rapture, "My Lord and my God." But this is a very different thing from saying that there is such a natural kinship between Jesus and the human race, that the conscience of man recognises in Him his brother, by virtue of creation, that is, by nature, not by grace.

Now let us look at the nature and origin of the message which was conveyed. Of course, of some supernatural things unaided men are competent witnesses, notwithstanding human frailty and fallibility. I would accept the witness of honest men who affirmed that they saw a man first a corpse and then resuscitated. Their senses could tell them that. But what is Christianity? I am not arguing with ordinary rationalists, but with men who believe in the unseen, and who cling to the belief of God made man. To that question, then, widely as we differ as to the meaning of our words, we should give thus far a common answer. He who was born of the Virgin Mary, who brought down from Heaven a new revelation, and who died upon the cross, was God. To guarantee this truth, with all that is involved in it, such witnesses as the Apostles—nay, as our Lord Himself—are supposed to be by the writers of whom I am speaking, are utterly inadequate. It must not be forgotten that by them the human weakness of our Lord Himself is tremendously exaggerated. His Divine personality has by no means so influenced His human nature as to shelter His intellect from the possibility of mistake. As for the Apostles, not only are they supposed to be fallible, but it is even allowed that they blundered on the very point which we are considering, the divinity of our Lord. None, it is said, realized the grand truth, except St. Paul and St. John. Even St. Paul imperfectly apprehended it. Surely, if you sweep away all infallibility, that of the Founder of the religion, that of the Apostles, of the Bible, and the Church, you sorely imperil the great truth itself. It rests on the opinion of fallible men. The truth itself is incapable of human verification. Who could sound the depths of that personality which showed itself under the weakness and infirmity of man, and pronounce it to be God? Without an infallible base the whole structure shakes. How thoroughly this is wanting will appear, when it is allowed that "Christ's expressed conviction in the eternity of His

own life would and could not be decisive without echoes in our own experience."\*

Evident, however, as it is that fallible Apostles could not found such a religion as the Christian, still less could fallible preachers preserve it. That it has to be preserved results simply from a statement which looks like a truism, that the religion of Christ was meant to be the salvation of the human race to the end of time. This is what I venture to call the grand originality of the Christian idea. It was the very first religion which claimed to be the faith of the human race, and, above all, to be final. After it, not the deluge, but the judgment and universal doom of fire. That short life of thirty-three years, lived on a narrow strip of land, not much larger than Yorkshire, hemmed in between the wilderness and the desert, is asserted by us to be the turning-point of the world's history. Back to the beginning of time and onwards to eternity without end, recoil and stretch the effects of a three hours' agony. Our religion is simply the words and deeds of Christ, and nothing else. I do not forget development. Yet extend the principle as far as you will, if it is to be real and not deceptive, the whole development must be wrapped in and evolved out of the teaching of Christ. Who now is to be our guarantee that we possess the very teaching of Christ? Pare it down and simplify it as you will, make it, if you please, to consist exclusively of facts, yet the faith in an Incarnate God cannot be so very simple, and the facts are certainly divine and incomprehensible. Who will warrant that in the course of nineteen centuries the facts have not been perverted or misinterpreted? Nay, what chance is there that the religion of Jesus should reach us unadulterated, unless the teachers of it to the end of time are divinely appointed and divinely guarded from mistake? The Christian religion is from its very perfection most liable to corruption, because while it cannot be comprehended it can be understood. On the one hand its incomprehensibility makes it naturally defenceless against human imagination; on the other, its intelligible side exposes it to the disintegrating process of the human intellect. If the Christian faith could possibly be contained in formulas there would be no need of an infallible Church. A religion of formulas can take care of itself. Such a dead thing has only to be engraved on bronze or marble. Formulas can be written down and learned by heart. What I suppose is meant by a formula is a set of words which either has no meaning or pretends to exhaust a subject. Never was there a religion less formal than the Christian. While on the one hand it is conveyed in words, since it is taught by man to man, on the other no one ever pretended that human words adequately expressed its depths. Its peculiarity is that while it is addressed to the intellect

\* "Essays, Theological and Literary," Vol. i., 261, 269—272.

of man, and therefore may be said to be understood, it never can be comprehended. It is not shut up in sacerdotal hearts, but is openly taught to mankind at large, and those who are its appointed teachers do their very best to make it intelligible to all, learned and unlearned. Its very incomprehensibility has opened up to human thought vistas of which the intellect left to itself had never dreamed. There are no cognitive limits to religious thought accurately defined. The incomprehensibility of an object implies that it is partially known. There is no sheer veil of utter darkness let fall between the known and unknown. The twilight of faith gives us glimpses into the supernatural world; the dread solitude of the abyss is peopled with forms, the very indefiniteness of which excites the mind. In point of fact, no religion and no philosophy have ever stimulated the intellect like the religion of Christ. I need only point to the existence of heresies as a proof of this. Inexhaustibly prolific ideas have been infused into the human race, and have even excited it to madness. Other intellectual religions have been confined to the schools, while the vulgar practised what they did not understand. But the poor have had the great gospel preached to them, and the consequence is that the deepest and most abstruse questions have become the property and the common food of the universe. The profoundest question has a kernel of reality within its notional husk; hence uneducated multitudes have been stirred to passionate enthusiasm by such high questions as predestination and free will. It has sometimes been made a reproach to the Catholic Church that she imposes on all her children Articles which they have no capacity to understand, and guards unintelligible doctrines with anathemas which are binding on the unlearned. The canons of the Council of Trent on justification have been especially cited as an instance. Yet is it not certain that these questions shook the heart of Europe down to its inmost depths with a volcanic force which even to this day has not spent its power? English Puritans, Scottish Cameronians, and modern Dissenters are proofs that the original impulse still carries it on. This intellectual stimulus is a part of the essence of the religion ever since St. Paul addressed to Christian Churches letters hard to be understood, because the new ideas roused by the religion of Christ were too great even for the passionate exuberance of his fiery words. Ever since "God, who commanded the light to shine out of darkness, hath shined in our hearts to give us the knowledge of the light of the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ," the intensity of the rays have set on fire while they enlightened the soul. The mighty flow of the knowledge of God has overspread the earth as the waters cover the sea. Who can control it but God alone? Such a religion as this has not the slightest chance of remaining intact through the lapse of ages without supernatural

help. Fling such a faith undefended upon the disputations of men, it is utterly impossible that so powerful a crucible as the intellect of man shall not dissolve it in the passage. Unless the teachers of the religion had a promise from Christ that the gates of hell should not prevail against them, it must long ago have disappeared under the corroding effects of time. Its very power of development and of adaptation to the wants of successive ages would be fatal to it. If no infallible teachers remain, then according to all human experience the religion of Christ must be by this time undiscoverable. It is a damning fact for Protestantism, that it supposes that Christianity was a mass of doctrinal corruption sixteen hundred years after its origin. If so, what possible reason is there to suppose that the Reformers rediscovered it? In like manner it is decisive against the very peculiar Protestantism which is occupying us, that no one ever dreamed till now that Christianity could be a divine religion without something infallible, Church or Scripture. In so old a religion as ours such perfect originality is fatal.

But could not God have preserved His own religion by working solely and directly upon the hearts of men? I can only say that He has not done so. The state of Christendom forbids the supposition. If Christians were all agreed upon the doctrine of Christ, then it would be possible to say that the Holy Spirit, by teaching Christians immediately and intuitively, preserved the truth, as it were, in person, without the external authority of an infallible body. It might be conceivable before heresies arose, if ever there was such a golden age, that Christians should never have asked themselves, how do we know what is "the truth as it is in Jesus?" Then, of course setting aside Scripture and the Church, it might have been possible to argue that the promise of Christ that He would be with Christendom to the end of the world included a promise that His doctrine would last till doomsday through His own secret operation. Now, however, that the forms of doctrine claiming to be Christian are endless in number, as they are boundless in their antagonism to each other, it is impossible to say that Christ has preserved this doctrine simply by a general secret superintendence of His providence. What is meant by the preservation of this doctrine is, of course, not its mere existence, hidden amongst all the various contending sects of Christendom, but a preservation such that it can be recognised as Christ's. Now it is not even pretended that there is such an interior criterion as this, such a flavour of certainty which separates true doctrine from false. So true is this that those writers who argue most strongly for the continual revelation of truth through an immediate spiritual contact with God, have abandoned the very hope of ascertaining with any certainty what is Christian doctrine, and

are prudent in proclaiming that the religion of Jesus is not one of doctrine at all, but rigidly and strictly of facts.

I cannot see what can be said to this; moreover, I cannot see that anything is said to it. Our opponents do not deny that the original Christianity cannot be discovered. I have read attentively, for instance, Mr. Baldwin Brown's most interesting book, and I there find that we Catholics are severely blamed for shrinking from the strain of the intellectual quest after truth. The craving for an infallible guide is referred to a morbid desire for the solution of religious difficulties.

"What we should like, I suppose, would be a more clear and explicit announcement on the indisputable authority of heaven, which would settle at once and for ever all the doubts which distress and often agonize us. We should like to have heaven's judgment about our own being, our origin, and destiny; about the nature and attributes of God, as we phrase it; about the precise nature and measure of the inspiration of the Bible—the exact bearing and force of some of its most startling commandments; the real meaning of those difficult words of Christ, which seem to tend towards asceticism, and make the ordinary conduct of the business of life appear inconsistent with a high strain of love and devotion to himself." "It is wonderful how much of the precious legacy of the past has been spared; but it is equally wonderful how much has been suffered to perish. We can only explain it on the principle that it was no part of the plan of God to spare us difficulty and controversy when He gave to us the Scriptures, but rather to offer what was certain to become matter of controversy as the first stage in the discovery of truth." "Our minds are kept on the rack about all those questions on which the conduct of life and the doctrines of eternity are hanging; they vex and torment the world."

Now, what is this but allowing that Christianity as it stands gives no clear answer to the very questions which it professes to solve? If this be so, the revelation has been a lamentable failure. We Catholics have no objection to a quest after truth. But what we do object to is that after all the struggle and the agony there should be no truth attainable. It is not the luxury of certainty that we contend for; in fighting for infallibility we are only struggling for the very existence of Christianity. We stretch our longing arms across the gap of nineteen centuries which separate us from Christ, and we cry out, "What shall we do to be saved?" We maintain that this is the most reasonable of demands; for His very name is Jesus, because He is to save his people from their sins; and if the very echoes of that beloved voice are gone for ever, if His revelation gives no answer to our agonizing prayer to know something about our everlasting destinies, about our God and His attributes, then the last hope of mankind has perished, and nothing is left but despair. A revelation which gives no explicit answer on such subjects is a mockery and a sham. I know that an infallible guide is promised us by Mr. Brown in the Holy Spirit; but as we are also told that this guidance is to

enable us to think for ourselves, and, as it is allowed that controversy will still subsist in spite of it, I do not see that we get nearer to the truth. I do not understand an infallible guide, who inspires men who possess him equally with messages so very contradictory. Nor am I consoled by the promise that "we shall arrive in the end at the full understanding of the truth." I confess to a great impatience when I hear that this truth is "to be developed through all the ages of earth's history." What I yearn for now is the Christian faith, as it fell from the lips of Christ.

It must not be supposed that such considerations are confined to Catholics. Writers who are our antipodes in theology have seen the same necessity for an infallible teacher if we are to believe the Incarnation. The same argument has been urged by Mr. Martineau, with his accustomed clearness, a writer with whom it is always a pleasure to agree whenever it is possible. "Such a fact as the Incarnation—namely, that a seeming man, born, suffering, dying, was really Infinite God, incapable of birth, suffering, death, could never be assured to us but by those who are admitted behind the scene of the finite world. Mere witnesses, few or many, are useless here; they can tell us only what they have seen and heard; and this is a thing neither visible nor audible, and traceable by no characteristic and exclusive signs. Unless, therefore, those who affirm it can make good and claim to know what humanly is unknowable, the doctrine must be left to its place among the historical developments of religious faith."

It is not, however, so much for its own sake that I quote this passage, as in order to notice the answer which has been made to it by Mr. Hutton, by far the ablest and most forcible writer of the school in question. The sole answer to Mr. Martineau's argument is a parallel drawn between the belief in the existence of God, and the faith in the Incarnation. We believe, it is said, in the existence of an Infinite Being, incomprehensible as He is, in spite of all the difficulties involved in the doctrine, and we require no infallible teacher to bear witness to it. Why, then, should we not believe in the Incarnation, though it is not guaranteed to us by men who can lay claim to especial divine preservation from error? If the great truth of the knowledge of the Infinite could safely be left to the guardianship of mankind, and could be preserved though it was committed to the fluctuations of the human intellect, why should not the doctrine of God made man be in like manner warranted and transmitted through means purely human, without the special assistance from on high involved in the promise of infallibility? It is quite evident that this answer implies a substantial identity between natural and revealed religion. The Incarnation is neither more nor

less supernatural than the existence of God. The exigencies of dialectics have driven the authors of this theory into the very naturalism condemned by the Council. This seems to me to be the great inevitable stain upon the theory. Sincerely wishing to repudiate rationalism, and at the same time deeply prejudiced against infallibility, they are forced to treat Christian mysteries as a new development of natural religion. So intimate is the connection between supernatural truth and infallibility, so indispensable is an unerring organ to divine truth, that if you deny the possession of the gift to the teachers of Christianity, you necessarily degrade the conception of Christianity itself as a supernatural religion.

Of course, we all know and acknowledge that there is a sense in which all religion can be called supernatural. The very act of creation, though it is the calling into being of a new human nature, is a divine act, and might thus, in a loose sense, be called supernatural. When St. Paul speaks of the God in whom we live, and move, and have our being, he is not referring to a scheme of grace; he is merely expressing the relation to God which results from creation, and which exists in the veriest savage, who has never heard of Christ. Yet so close and intimate is that relation, that the Apostle has to use language which might be perverted into Pantheism. There is a natural God-consciousness in man which makes the belief in God light and easy to him. He seems to feel in his inmost being the spiritual touch of the omnipotent God. What are the whispers of conscience but the voice of the living God speaking to a natural faculty? In all its agonies, helplessness, and sorrows, the human heart spontaneously bursts into prayer; yet prayer lifts us so high above the earth, it brings us into such a personal contact with a personal God, that it may well be called supernatural. All nature is a true revelation of God. In all that is good and true, in all that is beautiful, in the outbursts of intellect and the bloom of art, we recognise the stirrings of the Eternal Word, "who lighteneth every man that cometh into the world." But when supernaturalness is predicated equally of the conscience and the Incarnation, when the truth of God made man is looked upon as a "development of the message which the Gentiles heard in their consciences," we demur with all our might, and appeal to the Christian truth itself against its degradation. We deny that the Incarnation "is involved in the very existence of man, in the very order of the universe."\* To say that the Eternal Word was the pattern of our creation, and that our intellect is a faint copy of the Logos, through whom all things were made, is a very different thing from the assertion that that Eternal Word was necessarily Incarnate, given the creation of man.

\* Maurice, "What is Revelation?" pp. 224, 227, 228. ;

If it be an eternal truth that there is so close a union between the Word and humanity, then that union is necessary to the life of the Word as well as necessary to man. If the natural conscience of man, and the intimations of his moral vision, if his willingness to obey God are the fruits of "the Word made flesh," then such a natural correlation between humanity and the Son is sure either to imperil our belief in the real Godhead of the Word, or to remind us painfully of Pantheistic theories. On the one hand, Catholics are not the only theologians to accuse Mr. Maurice of Pantheism;\* on the other, there are unpleasant symptoms in his language of a belief in the inferiority of the Son to the Father.† When two substances fuse so naturally together as do God and man in this hypothesis of this necessary Incarnation, then there must be some essential affinity between them. But what natural proportion is there between the Infinite and the Finite? That the Infinite God should stoop to His creation is conceivable, but that the Finite should by the mere virtue of its creation necessitate the Infinite to unite Himself to His creature, is at the very least not to be assumed without proof. I must confess that the alleged proof is far too weak to support so astonishing an assertion. What necessity could there be laid on the great God to become man? We are told that without an Incarnation man could never feel a filial dependence on the Father, and learn the duty of self-sacrifice. I cannot see the necessity of a being interposed between the Father and man for that. Surely it needs no ghost from the grave, and no God from heaven, to teach us that our Creator is our Father, and that we owe Him all our being and the life which He gave us. All that is supposed to be learned from the Incarnation seems to me to be a portion of natural religion discoverable without the Word made flesh. Is this an adequate reason for the life and death of God? Can the blood of God be one of the ordinary forces of the universe? Can the sorrow, and the agony, and the death of the Eternal Word, be a mere matter of routine, involved in the very creation and existence of man? Surely the Crucifixion implies a catastrophe no less than a ruined world. It cannot be a necessary portion of a universe rolling smoothly and musically in its grooves. It implies a battle, and an agony, and garments rolled in blood.

Let no one suppose that it is a small thing—a mere matter of words—whether the Incarnation belongs to the absolute supernatural, or is involved in the act of creation and the constitution of man. Small as the original divergence seems to be, the two lines of thought part company at once, and the distance widens into an infinity. Out of it springs at once the doctrine of universal salvation, every

\* "Essays, Philosophical and Theological," by James Martineau, vol. i. 379.

† For instance, "Theological Essays," p. 91.

argument for which shows that it is involved in the very notion of creation, in the very idea of a righteous God ; so that man is saved after all not by grace, but by nature. The system alters the whole character of Christ. It takes away from the yearning, anxious cry of God, exclaiming to His erring children, "Why will ye die?" since that death is but a sleep, which has its fated awakening in Paradise, in spite of the free will of the sinner. It takes away from the horror of sin as an infinite evil calling for a boundless punishment. Sin becomes a necessary move in the game which is played between God and Satan for the soul of man, and which can have but one termination. I call it a game, for it has none of the dangers and risks of a battle. Let the Good Shepherd be comforted ; the wandering sheep must come home at last, for it is in the nature of things that none shall go eternally astray. One thing, at least, He is spared, the torture of anxiety, for none shall be lost, not even the son of perdition. He may look calmly on the impotent struggles of the sinner to escape from His love, for he must be won at last. What need of all the expenditure of blood in His agony ? The interior sorrows which wrung out from Him the bloody sweat, lose all their meaning if the salvation of man is not at stake.

Thus this hypothesis, which evolves the life and death of God-man out of the constitution of humanity, frustrates the very end which it is supposed to accomplish. It is said to unfold before us the character of God. It is not, however, from the necessary acts of God that we learn His character. As in the case of our fellow-creatures we cannot judge of their moral disposition in our regard by actions which are fated and necessitated, so in the case of God we can only judge imperfectly of what I may venture to call His character in dealing with us, from these eternal facts which are involved in the very immutable essence of the Godhead. The Generation of the Son and the Procession of the Holy Ghost are no emanations from His freedom. His immutable justice shows His nature ; the free evolutions of His unconstrained love are the real revelation of His inmost heart with respect to man. On this no light is cast by anything involved in the very constitution of things. Indeed, if the very nature of humanity is so involved in the existence of the Eternal Word that His Incarnation is an eternal truth, it is very difficult to see how creation itself is not necessary. At all events, according to this hypothesis, the life and death of the Son of Man throw no more light on God's character than the creation itself. Given the existence of man, suppose the Cross of Christ to be the necessary instrument of his universal salvation, then the Eternal Word is no longer free, but is fated to live and doomed to die. The beauty of the life of the Son

of Man and the pathos of Calvary become logical conclusions. Indeed, this is precisely the use which is made of the necessary connection between the Word and Humanity in the system which I am criticizing. The stupendous act by which God became man is stated to be believable because of the yearning for it in the very constitution of creation. So inevitable is the Incarnation, that this anticipation is held to be a sufficient proof of the event, notwithstanding the lack of external evidence, which is systematically disparaged. I do not see that much is thus learned about the character of God. The light of Nature would be enough to tell us that whenever man appeared upon this planet, the Incarnation was fated. Now if there is one thing more plain than another from Scripture, it is the perfect freedom of the Son of man. No man took His life from Him; He laid it down. St. Paul exhausts human language to impress upon us that the redemption wrought by Christ was a free, spontaneous gift, in no way due to man. "In this did God commend His love for us, in that while we were yet sinners Christ died for us." "God so loved the world that He gave His only begotten Son." The same truth appears in St. John. This is indeed an unveiling, not of the face, but of the very heart of the Godhead. I do not forget the difficulty of reconciling the immutable nature with the free will of God, but whatever be the reconciliation, the distinction between the nature and the volition of the Godhead is founded on reality. The two cannot be confounded without throwing the difference between the natural and the supernatural into unutterable confusion. Accordingly, that is precisely what is done by this hypothesis. Creation becomes supernatural, and the Incarnation itself is no more supernatural than creation. The revelation made in Christ is degraded to the level of the natural revelation by which the intellect sees the existence of God in His works. If to evolve the death of God out of the constitution of human nature is not the destruction of the supernatural, I know not what is such. God is bound to give us His only begotten Son as He is bound when once He creates us to give us lungs to breathe or brains to think. The Incarnation is a part of the rights of man, since it is a portion of God's scheme to help him to fulfil the natural end of his being. Surely the Cross of Christ, which was a scandal to the Jew, and folly to the Greek, was something more than a necessary condition in order to the reconciliation of the Hellenic love of human beauty and the Jewish awe-struck worship of God. It was that, and infinitely more. It was a revelation of the very depths of the inner nature of God, because it showed not merely the Father brooding over His human child, and tenderly leading it to Himself, but something infinitely deeper. If I may dare to attempt to express the ineffable,

it was God rising above His own fatherly nature. It was a vision of God, after the old scheme of creation had been marred and defeated, overcoming His own anger by a deeper love, going down to a lower depth of love in His own being, and forming a supernatural scheme to save the lost. His awful holiness and hatred of sin bowed down before a new love more profound than that existing in creation. That God should have a Fatherly love for His creatures is natural, and belongs to the natural character of God. Again, that God should have within Himself—if I may venture to say so—family affections, and that the object of His eternal love is not an abstract Logos but a Person, standing to Him in the relation of a Son, that is indeed a supernatural glimpse into the very being of God beyond the might of reason to discover. But that the love of God for His poor sinful creatures, for the harlot and the publican, was so much of an over-mastering power within Him, that the Father sacrificed the Son, and the Son became a willing victim, that God might have the luxury of pardoning the sinner, this is indeed supernatural. This is God going out of Himself in an ecstasy of love. It is a fire of love burning like a passion in the very heart of the Godhead.

I have dwelt upon this because it seems to me to lay bare the original sin of the school of Mr. Maurice. The hypothesis forces these theologians to confound the natural and supernatural order. In order to escape the necessity of an infallible guide, involved in a supernatural revelation, they are forced to place the Incarnation on a level with the existence of God. It is quite true that both contain incomprehensible mysteries, but the difference is that the being of a God is discoverable by natural reason, while no effort of intellect, backed by the conscience and the moral being of man, can, apart from revelation, prove the Incarnation. Hence the being of God may safely be left to the guardianship of reason. The religious history of the human race is the history of the fate of that great truth. Lights and shadows pass over it, but it is perpetually reappearing; it may be almost lost by some revolution of humanity, but it again presents its surface to the light; if lost, it may be re-discovered. It is not so with the Incarnation. Human logic cannot prove it; human intellect cannot anticipate it. It cannot recover what it is incompetent to discover. For this reason it wants infallibility to bear witness to it, and infallibility to preserve it.

Finally, such a system as that which we have been considering is not Christianity. It is not the religion which conquered the world. It is too vague and too unsocial. It is unsocial, because outside the thin circle of facts, about which men are supposed to be agreed, there must ever lie a large and ever-widening circle of doctrines, ring within ring, about which there must be either fierce discord or indifference which defies cohesion. I call that a vague religion which limits the revelation

strictly to facts, strips all dogma of divinity, and delivers it over to the disputations of men. It is necessarily vague, because this distinction between religious facts and doctrines is utterly unreal. A supernatural fact which is meant to enlighten mankind as to their eternal destinies, involves doctrine; that is, it has an authoritative teaching appended to it, on pain of being the most unintelligible of formulas. The two so run into each other as to be really inseparable. Of course, when these writers call the Crucifixion a fact, they do not mean the *event*, else Pontius Pilate and Suetonius would be Christians. They mean the fact that God died on the Cross. I defy them to exclude doctrine from such a statement as that. Will any one tell me that it is indifferent to the fact whether that man who died was God, as God the Father is God, according to Catholic doctrine, or was a subordinate Person, as is held by more than one of the school. I am not assuming at this moment that the Catholic Church is right. All I aver is, that the point involves doctrine, and that until it is settled the whole fact is so utterly ambiguous, that it becomes practically valueless. A real God and subordinate God are two very different beings. Again, when I hear that my God has died on the Cross, the statement is, I must own, so startling, that I suspend my judgment until I am told the meaning and the purpose of His death. It would not be denied by these theologians that the Crucifixion would not be the same thing to them if it were not coupled with the doctrine that Christ died to *manifest* His filial love to His Father. Would they accept the fact if the death of Christ were declared to be a vicarious sacrifice in the Catholic sense? The whole fact is utterly changed in its character according to the doctrine. Yet they are obliged to hold that this, being a doctrine, is not a portion of the revelation, since it is a theory about the fact; in other words, God has given us a fact which, stripped of its doctrinal appendages, is a mere unmeaning formula. It is thus to remain to the day of judgment a matter of dispute whether the Crucifixion was a vicarious sacrifice. The sound of this trumpet is too uncertain; who will prepare himself for the battle? Still more uncertain is its voice in cases which clearly belong to doctrine, and cannot be reckoned among the facts of the Gospel—such as, for instance, the question of the eternity of future punishment. Mr. Maurice is quite certain that it is not eternal, yet he cannot say that this is a portion of the revelation. It is a deduction from another problematical doctrine—the necessary Incarnation of the Word. I cannot conceive how that can be called a revelation which is silent—nay, worse than silent, hopelessly ambiguous—on such a point as that. If this be so, then Christ, instead of bringing sweetness and light upon earth, has increased by one the already sufficiently numerous perplexed religions in the

world. Nay, He has raised hundreds of doubts of His own on questions, not of speculation, for that it is evident that He has done, but on practical points than which none can be more vital and fundamental. He has opened abysses of burning questions, on which men hold their breath in terror, and has carefully made them hopelessly insoluble by leaving no authority to decide them. This religion will not re-conquer England to Christianity. It may arrest a few thinking men on their downward course to a deeper Rationalism. But it will never make an impression on the masses. To the last it will be a class religion. Go and preach your uncertain Hell and obscure Atonement in the streets of our large towns, how many proselytes will you gain among the masses, the stench of whose corruption goes up to heaven more foully every day? You tempt them by the dubious boon of a universal salvation, but in so doing you deprive them of the consolation of a Saviour. You take Jesus away from them, for you cannot on your principles preach that this exemption from hell is the real work of His Crucifixion, for that would imply that apart from His Cross, God could and would have condemned them eternally. You will throw them back from their belief in a supernatural Christ, not on your Platonic Logos, not on the beautiful nature which God made, but on a practical Naturalism which is at once the destruction of religion and of morals.

I trust that enough has been said to give a point to the conduct of the Council. It is, I hope, clear that the doctrine of Infallibility is a very vital question for all Christians. It is not the imposition of a wooden tyranny, but the condition of the existence of any doctrinal Christianity. I am of course aware that this throws no light on the motives of the definition of the infallibility of the Sovereign Pontiff. I can only, in the space which is left me, endeavour, though most inadequately, to show the internal situation which called it forth.

It is easy to understand the motives of the definition of the infallibility of the Pope, when we take in the fact that views of revelation strikingly similar to those which we have been criticizing have been widely advocated by German Catholic writers. As long ago as 1858, Frohschammer, from the chair of Philosophy at Munich, had taught that the deepest mystery of the Christian religion—the Holy Trinity—is within the compass of human reason. The same natural faculty, the ordinary Vernunft, which the writer looks upon as an inborn power of God-consciousness, which grasps the existence of God, is also capable of knowing the Holy Trinity, when once Christianity has stated it to the intellect. Thus revelation is not the preaching of an absolutely new truth, utterly undiscoverable by man; it is only the condition for the recognition of a truth which was already in germ in the intellect. The function of Christianity is to educate

the reason, and thus to educe what was already immanent in the mind. We find in Frohschammer's work the same parallel between the natural truth of the existence of God and revealed truth, the same studied confusion of the natural and the supernatural, the same prominence given to the text of St. John on the illumination of the every man by the Logos,\* as we have already seen in the English theologians. That notion of the essential Incarnation of the Word which was a leading idea in Schelling, and which we have found in Mr. Maurice, reappears in Frohschammer, but with the difference that in the Munich professor it is united with realistic, almost physiological, theories. It must, however, never be forgotten that whatever resemblance exists between the German and the English theologian, their spirit is totally different. The English writers are men struggling from a lower faith to a higher; their theory is a reaction against Rationalism, an attempt to infuse life into the dry bones of English theology. Frohschammer's book was a distinct attempt on the part of a Catholic to reduce to a minimum, or rather utterly to neutralise, the functions of an infallible organ of revelation. In his mind the theory has borne its whole fruits. In his latest work, "*The Right of Private Judgment*," he lays it down as a fact that "neither truth nor divine revelation have an objective existence."

The appearance of Frohschammer is no isolated phenomenon in Catholic Germany. From every part of that great country there sprang up writers insisting on the possibility of a demonstration of the deepest mysteries of the Christian faith. In Posen Volkmuth proposed a "solution of the fundamental problem of the Christian Trinity." Sengler, a professor, first at Friburg, afterwards, I believe, at Heidelberg, adopted the words of Hamann, a wild Protestant mystic, that "the contents of Revelation are not simply above reason, or for reason, but immanent in reason." "How should the triple personality of the pure being of God not be a truth of the human reason? The pure essence of man's personality can be shown by reason to be triple; so also can the proof be extended to the personality of God." In Catholic Innsbruck Schenach attempted to teach the Tyrolese students that "the triple personality of God must be metaphysically re-established." Eberhard taught that "free philosophy must prove that the Holy Trinity, which is believed by Christians, is a metaphysical necessity." On hundreds of banners in German universities "free science" was inscribed as a war-cry. With the same intense passionateness which roused the people to resolve that the Rhine should be free, German Catholic professors contended for "*freie wissenschaft*." Such a cry in Eng-


\* *Einleitung in die Philosophie*, 277, 306. Also 121.

land would mean the freedom of physical science, the liberty to hold Darwinian theories, and Professor Huxley's Protoplasm. It meant that in Germany, but very much more. Men are not accustomed there to stop short of conclusions, or to put false bottoms to abysses of thought. The freedom claimed for science is the unlimited liberty to speculate on the truths of supernatural religion ; and it is claimed on grounds which are destructive to the very idea of the Christian revelation. It is affirmed that the truths of Christianity are only supernatural relatively to the human intellect in its weakened state, and therefore that reason, when once the Christian truths have been presented to it by revelation, can acquire a higher scientific knowledge of them (*wissen*) more perfect than the faith. On this theory, the office of revelation is only to stimulate and arouse reason. Intellect, when once awakened and educated by faith, can raise itself to a more sublime knowledge. Reason uses Christianity as a fulcrum whereon to take its spring, and overleap abysses previously inaccessible to human thought, and which now transcend revelation. It is this speculative theology which is said to be free, and to lie beyond the jurisdiction of the Church. Who does not see that the effect of this freedom is to deliver Christian truth, bound hand and foot, over to the mercies of the professor ?

I think with these facts before us it will be easy, even for those outside the Church, to comprehend the drift of the decrees of the Vatican Council, even of that which must seem most strange to Protestant minds, the definition of the infallibility of the Sovereign Pontiff. It is marvellous to me how the German Liberal Catholics have managed to conceal the real point at issue. They have contrived to throw on the majority the odium of aggressiveness, while in point of fact their own aggressions were such that a universal cry arose from all parts of the Catholic world for the only adequate remedy. They complained that the definition was uncalled for, because no heresy required it, and they trusted to the profound ignorance of German ecclesiastical affairs, which generally prevails, to enable them to conceal the audacious and tumultuous errors which had been produced by Catholic teachers in German universities. They continued vociferating, Peace, peace, when there was no peace. They diverted our attention to the doings of Pope Formosus, while the real question was whether they were to be allowed with impunity to broach theories of revelation which revolutionized Christianity. It was a real danger for Christendom. The German intellect has powers of fascination which cannot be ignored. In vain does the rest of the world cry out that German theories are unintelligible nonsense ; Europe listens in spite of itself. Just as the Ancient Mariner forced the bridal guest to

listen to his wild, mysterious song, so the great genius of the German race compels the universe to stop in its course and pay attention to systems which charm in spite of their obscurity. Out of a university established, like Tübingen, in the third-rate town of a small kingdom, have issued schools of thought which have shaken the faith of half the world. It was impossible for the Catholic Church to overlook the danger. The sole remedy for such a state of things was the declaration on the part of the Catholic Church of its belief in the existence of a permanent tribunal, capable of judging each heresy as it arose. The time was gone when an Œcumenical Council could meet the peril. When each professor could devise a new system of Christianity, and while retaining the name of Catholic, teach it to Catholic youth, it was in vain to summon bishops from America and China to put down a Protean foe, who might have taken another shape while they were on their way. Rapid, bold, unhesitating, modern thought spreads like wildfire. This the German theologians well knew, and their whole efforts had been directed to establish theories of infallibility which absolutely neutralized the power of the Church, and changed its constitution. They placed the seat of infallibility in the consent of the whole multitude of the faithful. How immense was the imposture of this plea will be seen at once if we reflect that if this imaginary *plébiscite* had been realized, an enormous majority of the Catholics of the universe would have voted for the Papal infallibility. What these men hated most was the existence of an ever-watchful tribunal at Rome, ready to lift up its voice against error as it arose. Nothing is more remarkable in the whole controversy than the air of injured innocence with which it is urged that nothing is wanted but the freedom of science. What they really wanted was free Christianity. Their practical aim was an unlimited license to remake Christianity as they pleased without let or hindrance. Each science claims the right of fashioning the faith after its own image. A philosopher like Dr. Frohschammer would temper revelation by philosophy, while a historian would put upon facts his own interpretation without interruption from the central authority of the Church. Christianity, however, has been for nineteen centuries before the world, and its principles ought really by this time to be immutably ascertained. No new or arbitrary power has been put into the hands of the Sovereign Pontiff. He judges according to the ancient rules of the Catholic faith. The issue and the meaning of the Vatican Council is the declaration on the part of the Church that by defining the infallibility given by Christ to the Holy See she assumes the attitude which will best enable her to fulfil her mission of preaching the Christian faith most clearly and most readily to the modern world.

J. B. DALGAIRNS.



## THE LAND QUESTION.

SOME time since, while in a purely agricultural district, I met a farm labourer whom I had known for at least thirty years. Although past middle age, he was still hale and hearty, and as capable of doing a fair day's work as at any portion of his life. I entered into conversation with him upon both his past and present condition, and the information he gave me was that his position was worse now than it was thirty years since. I was not content to accept his bare word for this, but desired that he would give me the facts, in order that I might see that the conclusion he had arrived at was justified. They were as follow, as nearly as I can recollect:—  
“My wages during that time have neither increased nor diminished; but formerly I had a cottage on the estate, with a large piece of garden-ground attached, for a weekly payment of one shilling and sixpence. The cottage, with another adjoining, was allowed to become uninhabitable, and then razed to the ground; and since that time I have been forced to reside in the town, a mile from my employment, where I pay for the house in which I now live, with no ground whatever, two shillings and sixpence per week. At the old house I kept pigs, and the profit on these, though not large, was calculated and did enable me to live rent-free; while from the garden, at a trifling expense and a little labour, I obtained all the vegetables myself, wife, and family required. In the town in which

I now live, no pigs are allowed to be kept, or, if so, it is at the risk of a fine, and in consequence of the neglect of duties on the part of the officers of the Board of Health. The cost of living, and other necessities are, when lumped, about the same. You therefore see that my position has changed for the worse."

"How many men are now employed upon the estate as compared with your earliest recollection of it?" I asked.

"The regular hands have diminished at least a third, while at hay-making and harvest times the number of casual labourers employed is certainly not more than half."

"Is the estate more or less productive?" I asked.

"I believe it to be less productive; but the profits must have considerably increased," was the reply.

From inquiries directed to others on the spot, with which and the surrounding districts I have been long familiar, I feel certain that the tale he told, of which I have given the substance, was and is perfectly true, and that it may be taken as a guide to the past and present condition of the entire agricultural population of the neighbourhood within the limits mentioned.

The Union includes nine parishes, the largest of which does not contain more than five thousand inhabitants, and yet I found upon inquiry that over one thousand persons were in the receipt of indoor relief. If this be not enough to set men thinking, I know not what is. From that time to the present, I have never fairly forgotten the effect the statement made upon me. After-reflection told me that this man, after a life spent in productive industry, would one day assume the garb of a pauper, and exist on charity. In the following pages, I purpose to point out the causes of this shocking state of affairs, and endeavour to suggest a remedy.

Mr. Disraeli, in a speech delivered at Aylesbury, when speaking of Ireland, said that the famine did more for the inhabitants of that country than a long succession of statesmen had been able to do. This was in a measure true; but the reason is plain. The land of Ireland was the property, or at least was in the possession of, large proprietors, and the power of making laws was almost confined to themselves and others of the same class. Hence on all attempts at legislation on the land question, till a very recent date—a vital question, affecting the interest of nine out of ten of the entire population—the voice of the peasant was rarely heard. Who wonders, therefore, that famine and death should contribute the greater amount of relief?

Since men of far greater ability than myself have acknowledged their inability to deal with the increasing poverty of the bread-winners of the kingdom, I venture to proclaim that their failure

arose from the shackles which prevented them from moving beyond certain prescribed boundaries. It was made imperative that they should not interfere or meddle with certain easily recognised interests, and hence their failure. It mattered not who was in office, the retention of power was a question of retaining a majority, and no party could hope to do this who neglected the special interests of those who had monopolised the suffrages of the nation.

What Mr. Disraeli meant to say was, that population in Ireland pressed too heavily on the means of subsistence, and that as famine relieved this pressure, it so far lessened the labours of the Government.

Now, according to this declaration of Mr. Disraeli, it would be a fortunate thing if famine broke out in England, and swept one half the labourers off the soil; for, is it not evident that no other remedy can be found so long as class interests are to be preserved at the expense of the entire people?

When a surgeon discovers that the leg or arm of a patient has mortified, in order to preserve the patient's life he removes the affected limb. He knows there is no other remedy. Now, suppose that the relatives of the sufferer stepped in, and prevented him doing this, what could possibly prevent the patient dying? The position of a surgeon so prevented from using his best judgment, is precisely that in which the members of successive ministries have found themselves when endeavouring to ward off the fatal effects of poverty. Could they have caught hold of the lands half tilled, cleared woodlands kept solely as breeding-places for game, and secured to the producer at least a fair share of the results of his industry, it would have been far otherwise; then the superiority of famine as a remedial agent might not only have been disputed, but positively overthrown. There was a time when the leader of the Opposition thought as I now think—when he held that the poverty of Ireland was to be traced to the existence of rapacious landlords, and want of healthy legislation; when he would have scorned to have raised famine to the position of a benefactor; but his sympathies have been warped—he has ceased to belong to the struggling classes of the community, having secured a position by bitterly opposing the liberal and humane principles he once held.

I would not, however, have it thought that either Disraeli or the party that he leads, alone oppose practical legislation. Were it so, they might easily be swept aside. No, there are other powerful agents existing, who, despite their professions, stand in the way of the moral and material advancement of the people.

Had Mr. Disraeli ever heard of the poor colonies of Holland? If so, he might surely have profited thereby. A society was formed

in Holland some years back, to purchase some 12,000 or 13,000 acres of inferior land. This they accomplished at an expense of £4,600. The land was laid out in allotments of seven acres, each allotment being provided with a suitable dwelling and appurtenances. The total cost to the society, beyond the price of the land, for housing and assisting each family of seven for the first twelve months, was £141 13s. 4d., or between twenty-two and twenty-three pounds per head. In two years after their location or settlement on this acknowledged inferior land, each head of a family had discharged one fifth-part of the debt originally contracted, and hence, long ere this, I should imagine the entire amount has been paid off. Had Mr. Disraeli and his friends, or the statesmen opposed to him, been equally wise and humane, they might have copied this simple plan of affording relief to a distressed people, instead of trusting famine to do their work. Whatever may have since become of this society, I feel assured that it has resulted in a large amount of good. The area of productive industry has been extended, and the home-grown food supply of the population correspondingly increased. In all such efforts there can be no positive failure; for land once brought into cultivation, is seldom allowed to go back to a state of barrenness. Upon the contrary, improvement follows improvement, and so its productiveness continues to increase. There is, if I mistake not, many a fertile tract to be found in England, which has excited the envy of foreigners, that at one time looked fully as unproductive as many of the vast wastes yet to be found in certain portions of the United Kingdom.

In dealing with a question like that I have now chosen, it is impossible to proceed far without raising up a large number of opponents, more especially when my object is nothing less than to bring about a complete revolution. This fact, I have no doubt, has deterred hundreds from stating their views upon a subject which it must be admitted is of the gravest importance. An opportunity has, however, been given by the passing of the late Act with regard to the holding of land in Ireland, which would appear to those entertaining views similar to those held by me almost criminal to let pass by. That Act has shown that the welfare of the people is acknowledged to be of greater importance than that of any particular class. If I mistake not, the forerunners of that Act were, first, the Irish famine, and, second, Irish discontent.

A still greater change, in so far as land was concerned, followed the first French Revolution. That change also was the direct result of famine and revolution. A mere glance at any good history of France will enable you to follow the course of events that led to the overthrow of the landed aristocracy in that country. First famine;

then followed famished vagrants cutting down and clearing fields of corn in a single night; then the terror of landlords; the proposition of the Duke D'Aiguillon to give redemption to the peasant for a stipulated price; the confiscation of the estates of the clergy; the suppression of tithes; the law of equal inheritance; and the wide distribution of land among the people.

My desire is that a change, which sooner or later is inevitable, shall be inaugurated peacefully, and not spring from the joint influences of those terrible agents before mentioned; for, in the words of Burke, "Remember that when you have completed your system of impoverishment, then nature still proceeds in her ordinary course, and that discontent will increase with misery; and that there are critical moments in the fortunes of all States when they who are too weak to contribute to your prosperity may be strong enough to complete your ruin."

It has been the fashion to decry the Revolution of 1792, and to remember nothing but the scenes of blood and carnage which unhappily marked its course. Let us change the word revolution for war, and then see if in all the dynastic or other wars which have afflicted mankind we can find one which conferred so great a blessing or wrought so great a change as this war of the people against feudality. The exceptional condition of France at this moment will, I feel assured, in no way be allowed to counteract the effect of any argument I may adduce from the condition of its people immediately before the war.

England, it will be admitted, is a far richer nation than France, and yet if we contrast the condition of England's peasantry with that of France, until war had wrought its devastating influences, we must admit that the result is far from proving favourable to the richer nation. Mr. Thornton, in speaking of France, says:—

"One-seventh of the whole population are landowners, a much larger proportion probably than in any other part of the world. Most of the properties are of course very small; but, cultivated as they are with minute and assiduous attention, which are never bestowed but by small occupiers, they are sufficient to furnish their owners in general with a comfortable sustenance, or at least contribute very materially towards it."

A recent correspondent of the *Standard*, speaking of the working population of a purely agricultural district of France, said there were few of the peasantry who had not saved money, and in illustration of this gave several instances from persons with whom he came in contact. Could as much be said with respect to the inhabitants of our rural districts? Such are the results of the revolutionary struggle of 1792. The revolution found a people starving, it bequeathed to

them an amount of general prosperity which, before the late unfortunate war, was greater than that of a wealthier nation.

The cause of this apparent anomaly is easily seen. The abolition of large landed proprietors throughout France caused the entire, or nearly the entire, products of husbandry to fall to the share of the labourers. Here, the land being the property of the non-toilers, its cultivators, instead of getting a full share of their industrial produce, get barely sufficient to enable them to live. Every English estate (or most of them), in proportion to its size, is burthened with a host of non-producers, who live more or less luxuriously. Let us see of what this host consists. 1. The owner of the soil, who, in proportion as population increases and the competition of farmers waxes more fierce, raises his rents to a standard that would, in days gone by, have been thought fabulous. It is not uncommon for men of this class, with their enormous incomes, to keep as many as three or four large establishments, in and about each of which are to be found liveried and other servants, who, as they are never employed in productive industry, are simply consumers; again, at each of these residences are to be found studs of pleasure-horses, hounds, &c., kept for the mere personal gratification of their owner, each and all of which consume food that would naturally reduce the distress of the country. 2. The farmer, who, as a mere employer of labour, lives upon the profits of such employment. His service to the State consists almost solely in holding the said lands, and for this it is no uncommon thing for him to receive as much as a thousand pounds per annum, or the wages of about forty farm labourers. This immense profit, or salary, is expended in the keep of servants, horses, &c., and these likewise diminish the food that should form the sustenance of the people. The tastes of these people have materially changed even in our own day; for, whereas formerly they were content to dress in homely gear and devote themselves to useful labour, they now affect the airs of gentlefolks, and live like princes. 3. The farm-bailiff. This office has become a necessity from the refusal on the part of the farmer to perform the duties of his predecessors. His salary is often as much as £200 per year, an amount equal to the wages of say six labourers. How, under such conditions, can we expect any material improvement in the position of the labourer? What, to him, is the *asserted* "increased productiveness of the soil?" What, to him, is the employment of labour-saving processes or agents of "increased fertility?" He knows, or ought to know by this time, that no good can possibly result to him, that the added increase will be absorbed in rent, *profit*, and multiplied extravagancies, and that as fewer men are employed to the acre his position must become one of yet greater dependence. Here, then, is the explanation of this apparent anomaly.

The result of the efforts of '92 has been to diminish the number of non-producers, and equalize the products of the soil of France among the producers; the large proprietary system of England increases the number of non-producers, whom it enables to live in luxurious idleness, while it leaves the labourer poor and helpless.

I remember, some time since, reading an article in which it was advanced against the French system that it led to the cutting down of ancestral oaks, and the despoiling of parks. I could not help admitting the truth of this, but much as I revere and love to gaze on trees that have outlived generations, I could not, for one moment, place their existence against the happiness of a people, and so I suppose I should have removed them with as little compunction, and for the same reason, as certain trees were disfigured for the convenience of exhibitors at the Great Exhibition of 1851, or with as little respect as a park owner, when he finds it more profitable to lease his land out for building purposes.

I believe, with John Stuart Mill, that "the land of every country belongs to the people of that country," and believing this, I think that a people can, without stopping for famine or revolution, dispose of their property as they choose. The land is not the property of the dead, but of the living, and they have full power of disposal, independent of what former generations may or may not have done. A little thought will prove that it cannot be otherwise. No one will doubt but what the land was created for the use of man, and no one will assume that it was made for any particular man or class. All men, therefore, have the right of a voice in its disposal; in other words, the land belongs to the people, and is at the disposal of their representatives. If this were not true, it would be quite possible that a few men could hold the lives of myriads within their grasp. The land was taken from the former proprietors by force; of this there is no doubt whatever. The right of conquest is always disputable. The people have never condoned the theft, and I trust they never will. The Conqueror, under whose banner fought vast hordes of Norman robbers, in giving the land to his followers, stipulated that in case of invasion they should fully arm and equip a certain number of their retainers—that was the backbone of the feudal system. "A great part, perhaps all our lands, were formerly *shacke*" (or *lammas* lands), says Malthus, "of which the occupant had the use only while his crop was on, the land then reverting to the community, and the occupier of two adjoining fields has no right to plough up the mere-bank between them." But returning to the disposition of the land by William, we find that the barons in their rebellion wrested the power of enforcing these duties from the King, and then, by usurping to themselves the power of ruling in the

Commons House of Parliament, shifted the power of raising and arming troops upon the landless. In doing so, the people had little or no voice. They protested, and even threatened rebellion—nay more, they did rebel; but from the fact that they lacked organization and military training, they were easily put to the rout. Hence, even if the right of conquest was admitted, the conditions of the holding consequent thereon, not having been fulfilled, it is evident that that right has been forfeited. In order to secure to themselves and families for ever the land thus forcibly wrested from the people, they have passed laws of primogeniture and entail, as though, forsooth, any legal enactment respecting the disposal of land could blot out the crime which led to its present monopoly and investiture in the families of a class. In the case of the Queen against Strange, an attempt was made to justify the possession of certain pictures by the latter on the grounds of lapse of time and a succession of purchasers; but Judge Bruce (if I am not mistaken in the name), in his summing up, declared that a right of possession could never be established on the grounds set forth. Can any sensible or just man dispute this? Is it not evident that the man who stole had no right, and that he could confer none by the simple act of transmission, for, if so, what becomes of those laws which mete out punishment to receivers? Those special punishments are confined to no one class of property, they encompass all, or if otherwise, none. If the stealer of her Majesty's etchings had been strong enough to pass and enforce laws to legalize his theft, he might, like other pilferers, not only have escaped present punishment, but have transmitted, as others have transmitted, the pictures so obtained to his heirs and successors.

I am well aware that property in land has been acquired by less objectionable modes, and that lands acquired by conquest and plunder have passed by purchase from their original owners. For instance, men have taken possession of land that was apparently worthless, and by their labours enriched it; others possess by the investment of their savings from other sources of profit, and in some instances it has been bestowed for services rendered to the nation. Were it possible to sift these differences, I should advise a distinct and separate mode of dealing with each class of possessors; but this is not possible, and hence I propose to meet the difficulty by making fair and reasonable compensation to the present proprietors. There are some exceptions, cases of acquirements so notoriously bad, that I would willingly except them; but as I before said, or rather gave grounds for inferring, it is so much a question of degree, that such a mode of proceeding could only result in apparent and positive injustice. The result of the present monopoly and investiture of lands is fully set forth in the last published Report on the Employment of Women and

**Children in Agriculture.** It says that "beef and mutton are so rarely tasted by farm labourers and their families, that they may be said to form no part of their diet; that bacon is not partaken of more than, if so often as, once or twice a week, and not in any proportion amounting to a meal; and that bread and cheese form the main food of adults." The cheese is described to be of the worst possible quality. The children mostly exist on bread soaked in water, or, at the best, are obliged to put up with thrice-skimmed milk. The house accommodation is of the worst possible description. But without going into details that would prove tiresome, let me give the chief features of the summing up of the report. It declares that the sustenance of the peasantry at all ages bears no due proportion to the toil to which they are reared, and the privation is sadly and needlessly aggravated by the distances which many of them have daily to walk, through the decay or actual destruction of cottages. There have been too many instances in which, before the termination of a lifetime of labour, men have, through this cause, been compelled to perform a foot-penance equalling, in many a case, a journey once round the world, and in some even twice! and in some thrice!

It is impossible to shut our eyes to the evidence afforded in the fact, that the present children of England are remarkably slow in learning, and quick in forgetting what they learn, more especially when compared with their superiors of the same race; evidence that nutrition must be falling short of the demand made upon it.

We may reasonably join issue with those who point to the wheaten bread now eaten as a proof of superior feeding to the oat and barley-meal consumed by labourers in our earlier times. Accompanied with their home milk in those days, such cereal, if good of its kind, was food greatly superior to the dry, milkless sophisticated bread of the modern baker. Moreover, there was superadded to the former an amount of flesh-meat unknown to any village labourer of the present day. There can be little doubt, that when every cottager could keep a cow, with its contingent of pig and poultry, and when animal food was more abundant and labour less continuous, the sustenance was better proportioned to it and to the infant wants depending upon it.

If the picture be a true one, and of its truthfulness I have no manner of doubt whatever, it follows that the system is in a fair way for condemnation; for its continuance must, sooner or later, lead to some great national disaster. How anyone after such revelations, not by opponents, but by friends of the system, can tolerate its existence, is to me a mystery. It is a libel upon our common Christianity.

Add to the foregoing summary the alarming outgrowth of pauperism, and there is no need of marshalling additional con-

demnatory evidences of the frightful results accruing from the monopoly of landlords.

The result of these accumulating evidences will, sooner or later, necessitate a change. But this is not the only ground of hope. As the number of proprietors diminishes, the system is less able to support itself, and that they do diminish the following figures bear witness:—In 1786 there were 250,000 corporations and proprietors, in 1822 only 32,000. A better notion, however, of the growth of the monopoly may be obtained from the following:—The Earl of Breadalbane can ride on his own property 100 miles from his own house in a single direction; the Duke of Sutherland owns the county of the same name. This county reaches from sea to sea. The Duke of Richmond holds possession of 340,000 acres at Gordon Castle and Goodwood, and the Duke of Devonshire 96,000 acres in the county of Derby alone. It has been authoritatively stated that less than 160 persons now own half the land of England and three-fourths of Scotland.

The way in which political power, so largely monopolised by landed proprietors, has been used, may be gleaned from the fact, that within these last two hundred years, 7,000,000 of acres of common lands have been added to their estates, that is, to the estates of adjoining proprietors. In a former article I advocated the immediate utilization of our waste lands; but it is necessary to say, that if a sufficiency of political power remain with our landed aristocracy to monopolise the remainder, I would ten times sooner that they should be allowed to remain until the people are sufficiently organised to prevent any such an attempt on their part succeeding. The people should insist that the Government, whenever it determines to redeem these now barren acres, shall, while holding the land in trust, rent it out in small parcels. By so doing, the following advantages will be secured:—1. Employment for a large number of the unemployed. 2. The raising of heavier crops. 3. Heavier rentals; for it is a fact beyond contradiction that small occupiers do and can afford to pay the largest sum per acre. Of course, it would not be wise to make the rent-charge too high. A fair price, that is, a price that will enable occupiers to live, is all that any sensible person would think of demanding.

On the estate of ~~Sir~~ Charles Newdegate, M.P., the allottees are charged nearly double the amount paid by the large holders of land adjoining, although, at the time the land let out in small allotments was taken to, it required to be cleared of furze, the growth of centuries, at an enormous amount of labour.

With respect to the mode in which small farmers cultivate their estates, we have an abundance of evidence from the very best

authorities, Adam Smith, Mr. Mill, M. de Sismondi, Mr. Laing, Mr. Kay, Mr. Macculloch, Mr. Thornton, and others of lesser note, but scarcely inferior to them in their practical acquaintance with all matters relating to the land. The small cultivator labours with a will, and the only thing required to ensure this is security of tenure, and this the State could afford to give. A deal has been said about the difficulty of small cultivators securing a plentiful supply of good seed, but this difficulty, if it should ever be found to exist, is speedily to be got rid of. In Italy, the landed proprietor lets his land upon terms whereby he engages to find the seed, on condition that he takes a certain moiety of the gross produce, and the plan acts exceedingly well. A land-owning and land-letting government could, if it chose, adopt the same or a similar plan. Nothing can be fairer than this system, for it apportions the rent to the yield; and while in a bad season it relieves the tenant, in a good one the additional amount of produce set aside for rent leaves a proportionally greater remainder to the cultivator.

M. Rudolph, who was well acquainted with the workings of the Metayer system in Tuscany, speaks thus approvingly of its results:—"The labourer, in general, is happy and virtuous; the unvarying nature and quietude of his life and the dependence, free from all servility, in which he stands in relation to his employer, foster his habits of morality, whilst they maintain his dignity as a man. The peasantry is, beyond all dispute, the best class in the country, and all the good that is said and has been said of the Tuscans is due to the peasantry. A peasant who should be reduced to work as a day labourer, would feel himself miserable and degraded." The increase of population is much larger in Tuscany among those who labour as ordinary wage receivers than among those who cultivate the land upon this system, showing forcibly that it tends to produce care and forethought.

The necessity of cultivating small proprietors has been fully recognised by the Prussian government by forced sales. I am not an admirer of this system, yet it is far better than the concentration of lands in the hands of a few, as in England. It leads to a greater distribution of wealth, and enables the government to call, with a greater show of justice, upon a larger number to defend the country when in danger. I very much doubt, had it not been for the existence of this system, whether the men of Germany would have fought so well as they did in the recent war. The battalions of our own Cromwell were mostly composed of men of a class of yeomen now almost unknown. They fought as men only fight who have something to fight for. In Prussia, by the law of 1850, the smallest occupier of peasant's land acquires the proprietorship at twenty years' purchase,

the amount being paid to the landlord, not in money, but in rent debentures issued by the authority of the State, and bearing four per cent. interest, and gradually redeemable by means of the one per cent. difference, which at compound interest extinguishes the principal in a little over forty-one years. The Prussian peasant has, however, two other options: he may pay less by one-tenth to the State bank than the rent he formerly paid to his landlord, in which case the purchase debentures take fifty-six years to redeem; or he may, if he can raise the cash, compel his landlord to accept eighteen years' purchase money of the annual rent. By this means, nearly 100,000 peasant proprietors have been created in Prussia. Rent debentures to the extent of many millions have been issued to the landowners, and in less than eighteen years more than one-eighth of the debentures issued have been entirely redeemed and extinguished.

The laws, as shown, which led to this monopoly were passed in Parliaments in which the people had no voice, in Parliaments chiefly composed of landowners and their nominees. The people have now established their right to return representatives, and what former representatives had the power to do in the interest of those who were instrumental in their return, those now and hereafter elected by a wider constituency have the right to undo:

Paley says that the right of individuals to the land "is to be found in the law," and, as no law is permanent, that right is only coeval with the law by which it was established, and the law-makers can by its repeal, abolish it to-morrow. He gave up as untenable the argument that the passiveness of a people can be taken as consent, seeing, as all clear-sighted men must see, that that passiveness may result from a want of knowledge or inefficient organization, and, at best, that it can only apply to a single generation, or so many generations as are prepared to submit to laws which dispossess them of their birthright. He advocates property in land upon the ground that it is more economical and productive of better results; and in order to prove that these advantages really do flow from the establishment of private property in land, he contrasts the position of civilized with uncivilized nations. The fault of this argument is that he draws a comparison not with a well-devised system of imperative proprietorship, that is, the holding of the lands in trust by the government of the nation for the benefit of the governed, but from a state of existence which exists only amongst the most barbarous. Had he conceived the idea of such a system as this, he would have seen that there was no necessity of going backwards in order to get rid of private property in land, and that the advantage of the present system would not have been quite so easily shown. By the comparison he adopted, he simply proves that the present system is more

compatible to modern society, than a system which prevailed and yet prevails in almost every sparsely populated country of the earth where civilization has not reached.

In opposition to the principle of making land national property, it will be pointed out that the right of individuals to possess land is almost universally acknowledged. True, but it is in Britain alone that the power of enjoying this right has so limited itself in point of numbers, as to become unbearable. If the power of holding land shall be made to contribute to its distribution as in France, the results might be the same or nearly the same as though all land was national property; but knowing that, at least in England, it can have no such tendency, I hold repossession on the part of the people to be a necessity. As we have shown, the Germans, seeing the evil tendencies of a similar monopoly in land, have provided for its distribution.

Paley, admitting that all lands were once common property, says that no man could produce a charter from Heaven, or possesses naturally a better claim to a particular property than his neighbour. The particular right he admits could only be established under conditions that would ensure plenty to those who were so deprived of their right to the soil. Now, is it not evident from the foregoing extract that the present arrangements have failed to ensure this? It is true he advocates an extension of charitable deeds as a way of meeting this objection, but such a mode must always fail in a community where an unequal division of wealth does not ensure brotherly feeling, but, upon the contrary, positive estrangement. The rich landed proprietor seldom knows the wants of those who live in the vicinity of his dwelling, and, as we have seen, positively refuses to recognise his responsibility; for taking advantage of the state of our laws, which he himself was instrumental in bringing into existence, he places the responsibility upon the shoulders of the landless. We have seen him levelling cottages with the ground in order to force labourers born upon his estate into another district or town. So unscrupulously has this been done, that the men engaged on his own farms have had to walk miles, every evening, when the duties of the day were over, thereby inflicting an amount of unnecessary physical toil that rendered life positively loathsome.

In the southern counties of England, landlords have refused to give protection to the tenant by way of long leases, and the natural result is that a vast quantity of the land is tilled upon the most niggardly system possible. Naturally this must of necessity cause its impoverishment; for what sensible man would place upon the land vast quantities of manure or go to the expense of draining, where the possibility of reaping the advantages flowing from such improvements is, to say the least, doubtful? Many of the agrarian outrages in Ire-

land have resulted from such like iniquities. There is one case in particular which is too well-known to need specifying, standing out as it does in its positive hideousness.

Had Paley lived to see the results we now see, I have good reason for believing that he would have acknowledged the positive injustice of this system.

The contemplated abolition of the purchase system in the army bears indirectly on the question of land reform. It aims at the destruction of a monopoly, and the recognition of right and fair play. Under the system that now exists, a fool may possess vast estates to the injury of his fellows, and from a want of proper management famine and starvation may be caused to stalk through the land. An equally deplorable result may succeed the shutting out of merit from the highest and most important positions in the defensive forces of the nation; for is it not clear that a nation that restricts the choice of officers to a class forming only a tithe of the population, lessens its chances of obtaining the best possible selection? There is an instance on record of a mere child holding a captaincy in one of our crack regiments, and drawing pay for duties the child could not possibly perform; and to show that the present system of proprietorship in land has produced something equally absurd and injurious, it is only necessary to mention the name of Lucas.

I remember some time since reading a description of this extraordinary (I might use a harsher term) personage. According to the account published, he dwelt near Stevenage, in Hertfordshire, and from some unexplained cause had determined to lead the life of a hermit. With this determination, he was content to see his farms and premises go to wreck and ruin. Now, although this could not take place without detriment to the nation, still there was no law that gave power to the State to step in and say, "this cannot be."

I admit this is an extreme case, but it is sufficient to prove what might occur if landed proprietors were similarly disposed.

When a landed proprietor has a mania for preserving game, the effect is scarcely less injurious.

If you admit of the land becoming private property, you can only, as in Ireland (see Encumbered Estates Act), deal with such cases by special legislation; and this is at all times difficult, more especially when the defaulters are both rich and numerous. I have no hesitation in proclaiming that this man should have been long since dealt with as a dangerous lunatic, deprived of the control of his estates and his power to do harm, and have been taught, if possible, to respect the common decencies of life and his duties to his neighbours. His farm-house, now unoccupied and in ruins, should have been made to give shelter to some poor houseless wretch; his farm, choked up with

weeds, should have been devoted to the growth of food and the profitable employment of the poor of the neighbourhood. If he is playing his fantastic tricks, to the detriment of his poorer neighbours, under the influence of mere brutal stubbornness, I would have him whipped; if he is mad, I would have his lands and himself better taken care of. At any rate, he is an abomination in more senses than one, although his conduct serves at least one useful lesson, namely, to point out the evil results which may flow from a people suffering their right to the land to be confiscated or held in abeyance.

With a limited amount of land and an ever-increasing population, we cannot afford to allow its possession to be monopolised by Lucases or pleasure-seekers, for that would be simply to increase the extent of our dependence on our foreign neighbours for the means of existence.

The nation has already seen and condemned the effect of the monopolising system in so far as it applies to the army, and, if I mistake not, it will speedily see the necessity of also condemning the same system as it pertains to the soil and all kinds of natural wealth. The coal fields of England, her vast mineral wealth, our fisheries and our streams are not the work of man, but the direct gift of the Creator to the people. The former is the result of some mysterious laboratory that Nature has established to supply the wants of man; the sea and the rivers contain man's natural food. A few bold and unscrupulous men, by means of bribes, or the employment of force, unmindful of nature's laws, usurped a power which has for a time been sufficient to keep men in subjection. In the bitter cold of winter thousands are deprived of warmth as necessary to the preservation of life as food itself, by the unjust claims of these forestallers of humanity. If I, or any one, require coal, or iron, or tin, or copper, and have to pay, let that payment, in so far as it appertains to the privilege and right of the taking of the mineral or metal from the soil (excepting the labour cost), be made to the state, and by so doing, the necessity of paying taxes, which are literally crushing men, will become less burthensome. Why should I be compelled to give one copper kettle away for permission to take a sufficiency of copper from the soil to construct two or three at the most; or give more than the labour cost for what nature has given for my warmth and comfort? The natural wealth of a country, and not the wealth that springs from labour, is the proper and only legitimate source of a nation's revenue.

I grant that so long as a nation possesses an abundance of land, as in America, then the evils of the system of private ownerships fall light upon the population; but it is far otherwise with a nation like

England. In this country, the system amounts to a monopoly; in America, the vastness of its broad acres prevents this. Then, even there, its evil results appear to be merely a matter of time, and already men begin to anticipate them.

There are two ways of effecting this; 1, by revolution, and, 2, by arrangement. Of these, I prefer the latter. The difficulty of effecting this is, no doubt, formidable, but it is by no means insurmountable. We have only to do for the nation what the nation has often done for railway and other companies, and what is about to be done with respect to army commissions. I know this proposition of mine may be used against me to disprove my argument respecting the legality of the present owners; but as I recommend recourse to it to provide against the occurrence of a greater evil, I care little of what opponents may make of it.

John Stuart Mill, in his last pamphlet, suggests a remedy to which I cordially give my support; but, while I hold it to be a more liberal scheme than any I have yet met with from so eminent an authority, I am sure that it would fail, were it set forth as final, to satisfy the people. He suggests the propriety of estimating the present value of the land and preventing owners in future from extorting a larger amount of rental. If Parliament possess the power to do this (and it does), it has the power also of carrying out a still greater reform, at some future date, a reform such as I propose—that is, the restoration of the land to the nation, and to the people by purchase.

I support Mr. Mill's proposal because it will not only limit the drain upon the people by landlords, but would, if adopted, prevent the amount requisite for making the land national property from being increased by delay. Its effect would be to place a regulation price upon the land, but this, if done, should be done in a manner that would admit of no infringement. To make an infringement of a certain law a criminal offence, and then propose to compensate those who have rendered themselves liable to a criminal prosecution, is not only absurd, but a direct encouragement to crime. Mr. Mill has stated that at the close of the Revolution of 1688, the land was taxed, in accordance with the landowner's own valuation, 4s. in the pound; and he points out that the tax now does not amount to 1s. in the pound. Why then, I ask, should we refrain from re-estimating the value of the land, as a means to raise this tax to its original level? The additional money thus raised might be employed to purchase the land from the present holders. I know it will be said that this will be raising the means of purchase from the very persons who now hold the land. But I ask whether the four per cent. was not the price paid to the nation for release from certain

obligations in time of war, and whether the reimposition of a tax of this nature is not to be looked upon as the enforcement of a just debt? Instead of feeling wroth at so just a proposal, my impression is that the holders of land should rejoice at being let off so lightly, for equity would insist upon the payment of all arrears.

I feel assured that by the mode I have suggested a large portion of the land, if not all, might be restored to the nation, and being so restored, the co-operative system suggested by Mr. Mill might be vigorously applied. To these lands might be added those now so grossly mismanaged by public bodies. If the trustees of those various endowments have any doubt about the result, the government might readily assure them an income equal to that now raised by themselves, and leaving them the power to disburse the same under proper supervision. This would make inspection an easy matter, and speculation almost impossible.

In order to work out my system, it is not necessary to enforce the sale of a single man's property, for the amount of land continually coming into the market is sufficient to absorb the national fund accumulating from the appointed source. But it will be said that the mere knowledge that the Government is in the field as a purchaser will be sure to enhance the price asked for the land. This can be met by a similar proposal to that of Mr. Mill with regard to letting, or rather by taking his estimates for letting as the groundwork of estimates of value. Of course I do not mean that the purchase of the land shall be a matter of public competition. Upon the other hand, I mean that when a man is desirous of selling his property in land, the Government or nation shall alone have the right to buy, and that at a price fixed or based upon the estimates of value already taken.

Many persons will take exception to this suggestion on the ground that it would lead to additional jobbery. There might be possibly some force in this if the whole of the land were purchased at once; but, as I propose to purchase gradually as described, public attention would be so directed to the mode in which the land so purchased was managed, that it would be almost impossible, with the power in the hands of the people, as at present, to successfully perpetrate a fraud of this nature. Errors would doubtless arise at the outset with regard to management; but there is no doubt whatever but that these would be remedied, and then as the Government purchases became larger the experience would correspondingly extend, and so the chances of such errors arising in future would be small indeed. It would be impossible to go into the details of such a scheme in the space at my command, but I would propose that the management of these estates should be subject to local controllers, who shall be

elected by the people for the fulfilment of special duties in the management of the land within their control. This would prevent too much power being centralized in the hands of the Government.

Another writer on the same subject, Mr. Atherton, proposes another scheme: he advises the enactment of a law by which any man can claim to rent an acre of land in the parish of his birth at a fair and reasonable rental, provided there be sufficient land for all such applicants; he further deprecates rating by value as a bar to improvement, but insists that the rates on all lands held on short leases (excepting lands that are of little or no value) shall be highly rated. The object of this is to enforce the granting of long leases, as a means of increasing through the security of the tenant the productiveness of the holding. In the same direction he advocates the taxing of all lakes and parks at a heavier rate than they would be taxed if they were charged and used for more productive purposes.

I might multiply schemes, but it would be simply to reject them, as I believe this to be the simplest and best. It has, moreover, this great advantage, it would in no way materially impoverish the present holders. The change would be wrought out slowly and surely, and the Government would not be called upon to improvise an entire code of new laws and practices. A few simple rules would suffice, for it is easy to be perceived that the scheme carries in itself the machinery (or a vast portion of it) requisite for its safe and practical adoption. If the term levelling can in any way be used against my proposal, it must be in a different sense to that usually understood; it is levelling only so far as it tends to lift up the poor and depressed. It will give to the unemployed farm-labourer remunerative employment; but in doing this it relieves the middle class from a burthen of taxation that will extort their approval as the sensation of relief is forced upon them. Thus while it will raise up the very poor, it will improve to an equal, if not larger, extent, those who compose the scale above them. Again the improved condition of the tiller of the earth will admit of his becoming a larger and better customer, for he will not only be able to consume more food, but will be able to command more clothing and more luxuries. The advantages will be equally great in a national sense. Home-grown food will exist in greater abundance, and, in time of war and peace the country will be less dependent on the produce of other nations. At present our criminal list is swelled to undue proportions by the vast number destitute of employment. It is reasonable to hope that the introduction of this scheme would lead to a diminution of crime and so effect a greater reduction in the burthens on the State.

My ideas of this subject may be thought Utopian; but it cannot

be denied that they are more Christian than those held by the supporters of the present system, for if one thing above all others characterized the teachings of Christ and His followers, it was an earnest desire for the welfare of the great mass of the people. He plainly saw the effects of the accumulation of vast riches and its manifest disadvantages. His own and his disciples' sympathies were for the poor, the very poor, and were you to search the Scriptures till doomsday it would be found impossible to discover a single passage at variance with aught that I have said.

It is quite possible, nay, it is almost certain, that the doctrines here laid down will be quoted to my disadvantage, and, possibly, be held up to ridicule; but I feel a strong conviction that although they may remain unpopular for a while, there will be a time when a contrary opinion respecting them will prevail.

As the people become more intelligent they cannot fail to inquire into the causes of their miseries, and then they will not only see from what cause they originate, but insist upon the best remedial agents being applied.

The interests of a comparative few will be quietly disregarded, if they be found incompatible to those of the many, and the wonder will be, not that I and a few others have given utterance to such revolutionary ideas, but how it was that so few were to be found who could perceive their justice and necessity. The common instincts of humanity are always doing battle for the right, and they marshal forces that are not to be despised.

If two dogs quarrel over their food, human sympathy is always with the weaker, and I have seen men step in and prevent the stronger from robbing the weaker of his share. These sympathies may be less observant in man's dealing with his fellows; but they are never totally subdued. Remove the pressure of self-interest, and however blunted they may appear to have become, they will grow strong and active, and assist to bring about those changes which are necessary for the amelioration of the poor and helpless and the true brotherhood of man.

If it be visionary to look forward and see something that is sure to be realised sooner or later, I plead guilty. Whether I am or am not, time will decide. The pressure of taxes upon all classes, save the very rich, is sure to increase, despite the reduction in our pauper roll during the past twelve months. A war among neighbours could not but result to our advantage, at least for a time, for war means not only the neglect of business, but the alarm and desertion of those who have the wherewithal to shift. I have no hesitation in saying, that the improvement is in no way due to any State measure, that the causes of this vast amount of pauperism remain in full force, and

that the slight relief we have felt is of a temporary and fleeting nature. Hence I feel certain, that the necessity of great and lasting reforms, such as I have pointed out, will increase as time advances. This necessity will compel men to seek a remedy, and then the landless condition of the people is sure to present itself more forcibly to their view. They will see that as the nation gets richer our dependent class becomes more numerous; they will see that those who possess the land have been gradually but persistently shifting the burthen of taxation from their own shoulders on to those of their weaker and poorer neighbours; and then, aided by an extended franchise, they will propose and carry measures to effect the desired reformation, and these measures are sure to infringe on the ownership and duties of landed proprietors. The struggle once fairly begun, the issue is certain, for it will be impossible to resist the force of public opinion backed by the growing necessities of the nation.

Under these conditions, would it not be well for those who now hold a monopoly of land to accept a modification in favour of the nation, such as that proposed? It would at least be a sure way of preventing bloodshed and national disaster.

GEORGE ODGER.



## THE COMÉDIE FRANÇAISE.

IN England there is no form of writing so little appreciated as dramatic poetry; no art so little prized as that of dramatic representation; the two things are naturally connected, and the one without the other has no vitality; we may therefore put the statement thus: dramatic poetry has ceased to grow in our country, because the stage which is necessary to its development has become sterile. To read a play as a poem in seclusion, is to most minds a disagreeable exertion. Few can supply the action of the piece from their own unaided imaginations, and without the action the dialogue becomes dull; it is troublesome to follow elaborate stage directions, with no idea of the stage to help the effort; and it is still more fatiguing to exert a continual vigilance in order to keep the speakers distinct where the dialogue is of a varied character. For these reasons the dramatic form will exclude works of the highest order from extensive popularity in any country where there is no stage fit for their exhibition, and such poems as "Philip van Artevelde," "St. Clement's Eve," "The Sicilian Summer," and "The Spanish Gypsy," will circulate only gradually among students of literature, exceptional existences in the small core of the reading mass. In reply to this assertion, it will be said, "You forget our greatest poet—look at Shakespeare;" but the rejoinder is, "Yes, look at Shakes-

peare ; we have not forgotten him—and we have not forgotten how little he is read.” Most houses contain a copy of his works, but in a very few is that copy often handled. His reputation was made by the acting of his plays. He was popularised by the players. Those who had wept or laughed with the poet’s interpreters turned over his pages afterwards to renew the delight of their awakened sympathies ; but such sensibilities are spontaneous only with the emotionally or intellectually gifted ; and, now that dramatic poetry is dead to the English stage, it is also dead to English society. If there were an exact census to be made of the readers of Shakespeare in England, the number returned would be infinitely small. Of the casual readers of this paper, how many are there who really ever take down a volume of Shakespeare’s plays from their honoured shelf to read a drama for the sake of entertainment ? We may venture to assert that the only plays familiar to the public, even by name, are those which are still sometimes performed—*Hamlet*, *Othello*, *Romeo and Juliet* ; and to no inconsiderable number of the feminine portion of London society, even these are better known through the medium of the opera singers than any other. If any particular verbal passages are still handed about it is only because they are quoted in a novel of the day, or in some light magazine article ; and yet there is an increasing circulation of Shakespeare’s works. But their sale does not depend upon the general reader. The reputation of the poet causes his volumes to be purchased for most libraries as things which must be there, whether they are to be opened or not. It is a kind of stage property—for show, not for use ; also it is a prize book in schools ; and it must be borne in mind besides that, however negligent ordinary readers may be of his works, students of literature, throughout the whole civilised world, love and reverence the dramatist whose genius is of all others the widest in scope and the most universal in humanity. In France, in Italy, in America, in Russia—all exclusively literary men and women are familiar with his writings ; and in Germany, because the plays translated by Schlegel, Tieck, and Schiller are continually acted, they are really popularly known ; to a certain extent, this is the case also in Italy, where the great tragedian Salvini has excited the sympathy of multitudes in Shakespearian characters. Thus the circulation of the poet augments, while the bulk of the reading world is really profoundly ignorant of his writings. Any one who will take the trouble to make investigations on this subject,—in general society—either in town or country, will find that for one hundred young ladies who have read Tennyson’s poems collectively, one has read through one play of Shakespeare’s ; the proportion among young men might perhaps be five per cent. ; and yet Shakespeare is undoubtedly the most popular dramatic poet in

England. The death of the dramatic art as connected with poetry upon the English stage is due to a variety of causes. In the first place, there exists a large section of the British public to whom an acted play appears in the light of an impiety, whatever the nature of the play may be; in the second place, late dinner hours and a continually increasing number of these and other social meetings, prevail against the playhouses; and in the third place, the more easy stimulus of novel reading, and the growth of exciting morning diversions, use up the physical energies, leaving the mind unfit for any further effort. These causes, and many more, act upon that class of society which might otherwise be disposed to encourage the poetical acted drama, and consequently the stage in London is given up mostly now to the exhibition of ballets or burlesques, where there is no sort of strain upon the attention or upon the emotions; and where, in short, no exertion of intelligence is required either in the performers or the spectators, so that each individual of the audience, and each individual of the dramatic company, grows every day more languid in his vocation. Under these circumstances, dramatic readings are attempted as a kind of compromise between acted and unacted poetry; sometimes they are undertaken by enthusiasts, sometimes by speculators, sometimes by artists of considerable genius, and in many cases the entertainment offered to the public in this way is of a high order; but, however distinguished some gifted persons may be as dramatic readers, the art can never be so true in all its bearings as that of play acting. The variety of tone, the many different assumptions of character, and the degree of animation required to excite the interest of a multitude in the reading of a play, are necessarily at war with the fixity of the reader's position, and the presence of his book; nor is it really possible that any one man or woman, however dexterous, can adequately represent the conflicting passions of opposite characters in complex situations.

"Who can be wise, amazed, temperate and furious, loyal and neutral, in a moment? No man." In the attempt to execute what is impossible, a dramatic reader, though his endeavour may exhibit great ability and agility, must be untrue, and will generally fall into exaggeration of gesture, and often into the worse faults of grimace and mimicry. But even if he escapes these things, his performance must either be a little flat and dead, as Lord Bacon says good books are wont be, or it must be forced into that debateable land between the stage and the reading desk where the proper limits of neither style are observed. For these reasons dramatic reading cannot be accepted as a true substitute for the acted drama.

In France, although some of the same forces which have prevailed in England have been in operation of late years against the

cultivation of the highest forms of dramatic art, the existence of the Société de la Comédie Française as a body protected by Government funds, has enabled the drama still to support itself in spite of its enemies, and for the satisfaction of its friends. This society, established in the time of Louis XIV., is a corporation of which the actors are shareholders under the special protection of the State. There is a fixed fund reserved for pensions to the retired actors, and this is an important part of the constitution. And there is also a department of the conservatoire whose duty it is to train pupils for the supply of the Théâtre Français; the laws of the society are strict, and insist upon the representation of the classical drama of Racine, Corneille and Molière annually for a certain number of evenings: no care is omitted for the fostering of genius. Here, then, independent of "the grossest taste of grossest numbers," the most cultivated artists have been able to delight that educated portion of society which takes an interest in poetry and in the elaborate development of artistic excellence. How long this will continue to be the case is no less uncertain than the present prospect of the whole French nation, and the government of September last announced a considerable diminution in the annual contribution to the funds of the Théâtre Français as a necessary consequence of the national loss involved in a disastrous war. However justifiable this measure may have been, we regret its adoption, as being calculated to injure one of the most perfect national institutions of France; but, when the present crisis is passed, the subsidy may possibly be reinforced, and meanwhile we can hardly desire for Paris that phase of exclusive art-worship which at one time made it a capital offence in Athens to propose the diversion of any portion of the State theatrical fund to any other purpose, even to that of the national defence. The drama has occupied a sufficient place in the Parisian mind hitherto; society and literature have concerned themselves greatly with its progress, and all Paris has been astir at the production of any new creation of dramatic poetry, as at a high festival.

Few of the many political revolutions which have occurred among the Parisians have made a greater sensation than that rebellion against the established form of tragedy which was led by Victor Hugo in the year 1829, when he brought out his great drama of *Hernani* at the Théâtre Français. A brilliant account of this event is given in the work called "*Victor Hugo; Raconté par un témoin de sa vie.*" It was a civil war carried on in the play-house; Young France was struggling to redeem a national institution from slavish fetters; Old France was making a final effort to maintain the classical discipline which dated from the time of Malherbe; which held tragedy stiffly up, which imprisoned

her passions in a narrow space, which forbade her to speak out, which ordered her to use verbal amplification in the place of dignity, which dressed the muse in brocades, and told her that epigrammatic precision was necessary to a well-governed imagination, which insisted upon monotony of verse and monotony of scene as a law of decorum, and which looked upon every outbreak of natural emotion as an insult to art. *Hernani* was a fierce challenge to the conventions of the classical school; irregular in construction, despising verbal etiquette, casting aside the "juste cadence" of Racine, its passion was free, its graces were unexampled, its harmonies sounded from the depth of the human heart in strange varieties; it offered a continual defiance to the critics, and the poet had not only to contend with his audience, but with his actors, whose belief was in Racine, and whose joy was in the aristocracy. Mdle. Mars was a true disciple of the *ancien régime*. Her passion was accustomed to wear stays; directness was unintelligible to her; the cry of agony was too piercing for her ears; a woman without conventionality, and a tragedy without buckram, were anomalies which offended her taste, and throughout the rehearsals she opposed herself to the author. Every morning she affected to be ignorant of his presence in the orchestra where he was seated, and with an artificial grace of manner, covering an impertinence, she asked, "M. Hugo est-il là?" Upon his rising to question what she wished him to do, she replied that a line she had to say greatly surprised her. After telling Dōna Sol that he is an outlaw, *Hernani* says, "Je suis bien malheureux," and Dōna Sol, with a burst of enthusiasm answers, "Vous êtes mon lion superbe et généreux." It was here that the actress stumbled—"C'est qu'en vérité cela me semble si drôle, d'appeler M. Firmin 'mon lion,'" she said.

The poet rejoined that in that case she thought too much of herself and too little of the drama. She must imagine *Hernani* and forget M. Firmin; "C'est bien; puisque vous tenez à votre *lion* n'en parlons plus; allons, Firmin, vous êtes mon lion superbe, superbe et généreux. Cela m'est bien égal;" and thus the controversy would conclude for one day, but only to be renewed the next. After repeating her objection for several days successively without variation, Mdle. Mars at last suggested an alteration in the line. She thought it would sound better to say, "'Vous êtes, monseigneur, superbe et généreux.' Est-ce que monseigneur ne fait pas le vers comme mon lion?" she demanded. And the poet answered, "Si fait, madame; seulement, 'mon lion' relève le vers et monseigneur l'aplatit; j'aime mieux être sifflé pour un bon vers qu'applaudi pour un méchant." Then the actress, "C'est bien, c'est bien, ne nous fâchons pas," and the rehearsal continued. But

the insolence of these repeated attacks finally irritated the poet, and he requested Mdle. Mars to surrender the part to another lady. The actress was alarmed; she was fifty years old, and consequently held a slippery position as the ideal of youth and beauty. It was evident that there would be danger in the appearance of a younger lady in her part, so she made up her mind to endure the poet's irregularities for the sake of his support, and promised to do her very best for Dōna Sol.

The first evening of representation was an anxious one for the author. In fevered excitement he stood at the wings, and saw the curtain rise upon a house crowded and agitated to the utmost degree. The aristocracy of Paris, decorated, jewelled, resplendent in beauty, filled the boxes; Young France, admitted by the poet at an early hour in the afternoon, thronged the pit and galleries. Long-haired, shaggy, in grotesque costume, with slouched hats, with Spanish mantles, with long beards, with divers coloured raiments, offending the eyes of fashion, they waited for the battle. The opening scenes of the tragedy were allowed to pass unmolested, but Mdle. Mars missed her usual reception. Her friends were silent because of their disapprobation of the author, and the author's friends were not hers; when Young France applauded, Old France groaned; feelings grew hotter as the piece proceeded, and in the third act many lines were hissed. Joanny, who played Ruy Gomez, held his position with difficulty in the portrait scene, but Young France was vigorous, and he carried it safely through the storm. In the fourth act the beautiful monologue of Charles V. conquered all prejudice and silenced all opposition. The poet was supreme, and the success of the tragedy was now a certainty. A publisher who was present offered six thousand francs for the drama on the spot; the great cause was gained, and the tragic muse was free.

At subsequent representations, however, the conflict was renewed, and specially daring lines were vehemently applauded, and strongly opposed, by the contending parties. The journals of the time announced the progress of the warfare; crowds discussed it in the streets; the poet's house was surrounded; the players had a hard time of it, but the tragedy held its own. The Romantic school had won the day.

This great dramatic revolution was followed in a few months by a political one; in the year 1830, Charles X. became an exile, and Louis Philippe accepted the sovereignty of France. Victor Hugo himself, ardent, triumphant in the embrace of his liberated muse, began now to meditate also upon the birth of national freedom, and abjured his early conservative opinions. The *ancien régime*, whether in prose or verse, became abhorrent to him. His greatest

works were written after the production of *Hernani*. His imagination saw no limits to its exercise. Within the span of his hand he could grasp the universe. With a stroke of his pen he could sweep over heaven and hell; over all earth, and all humanity. In the vastness of his range he is unequalled among living poets; and in that particular none have ever surpassed him. But the school of classical criticism still writhes under his verbal audacities, and under the license which he allows himself in every possible direction. *Le Roi s'amuse* is of all his tragedies the most remarkable for genius, for poetry, and for scorn of constraint. It was performed for the first time in the reign of Louis Philippe, but although its success on the stage was complete, the representation of it was stopped—first, upon the plea of political offence; and secondly, upon that of immorality. The drama contained actually no sort of allusion to the reigning sovereign, and if it was to be prohibited because it marked Francis I. as a profligate king, *Hamlet* might as well be forbidden because King Claudius is exhibited as the murderer of his brother. The poetry of *Le Roi s'amuse* is little known in England, but an English version of it has been played under the title of *The King's Jester*, and the outline of the plot, in all its license and all its horror, is familiar through Verdi's opera of *Rigoletto*. Propriety is satisfied by the substitution of tunes for poetry, and the most doubtful situations are tolerated because they are introduced with music.

The scope of this powerful drama, however, is not immoral; it is no more immoral than Beaumont and Fletcher's *Maid's Tragedy*, which, under the title of *The Bridal*, was produced during the management of Mr. Macready, with some slight alterations, and became the most popular of his revivals; nor than *King Lear*, nor than *Measure for Measure*, nor than any other of the many tragic dramas, the plots of which necessarily entail some scenes of a revolting character. Scenes of this nature will, unless they are commanded by the highest genius, be an offence to art, but they will not affect public morals. It is rather in the soft, insinuating, well-disguised, passionate excess that moral danger may be apprehended. The establishment of the romantic drama upon the stage of the Théâtre Français gave a new impulse to the poetry of France, and many poetical plays of considerable beauty and power have been brought out since that time. The most distinguished French authors have written for the stage. A catalogue of them would be too long for our space, but the names of Alfred de Musset, Dumas, Octave Feuillet, Augier, Sardou, Coppée, Pailleron, may be mentioned as familiar even to English readers, who are generally very ill-informed of the progress of French poetry, whether dramatic or lyrical. In the world of art, there is no greater delight than the

life which the acted drama gives to poetry when it is interpreted by players worthy of their office, such as those whom we have lately listened to at the theatre in the Strand, where the members of the Société Française, driven out of Paris by the disasters attending upon civil war, took refuge for the exercise of their calling. How beautiful it was to hear Delaunay and Favart pour into the poetry of De Musset the passion and the music of their recitation! How excellent to watch them as they gradually worked upon the feelings of a cold, insufficient foreign audience, and reached its soul, and forced it to acknowledge the perfect poet in his perfect interpretation! How much pathos lies in that unbounded faith in their art which carried these players through the most discouraging circumstances without a faltering moment! When first these artists performed Alfred de Musset's dramatic poem of "*La Nuit d'Octobre*" in the Strand the half-empty house looked cheerless; among those present, probably not more than a dozen knew anything of the poem to be recited, and not half that number had ever heard the names of those who were to recite it. In Paris the Théâtre Français used to be thronged for this performance, and the favourite performers were received with enthusiastic greetings. Here, there was a chill silence. There was no scenery, no decoration, no costume, to animate an assemblage accustomed to look to such sources for animation. There was only a poet in his daily dress, talking to his muse, who was veiled in white. There was no music but that of their voices; no change but the alternations of the poet's emotion. But then, such voices will be heard, such emotion will be answered, such a poet will conquer. The artists believed in their work, and it was done. The blank astonishment which prevailed at the opening of the piece was changed to admiration at its close; and London playgoers, after the second representation given by Delaunay and Favart of De Musset's poem, began to ask for more. By means of the players, this fine production of the poet's genius has become known to many English people, who believed before that no Frenchman could write anything but prose. Alfred de Musset, whether writing in verse or prose, is always a poet: his plays are for the most part comedies, but true comedy, however bright and sparkling its surface may be, has its depths of sadness, if we know how to sound them. The top wave dances in the sunshine, but the water beneath is sombre; all the glorious hues of heaven's light meet upon the face of one fair flower till it glows with beauty, but its root is in the dark earth; and bright blossoms show fairest when tears of night, trembling as they reflect the radiance of the sun, still hang about them. If a plaintive undertone rings through the laugh of pleasantry, a deeper sorrow pervades the humour of the satirist; and while he plays and wantons

with the spirit of ridicule in wildest mirth, then the pain at his heart is most sharp and most stinging. Of all De Musset's comedies, the strongest in light and deepest in shadow is *Les Caprices de Marianne*,—where the scene is at Naples, and the period is that of François I., where the gay profligate Octave woos his cousin Marianne for his friend Celio, his cousin being married to an old, cruel man, from whose side she never stirs unless to go to mass. She is dutiful; but exasperated by Claudio's unjust suspicions, in hot anger she invites Octave to serenade her. He substitutes Celio for himself. Marianne overhears a plot between her husband and his servant for the murder of the serenader, and leans out from her balcony to give a warning cry to Octave. Celio, hearing the name of his friend, believes himself betrayed by him, and dies by the hand of Claudio's hired assassin under that belief.

The play is short; but it is an exposition of life in all its mirth and all its bitterness. It is like a sharp and glittering toy dagger, which cuts deep.

The scene of the drama never changes, every dialogue takes place on the same piazza. The old man and his confidential servant hold there the colloquies which end in a murder. They are ludicrous figures; the excess of jealousy, of self-adulation, of despotic, narrow thought on the one hand, and on the other, of cringing, low, obsequious flattery, makes the two men grotesque and grimly comical; they excite laughter, but the merriment is cynical, for the sense of a great wrong is always present with them; when they retire it is Octave who, in a tone of jest, addresses Marianne, playing, trifling, but with a profound meaning, while Marianne replies with stately irony, but gives way little by little to that significant banter, and then the lover standing still, seems the centre statue of that same piazza; fixed in his dream; hopeless; living on one thought; lost in the ideal; forgetful of self; divine in his despair; he gives forth his soul in music, uttering the sweetest melodies of a poet's heart without the limits of rhythm.

The prose of De Musset's most finished comedies has a cadence in it not so marked as to fatigue the ear, yet so perceptible as to give it the grace of symmetry with the charm of recurring periods. In some prose writings, for instance, in Sir Philip Sidney's, and especially in his "*Arcadia*," this kind of melody sometimes falls into the fault of monotony, but many of his passages are unrivalled in their sweetness; and in the highest order of prose composition generally, a distinct cadence may be observed by an appreciative ear. In Burke's writings, and in Milton's and Cowley's prose works, it is evident to any attentive reader, and great delight is derived from it. Those who are familiar with the French language will feel a delicious music

in Celio's description of his love, which we extract here from *Les Caprices de Marianne* :—

"Vingt fois j'ai tenté de l'aborder : vingt fois j'ai senti mes genoux fléchir en approchant d'elle. Quand je la vois, ma gorge se serre et j'étouffe, comme si mon cœur se soulevait jusqu'à mes lèvres. . . . Pourquoi donc suis-je ainsi ? pourquoi ne saurais-je aimer cette femme comme toi, Octave, tu l'aimerais, ou comme j'en aimerais une autre ? pourquoi ce qui te rendrait joyeux et empressé, ce qui t'attirerait toi comme l'aiguille aimantée attire le fer, me rend-il triste et immobile ? Qui pourrait dire ceci est gai ou triste ? la réalité n'est qu'une ombre. Appelle imagination ou folie ce qui la divinise. Alors la folie est la beauté elle-même. Chaque homme marche enveloppé d'un réseau transparent qui le couvre de la tête aux pieds ; il croit voir des bois et des fleuves, des visages divins, et l'universelle nature se teint sous ses regards des nuances infinies du tissu magique. . . ."

We invite also the attention of our readers to the following exquisite piece of dialogue between Octave and Marianne in the same comedy :—

"OCTAVE.

"Deux mots, de grâce, belle Marianne, et ma réponse sera courte. Combien de temps pensez-vous qu'il faille faire la cour à la bouteille que vous voyez pour obtenir d'elle un accueil favorable ? Elle est comme vous dites, toute pleine d'un esprit céleste, et le vin du peuple lui ressemble aussi peu qu'un paysan à son seigneur. Cependant regardez comme elle est bonne personne ! Un mot a suffi pour la faire sortir du cellier ; toute poudreuse encore, elle s'en est échappée pour me donner un quart d'heure d'oubli, et mourir ! Sa couronne empourprée de cire odorante est aussitôt tombée en poussière, et je ne puis vous le cacher, elle a failli passer toute entière sur mes lèvres dans la chaleur de son premier baiser.

"MARIANNE.

"Êtes-vous sûr qu'elle en vaut davantage ? et si vous êtes un de ses vrais amants n'iriez-vous pas si la recette en était perdue en chercher la dernière goutte jusque dans la bouche du volcan ?

"OCTAVE.

"Elle n'en vaut ni plus ni moins ! Dieu n'en a pas caché la source au sommet d'un pic inabordable, au fond d'une caverne profonde ; il l'a suspendue en grappes dorées sur nos brillants coteaux. Elle est, il est vrai, rare et précieuse, mais elle ne défend pas qu'on l'approche. Elle se laisse voir aux rayons du soleil, et toute une cour d'abeilles et de frelons murmurent autour d'elle matin et soir. Le voyageur dévoré de soif peut se reposer sur ses rameaux verts : jamais elle ne l'a laissé languir, jamais elle ne lui a refusé les douces larmes dont son cœur est plein. Ah ! Marianne, c'est un don fatal que la beauté : la sagesse dont elle se vante est sœur de l'avarice, et il y a parfois plus de miséricorde pour ses faiblesses que pour sa cruauté. Bon soir, cousine. . . ."

The representation of Alfred de Musset's comedies upon the stage demands the highest art in the players. We have seen some of his most beautiful pieces here this season, so rendered that the poet's conception has appeared instinct with its true life for every spectator.

None who have seen it can ever forget the working out of each separate character in *Les Caprices de Marianne* by the company of the Théâtre Français; the gloomy, suspicious, pitiless old Claudio as he was exhibited by the keen intellect of Got, the low-minded Tibia, his valet and slave, personated by Coquelin, the high-bred grace and culminating passion of Mademoiselle Favart in the dialogue of Marianne, or the exquisite finish of Bressant's irony in Octave, or the tender beauty of Delaunay's modulations in his long strain of lament, so sweet that the ear dreaded the moment when it should cease, so passionate that no living soul could reject the persuasions of such a sorrow; the actor implicitly trusted his author, he maintained throughout a remarkable stillness, his attitude was fixed as his feeling, he was *cette gracieuse mélancolie*, which is saluted by Octave as the very opposite of animation. He moved like a somnambulist, and he spoke like a poet. The same Delaunay who is the ideal of a love sorrow in *Les Caprices* is the embodiment of joyous life in *Le menteur*; here his follies are forgiven him for his smile, and at the height of his self-glorification, of his boastings, of his vain lies, he persuades his audience to sympathy from the utter gaiety of his heart; his laugh is a stirring music, his romancing is a young enthusiasm, his step is light and airy, his garments flutter with his fancy, he is like a butterfly in sunshine; as charming and not more responsible; such a being seems an addition to the gladness of existence—who can be angry with his deceiving? it is a frolic.

Charles Mathews, in a translation of Corneille's comedy called *The Liar*, which is very inferior to the original, played the same part; he was clever, he talked fast and walked fast, and he was funny; but he missed the enthusiasm, the romance, the belief in himself—the poetical element which made the essence of Delaunay's representation, and which gave its true meaning to the comedy.

An artist such as Delaunay, able to represent two wholly opposite characters with absolute perfection, would be an exceptional excellence, the leader, the star of any other company than that of the Comédie Française; but here he is only one of a brilliant constellation. In this association an equal genius is felt throughout, the harmony is entire, each part is given with the same consummate skill. Got surprises as much by his variety of power as by his elaborate finish. He is strong, he is true, he is wonderfully comic, he is profoundly pathetic. Bressant, less vigorous and less enthusiastic, has a distinction in high-bred characters which no other actor has attained, and has at all times an ease and a gentlemanly bearing, and a delicate finish of style in which none can surpass him. Coquelin with his broader manner is delicious in the humour of Molière or of Alfred de Musset, and has shown also considerable force in strongly-

marked pathetic situations; those who have seen Mademoiselle Favart in Julie, in Marianne, in L'Aventurière, and in De Musset's Muse, know how she can maintain dignity of manner in the very whirlwind of passion, how tenderly she can plead for compassion, how she can wither and kill with her tone of sarcasm. There is nothing sharper than her irony; but whatever passion rings in its accents, her voice never loses the richness of its harmonies. Then there are Mesdames Royer, Prevost Ponsin, Messieurs Talbot, Chéri, Boucher, and Febvre, all excellent in their art, and yet willing to assume characters which appear unimportant until their acting gives them weight.

If to the ordinary spectator such perfection in the show of the ideal is pleasant to witness, how full the measure of delight must be which it brings to the poet! Such delicate, such exquisite finish in action and in speech, such force and such intellect, as we have seen combined in the performance of Molière's, Reynauld's, Augier's, and De Musset's finest works, must tend to exalt the character of any intelligent audience; it would be impossible to see Molière's *Misanthrope* played as it was by this company without feeling the intellectual faculties stimulated and strengthened. In construction, the *Misanthrope* is perhaps the most excellent of Molière's works; in dialogue it is inferior to none, in the character of Alceste it possesses a personal interest which is wanting in many of his comedies. That interest is heightened in the personation of Bressant by the finest perception and the most complete combination of voice and gesture, while Mdle. Favart, as Célimène, the coquette, who enthralls him with her airs and graces, with her fine ironies and her beautiful delivery of the language, crowns his performance by a full explanation of the effect produced upon him. Delaunay, as the coxcombical marquis, which in other hands might appear an insignificant part, exhibits with rare perfection a type of the vapid courtier of the Louis XIV. epoch. Vain, self-sufficient, petty in his aims, happy in their fulfilment, showy in his dress, profuse in his civilities, too conceited to be ill-natured, too vain to be good-natured, empty in thought, lively in movement, his presence on the stage is a relief to the graver satires of the comedy, and the effect he produces is so marked, that he seems present even when he is off the scene.

English audiences, looking on at performances so excellent as these, are wont to say, "Ah! you see the French are a naturally dramatic people; that is why they act so well;" but this is a mistake. The Société de la Comédie Française is exceptional in its perfection even in Paris—it has been gradually developed, it is the result of labour. Genius seeks out the Théâtre Français because there it can be trained, there it can learn tradition, there it can be rewarded. These con-

ditions could not exist if the establishment were not partly supported by national funds. No theatre which depends solely upon immediate success, no theatre which is a mere money speculation, will ever become a great school of art. It is in countries where the playhouses are not dependent upon the favour of the masses, that a high order of drama exists as a public entertainment. At Berlin and Dresden there are companies equal in finish to the *Société Française*, and perhaps still higher in their aims. An Englishman who wishes to see Shakespeare thoroughly well acted must go to Germany. In England, occasional managers have wished to give classical entertainments, but unassisted by government, able to live only upon the applause of the moment, resting in fact upon the approbation of the coarser tastes which mark the bulk of the playgoing public, they have broken down, and the consequence of this deterioration of the stage has been a steadily increasing deterioration among audiences. There is no general feeling for dramatic art remaining in England. Those who go to the play go only to break the evening with something less dull than being at home, and continually use the dialogue of the players as a stimulus for their own powers of conversation, carrying on their idle talk as a running accompaniment. Bad though this be, it is not the worst form of the British playgoer. Regret and lamentation over the decay of the English stage, however, can do no good service; it remains to those who see in a well-directed drama the means of a wholesome recreation, to study with zeal the performances of the distinguished artists of foreign countries who come to visit London, whether French, Italian, or German. The French company which has so lately delighted us, has gone through strange vicissitudes. The ladies of the company have been the nurses of wounded soldiers, and M. Got, ready for the call of duty, has played Figaro in the costume of a National Guard. A great national calamity drove them from their own abode of art to seek the favour of a foreign nation, and this may have given them an additional claim to our sympathy, but under whatever circumstances they come, true artists must ever be welcome to the educated sections of all peoples.

JULIET POLLOCK.



## WHAT IS DEATH?

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ἼΑρα μὴ ἄλλο τι ἢ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος ἀπαλλαγὴν; καὶ εἶναι τοῦτο τὸ τιθῆναι, χωρὶς μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπαλλαγὴν αὐτὸ καθ' ἑαυτὸ τὸ σῶμα γεγενῆσθαι, χωρὶς δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος ἀπαλλαγείσαν αὐτὴν καθ' ἑαυτὴν εἶναι; ἄρα μὴ ἄλλο τι ὁ Θάνατος ἢ τοῦτο; Οὐκ, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο, ἔφη.—  
PLATO, *Phædo*, p. 64 c.

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IT has been observed by Büchner in a recent work on man's position in the world, that great philosophers have spoken of Death as the foundation of all philosophy.\* How far this is to be accepted as universally true may perhaps be open to question, but this aspect of the statement will probably be admitted by all,—that Death is one of the most dark and difficult subjects with which philosophy has to deal. However we may account for the difficulties in which we always find ourselves involved whenever we attempt to solve questions connected with Death and Life, the presence of such difficulties can never be denied. In all such questions we find ourselves continually confronted by an unresolved factor; there is always an element which we cannot account for or explain; we have always an equation involving an unknown quantity which defies our most subtle analysis.

It may be well to bear this in mind in attempting to answer the question which stands at the head of this paper, and more especially when the attempt is designedly made only with the feeble lights of science and reason, and without the support of any *à priori* considerations. To give a clear and satisfactory answer is probably completely beyond the power of metaphysics or philosophy; but to

\* "Die Stellung d. Menschen en der Natur," p. 342.

consider some of the answers that have been made, and to make such approximations as modern science or speculation may help us in making, may not be wholly useless or uninteresting, and will be attempted in the following paper. The full and complete answer can only be given by Revealed Religion.

Bearing this distinctly in mind, let us not fail to observe at the outset, that there are clearly two ways of attempting to answer the question, "What is Death?" We may either deal with the question generally and abstractedly, or we may limit it to the case of personal beings such as ourselves. If we take the first of the two ways, we can hardly avoid dealing, first, with the question of Life; the most obvious answer to the question of the paper, and the most convenient position from which to start, clearly being the axiomatic assertion that Death is the cessation of Life. If we adopt this course, we must first obtain the best definition of Life with which science or philosophy can supply us, and then arrive at our conception of Death by considering how and where the definition must be altered, so as to be brought into conformity with the axiomatic statement from which we seem justified in taking our departure. For example, if we were to take Mr. Herbert Spencer's careful definition,\* and agree to consider Life as "a definite combination of heterogeneous changes both simultaneous and successive," we might certainly thus arrive at an answer to our question; and we should very probably concur in fixing the *differentia* of Death in the indefiniteness of the changes combined with some limitation of their heterogeneity. But here two things are plain; first, that we should have to make ourselves sure that our definition of Life was correct; secondly, that if it were proved to be so, and this conception of Death arrived at in the way indicated, we should only find ourselves left among abstractions, with the difficult question of Death, as considered with reference to a personal being, nearly as unanswered as before.

It would seem then better at once to decide on limiting ourselves in this discussion to the second aspect of the subject, and to confine ourselves to an attempt to answer the question before us, so far as it bears upon individual and personal beings such as ourselves.

This may not be the most philosophical mode of dealing with the question; but in adopting it we are certainly confronting the question on its more difficult side, and we are also as certainly taking into more prominent consideration that which, by the nature of the case, never fails most to engage our interest and attention.

The plain truth is, this is one of those questions in which we have a very serious *personal* interest, and no general answers to such a query as that put forward at the head of this paper *really* satisfy,

\* "Principles of Psychology," p. 363.

unless they are so framed as to take in some reference to ourselves and our own personal connection with the subject. Mere abstractions leave us still seeking and disappointed. Prove to a man by as flawless a demonstration as the mind can conceive that Death is "the final equilibration which precedes dissolution," and so "the bringing to a close of all those integrated motions in any body which arose during its evolution,"\* prove this, and in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred you will have but feebly interested him. The personal question is always the question of real interest, and that question will ever force itself into the foreground. "Be it so," he will say, "let Death be such a closing equilibration, but when the process so defined is completed, *what am I?* Am I existent in any sense of the word, or have I and integrated motions ceased together? Have I been reduced to *Nirvritti*, or, worse still for my egoism, to *Nirvāna*?† Have I passed into mere passivity, or have I become fairly blown out? What is Death when thus considered relatively to that Ego which I call myself?"

This is the aspect under which I now purpose to consider the broad and general question.

But even when the question is thus narrowed, and we try to shape out our answers from the dim hints supplied either by scientific investigations or by personal consciousness, we are at once made to feel how little (apart from revelation) we have actually advanced in positive knowledge during the 2,250 years which have come and gone, since the time when Plato put into the mouth of Socrates the words which form the sort of motto to this paper.

Science no doubt has done something. The striking speculations of the last twenty years in connection with life and vital forces have certainly suggested some new conceptions. Physiology, as Professor Jowett well observes,‡ though it has brought us no nearer to the great secret, has nevertheless tended to remove some erroneous notions respecting the relations of body and mind. This may be fairly admitted; but still when we return closely to grapple with the question, and especially under the aspects in which we are now considering it, we find, after all, that our answers are only a little better classified than formerly; a little more distinct in form, but in substance pretty much what they have ever been.

Three answers, at any rate, seem to deserve special consideration. We may say, for instance, on the general grounds we are taking in this paper, that Death is to the Ego simple Dissolution; or, again, we may show cause why it should be regarded rather as Resolution.

\* Spencer, "First Principles," p. 522.

† On the true meaning of this word, see Müller, "Chips from a German Workshop," vol. i. p. 281.

‡ "Dialogues of Plato," vol. i. p. 391.

Or, thirdly, we may view it under the idea of Outgoing and Migration, and regard it as a process by which the immaterial is sundered from the material,—what the younger Fichte calls *Entsinnlichung*.\*

Let us shortly analyze these three answers, and subject them to a few tests of reason and common-sense.

The first answer is one which, however cheerless it may be, is probably engaging the present attention of purely scientific men more than either of the others. The mysterious alliance that seems to exist between the phenomena of what is called vitality and those of the more subtle imponderable forces; the plausibility of the reference of all vital energy to a definite and material source, viz., the sun; the consequent possibility that this energy may thus, after all, be, as Professor Tyndall has suggested,† of a proximately mechanical origin; the apparent identity which some experiments (as, for instance, those with the nerve-centres of certain electric fishes) have been thought to establish between nerve-force and electricity,—all such considerations certainly do seem to prepare the way for the unpalatable conception that the Ego is only the product of certain structural forces; and that life is, so to say, only the running down of a weight which natural forces had raised, and that when the downward-bearing forces cease to work and the weight has reached its lowest point, then that it is all over with the Ego. The various structural and cohesive forces which kept the molecules of the human body together in all their manifold changes and successions, and so co-ordinated them as to have presumably preserved within the Ego the sense of personal identity, at last fail, and the Ego which was the theatre as well as the result of their operations becomes broken up, dissipated, and dissolved. Death, thus considered, is the final disintegration, however caused, of that which, when in its state of integration and when under the action of the structural forces, was and constituted the Ego. Under these aspects Death may be shortly defined to be the material breaking-up of the Ego, whether from internal wear and tear or from external causes, or from both combined; and the consequent dissipation of the personality.

Such is the first answer to the question, which, as is obvious, is the answer of pure Materialism. Sad and startling as it is to hear such an answer returned to any inquirer in a Christian country, it still must be fairly said that it has this claim on consideration, that it makes but few assumptions, tacit or otherwise. It professes to rest, and for the most part does rest, on observed phenomena; it is further, as it would seem, not out of harmony with more recent

\* See his "Anthropologie," § 147.

† "Fragments of Science," p. 436 sq.

scientific investigations. Its weak point clearly is, that it neither includes nor suggests a satisfactory explanation of such processes as those of willing and thinking, and certainly fails adequately to explain the emergence of, and subsequent maturation of, the consciousness of personality. In this respect it could hardly be deemed satisfactory in reference to an animal even of the lower genera, as it would seem, at any rate at present, distinctly unable to give any account of the genesis of many of those actions or processes which we popularly associate with the confessedly vague term, instinct. In the case of an individual and personal being like ourselves, this unsatisfactoriness is greatly enhanced; as it must fairly be admitted that all the difficulties connected with the subject are greatly increased as we pass from the mere members of a genus to the case of individuals like ourselves. The remark of the Danish thinker Martensen seems perfectly just, and to admit of general application, viz., that if we concede Death to be natural for existence generally, it by no means follows that it is natural for an individual and personal being.\* Of course, the replication to all such objections is, that the answer is not really concerned with these further questions, but with the facts of the case as it finds them; if it gives a consistent account of the facts, we are bound so far to be satisfied. Yes, certainly, we *are* bound; but still if any other answer be found which equally gives a consistent account of the phenomena, and does also cover more ground in the very direction in which it seems to want covering, why, there is nothing very illogical in preferring it.

These considerations will have now prepared us for more fully appreciating and more fairly estimating the second answer to the question of the paper, which, for want of a better term, I have associated with the word Resolution.

In this answer a distinction between vital and natural or chemical forces is both asserted and maintained. Both classes of forces are regarded as operative in the living organism; both are deemed to preserve a due co-ordination to each other when in actual working; but the origination of the action of the so-called natural and chemical forces is always referred to the antecedent action of some so-called vital force, however feeble or obscurely initial that action may really or supposably have been. There is some *divinæ particula auræ*, whencesoever it may have come, that gave the first start. In the stored-up reservoir of the water of individual existence (to use the remarkable illustration of Descartes and Professor Tyndall)† it is the

\* See the admirable work of this really great writer, entitled "Die Christliche Dogmatik," § 111.

† "Fragments of Science," p. 443.

something that pushes away the plug, and sets the water running. More, this something, it is alleged, continues to act, modifies, and itself is modified by, the downward flow. Physiology is confidently claimed as substantiating the general truth of such a concession. Facts and phenomena are often specified which seem positively to be inexplicable except on the assumption of some plastic power other than that due even to the highest conceivable action of merely natural or chemical forces. Such terms, vague as they really are, as *vis medicatrix naturæ* and the like, are all indications at least of the widely-spread persuasion that forces are at work within us which are essentially and qualitatively different from any of those with which experimental philosophy has yet come in contact. If we accept this view, the Ego, as before, may be regarded as both the sphere and the product of the interaction of the above-named forces, and Death as the termination of the interaction,—the termination being due, on the one hand, to the cessation of the action of the natural and chemical forces, whether by waste of substrata or by special external agency; and, on the other hand, to the return of the co-operative vital forces into the general life of nature. The forces which had been united previously with varying degrees of closeness, are at last resolved into their component parts, and the personality which was felt and recognised during their union and interaction, ceases to be either felt or recognised on their completed resolution. The Ego is not, strictly speaking, broken up or dissipated, but it simply ceases to be.

Such is the second answer to the question, the current answer of Pantheism. It has obviously some advantages over that which has been previously given. In the first place, we can give in some degree a better account of the intellectual side of our nature, and can, perhaps also, to a certain extent, give an account of the emergence and subsequent consciousness of personality. It may even further be said, that though the personality ceases when the resolution takes place, yet that the receding vital forces carry with them into the common life of nature some tokens of the uses to which they had been put, and so, that a feeble auroral light of our former selves still lingers on the horizon of being. In such a sense we have a kind of dispersed immortality,—not merely such an immortality as the poet had in his conception when he said that a great part of him would escape Libitina,—as an immortality to which probably Büchner alludes, when he says that we live “in nature, in our race, in our children, in our neighbours,” as well as in our works and in our thoughts.\*

Perhaps the *real* view of Aristotle in his remarkable, but often enigmatical treatise, *De Animâ*, was substantially the same as this.

\* “Die Stellung d. Menschen en der Natur,” p. 346, sq.

When he seems to regard his soul as a quickening essence, of which the very existence retreats into nothingness when it has nothing left that it can act upon, he cannot be regarded as very far from the substance of the answer that has just been given.\* Whether, however, this acute thinker can be claimed as on this side or no, it may be fully admitted that, from the very dawn of Philosophy down to the present time, there never have been wanting a certain number of close and consistent thinkers, who, if such a question had been propounded as that now before us, would have substantially adopted this second form of answer.

But still it is impossible, on any grounds, to accept such an answer. Even if we set aside all other difficulties connected with the acceptance of such a view of Death,—if we consent to regard the longings for immortality only as disguised forms of self-love,—if we put out of sight all the various difficulties and counter arguments which rest solidly on the endurance of the consciousness of personality, and on the whole theory of ideas,—if we are prepared to regard the prevailing consent of the more enlightened portions of mankind as only due to tradition and to prejudice,—if we thus set aside all other difficulties connected with such an answer, the ethical difficulty remains, and that difficulty will be judged by many as simply insuperable. The wicked, as Plato observed, would get too well off,† if either the first or the second answer were the true one. The sense of justice, the persuasion that good in the long-run must be rewarded and evil punished, could never be the strong feeling it is within us, if the true conception of Death was either one or other of those which we have already noticed. The more we consider the world, the more, as Rothe observes in his recently-published lectures,‡ do we feel that it has a moral purpose, which moral purpose is only to be sought for in man. If this be so, then surely any views in reference to man's existence that must often, by the nature of the case, completely negative any such conception of moral purpose, cannot possibly be regarded as free from the gravest doubt and suspicion.

There are many who think that the objection founded on our inward and, as it would seem, inextinguishable persuasion that our personal existence endures indefinitely, is a still stronger argument than the one already specified; but, be this as it may, no *reasonable* reasoner can deny that the two combined present obstacles to an acceptance of the second answer which it does not seem too much to characterize as utterly insuperable.

We may now, lastly, pass onward to a short consideration of the

\* See Archer Butler, "Lectures on Ancient Philosophy," vol. ii. p. 426 *sq.*

† Plato, "Phædo," p. 107 *c.*

‡ "Dogmatik," part ii. 2, § 131.

third answer, according to which Death is regarded as an outgoing, a departure of the immaterial Ego from its material environment. Under this conception, the real Ego is considered as an inmate of the body; closely indeed united with it, and in many respects even influenced and modified by it, but still ultimately separable from it, and capable of maintaining a personal existence without it. Death, thus considered, is the departure of the inmate, or perhaps, more exactly, its Outgoing;\* which, it is maintained, takes place when from decay or unusual external action the natural and chemical forces within the organism fail in their adjustment (to use the language of Mr. Spencer) † to the relations in the environment. This outgoing may be hasty or lingering, precipitated or gradual, but still, if we trust physiology in this dark domain of speculation, even in those cases where it would seem to be most sudden it is a process not actually completed at once. In the distinction which physiologists draw between general or somatic death and particular or molecular death, and the varying spaces of time that ensue between the former and the latter, we may see some hint at least that the complete withdrawal of the inmate may not really be so sudden and abrupt as it often seems to be. The strange phenomena of trances and of suspended animation seem to point in the same direction. Such, at any rate, is the third answer to the question,—the old and popular answer, but not necessarily, for that reason, not the true one. Indeed the continued agreement of the more enlightened portion of mankind in the general outlines of the answer, is rightly specified by Professor Jowett‡ as one of the more trustworthy foundations on which a belief in its truth may be considered to rest. The general consent of wise and sober thinkers in all ages is a form of evidence which no reasonable man will ever be disposed to set aside or undervalue.

This then, even on mere general grounds, may claim to be considered to be the true answer; but we are also well aware that it is regarded by many as not by any means free from difficulties and

\* It is perhaps interesting to notice that the very word "Death" has been considered by some philologists as involving the idea of expiration, or outgoing of breath. It is connected by both Curtius ("Grundzüge der Griech. Etymol., p. 497) and Grimm ("Gesch. der Deutsch. Sprache, vol. i. p. 404) with the Gothic verb *divan* (*dau*), the ground-idea of which is stated to be "expirare." It is probable that there is, in the background, the same idea in *θάνατος*. It is often connected with *θην* and ideas of "striking" (Bötticher connects it with the Armenian *zen*-, the Zend *zan*, and the Sanscrit *han*, "kill"), but it is not improbable that Curtius is right in his reference of the word to the Sanscrit *dham*, and to ideas of "blowing" or "breath." The Latin word *mors*, and perhaps *μαρῖνω* and *marcesco* (compare the Persian and Armenian *mard*, "a man"), are connected with the Sanscrit *mri*, which probably involves no further idea than that of "perire."

† "Principles of Psychology," p. 383.

‡ "Dialogues of Plato," vol. i.

objections. We may specify two which it may be well for us candidly to specify. In the first place it is urged that we have a clear difficulty as to the true Ego. The Ego would at first sight seem to be the Ego which our senses recognise,—the phenomenal body *with* its assumed inmate; but, if we accept the answer now under consideration, it is urged that we must regard this seeming Ego not as the real and essential Ego, but as the Ego under external manifestations. Now in this there is to many some degree of difficulty. Body and this assumed inmate really do, at any rate, appear to be inseparable not only in fact, but perhaps, as Professor Jowett seems to think, even in our conceptions. This is the first and chief difficulty. The second is a deduction from it, viz., the difficulty of forming any exact idea of this inmate, this essential Ego—call it soul, if you will—when separated from the body. The moment we begin to form any conception of it, we seem either to share the old fear, to which Socrates playfully alludes, that when set free it would be blown away,\* and that thus *Nirvana*, after all, would be more than a possibility; or, to speak a little more philosophically, to conceive it at least as possible that this viewless Ego might really, from pure inability to maintain an independent existence, be drawn back into the spiritual and universal, and at last lose personal existence and individuality. We should then have drifted back to the second answer, and to all the difficulties which such an answer appeared to involve.

There are difficulties, then, connected even with this third answer which deserve our consideration; but, as we have already implied, they are such as, even on scientific grounds, are removable. Indeed there seems every reason for thinking that just in proportion as true science advances will these difficulties be reduced or removed. For example, there are two considerations, both suggested by science, that seem in a great degree to relieve us. In the first place, the more we prosecute physical investigations, the more we seem forced to recognise in all things around us active principles and ultimate essences, which, so to speak, are the souls and *partes optimæ*, entelechies, to borrow a term from old philosophy, of the objects and substances around us. Such a recognition, at any rate, prepares the way for the idea of a real Ego, wearing awhile the garments of the body, co-ordinating the forces that build up its structure, looking out of the windows of its eyes, hearing through its ears, feeling by its nerves,—its active principle, its true and probably not wholly incorporeal essence.†

\* Plato, "Phædo," p. 77 *e*.

† Compare Splittgerber, "Tod, Fortleben, und Auferstehung," p. 65 *sq.*, and Delitzsch, "Biblische Psychologie," part vi. § 5.

In the second place, we are reminded by physiology, with increasing clearness of evidence, that the phenomenal Ego is not the same phenomenal Ego even for any consecutive minute. Independent observations seem to prove that the animal body, on an average, wastes daily one twenty-fourth part of its entire weight.\* And yet personal identity remains utterly unchanged. The real Ego is unaffected by all this ceaseless coming and going of atoms and molecules. Those that come take the places of those that go, and perform all the atomic duties with the same regularity. The changing sentinels, as Professor Tyndall very beautifully expresses it,† communicate their pass-words, and all goes on as systematically and regularly as before. Surely such facts render the conception possible of a formative entity within, an essential Ego that not only survives the successive waves of change, but orders the disposition of the molecules of which they are composed, and by the agency of natural forces acting through a living and organized body, maintains that body as long as the forces within it will work.

Such considerations, to say the very least, mitigate the difficulties connected with the third answer, and even prepare us to expect that further physical researches, though bringing us no nearer to the great mystery of Life, may nevertheless tend increasingly to justify the assumptions on which the third answer rests, and may silently remove some of its present attendant difficulties. We owe much to physiological science, and particularly to one of its most able exponents, Dr. Carpenter, for making it now perfectly clear that though there may be a certain amount of correlation between vital and physical forces, yet that the *differentia* between them is distinct and well defined, and that it is to be sought for in the nature of the material substratum through which they work, whether that be inorganic matter or an organized structure. Such generalizations are helpful and suggestive; we owe much to them, and in the future we may owe still more.

I will conclude this paper with four reflections, which, though perhaps not directly flowing from the subject, are still in close alliance with it, and may not be considered as wholly superfluous.

First, that there does not seem anything unreasonable in the opinion of many modern psychologists that the indwelling Ego or soul may have form, and even some kind of subtle corporeity, so that when it leaves the body and becomes unclothed, it may still preserve some distinct objective existence.‡

\* Savory, "On Life and Death," lect. iii. p. 97.

† "Fragments of Science," p. 441.

‡ Fichte, J. H., "Anthropologie," § 119. s.;, and the elaborate work of Perty, "Ueber die Seele" (born 1856). The remarkable lines in Dante, "Purgatorio," xxv. 88 sq., point to the same conception.

Secondly, that there is also nothing unreasonable in the supposition, that it may hereafter again receive and occupy a body, the elements of which it may aggregate from the surrounding environment, and may dispose and distribute in some kind of accordance with the agencies by which it has been supposed to work in reference to its present body.\*

Thirdly, the whole consideration of the subject seems to leave behind a feeling, if not actually a conviction, that to personal beings like ourselves there is something *alien* in Death, something that seems to indicate disturbance and dislocation, and stands in sharp contrast with the ideas of orderly progress and beneficent changes. This is, to some extent, confirmed by the prevalence of the fear of death, which, though, as Sir Benjamin Brodie has noticed,† rare when Death has actually arrived, is still undoubtedly one of the common feelings of our race, and in some countries, as I believe to this day in Madagascar,‡ often shows itself in a very startling manner. The importance of this observation will be deeply felt when we advance beyond the mere general principles to which we have confined ourselves in this paper.

Lastly, that if there is any truth whatever in the last observation, the opinion of many early thinkers and the judgment of a provincial council § are worthy of grave consideration, viz., that Death originally might not have been a necessity for a *personal* being, but that anything we may conceive as possible for ourselves hereafter might have been arrived at by gradual change, rather than by the apparently abrupt and discontinuous processes of physical Death.

But here we must stop. We have arrived at what would seem, as far as the present mode of treating the subject is concerned, to the furthest bound to which it is safe for mere speculation to advance, and may prudently forbear, with such lights as we now are using, from attempting to penetrate further into the gloom. We commenced with a motto from Plato, we may close with a sober sentiment from Pindar :—

. . . ἢ καὶ τίσσας ἀρετὰς  
ὁ μακρὸς αἰὼν, φρονεῖν δ' ἐνέπει τὸ παρκεῖμενον.

NEM. iii. 71.

C. J. GL. & BR.

\* This view is put forward, ably and ingeniously, by Gregory of Nyssa, in a very interesting dialogue (with Makrina, vol. iii. p. 213 *sq.*, ed. Paris), and has been maintained by an almost continuous series of writers and thinkers down to the present time.

† "Psychological Inquiries," part i. p. 132.

‡ Herzog, "Real Encyclopædie," vol. xvi. p. 185.

§ Concil. Milevitanum, A.D. 416; see Mansi, "Concil. Collectio," tom. iv. p. 327.



## OPTIMISM AND PESSIMISM; OR THE PROBLEM OF EVIL.

THE difficult problem to which the following inquiry is to be devoted has recently come into great prominence, especially in Germany, through the decided and very prevalent Pessimism of the philosopher, Arthur Schopenhauer. Because of the manifold sorrows and calamities of life, and the universal reign of death, he has maintained that this is the worst of all possible worlds. He says that it is even so bad that non-being is better than being, and that the consummation most devoutly to be wished is total annihilation, or the entire loss of conscious existence. This extreme Pessimism is not without favour among the general public in Germany. It might indeed be said that to it chiefly is due the lively interest with which Schopenhauer's philosophy has been received by some classes of society to whom otherwise all philosophy is indifferent. We do not say that the most zealous of these are practically in earnest with their pessimistic conception of the world; in fact, Schopenhauer himself is not. The discussion of Pessimism leads naturally to the consideration of the opposite principle—that of Optimism. This, as expressed by Leibnitz, is that this world is the best of all possible worlds, and that therefore it was created as it is. Between these two extremes we have an abundant choice of intermediary or modified views of good and evil, according to which various conceptions of the world may be formed.

It is not, however, the mere whim of an eccentric philosopher which in the present day has raised a renewed attention to this problem. Other and more important circumstances have united to press it forward as important, and to justify new efforts for its solution. To reconcile the imperfection of the world—its suffering and death—with faith in an almighty, all-wise, and infinitely perfect God, has been long aimed at by the dogmatic theology of the Christian Church. It has tried to show that the imperfection is not due to the Creator, but has been brought on by the creature. The entire creation, and especially man, is said to have been created good and pure. From an absolutely perfect Creator this was to be expected, and this is expressly declared in the Mosaic record of creation. Depravity, suffering, and death are ascribed to the transgression of our first parents. The life of sorrow began when the world ceased to be a paradise. This mode of reconciling the imperfection of the world with the perfection of the Creator was chiefly urged by St. Paul. Five hundred years later it received a fresh impulse from St. Augustine. There have been many controversies on subordinate points, but the solution of St. Paul and Augustine has for centuries satisfied the Christian world. In the present day, however, it is found inadequate. It cannot stand before the lessons of philosophy and the discoveries of natural science. The purified moral sense forbids us to believe that because of the sin of our first parents all mankind became liable to suffering, to death, and even to everlasting destruction. But besides this, discoveries in geology and paleontology not only do not confirm the belief that nature and humanity began in a state of perfection or paradise, but they really make such a belief impossible. That suffering and death are the consequences of sin, introduced into nature as something abnormal and depraved, is contrary to our present knowledge. Everywhere throughout nature they show themselves as necessary. Matter in its chemical processes exhibits such a perfect adjustment as forbids us to regard it as something abnormal and depraved.

The old problem of the imperfection of the world comes up afresh for the consciousness of our time. And now it is not merely the theoretical question whether the world be good or evil, but how the actual condition of the world is to be reconciled with the belief in a perfect Creator. The prevalence of the inductive method in modern science seems even to necessitate the conclusion that as the world is bad, it could not have had a Divine Author. It demands that the original cause, in itself unknown, be determined by the known effects, and not, as on the principle of deduction, the known effects inferred from the unknown cause. It does not allow us to say that because there is a God the world must be good, however bad it may appear.

Thus Pessimism and Atheism are closely allied to each other. Schopenhauer and his disciples are decided in their profession of Atheism. The primordial being, the "Will," which they acknowledge, they describe as blind, unconscious, or absolutely unintelligent. Under these circumstances a renewed inquiry into this subject seems necessary. In the present paper we can only treat the question historically, passing under rapid review the various attempts at a solution of the question by religion and philosophy, but reserving for a second part our own speculative discussion and the solution we have to offer.

## 1.

If we pass before our minds the original history of humanity, we shall meet somewhere a stage of development in which men came to self-consciousness, and in some measure began to think of their existence, their destiny, and their duties. This moment of human existence we can scarcely conceive to have come in the ordinary even flow of life. It must have been at some crisis, excitement, or convulsion, when the dull dream-like life and the mere animal feeling of existence were disturbed, that the light of human consciousness first began to dawn. As steel struck by a flint produces fire, so difficulties, dangers, and catastrophes may have first elicited from human nature the deeply-hidden sparks of the conscious spirit. In the same way religion may have had its origin in the awakening of a clearer consciousness of the world and of God. This first consciousness must have been eminently pessimistic. It is when men are disturbed in their usual mode of life that they think of the world and its phenomena, and especially of its first cause. But for such an interference with the routine of existence, all would be allowed to pass as something ordinary—something of which nothing further was to be thought or said. It would be regarded as we ordinarily regard health, as something which does not require any special attention. It is when health is disturbed by sickness, and its restoration earnestly desired, that men begin to think of it as the gift of a Power above us. It is this disturbance of health which first leads to the belief of higher unknown causes or mysterious forces, before whose will and power men appear as weakness and vanity.

Let us think of men as yet possessing no historical tradition and no doctrine, but developed to a conscious life, living under a perpetually serene sky and an equal sunshine. These men would have as yet no clear sense of the importance of the sun and its rays. They would scarcely have come even to the stage of offering divine worship to the sun or to any other object. But let there break forth suddenly a terrible tempest, with thunder and lightning, storm and rain, work-

ing destruction on the earth, and then all hearts will be deeply moved. Then thoughts will arise, not merely of their own weakness, but also of a higher hostile power, filling them with fears and anxiety, and calling forth the effort in some way to appease it and to obtain its favour. When the sun shines again, it will be regarded with eyes and feelings altogether different from what it was before. It will no more appear as ordinary and indifferent, but as a propitious and beneficent power, which, by its greater force, has triumphed over the power of enmity and evil. The thought of a good Divine Being has thus arisen and been developed through this very disturbance of the hitherto even course of human life, that which first evoked the thought of a mysterious evil power. This is an important moment for the significance of evil in the world. We can here understand how it is that, in the earliest times of humanity, a greater influence over men has always been ascribed to the evil power than to the good. Even according to the Bible narrative, Satan exercised a greater influence than God over our first parents. He knew how to seduce them to transgression against God. With many nations the evil powers are still supreme. Wherever the idea of a good Divine Being has been derived from nature, the thought or belief in a wicked being, and its influence on nature and nature-life, has not been put aside. On the other hand, in a theoretical sense, the existence for men of so many dangerous evils, and the manifest imperfection of the world, appear only the more mysterious in proportion as we form a correct idea of God as a wise, good, just, and almighty Being.

With such a difficulty, it is not surprising that, in the ever-increasing mental development of men, very different religious and philosophical systems have been formed, with very different estimates of the value of human life. To explain the dualism, some think it necessary to believe two original principles—one good and one evil. Some place an original estrangement of the world from God in the very act of its creation. Others suppose evil to arise from the creature, or regard it as a necessary means to advance and realise good. There are even those who say that the root of evil must be sought in the good Divine Being Himself. As to the value and happiness of human life, different views also prevail. Some are decidedly pessimistic, the aggregate of the sorrows of life being regarded as far surpassing the sum of its joys, and the end of all, annihilation or loss of conscious existence. Others unite Pessimism and Optimism, regarding this life as pessimistic, but having an optimistic compensation in the life to come. Perfect Optimism is also maintained. There are people who regard the good and the happiness of this life as a long way surpassing its evils and its sorrows, and these as only

means for the furtherance of the good. To this is added the belief of a compensation for all present sorrows in a life to come. We shall try briefly to set forth some of the characteristics in this respect of the most celebrated systems of religion and philosophy.

We may properly begin with the view that there are antagonistic supernatural powers concealed behind the phenomena of nature, which influence nature and men. It is supposed that there are good and bad, divine or demoniacal, beings. From the one come the pleasures of life, and from the other its sorrows and misfortunes. This conception is confessedly most complete in the religion of the Persians, or the religious system of Zoroaster. Two hostile spirits—the good, Ahuramazda, and the destructive spirit, Angramainja (Ormuzd and Ahriman)—stand over against each other, and with their subordinate spirits wage perpetual warfare. Creation was brought forth by the good Spirit. It was corrupted by the evil, and it is now the scene of the great conflict between the two powers. To the human race it specially belongs to share in this conflict, and, in union with the good Spirit, to overcome the evil, so that at last Ahuramazda with his followers will conquer, and be sole ruler over the universe. This dualism is then, at least so far, not absolute, since the kingdom of evil and its ruler shall be perfectly overcome, and the warfare ended. Concerning these two powers, whether both, with their followers, came originally from one single Divine Essence, and, if so, from whence it arose, nothing more is determined. One original unity, however, appears probable, the final conqueror being continually regarded as the sole and highest Divine Being. The system of Zoroaster manifestly inclines to Optimism. This is evident from the fortunate issue of the strife, and the final blessedness of those who fight for the kingdom of the good. To the Parsees the earth is not a vale of sorrows, but the stage of the great conflict with evil. They look forward to victory and a triumphant reward.

A similar dualism was also formed by degrees among the Egyptians. It was never indeed so decided as with the Persians, nor did it take such a marked ethical character. It was more naturalistic, embracing the great powers of nature as they were useful or hurtful to the Egyptians. It is also evident that less value or significance was ascribed to human life than among the Persians, and, therefore, so much the more prominence was given to its continuation after the death of the body. The true goal of existence was reached when the brief earthly pilgrimage had come to an end. The bodies of the dead shared as much as possible in the life beyond. For this reason they were embalmed and concealed in well-built tombs or mausoleums. This life was the time fixed for trial and probation. On it depended the destiny of the life to come. After

death came the judgment, when every condemned soul was given over to the torments of hell. It is, however, worthy of notice that this judgment is more concerned with the violation of religious and moral prohibitions, and not so much, as in Christianity, with positive moral conduct.

Still nearer to Pessimism is the religion of the Brahmins—although, indeed, here we do not find so clearly a positively wicked power as in the Parsee dualism. The world takes its origin from one sole Original Being, and that by way of emanation. Its relation to the Original Being is as that of the developed to the undeveloped, as that of the plant to the seed, of the stream to its source. But though it be an emanation from the Divine Essence, it is, nevertheless, imperfect, undivine, impure, and this in proportion as that which has emanated is estranged from its Divine Original. This world is a place of punishment, suffering, and purification. With the doctrine of emanation is united contempt for matter and the sensuous life, and at the same time the doctrine of transmigration of souls into animals and men for purification and final restoration to the Original Essence. How the pollution of souls began, and how material existence, which is an emanation from the Divine Essence, should be something bad, is never clearly explained. In Brahmanism purification and assimilation to Deity take place, not merely through practical moral acts, but mainly through passive conduct, through prayer, and asceticism. Prayer is the highest power—even that by which the gods themselves are overcome. Yea, it is itself divine, or absolutely God over all gods (*Brahmanaspati*). Through asceticism, or the mortification of the sensuous existence, come chiefly purification and restoration to the Divine Essence—or, at least, salvation is obtained in the life to come. The Brahmanical religion is, by its doctrines, a religion of priests, ceremonies, purifications, and prescriptions; but the ascetics are, in reality, above the priests. The highest thing for man is mortification, or contempt of the joys of life; and yet this religion is not directly pessimistic. It leans rather in its foundation to Optimism. The goal of life is still the salvation of the creature; and thus, in any case, being is preferable to non-being.

We find a more decided Pessimism in Buddhism. The religion of Buddha confessedly arose as a reformation of Brahmanism. Buddha chiefly opposed the outward ceremonialism and the trifling ritualism of the Brahmanical religion. But he opposed also the principle of caste, denying the supposed differences of classes, and maintaining the universal brotherhood, or equality of men. He preached a pure, simple, moral doctrine, that he might lead men to govern their passions, to love their neighbours, and thereby to lessen

the miseries of life. To the practical part of Buddhism was soon added an esoteric doctrine, which gave it the character of Pessimism or Nihilism. For the initiated it appears to have been simply Atheism; while the people had preached to them only that which was practical or moral. The theoretical part was already found in the speculative, and of course heretical, theology of Brahmanism. This theology was divided as to its most important questions into two antagonistic systems. The one was the Vedanta, and the other that of Sankya. The former maintained the reality of the Original Being, Brahm, and regarded the world of multiplicity or change as merely phenomenal. The Sankya system, on the other hand, regarded the manifold as the real, but denied the reality of Brahm or the Original Essence. In the Buddhistic theory the two systems were united. From the Vedanta system was taken the nothingness of the world of change and multiplicity, and from the Sankya system the nothingness of the Original Essence. The result was a complete Nihilism. This world essentially is a place of sorrow and wretchedness. Evil is not a corruption or deterioration of being, but being itself, and sin is nothing else but the striving or longing after being. Freedom, therefore, from misery can only be reached through the renunciation of being, by passing into Nirvana, which is either directly nothing, or, at least, non-being, and the loss of conscious existence. Thus, according to Buddhism, existence itself is wretchedness, and its annihilation is the goal to be desired. Non-being is better than being. This is the most decided, and the most complete Pessimism.

The conception of the world most opposed to Buddhism is that of the Greeks. We might call the old Hellenes the chief advocates of Optimism. Doubtless there are Greek philosophers and poets who have taken a very dark, in fact a pessimistic, view of the world, not far removed from that of Buddhism. But these are exceptions, and their words to be regarded rather as the expressions of a momentary experience than as a settled conception of the world. It may be said that, generally, the Greeks regarded human life as a valuable gift from the Deity. They enjoyed it as much as possible, and tried to look only at its brighter sides. They did not reckon upon another life as the complement of this. To them existence after death was but the existence of shadows, and not any proper continuation of being. The present life alone was real, and much to be preferred to any other life. This was expressed sadly by the shade of Achilles in Homer, where he says to Ulysses that he would rather be "the meanest day-labourer on earth than the supreme ruler of the shades below." This conception, however, did not prevail universally. The Greeks were not strangers to the thoughts and the hopes of a

blessed life beyond the grave. But the future life was not allowed to disturb the pleasures of this. If the world beyond was an existence of shadows, that was only a further reason why the present pleasures should be more eagerly enjoyed.

The Greeks were more free from the troubles and torments of the earthly life than any other people, not even excepting Christians. They did not live in fear of a wicked or devilish power continually threatening evil to mortals. For them the dark powers of wickedness were, at any rate during this era, restrained by the all-powerful Zeus, who thrust the mighty Titans into Tartarus, and allowed no room for their operation in the normal order by which his kingdom stands. In this the Greek conception of the world differs from the Christian, and not without advantage on the side of the Greek. The supernatural powers or gods of the Greeks could indeed be hostile to men; but they were not therefore peculiarly wicked or devilish. There was, of course, a background for the Greek consciousness—a dark, inexorable power, that fate from which nothing could be obtained, to which all was subject, even the reigning gods. But just because it was dark and inexorable, and because even the gods must bow to it, men could more easily be resigned, and not suffer themselves to be disturbed in the joyful pleasures of existence by cares and anxieties that avail nothing. We cannot at present examine the optimistic or pessimistic character of all religions, and their relation to the solution of the problem of evil; but it will be necessary briefly to look at some aspects of the religion of Judaism.

It is difficult to say whether the Jewish religion be Optimism or Pessimism. In it we have a union of both conceptions, sometimes the one prevailing, sometimes the other, and often a wavering between the two. The Jewish tradition concerning the beginning of the world, and in particular of the human race as it is recorded in the Books of Moses, is quite optimistic. The world and all that it contains was created "good." Men especially were to live in paradise in innocence and bliss. As soon as they fell by the temptation to disobedience, hard labour was their lot, and they became subject to the miseries of existence and to death. It is specially to be noticed that this did not come upon men from any evil hostile power, but directly from God Himself as a punishment for transgression. The wicked or devilish power is very much in the background in the earlier times of the Jewish people. This forms a very definite distinction between the old Hebrew conception of the world and that of the later Jews, which was also adopted by Christianity. The old Hebrew view of the condition and end of the earthly existence, notwithstanding the expulsion of our first parents from Paradise and the Divine infliction of punishment, is pre-eminently optimistic.

The patriarchs, indeed, utter lamentations concerning the sorrows of this earthly pilgrimage, and at last, old and weary of life, they longed for death. But this earthly life is always with them a Divine good. The worshippers of the true God are rewarded with happiness and prosperity. Well-doing and obedience to the Divine laws are the sure way to riches and length of days. Compensation through the immortality of the soul, or a future existence, is never mentioned in connection with this optimistic view of human life. In later times, in the days of the judges and the kings, the people seem to have had but one supreme object. That was the possession of the land of promise, which was connected with the fear of the Lord. All the goods and blessings of life are promised to them who keep the commandments. But these are to be taken away if the people are disobedient. They are to be given over to the dominion of strangers, and to sufferings of various kinds if they go after other gods. Human life is ever regarded as a blessing to be continued because of obedience, or taken away because of unfaithfulness.

In the Book of Job, which is specially devoted to the problem of evil, we have a deeper and more ethical conception of life and its sorrows. In the introduction, Satan appears before God Himself, and plays the part of the tormentor and tempter expressly by Divine permission. There the misfortunes and the sorrows of life appear as a trial, and as the means of a higher religious and moral probation. Job stands the trial in so far that he submits with devout trust to misfortune as a dispensation of Providence. In this devout faith he is never shaken. His friends come to comfort him with their reasons and exhortations. These are grounded on the old Hebrew conception that suffering is always a punishment for sin. Job is indignant, and denies with decisive firmness that he is suffering any punishment for transgression. He even vindicates himself, and maintains his entire innocence. The affliction he can bear, but the cause assigned, and the confession of grief required from him, he cannot bear. He rejects sharply the pretended wisdom of his friends, because he knows nothing of transgression against God or His commandments. They had expressed nothing more than the principle of the old Hebrew religion that sin and suffering are necessarily related to each other. By the discourse of one of the speakers we are reminded of a like doctrine in the religion of Confucius, where it is said that to every man is given in part an external gift corresponding to his moral condition. It is not altogether impossible that by means of caravans travelling through Central Asia a similar solution of the problem of human existence had been reached by nations widely removed from each other. Job rejects this solution, at least so far as it could be applied to his own case. He does not say that the mean-

ing of suffering set forth in the introduction is his view, yet he actually bears his misfortunes in that sense. He gives no theoretical explanation except that God is to be trusted. Without complaining, we should submit to every Divine dispensation, because in all things God shows Himself to be infinite, almighty, and all-wise. By this Job rejects the consequences which would follow from the theory of his friends if applied to him, that God is unjust, and also the doubt concerning the existence of God, which might be inferred by an inductive experience. The conclusion of the book, however, falls again into the ordinary Jewish conception. It is not shown that Job stood the trial, and came out of it with the religious and moral sense purified and elevated, having the reward in his own consciousness. There is nothing indeed said of a reward beyond the grave, but Job is again blessed with sons and daughters and an abundance of earthly goods. If, then, the object of the sufferings of Job was not something external in order to punish him for some transgression, his inner religious and moral preservation is an external reward, and so far this agrees with the optimistic world-conception of the Jewish people.

But a pessimistic view of life is not altogether foreign, at least to later Judaism. It is particularly expressed in the Book of Ecclesiastes. The "preacher" finds all which the earth can offer vain and unsatisfying. He even concludes that it is better to be dead than to live. He has no certainty of a life after death; he doubts if it is not then the same with men as with beasts. He knows not whether the soul goes upwards or downwards. There is not, indeed, in this book any decided doctrine. The pessimistic view, that all labour and all pleasures which life offers are vain, is changed into earnest exhortations to enjoy the pleasures of life so long as it lasts. The expressions of doubt concerning immortality, or at least a happy existence after death, are followed by the words that the soul returns to God, from whom it came. This certainly may be interpreted in different ways; but it does not necessarily mean that the soul shall have a personal immortality. In any case, this little writing shows that the pessimistic conception of the world was not unknown to Judaism, after the mind of the nation was so far developed that it could reflect with judgment on human life.

As to Christianity, the modern Pessimists do not hesitate to represent at least the Author of it as a very decided Pessimist. They appeal to passages in which Christ inculcates contempt of the world, little estimation of earthly goods and pleasures, even the giving up of all earthly things for the kingdom of heaven's sake. But so little is there in this of a really pessimistic conception of human life, that He reckons happy the unfortunate, the suffering, and the wretched, because their sorrows will be the cause of their coming to a higher

joy after this life—even to an everlasting happiness in the kingdom of heaven. This, however, is not the only way in which the apparent Pessimism of the Christian doctrine is changed into a real Optimism. It is effected in a higher and more definite way, by the devout frame of mind, the unconditional trust in God, as the Father of all men, which Christ himself diffused and strove to inculcate on all mankind. By this the world has already become a kingdom of God, which is set up, not externally, but in the hearts of men. It exists in the soul, and from thence it purifies and enlightens the whole being. By this the problem of earthly evil is solved in a higher way than if it were regarded merely as a punishment from God, or as the work of the devil. The sufferings and the evils of life can thus be conceived as only means for the religious and moral probation of men, and for a higher spiritual perfection and divine purification than could otherwise be attained. And this accords precisely with the lesson of the preamble to the Book of Job. To the truly Christian soul, to devout faith, and unlimited trust in God, the evils and sorrows of life will not, indeed, appear as nothing. Yet they will be regarded as nothing. They shall vanish away when brought into comparison with the possession of God or of the kingdom of God in the soul. On the other hand, the goods of life need not be cast away. The owners may possess them, but they must live as if they possessed them not.

These deepest thoughts of Christianity, this true spirit of the doctrine and life of Jesus, was, alas! soon forgotten. The old Hebrew view of evil in the world, and of God's relation to it, became current, and was the special foundation and source of the most important dogmas of the Church. On it was specially founded the dogma of original sin, which supposed that physical and moral evil were necessary results of guilt, and were either inflicted by God as punishment, or brought on by the devil through hatred and wickedness. But for this we must, as Augustine showed, ascribe unrighteousness to God, since without a sufficient reason He had given so many sorrows to men. The higher significance of suffering which is mentioned in the proem of the Book of Job, and which appears in the conclusion as the solution of this difficult problem, was ignored. The Church dogma is rather founded on the doctrine of Job's friends, that misfortune and suffering imply guilt, as otherwise they could not be inflicted by God. From the universality of physical and moral evil in the world and in man, a universal guilt and a universal Divine displeasure, with the corresponding punishment, are inferred. But as the dogma-framers did not wish altogether to deny the Divine goodness, and held that some men were ordained to eternal life, so they came to the fearful thought of the condemnation of the mass of mankind (*massa damnata*). Out of predes-

tion to salvation came naturally the predestination of multitudes to condemnation. This entirely contradicted the idea of God as the Father of all men, and excluded or made impossible that perfectly unlimited faith and that devout trust in God which constituted the very essence of Christianity. In the same way, and on a like foundation as the doctrine of original sin, was formed the Christological dogma of redemption, or the theory of satisfaction. The relation of this doctrine to the spirit of Christ may be seen clearly and at once by comparing it with the classical parable of the prodigal son and his reception on his return to his father's house. But parables of this kind, and indeed the entire doctrine of Christ, are explained according to this theory, while men ought rather to test the justness of the theory simply by His doctrine and parables. Here, in my judgment, is the starting-point for the reform of modern Christianity and the restoration of the Christianity of Christ.

We come now to the philosophical efforts to solve the problem of evil. Here our inquiries must be limited to the most important. Plato, notwithstanding his idealism, or rather because of it, was by no means an Optimist, at least in relation to this life. In his judgment, the condition of the human race on earth was essentially one of punishment and suffering for sins committed in a former state of being. He vindicates the pre-existence and transmigration of souls, though in a more dignified form than this doctrine was held by the Hindoos in India. The sensuous body appeared to him as the prison of the soul, from which it is to be freed by death. Matter is not any true existence, but the nothing, that which is impervious to true knowledge, the irrational. But, notwithstanding all this, Plato is not to be regarded as a Pessimist. He does not limit human existence to this earthly life, but supposes it to continue, and therefore to be capable of higher perfection or likeness to what is divine. This is evident from the proofs of the soul's immortality which he puts into the mouth of Socrates.

Aristotle was less an idealist, and still less a Pessimist, than Plato. He regards the present existence as justly arranged in itself, without having recourse to the idea of compensation by the Deity. It is however true that on this subject he does not speak with any clearness or decision, nor does he use any special arguments for the immortality of the soul. The chief philosophical schools after Aristotle, as well as the Cynics before him, took altogether a practical character. Their object was to discover how to overcome the sufferings of life, and to enjoy happiness. This cheerful goal was the aim of the Cynics, the Epicureans, and the Stoics. The Cynics sought elevation over want and suffering, that they might freely renounce all which other men praise and desire as the joys or the pleasures of life. They wished to show that the real happiness of human life

did not consist in external goods and pleasures, but in the soul, and that happiness and misery were not to be estimated by outward circumstances or sensuous joys and sorrows. The early Greek conception of the world gave place to higher thoughts. The spirit awoke, and, claiming its freedom, asserted its superiority over nature. The beautiful balance of the sensuous and the spiritual in human nature, which men found pre-eminently among the Greeks, was certainly disturbed, but it was succeeded by a higher stage of the historical development of the human race. The elevated spiritualism of Christianity was not indeed reached, but the work of preparation for it was begun. To the same end Stoicism was working, but with a deeper and nobler spirit. The wise man, that is, the Stoic, tried by insight and the power of will to rise above the things of life. These could prevail nothing with him. Neither sorrows nor pleasures, neither poverty nor riches, could break his peace or disturb the equilibrium of his soul. He lived according to nature, and did not suffer his conduct to be guided by external circumstances, but by reason and will. In this way the Stoic was a man of great worth. He was wise by insight, which alone guided him, and a king by the moral force of will, which raised him above all things, and made him independent of all things. The wise man even became equal to the Deity through the power of his soul. As in Brahmanism, he that prayed was assimilated to God, or rather produced God, by his prayer, prayer itself being regarded as God (*Brahmanaspati, Logos Verbum?*), so the Stoic by moral force became God. According to this, the conception of the world was naturally optimistic. The practical tendency of the Epicureans was also to discover the best side of existence, yet not by means of moral or spiritual elevation over the evils of life. They rather tried to mitigate them by art, and to find as many pleasures as possible. This effort was certainly more pleasant than that of the Stoics, and required less expenditure of mental power, but its results, in consequence, were more questionable.

The Neo-Platonists, who arose after the establishment of Christianity, sought to renounce the sorrows and the nothingness of life, and to obtain blessedness by a mystical and magical union with the Deity, or a plunging of themselves into the Godhead. This also was not a theoretical philosophy, but a practical striving, having for its goal not knowledge or truth, but happiness. And this was sought, not as with the Stoics, through elevation of the innate powers to an infinite energy of moral and practical self-assertion in all the relations of life, and by the attainment of a Godlike sublimity of character, but through the giving up of self into the Divine Essence. The Neo-Platonists renounced their own being, not merely to come into contact with the divine, but to be absorbed in Deity. It might

indeed be said that with Neo-Platonism Greek philosophy also gave up the ghost. Wearied with the struggle which had lasted for ages, in obedience to the divine purpose, it retired, and gave up its earthly calling. The spirit of energetic and independent inquiry had disappeared. There remained behind nothing but the lifeless body, or the mere letter. With the establishment, however, of Christianity, the seed was sown for a new intellectual life. This developed in time, and appropriated to itself whatever was suitable from the lifeless body of Greek philosophy. It assimilated or worked up the old materials into the new organism of Christianity, even as in nature the new organisms appropriate the remains of what is old and lifeless, assimilating them and using them as nourishment for growth.

In the first centuries of the Christian era arose what is called Gnosticism, which was a mingling of Indian emanation, Persian dualism, and Greek philosophy with the Jewish traditions of creation and legends concerning the origin of men. Of these varied elements sometimes one and sometimes another had special prominence. For long centuries the Church fathers had to maintain a severe conflict with the Gnostic systems and their supporters. Not only had they to defend the Church doctrine and Christianity, but even ordinary mental clearness and logic, with the ethical value and independent individuality of human nature. There were two principal sects of Gnostics, both of which bore a decidedly pessimistic character, at least as to the world and human existence. One is related to the Indian doctrine of emanation. According to this doctrine, the first impulse towards the creation of the world was given by the desire for manifestation arising within the Divine Original Essence. Through this arose the world of phenomena, of imperfection, and of guilt, which is again to be given up through annihilation and restoration to the bosom of Brahm. In like manner the Gnostics said that this world originated through a separation or division in the Divine Original Essence or kingdom of light. This emanation from the Divine Original constituted not only the world, but dark, impure matter, which with the light formed a dualism. A part of the kingdom of light was united to matter, from which arose the vegetable kingdom, but chiefly that of animals and men. Existence is regarded as essentially a state of suffering, and its problem is restoration to the kingdom of light. In this the Manichees and other kindred sects agree with the Gnostics. The other Gnostic party held indeed to the dualism, but did not believe in an emanation from the Divine Original Essence or kingdom of light. They approached nearer to the Persian dualism, and thought of this life more as a time of warfare and of victory over the forces of evil, but not as a time of mere suffering and penance, in order to be restored to the eternal kingdom of light or the Original Essence.

For the solution of the problem of evil the Christian Church had recourse to the doctrine of the fall of our first parents, with original sin, guilt, and punishment for all their posterity. The perfection of the Creator required that the creation be regarded as perfect, at least in its beginning. But it was also necessary, to reconcile as far as possible the present sad condition of the creation with faith in a good, wise, and almighty God as the Creator. With this solution, which in its main features was formulated as the Church doctrine in the fifth century, the Church remained satisfied through all the middle ages, even to the present time. But occasionally a man arose who, pressed by a deeper metaphysical necessity, sought to go beyond the fixed boundaries, to bring the subject again under discussion, and to obtain a deeper and more comprehensive solution. Such a man was John Scotus Erigena, who flourished in the ninth century, and lived for a time at the court of Charles the Bald. His chief work (*"De Divisione Naturæ"*) inclines to the emanation doctrine, and does not distinguish so definitely between the Creator and the creature as was generally done by the Church. It was therefore rejected as heterodox, "full," as a pope expressed it, "of the worms of heretical depravity" (*Scatens vermibus hæreticæ pravitatis*).

In the later middle ages it was chiefly the so-called Mystics who felt after a solution of the problem in question, while the Scholastics proper held fast by the decrees of the Church. Thus, for instance, the Mystic "Master" Eckhart, whose ground thought is the union of the human soul in will and reason with the Divine Being. The world, according to him is a unity, an eternal idea in the Divine mind, but it was necessary that it should be manifested or created out of nothing to satisfy God's desire to communicate and reveal Himself. But it is only the universal, that which has its foundation in the divine Being himself, which has any real existence, not that which is created, manifold, individual. This is null and transitory. The problem of the world and of men is restoration to the Godhead. The soul of man, that is, his highest power or most inward essence, the peculiarly divine spark in human nature, can strive after this restoration in the present life chiefly through intelligence, immediate intuition, and an intellectual absorption into the divine. The practical effort of the will and positive faith are put only in a secondary place. The world in its multiplicity, manifoldness, and individuality appearing only as an essenceless nothing, its qualities and relations can have no real significance. Suffering and evil do not exist. They arise only from the finite and the external. Sufferings are good and wholesome for men, and so far necessary. Through them is awakened the longing after God, and the desire for restoration to the Divine Original. Even moral evil, sin, and temptation are necessary for men that they may reach the ultimate goal. They humble a man, break his self-will,

and thus effect complete resignation to the Divine Will. Physical and moral evil thus come from the nature of the creature, and are at the same time the means of advancing its progress towards the final goal. Of the original fall of man, of birth, sin, and guilt, there was no need for further explanation. Eckhart, however, takes some account of Church doctrine, that he might not pass it by altogether in silence. But this did not save his own doctrine from censure. As to the redemption of men through Christ, he could not give his consent to the theory of satisfaction. Redemption, he said, and restoration to God did not take place through the sufferings and death of one individual historical person, but through the universal sufferings of creation, and especially of men. So far it may be said that the world, as a phenomenon, was regarded as pessimistic. But notwithstanding this pessimistic feature of the earthly destiny of humanity, Eckhart's doctrine was decidedly optimistic. His genius had been influenced by Orientalism, Neo-Platonism, the writings of the Areopagite and others of that class, but it was kept in balance by a great clearness of reason. Mystical extravagance was checked by a scientific and well-disciplined intellect.

With still greater boldness has Jacob Böhme essayed the solution of our problem. This poor shoemaker, notwithstanding his want of classical education, was a deep-thinking philosopher. He is sometimes, indeed, fantastical, and his language is not elegant, but his thoughts are often profound. The results of his inquiries concerning physical and moral evil are found in the "*Aurora*," and his later writings. He places the deepest source, or original root, of evil in the Divine Nature or Essence. To him God is not a pure abstract, natureless spirit, but an infinite fulness of Being, in which the original ground (*Urgrund*)—or, as he calls it, the un-ground (*Ungrund*)—is distinguished from the personal Divine Spirit. In this Original Divine Being, besides the Divine goodness and perfection, there is a Divine source of wrath, an eternal negation side by side with an eternal affirmation—over against the "yes" in God there stands a "no." There is placed, then, in the Divine immanency itself a wicked principle, but eternally conquered and kept in subjection by the good principle. By this God eternally preserves his Divine actuality. Without the principle of opposition He could not discover Himself, and be perfect. He could not come entirely to self-consciousness. The Persian dualism is here placed in the Godhead itself, in the very midst of the unity and fulness of the Divine Essence, and in this Böhme approaches the doctrine of the Brahmins. In Brahmanism, desire for extension first arising in Brahm, shut up in himself, led to a passive deprivation and emanation. But with Böhme the dualism, eternally active, has to be overcome, and when a world is created it is the work of an active creating power. But as the world, in any

case, is the image of the Deity, and arises by Divine power, it is not surprising that the principle of opposition lies at the foundation from the beginning. It is at least potentially present, and comes to reality at the same time as the creation. According to Böhme this happened first in the spirit world, where Lucifer, at the head of a host of fallen angels, rose in rebellion against God. On that account his dominion over that part of the world subject to him was taken away, and Lucifer himself punished. But this dualism is realised in the development of nature and humanity. In this the Divine wrath again appears. But humanity is capable of redemption, and the gross material world arose in obedience to the Divine decree for the purpose of mitigating the severity of this antagonism, of preparing the way for its abolition, and of making redemption possible. As to the essence and importance of matter, Böhme departs widely from the old Oriental conception which regarded it as essentially evil, or as the source of evil and suffering. He adhered to the doctrine of the fall of our first parents, with, however, important modifications. The fall, the conflict, and the suffering of the creation in his theology are perfectly normal, and do not require any catastrophe. Strife and suffering are the law and fate which have their foundation in the Divine Essence itself, as in the doctrine of the Brahmins suffering is as universal as existence. God Himself not being excepted. With Böhme, however, the active principle of conflict predominates, and not the passive one of suffering.

On this subject by far the most celebrated work is the "Theodicy" of Leibnitz, or "An Inquiry concerning the Goodness of God, the Freedom of Man, and the Origin of Evil." The doctrine of Leibnitz was elaborated with special reference to the pessimistic scepticism of Bayle. It is considered the most decided Optimism, as he maintains that this world, having been chosen and created by God, is the best of all possible worlds. By a common misunderstanding of Leibnitz's doctrine, it is often made the subject of cheap and useless banter. His Optimism is construed as if he meant that the world, as it is, is thoroughly perfect, free from evil and suffering. What he really maintained was that the world, with its evils, was the best world that could have been created. The good really far surpasses the evil, while the significance of the evil is the realization of a yet higher good. To Leibnitz it seemed impossible that a world could exist without moral and physical evil, at least potentially, especially if in it so much happiness, perfection, and blessedness was to be aimed at as exists in the present world. He does not, like Böhme, place the root of moral evil in the nature of God Himself, but he considers it as having a necessary foundation in the essence of creation, and as therefore inevitable. The nature of the finite necessarily involves imperfections. But, on the other hand, a higher per-

fection is made possible. The possibility of physical and moral evil is thus placed, not in the Divine will, but in the divine wisdom. The imperfection of the world is called metaphysical evil, as out of it is produced moral and physical evil. The world must have been created imperfect; for if it had been without all imperfection, then it must have been created absolutely perfect, and thus entirely like God Himself, or a duplicate of Deity, which is impossible.

The necessary imperfection of the world is, however, only privative, not positive. It is only the want of perfection, and the imperfection is only a less good, not a positive substantial evil. In this Leibnitz agrees with Augustine and other orthodox theologians. He considers the question of moral and physical evil only from the standpoint of metaphysical evil. But he does not omit to notice the imperfection of our knowledge. By regarding things as units, we take many things to be imperfect which are yet portions of a perfect whole, as the parts of an organism, incomplete in themselves, form a complete union. As the solar system must be studied from the sun as its centre, so, to understand the world, we must place the eye, as it were, in the sun, and from thence, as the central point of creation, survey the whole. Leibnitz wishes that the world be viewed from the Divine standpoint, or rather from the standpoint of the Divine idea. The standpoint of the world-centre is, for us, impossible, unless we can regard the centre which man occupies as that of the world. And this in its foundation is God's centre, as the human mind includes in itself the idea of God and is developed to a God-consciousness. Physical and moral evil are hereby justified as being inevitable in the best world possible. They have an important meaning in their relation to the existence of nature and of men. They are as the shadow on the picture, as the discord which adds to the harmony. They are the bitter over against which the sweet appears agreeable. For the human race, suffering is a necessary means of progress. All physical evils lead a man in the end to what is best, if he really desires it. In any case they may be conducive to his spiritual perfection. Moral evil Leibnitz also explains as necessary for the best world, and this evil is also grounded in God or His creative activity—at least as to its being possible and admissible. If only the least evil which is in the world had been wanting, it would not have been that world which was invented by the Creator as the best possible. He adds, however, the caution that we are not on that account to take pleasure in sin. Over against the power of sin stands the stronger power of Divine grace. As Christians we have received grace because sin existed. Here we have a development process by which we may see that a world in which sin entered may be better, and in fact was better, than another without sin. If God's great object was to create the best world possible, it was necessary to

permit sin. And if He had not wished to create the best, He would have failed in his duty. God's permitting sin is illustrated by an officer leaving an important post committed to him, that he may settle a fight between two soldiers of the garrison, and prevent them killing each other. His wisdom, goodness, and perfection determine Him to allow the evil, for only thus could He have chosen the best of all possible worlds.

We cannot further at present discuss the views of recent philosophical thinkers. It may be said generally, that the pessimistic conception of existence is adopted by many. David Hume, for instance, concludes his treatise on Natural Religion in words which point in this direction. Kant, in his earlier days, adopted in a treatise on Optimism the views of Leibnitz; but later he inclined manifestly to Pessimism, at least as regards this life. This appears in his doctrine of radical evil in human nature, and in a remark he once made that there could scarcely be a rational man who had passed through this life that would be willing to begin it again. Baader and Schelling return to Böhme in their speculations concerning evil in the world, giving for a foundation partly Böhme's doctrine of a dark "Ungrund," or negative moment in the Divine Essence, and partly adopting his views of the fall of the spirit-world and the consequent rising of material nature to hinder the development of evil, or at least to make restoration possible for man. Hegel might be regarded as an Optimist, as he declares that the actual is rational, and the rational actual. This, strictly taken, would exclude the necessity of progress or perfection. This Optimism, however, is only dialectical. All is, as it must be according to a dialectical process, and is even on that account, destined to non-being. Everything stands under an eternal dialectical fate, or logical reason of this process, which considered in itself may be absolute, perfect, or necessary, but considered from the human standpoint it must appear as bad as it is good.

Arthur Schopenhauer has at last become quite in earnest with the most complete Pessimism, at least in theory. His philosophy, as set forth in his chief work, "The World as Will and Conception," rests chiefly on the Kantian philosophy, according to which the bounds of time and space are mere forms of the conception of our minds, *a priori* conditions of our sensuous external and internal experiences. On this philosophy Schopenhauer establishes his doctrine of the world as our conception ruled by the law of causality. On Kant's doctrine of an intelligible act in a past time by which radical evil arose in human nature, he engrafts the principle that the true essence of the world, behind time and space, is the "Will," a blind inexperienced agent, which is at the same time the true Kantian "Thing in itself." He draws, however, the chief feature of his system from the Buddhist doctrine of the nothingness of all being

and the going into Nirvana, the unconscious being or non-being which is the true goal of all human endeavours. As a reason Schopenhauer sadly and explicitly describes all evil in nature and history, and all the misery of existence, in the fourth book of his work, which treats of the affirmation and negation of the will to life. In nature he sees nothing but suffering and misery. These are chiefly manifest in the animal kingdom, where a continual warfare goes on for mere existence. The lives and pleasures of beasts of prey depend entirely on the suffering and destruction which they cause to others. That the pain of the sufferers is greater than the pleasure of those which inflict it, Schopenhauer thinks may be easily shown by comparing the condition of the beast which eats with that which is eaten. The human race do not appear to him in a better state.

Human existence is nothing but a round of sufferings, cares, and troubles. It were better, he says, not to be, but to go back into the nothing. He divides men into two principal classes—the one is the poor harassed by labour and necessities, the other the rich and idle to whom life is tedious. The greatest pleasures of life are of no real value. When they are reached they never give the satisfaction which they promised. Mental pleasures stand higher, and help to overcome many an earthly sorrow, but of these the uneducated is deprived. Beyond all stands death with his terrors, not suffering man to enjoy any true pleasure even if he were free from other sufferings. Schopenhauer, however, does not recommend self-murder as a lawful "Negation of the Will to Life." Like Hamlet, he longs for an eternal unconsciousness—

"To die—to sleep,—

And by a sleep to say we end

The heartache, and the thousand natural shocks


That flesh is heir to ;—'tis a consummation

Devoutly to be wished."

He is not, however, like Hamlet, restrained by thoughts of a personal immortality and a personal God. He has no fear of anything beyond and no hope of compensation for the sufferings of this life in a heaven of blessedness. Such a Pessimism has Schopenhauer taught, and, as we have said already, not without success. He has disciples and followers who imitate him in their delineations of the wretchedness and the worthlessness of being, who, in fact, try to surpass him, and even succeed. The present appears to us the period of "World-suffering" for young philosophers, which is happily past for young poets.

This historical review will be followed in a second part by the solution of the problem which we have to offer.

J. FROHSCHAMMER.



## THE GOSPEL OF ST. JOHN AND THE APOCALYPSE.

### FIRST PAPER.

IN the comparison which we propose to institute between the Gospel of St. John and the Apocalypse, the question as to the date when the latter was composed or given to the world will be left out of view. Not that that question has not a most important bearing on the general issue. Twenty-five or thirty years is certainly not a long period in the life of man, especially when one, as in all probability St. John had done, has reached threescore before the period begins; and it is not to be expected, in ordinary circumstances, that views which have grown with one's growth and strengthened with one's strength, which have been held with the firm grasp of a deeply meditative nature, and which have been wrought into the inmost texture of the soul by controversies of transcendent importance, will at that stage of life undergo material alteration. But twenty-five or thirty years filled with such events as marked the closing years of the last of the Apostles may well tell a different tale, and be judged of by another than a common standard. The fall of Jerusalem, the departure from Palestine, the prominence of the position occupied in the great capital of Asia, the coming into contact with new ideas, new trains of thought, a new Church, and a new world; the spectacle of the wonderful effects produced by the Gospel upon the Gentile nations; the persecutions endured, the trials

met, the victories achieved during these years, must have separated the life of St. John in the retirement of the Holy Land from his life in the throng of Ephesus by a gulf which the mere space of time thus lived by no means adequately represents. Could it be proved that so many years did intervene between the dates of the composition of the two works before us, it would be impossible not to feel that the fact would exercise a most important influence upon the inquiry that we undertake. Besides which, we are entitled to bear in mind that all leading critics of the negative school assume the existence of the interval referred to; and that upon no point are they more at one than upon this, that the Apocalypse was penned before the destruction of Jerusalem. They, therefore, would not be entitled to complain if, in an argument with them, their own conclusion were taken to be correct.

Yet it shall not be made account of in the following pages, and that mainly because the writer has not been able to satisfy himself that the arguments, powerful as they are for the early date of the Apocalypse, are sufficient to counterbalance the well-known testimony of Irenæus to a late one. He is not at liberty, therefore, to avail himself of the supposition that twenty-five or thirty eventful years separate the dates of the two writings to be inquired into; and all that he can do is, to take these two writings as they stand, with the view of asking whether, without reference to date, they are so different from one another as to make the supposition of identity of authorship impossible. It is not, however, to the negative school of criticism that, in trying to give an answer to this question, he proposes directly to address himself. It were needless to do so. So long as that school maintains its fundamental principles of the impossibility of miracles, and of the merely natural character of Christianity, no argument with regard to the historical authority of the books of Scripture can be urged against it with the slightest hope of success. Labour expended in such a direction and with such an aim is, so far as it is concerned, entirely thrown away; and it is full time that this were recognised by the defenders of the Church's faith. That school *must* dispose of our authoritative books as unhistorical and false. It cannot, in the very nature of the case, give fair consideration to the arguments adduced by the apologists of Scriptural Christianity. It may profess to do so—it may even succeed in persuading itself that it desires to do so; but the thing is simply impossible, and it is in the domain of metaphysics and of the fundamental ideas of religion, not in the domain of historical criticism, that it must be met. The difficulties before us are not, however, felt by it alone; they are felt by not a few who have no sympathy with its general views. There is perplexity upon the point in the minds of

many who believe Christianity to be a supernatural revelation. They, too, are sensible of the wide difference which apparently marks off the Apocalypse from the Fourth Gospel; and to them, although drawing the statements of this difference from the writers of the negative school, and not to these writers themselves, we desire to speak.

Most of those who will take an interest in this paper are well aware both of the nature of the charge to be dealt with, and of the confidence with which it is urged. But, for the sake of others, it may be well to say that it consists of the general statement that, both in form and substance, the Apocalypse is outward, realistic, Judaic; the Gospel of St. John inward, spiritual, exhibiting not the slightest trace of a Judaic, but rather every possible proof of the widest, most unrestricted, most universal, conception of Christianity. It is alleged that the writer of the one betrays "a want of the breadth of mind which only culture can give," and that his work is "deeply impregnated with the Jewish spirit, and steeped in the very essence of Chiliasm;"\* while the writer of the other is constantly lauded for his breadth of view, and for his freedom from every Chiliastic element. It is urged that with the one Christianity is only a higher form, is only the fulfilment, of Judaism;† that with the other it has burst all local and temporary bonds, risen superior to the early antagonism between Jewish and Heathen forms of Christian belief, and presented itself in the purest and most spiritual light. Such is the general charge, and it seems unnecessary to illustrate it by any number of quotations from the writers spoken of. The conclusion drawn may be stated in the words of De Wette, often quoted with approbation by these writers, both on the Continent and in England:—

"In the criticism of the New Testament there is nothing established with such certainty as that the Apostle John cannot have written the Apocalypse if he be the author of the Gospel and Epistles, or that, if he be the author of the former, he cannot also be the author of the latter.‡ It is the same conclusion that is otherwise expressed by Baur when he says, "The Evangelist's point of view is not merely different from that of the Seer, it is thoroughly opposed to it."§

The question before us, then, is one of capital importance. We shall endeavour to call attention to its leading points as fully as the limits to which we must confine ourselves will allow.

We add only two preliminary remarks. First, we shall refer to the First Epistle of St. John as the production of the writer of the Gospel. The right to do this will be denied by so few, that argument upon the point may be dispensed with. Secondly, we shall regard the words of Jesus in the Gospel of St. John as expressing not only the Saviour's but the Evangelist's thoughts. Such a right

\* Tayler on the Fourth Gospel, pp. 144, 146.

† Baur die Kanon. Evang., p. 347.

‡ Einleitung, § 189, 4.

§ u. s., p. 347.

must be conceded, altogether apart from the question how far these words may have been modified in their form by passing through the mind of St. John. The simple fact that the Apostle gives them is sufficient proof that he regarded them as divine, and had made them his own. We turn first to the form of the books before us.

## I.

As to the *Jewish form* of the Apocalypse, we have to ask whether there is anything in that inconsistent with the form in which the writer of the Fourth Gospel might have cast his thoughts. That the form is Jewish, steeped in Judaism, it is of course impossible to deny. The work is the production of one whose mind was filled with the rich, the concrete, and the sensuous imagery, as well as with the lofty and impassioned language, of the prophets of the Old Testament. The figures are, without exception, taken from Jewish sources and associations. Even those of them of which it can hardly be doubted for a moment that they are intended to set forth purely Christian ideas, such as Jerusalem and Zion, bear their Jewish origin on their face; while not a few are to be found, both in their special details themselves and in the arrangement of these details, in Daniel, Ezekiel, Isaiah, Nahum, and others of the prophets. The hopes and promises set before the people of God are presented in images long consecrated to the encouragement of the pious Israelite—the hidden manna, the living fountains of waters, the name written on the forehead, the sealing of the twelve tribes, the tree of life. The pictures of threatening and judgment again, are such as had long been used to awaken the careless, and to alarm the guilty, Jew; and the whole delineation has in it a poetic liveliness and force at once revealing one to whom the thoughts of ancient prophecy were both familiar and dear.

How different is it with the Gospel—prophetic imagery awanting; the truths unfolded set before us in didactic narrative in which symbolism appears, at first sight at least, to play no part; the language calm, unimpassioned, clear; the stern spirit of the ancient prophet giving place to that of the Gospel messenger of peace; “quiet contemplation having full scope, mildness and love finding utterance in affectionate discourse;”<sup>\*</sup> where little meets us indicating either a regard for Judaism or a connection with it; where, rather, the Saviour is brought before us speaking to Israel of “your” law, as if it were not also his; and where the very term “Jews” is again and again employed as the most appropriate for his bitterest and most persistent enemies.

Certainly the contrast is a striking one; yet we cannot persuade ourselves that much stress would have been laid upon it had it stood

<sup>\*</sup> Davidson, i. p. 335.

*alone*, had it not been supposed to be accompanied by divergence of thought, and by a total difference of style and grammatical structure. Few things can be established with greater certainty than that the writer of the Fourth Gospel was a Jew. Was he to forget his Jewish forms of thought when he became a Christian—the Jewish rites amidst which he had evidently loved to linger—the diction of that Jewish Bible which, as is proved by his quotations, he knew so well? Have *we* forgotten them even now? After a lapse of eighteen centuries, all illustrating, not so much the connection of Christianity with Judaism, as the newness of its own power on the earth, is not the Old Testament still to us the treasure-house of many of our most inspiring thoughts, and certainly of our most lofty and solemn language? But in the early age of the Gospel it was far more the Church's Bible than it is now. It was emphatically *the* divine revelation given to the world, the source in which edification was to be sought, and by which the heavenly character of Christ's mission was to be proved. It was more read, more lived by, more engraven on the memory, than it is with us; and if, therefore, its images and figures may still be used by the most spiritual Christian as the appropriate vehicle of his thoughts, surely they might be so used then. Nay, there are circumstances and seasons when the mind seems naturally to turn for its mould of thought and for its language to the Old Testament rather than to the New. Such are times of suffering and trial, times when we are led to look forward with longing to a future brighter than the present. The New Testament hardly supplies so much as the Old to feed this frame of mind. No doubt it has in it deep longings too; but it is at the same time so full of peace, of conscious possession of a present salvation, of eternity already won, that it cannot give these longings so prominent a place as does the Old. Therefore it is that, when we stretch our thoughts forward into the future, we are thrown more into the state of those whose chief characteristic was longing, and therefore that we grasp, putting our own deeper meaning into them, at the prophetic pictures by which they were cheered. It is little to the purpose, then, that the writer of the Fourth Gospel should have been in that work so simple, so didactic, and so calm. He was writing narrative, he was describing facts; facts which, even as beheld by him, had been wonderfully interwoven with "quiet contemplation" and "affectionate discourse." But when he came to look, like a prophet, into the future, why should he not use the prophetic figures and language that had been long familiar to him? We mark something of the same kind in our Lord himself. Put into any one's hand the Sermon on the Mount and the twenty-fourth chapter of St. Matthew's Gospel as two separate productions, and would he not pronounce

them to have been spoken by different lips? Or take the account of the institution of the Lord's Supper as it is given us even in St. Luke, and is there not a rising on the part of Jesus into that symbolical, that prophetic language which he does not usually employ, but which we at once feel to be peculiarly suitable to the solemn circumstances of the hour? The difference of the subject or of the moment makes the difference; and the same thing is illustrated in the case of every author who deals with matter so different as narrative and didactic discourse upon the one hand, or with prophetic discourse upon the other.

But it is not enough to say that the Fourth Gospel deals mainly with narrative of what is new, and that the prophetic pictures of the Old Testament had long had a place in the writer's heart, been entwined with his holiest associations, and might therefore be expected to mould his utterances when he fell into the same train of thought with them. It was, further, only now that these prophecies rose in their full meaning before his view. They received now a meaning which they had never had before, and, as he beheld them all transfigured in that Saviour in whom their most rapturous language was fulfilled, it was but natural that he should use them to express what was the accomplishment of his own and his nation's hopes.

This explains also why the language of the Apocalypse should be so severe. It was in visions of the sterner kind that the prophets of the Old Testament had mainly dealt. Amidst the wickedness by which they were surrounded they had seen God arising "to shake terribly the earth," and the overthrow of sin was necessary to the establishing of righteousness. It is thus in every age. The voice of a true prophet must always in a large degree be a voice of judgment, of "mourning, and lamentation, and woe."

What has now been said would be unavailable for our purpose only on one condition. Had St. John shown in his Gospel that he could express himself in dull prosaic language alone, had there been in that Gospel no traces of a hidden fire, of liveliness of feeling, of power of graphic delineation, of pathos, of sublimity, of a soul that could be stirred to its greatest depths, we might have hesitated before speaking thus, and might have thought that it would be difficult for such an one to feel himself at home amidst the glowing visions of prophetic imagery, and the picture-words of prophetic speech. But it is well known that the very contrary is the case; and the conclusion therefore is legitimate, that, when occasion called for it, when the nature of the subject itself demanded it, it would be an easy and natural thing for the author of the Fourth Gospel to express himself in the figures and in the language of the Apocalypse.

Then, too, in forming our estimate of that author, we must not

forget the First Epistle of St. John, which there is so much reason to think also proceeded from his pen—the Epistle in which we may expect to find him revealing himself even more than in the Gospel, and which exhibits so much of that “sharp, definite, decisive tone,” so much of that fiery nature, though accompanied by the tenderest love, which are allowed to be so characteristic of the other work claiming also to be his.

It is unnecessary to say more. Dr. Davidson, alluding to “difference of subject,” admits that it “has its weight,”\* and it is upon this alone, and not upon “difference of age or of mental state,” that we rest our argument.

These remarks apply only to the *form* of our two writings. It may be otherwise with their ideas. There the possibility of great difference cannot be allowed. A man may change his style, according to the aspect in which he desires to present his thoughts. If he be a true and genuine writer he cannot change the thoughts themselves. Now, nothing is more obvious than that the writer of the Fourth Gospel has a singularly clear, definite, and individual idea both of Christ and of his kingdom. That Gospel of his is totally distinct from the Gospels of the first three Evangelists. It is no gathering together of little stories, illustrative of Jesus and his work, and only at times, by the retaining or omitting of some particular, permitting us to infer that the writer has a special conception of the Redeemer, which he is desirous to present. It is stamped on every line with the most marked individuality. It is the embodiment, from first to last, of the most definite and characteristic views. It is the complete outpouring of the soul of its writer. Difference of view, therefore, or, at all events, fundamental difference, in another work by the same author, is impossible. There might, indeed, be development, although, even then, it must be in the same line; but, having left the date of the Apocalypse undetermined, we are not entitled to avail ourselves of any plea founded upon this. We must take the two books, and compare their contents as they stand.

We are thus brought to our second point, the substance of the books before us.

## II.

In treating of this point it is, of course, impossible to pass in review the whole teaching either of the Apocalypse or of the Fourth Gospel. But, if we select the parts of the former, embracing nearly all its most important visions, and those of the latter, embodying its most distinctive and characteristic teaching, no one will be justified in complaining of unfairness. We select four such points for con-

\* i. p. 343.

sideration :—The light in which the Apocalypse presents, first, the Saviour himself; secondly, the nature of the field in which He has to carry out his work, and the opposition to be met in it; thirdly, the general character of that work, and the manner in which it is accomplished; fourthly, the close of all. No one acquainted with the controversy will deny that these four topics lead us into the very heart of the teaching of the Fourth Gospel—that they exhaust the main portion, at least, of the symbols of the Apocalypse will be seen as we proceed. We have to notice the relation in which the modes of their presentation in our different documents stand to one another.

1. *The light in which the Apocalypse presents the Saviour to our view.* Upon this point we may well afford to be brief. It is allowed that “the most marked coincidence is apparently in the Christology.”\* The complete correctness of this statement cannot be admitted, for the other coincidences to be spoken of are more marked, because less immediately perceptible, and less likely, therefore, to have been the work of a late forger of the Gospel. The admission, however, is enough to justify us in passing rapidly over this part of the subject. We forbear, therefore, to dwell upon many points of resemblance between the descriptions of Jesus in our two books, such as the divine attributes everywhere ascribed to Him in both; the prominence given to the conception of Him as a shepherd, a conception only distantly alluded to in the three earlier Gospels, but wrought out fully in St. John; the importance attached to the idea of his being the faithful and true witness; his bestowing the “hidden manna,” equivalent to “the true bread from heaven;” his dwelling among his saints; his supplying them with the water of life; his being the bridegroom of his church. The existence of these conceptions in the Apocalypse, and that, too, in a marked manner, is not denied; and they all incontestably lead us to the thoughts of the Fourth Gospel rather than to those of any of the others. We pass rather to one or two points which it is either impossible to omit, or the force of which does not seem to have been sufficiently apprehended.

First, the appellation, “Word of God.” The most superficial reader is struck with the fact that, while the fourth Evangelist introduces the Saviour to us, in a way altogether peculiar to himself, as “The Word,” “The Word which was in the beginning, was with God, and was God” (i. 1), the Seer of the Apocalypse says of the Messiah, when he describes Him as coming forth to victory, “his name is called the Word of God” (xix. 13). Into the origin of the designation it is needless to inquire. It is of more importance for us simply to observe that, while this express title is given to the Redeemer in no book of Scripture previous to the Apocalypse except

\* Davidson’s “Introduction to the New Testament,” i. 333.

the Fourth Gospel, it is here assigned to Him under circumstances rendering it peculiarly important and impressive. It is the first time that any *name* is given Him in the book. It is the first time that He *appears* in order to be the conqueror over his foes. The battle of the truth indeed seems, by the time he does so, to be almost over; but, during all the visions that have described it, we have never *seen* Him the secret might of whose arm has scattered and destroyed his enemies. Now we see Him. Now we behold Him who, from his unseen throne, has smitten the nations, has ruled them with a rod of iron, has trodden the wine-press of the fierceness and wrath of Almighty God (comp. v. 15)—has, in short, produced the discomfiture recorded in the previous visions of the book; and, at the moment when He is thus introduced to us, the central victorious figure of all Christian history, the great Captain whom the armies of heaven follow as the captain of their salvation, we are told that “his name is called the Word of God.” Nor, though now first used, was the name now first given, for the later reading *κέκληται*, instead of *καλεῖται*, shows us, to use the words of Hengstenberg, that “the name was even now an old one.” Nothing could exhibit a more remarkable correspondence with the Fourth Gospel, not merely in the use of the name, but in the thought of the circumstances and relations amidst which, and in connection with which, that name is made known to man. It is the moment of Christ’s coming forth visibly from the bosom of the Father that is chosen to announce it.

Upon the old and often refuted attempts to draw a distinction between the manner in which the name thus given to the Saviour is used in the Gospel and in the Apocalypse, we deem it unnecessary to dwell; but Dr. Davidson has recently made a new one, to which it may be proper to allude. “The Christology of the Apocalypse,” he remarks, “contains genuine apostolic elements;” and, after pointing out a few of them, he adds, “Jesus is the organ of communication between God and his people; and therefore he is the ‘Word of God,’ not ‘God the Word,’ as in John i. 1.”\* But not only is there not the slightest trace that, at the moment when the title in question is given to the Redeemer, he is thought of as “the organ of communication between God and his people,” the particular form of the title said to be found in the Gospel has no existence there. Nay, more, we may venture to assert that, considering the Christology of the Gospel, it could not occur there; it would be entirely out of keeping with the representation of Christ with which the Gospel opens. “God the Word” would convey an idea altogether different from “the Word was God,” and the two expressions are very far from being interchangeable.

\* *Introd.*, i. p. 322.

Secondly, the appellation of the Lamb. It is not only as the "Word of God" that the Saviour is presented to us in the Apocalypse. There is another figure employed to set him forth, one so intimately bound up with the whole structure of the book that we meet with it no less than twenty-seven times—the figure of the Lamb. But this figure, as is well known, is not only peculiar to the Fourth Gospel alone of all the other books of scripture; it occupies so prominent a place in it, that it is regarded by Baur as one of the great dogmatic points in the interest of which that Gospel was penned, and for the sake of which the writer went so far as deliberately to change the day already known in the Church as the day of the Lord's death. We may dismiss this exaggeration for the present; but it cannot be denied that the account of the Crucifixion in John xix. 34—37, does exhibit in the most marked and striking manner the anxiety of the Evangelist to lead us to the thought of Jesus as the true Paschal Lamb. When, therefore, we find such a conception, evidently a fundamental one, ruling both the works before us; so prominent in the Gospel that, by the confession of opponents, it is subordinate to no other figure there employed; so characteristic of the Apocalypse as to be associated even with pictures of the Redeemer's glory and "wrath" which might have been thought likely to exclude it, if not to be altogether inconsistent with it (comp. *e. g.* Rev. v. 12, vi. 16), it is impossible not to see in this a mark of the closest and most intimate correspondence of thought.

No doubt it may be urged, as has often been done, that the words used to denote the Lamb in our two books are totally distinct, in the one *ἀμνός*, in the other *ἀρνίον*. Yet the use of the latter, instead of the former, in the Apocalypse, ought not only to be no occasion of perplexity, it admits of a simple and natural explanation which again binds our two writers together, instead of separating them from one another. For, let us observe that the word *ἀμνός* is not once used by the writer of the Fourth Gospel himself. It occurs only twice in that work (i. 29, 36), and both times in the mouth of John the Baptist. The word *ἀρνίον* again is found only once in the Gospel (xxi. 15\*), and then in the lips of Jesus. Can we suppose that this was the only time during a three years' ministry that our Lord, who seems often to have used of himself the figure of a shepherd, and who took children in his arms and blessed them, spoke of his *ἀρνία*? Hardly will any one for a moment think so. If we may not say that it is certain, we may at least say that it is in the highest degree probable, that the tender expression must have been often in the Good Shepherd's mouth, and in that circumstance alone we have an ample

\* We must crave leave to refer, without argument, to the twenty-first chapter of St. John's Gospel as authentic.

explanation of the fact that St. John, if also the historian of his life, should have preferred it to *ἀμνός*, a word associated with no such touching and endearing recollections. It is the memory of the Evangelist that guides the Seer.

There is more, however, to be said upon this point. The Saviour is not only in the Apocalypse the Lamb, He is also the slain Lamb, the *ἀρνίον ἐσφαγμένον*.\* What is the meaning of this appellation? Not merely that Jesus was put to death. The verb *σφάζω* expresses more than a mere violent death. It has reference to killing in sacrifice, to such sacrifice as prevented the blood remaining in the body. To no idea of the Gospels is this so naturally allied as to that already referred to in the nineteenth chapter of the fourth, where we are taught by the evangelist that not only did blood flow forth from Jesus at his death, but that its doing so was in his eyes of extreme importance. It was the complete fulfilment of the prophecy, "They shall look on Him whom they have pierced."

Thirdly, to one other point in connection with this part of our subject we must still advert. While it is allowed that the glory ascribed to the Saviour in the Apocalypse corresponds in extent to that assigned Him in the Fourth Gospel, it is objected that the mode of its manifestation is wholly different. In the Gospel that glory is made manifest only to the inward eye of faith, which beholds in the Redeemer the sum of divine grace and truth. In the Apocalypse, again, the glory is something outward, in the form of might and dominion.† The contrast thus alluded to between grace in the one case and might in the other, undoubtedly exists to a large extent, and the cause of it will appear at a later stage of our discussion; but the charge of outwardness in the Apocalypse, as compared with inwardness in the Gospel, is destitute of all foundation. When, indeed, we attend to the order of the visions in the former book, there is nothing more strikingly characteristic of them than the manner in which, up to the very last, the Saviour himself is withheld from view. In the visions which constitute by far the larger portion of the whole, those in which victory over enemies is described, He is not once brought forward in his outward glory; and it is not until we reach the nineteenth chapter that He comes forth in the sight of the nations. Up to that time, the world has not once beheld Him. In the very instant of his birth He was caught up unto God and unto his throne (xii. 5). From his unseen place in

\* Baur (Geschichte, i. p. 155) denies that the words *ἀρνίον ἐσφαγμένον* lead us to the Paschal Lamb. They lead us rather to Isaiah liii. 7. But that text was a proof-text in the Early Church that Jesus was the Paschal Lamb, *ἦν γὰρ τὸ πάσχα ὁ Χριστός, ὁ τοῦ αἵματος ὑστερον, ὡς Ἡσαίας ἔφη, Αὐτὸς ὡς πρόβατον ἐπὶ σφαγὴν ἵχθη*. Dial. c. Tryph. c. cxi. Comp. Ritschl. Altk. Kirche, p. 121.

† Frommann der John, Lehrb., p. 545. Comp. Davidson, i. p. 335.

heaven He has directed the contest and exercised his rule. No hostile eye has witnessed the glory which belongs to Him. Even his people have not beheld it until the final stage of the conflict is reached. John, indeed, himself has seen it in the first chapter, yet only "in the spirit" (i. 10); they have not. It is not as those upon whom outward glory has shone that they are spoken of, but as those who "have washed their robes, and made them white in the blood of the Lamb" (vii. 14). The glory of the slain Lamb is all that they have seen; and is not that the very glory which meets us in the beginning of the Gospel, "The Word was made flesh and dwelt among us, and we beheld his glory, the glory as of the only begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth?" (John i. 14.) Were it indeed true that the first rider in Rev. vi. 2 is a figure of the Saviour, it might be urged that the representation now given is not correct; but the analogy of the other riders, combined with that singularly harmonious and well-ordered arrangement of all the visions of the Apocalypse with which every student of the book is familiar, makes such an interpretation doubtful; and it is not, therefore, till the contest is set before us in its final stage, that even the redeemed of the earth behold the captain of their salvation in his outward majesty. They beheld Him by faith before; and only when the victory is won, do they see Him as He is, and follow Him "upon white horses, clothed in fine linen, white and clean" (xix. 14).

2. We turn to the second point proposed for consideration, *The nature of the field in which the Saviour has to carry out his work, and the opposition to be met in it.* Nothing is more characteristic of the Gospel and Epistles of St. John than the light in which we are there presented with the field of the Saviour's working. It is one in which we see not so much sinners to be saved as enemies to be overcome; in which mankind are divided into two great classes, one of which has already a receptivity for the truth, while the other is determinedly opposed to it; and in which, therefore, the work of Jesus consists in a separation of the two classes, in perfecting and making manifest the tendencies existing in them, rather than in bringing the one class over to the other. The general impression conveyed to us by the earlier Gospels of the state of those not yet interested in Christ, is that they are miserable in their sinfulness, and are to be led by a gracious Redeemer to the happiness which they need, and for which they long. Not that their sinfulness is unthought of, but it is not so prominent as their misery. They "labour and are heavy laden;" they "faint and are scattered abroad as sheep having no shepherd;" they are laden with the "infirmities" and "sicknesses" which Jesus bore; they stand in need of the "rest" and healing which the good physician alone can give

(Matt. xi. 28, 29, ix. 36; Mark ii. 17; Luke v. 31). To all of them, therefore, Jesus addresses himself, as if they occupied substantially the same ground. All of them are in an exactly similar position as regards Him; the state of all when He issues his invitations is equally one, not only of necessity, but of hope; on all He has equally to bestow the blessings of his salvation, if they will not now, *after they have listened to Him*, cast away his offered gift.

St. John's point of view is entirely different. Not, indeed, that the salvation to be found in Jesus is not designed to be universal, that there is even one who may not be saved if he will only turn to the light that shines around him, and let that light shine within him. "God so loved the world, that He gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in Him should not perish, but have everlasting life;" "I came not to judge the world, but to save the world" (iii. 16; xii. 47). Nor, again, that men are considered as so essentially identified with the two classes into which they are divided, as to deprive them of all responsibility for the reception or rejection of the truth. It is conclusive against any such idea that, as regards the one class, St. John says in the very opening of his Gospel, "As many as *received* Him, to them gave He power to become the sons of God" (i. 12); as regards the other, "This is the condemnation, that light is come into the world, and men *loved* darkness rather than light, because their deeds were evil" (iii. 19). In both cases moral responsibility is implied. Still, the fact remains that there are two classes, and these not simply formed *after* the work of Christ has tried and proved the world, but before it, and while the Logos is not yet incarnate. Almost the very first words of the Gospel introduce us to this conception. We do not see only a world of sinners, all equally alienated from God, all in that earliest stage of natural sinfulness to which no moral discipline has been as yet applied. There has been such a discipline, although its history is not unfolded to us; and we now witness the result.\* From the first two classes appear: on the one side there is alienation, deep, deliberate, confirmed, "the light shineth in darkness, and the darkness comprehended it not" (i. 5); on the other side there are those who "received" the Word incarnate, and who, because they received Him, had that faith implanted in them by which they became the sons of God (i. 12). And this antithesis of light and darkness, of

\* In considering the difficult topic here before us it may be well for our readers to take along with them the following words of Dean Alford. He is commenting on John iii. 17, and showing that that text is not in contradiction to ix. 39, "for judgment I am come into this world;" and he says, "The *κριμα* there, as here, results from the separation of mankind into two classes—those who will, and those who will not come to the light; and that result itself is not the *purpose why* the Son of God came into the world, but is evolved in the accomplishment of the higher purpose, viz., Love, and the salvation of men."

truth and falsehood, of life and death, runs throughout the whole Gospel. It knows only of two classes of men, represented by these terms; and, from the moment these classes are introduced to us, they are completely separated from one another. There is the class of those who receive the Saviour, and of those who do not receive Him; of those who recognise his glory as the glory of the only begotten of the Father, and of those who do not recognise it — mark the emphatic “we” in i. 14; — of those who know Him, and of those who know Him not; of those who see, and of those who are blind; of those who are the children of God, and of those who are of their father the devil. Nor is this antithesis conceived of as an antithesis of states into which men gradually rise or sink, but as all along fully formed, as chosen by such as respectively belong to either side, as developed and mature. In short, the contrast between the followers and the enemies of Christ, between the Church and the world, is from the first and always presented to us in the sharpest and most distinctive lines; the separation is decided; the two have no point of connection with each other. “Everything with John falls into two opposite spheres, the one of which contains whatever is divine, the other whatever is the reverse.”\*

Various circumstances connected with St. John's mode of speaking illustrate what has now been said. Let us advert to one or two of them. It is thus, *e.g.*, that, in his writings, even false brethren are not those who have fallen away from the Church. They never belonged to it; they were the world in the Church. “They went out from us, but they were not of us; for if they had been of us, they would no doubt have continued with us: but they went out, that they might be made manifest that they were not all of us” (1 John ii. 19). It is thus that he recalls the words of Jesus regarding Judas: “Have not I chosen you twelve, and one of you is a devil? He spake of Judas Iscariot, the son of Simon: for he it was that should betray him, being one of the twelve” (John vi. 70, 71). Judas is to outward appearance one of the twelve but he really belongs to an altogether different class; he is a devil. It is thus that in the present condition of men their future is always viewed without any heed being given to the fact that the righteous may fall away, that the wicked may be converted and saved. “He that believeth on him is not condemned: but he that believeth not is condemned already, because he hath not believed in the name of the only begotten Son of God;” “He that believeth on the Son hath everlasting life: and he that believeth not the Son shall not see life; but the wrath of God abideth on him” (iii. 18, 36). Above all, it is thus that St. John seems often to look wholly away, or to

\* Koestlin, quoted in Hengstenberg on the Rev., ii. 480.

bring Jesus himself before us as looking away, from some of the most important steps in what we should call the conversion of the sinner, and that not a few of his texts present in this light serious difficulties to the interpreter. "He that is *of God* heareth God's words: ye therefore hear them not, because ye are not of God;" "But ye believe not because *ye are not of my sheep*;" "Every one that is *of the truth* heareth my voice;" "They are *of the world*; therefore speak they of the world, and the world heareth them. We are *of God*: he that knoweth God heareth us; he that is *not of God* heareth not us" (John viii. 47; x. 26; xviii. 37; 1 John iv. 5, 6)—all, words in which the expressions "of the truth," "of God," "of the world," must be referred, not to a stage of the spiritual history when Christ's words have been either received or rejected, but to a stage anterior to that, when the bias to the one course or the other is thought of as already existing in the soul. The spiritual history of man is, in such passages, taken up at a different point from that in which the eye only rests on the natural disinclination of all to godliness. Man is viewed as if he were marked by a predisposition to either good or evil; as if some were from the first inclined to receive, and others to reject, the full communication of the light that shines in Christ; as if the germ of the ultimate result were previously existing in the soul; and as if the true point of departure for our consideration of man's state were that where the divinely-implanted love of the truth is the foundation for higher blessings, where the devil-implanted love of a lie, and the free clinging to it, is the foundation for final doom. It is needless to say that, in all this, there is not the slightest essential divergence from the doctrine of the universal corruption of human nature, and of our entire dependence upon the grace and spirit of God for the very earliest dawns of the divine life within us. That doctrine is set before us by St. John with all the distinctness which marks the other writers of the New Testament. It is simply a mode of viewing the matter peculiar to him. It marks him out at once from the rest of the Apostles; and it is so essentially imbedded in his nature that it colours his whole language, and is interwoven with his whole style of thought.

Such then being the antithesis between good and evil, as presented to us in the Gospel in the field of the Saviour's work, we shall be prepared to find a corresponding modification in the aspect in which that work itself is set before us there. It may be expected to consist, not so much in converting all classes, as in separating the two of which we have spoken, and in cultivating in the one the germ which is to issue in the possession of life, in visiting judicially in the other the germ which is to end in death in its deepest and fullest sense. And so it is. The work of Christ through all the Gospel is a work

of sifting. He knows what is in man, and needs not that any should testify of man. Therefore He does not commit himself to the Jews at Jerusalem, even when they had been so impressed by his miracles that it is said "they believed on his name," because this faith was not the genuine faith of his children (ii. 23—25); while he immediately afterwards reveals his highest truths to Nicodemus and the Samaritan woman, because they were really anxious to learn: a line of demarcation is drawn between the former and the latter. In the subsequent chapters the line is still more distinctly drawn. The unbelieving Jews are set before us as becoming only more and more confirmed in their opposition; the believing disciples are united to their Master in bonds constantly closer and more endearing. To the one he can only speak in terms of severe reproach, "How can ye believe?" "Ye are from beneath;" "Ye are of your father the devil" (v. 44; viii. 23, 44); the other are in ever-increasing degree his friends—He washes their feet; He addresses to them his most consolatory discourses; at the Supper, one of them leans upon his bosom; till at length in his last intercessory prayer the separation is indicated in the most solemn and awe-inspiring manner—"I have manifested thy name unto the men which thou gavest me out of the world. I pray for them: I pray not for the world." (xvii. 6, 9.)

Before proceeding further let us turn to the Apocalypse. And how is it possible not to mark its identity of representation with the Gospel of St. John in this highly characteristic point of view? From the first vision to the last nothing can be stronger than the antithesis set before us between the Church and the world, between the followers and the opponents of the Lamb. There is no neutral ground; all men are divided into the two great sections, light or darkness, truth or falsehood. Nay, just as in the Gospel the antithesis between truth and falsehood, light and darkness, is seen at the very beginning of Christ's work—just as, when any are brought to acknowledge Jesus truly, we are immediately reminded that even previously they were of his sheep, of those whom the Father had given him—just as, in short, we see less a passing from darkness into life than a brightening of the already existent light and a deepening of the already existent darkness, so in the Apocalypse the two great divisions of mankind are viewed as separate from the first; and what we see of them is not a passing from the one to the other by either an upward or a downward progress, it is a rising in the same line to ever higher victory, a sinking in the same line to ever heavier woe. It may at first sight strike us with extreme surprise that a prophetic book, intended to be the stay and comfort of the Church amidst her trials, and written when as yet she had made no great progress in the world, should in all its visions not possess one to tell her of that

increase in number, of that missionary success, which should be had. Yet such is undoubtedly the fact. The visions of the seals, the trumpets, and the vials relate all to the same objects. No extension of the Church's borders is even so much as incidentally alluded to under any one of them till the very end is reached; and even then "the kingdoms of the world become the kingdoms of our Lord and of his Christ," not by the conversion, but by the destruction, of the Church's foes. There is no change in the sphere in which the action of these three great series of visions, constituting evidently one of the most important parts of the book, is played out. There is a difference, indeed, between the trumpets and the seals, and again between the vials and the trumpets. There is a climax as we proceed; a climax in the visions of each series compared with those of the series going before, because mercy has been more despised, and sin has grown more ripe for judgment. But all this time, a time extending through the whole history of the militant and struggling Church, the field upon which the scourges of God are poured out does not change its boundaries. It is the same with the visions of comfort interposed at various points of the delineation, with the sealing and harping visions coming before the seventh seal, the measuring and witnessing visions coming before the seventh trumpet, and the vision of the Lamb upon Mount Zion surrounded by his saints coming before, not the seventh vial, but all the seven vials, for the Lord is now about to make a short work upon the earth. There is again no change in the numbers of those who are made partakers of the blessedness represented. There is a difference as before. There is a climax, because Christian faith has been more tried, and Christian experience is richer and able to take in a higher reward; but through the whole period, a period extending from the First to the Second Coming of our Lord, the field of blessing is not enlarged; the Church is ideally as strong at the beginning as at the end. There is no passing then of darkness into light; there is no sinking of light into darkness. There is ever brightening light; there is ever deepening darkness. The two lines are from first to last distinct, antithetical, opposed—the very mode of representation that we have already found in the Fourth Gospel.

It is not enough, however, to dwell only on this more general light in which the disciples and the enemies of Christ are thus presented to our view in the writings under consideration. The enemies occupying the field of the Saviour's work are specialized in both. Before endeavouring to determine what they are in the Gospel and Epistles one remark has to be made. It is in the Epistles rather than in the Gospel that we are to look for a statement of them. The reason is obvious. The Gospel is historical. It is not an ideal picture in which the contrasts and struggles of the Apostle's own day are trans-

ferred to the days of Christ, and in which the mould of the Redeemer's life is formed with express reference to them—it is a history of Jesus at a period when the nature of his work was not fully understood by men, and when the opposition called forth by it was not yet fully developed. It is otherwise with the Epistles. They are the writer's own language, the expression of his own views *at the time he wrote*; and we may expect, therefore, to find in them what his later experience had taught him of the chief sources of opposition with which the cause of Christ had to contend.

Keeping this in mind, and taking the Gospel and Epistles as a whole, there can be no doubt that the first and most formidable enemy of Christ spoken of in them is Satan, the prince of this world, the source and origin of all evil. That this is a fundamental idea of the writings before us no one will deny. We meet it continually, and that in the strongest and most emphatic language. "Now," says Jesus on one occasion, "is the judgment of this world: now shall the prince of this world be cast out;" again, "the prince of this world cometh, and hath nothing in me;" and again, speaking of the three great parts of that work of conviction to be carried on by the Comforter after his departure, "He shall reprove the world of judgment, because the prince of this world is judged" (xii. 31, xiv. 30, xvi. 11). In like manner he is the great hindrance to men's coming to the knowledge of the truth, "Why do ye not understand my speech? even because ye cannot hear my word. Ye are of your father the devil, and the lusts of your father ye will do" (viii. 44); he is the great source of sin, "he that committeth sin is of the devil" (1 John iii. 8); and when we prevail against him we are strong, "I have written unto you young men because ye are strong, and the word of God abideth in you, and ye have overcome the wicked one" (1 John ii. 14). It is unnecessary to quote more. "This prominence," says Auberlen, "given to Satan is a peculiar characteristic of all the writings of John; they contain not only the deepest revelations concerning the Divine Being, but also disclose to us the most distant background of the world and its history."\*

The second enemy is the world, which, to use the words of Lechler, comprehends "the whole earthly creation in so far as it is alienated from communion with God, in so far as it is subjected to the dominion of the evil one."† "Love not the world," it is said, "neither the things that are in the world. If any man love the world, the love of the Father is not in him. For all that is in the world, the lust of the flesh, and the lust of the eyes, and the pride of life, is not of the Father, but is of the world." "They are of the world: we are

\* Daniel and the Rev., Clark's Translation, p. 265.

† Das Ap. u. Nachap. Zeitalter, p. 211.

of God" (1 John ii. 15, 16; iv. 5, 6). Nor this alone: the world which is thus the enemy of truth and goodness is peculiarly connected with the first enemy the devil—"We know that we are of God, and the whole world *lieth in the wicked one*" (1 John v. 19, *ἐν τῷ πονηρῷ*, unquestionably wrongly translated "wickedness" in the English version, comp. v. 18).

To these two enemies we have a third to add—false teachers, antichrists, springing from the world and serving the world's cause. "Little children, it is the last time: and as ye have heard that antichrist shall come, even now are there many antichrists;" "many false prophets are gone out into the world . . . this is that spirit of antichrist, whereof ye have heard that it should come; and even now already is it in the world. . . . They are of the world, therefore speak they of the world, and the world heareth them" (1 John ii. 18, iv. 1—5); and again, if we may use the shorter Epistles, "For many deceivers are entered into the world, who confess not that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh. This is a deceiver and an antichrist" (2 John 7). An important question, however, arises in connection with this last enemy. Does St. John look for one personal antichrist in whom all the other antichrists spoken of are to culminate, or is the presence of these antichrists itself the fulfilment of the expectation to which he alludes? It seems to us, notwithstanding the reasoning of many eminent commentators, that the latter is the case. He begins the eighteenth verse of the second chapter of his First Epistle with the words, "Little children, *it is the last time.*" He next refers to the fact that they had heard that antichrist should come; and then, turning to the phenomena of the age, he adds, "even now are there many antichrists, *whereby we know that it is the last time.*" Words could hardly make it clearer that the rising of these antichrists was the fulfilment of the expectation, the proof that that "last time" was arrived of whose arrival the coming of antichrist was to be the sign. There is here, therefore, no expectation of an individual and personal antichrist. It is in the "many antichrists" already around him that the Apostle sees one of the great manifestations of opposition to the Redeemer by which "the last time" was to be marked.

Such, then, appear to be the great enemies of Jesus and his truth spoken of in the Gospel and Epistles of St. John. It may be, perhaps, objected that the selection is a wilful one; and, in particular, that that opposition of "the Jews" which forms so marked a characteristic of the Gospel ought to have been noticed. To this last statement we reply in the words of the negative school itself that, at the time when the Gospel was written, the opposition between Judaism and Gentilism had been merged, to the Apostle's eye, in a

higher unity. The opposition of "the Jews" was peculiar to the early date and limited field of the Saviour's ministry. We are now at a later date and on a wider field. Jewish and Gentile believers are one in Christ, and Jewish and Gentile opposition are embraced in a larger conception including both. Any general charge of wilfulness can only be met by an appeal to our readers to consider the matter for themselves. If they strive to sink themselves into the spirit of the Gospel and Epistles of St. John, they will hardly be able to resist the conviction that that Apostle has three great enemies of Christ before his eye, the devil, the spirit of the world, and many antichrists.

Let us again turn to the Apocalypse. That the great enemies of Christ represented there are three does not admit of a moment's doubt; the dragon, the first beast, and the second beast. The only inquiry that needs an answer is, Are they the same as we have seen in the other writings in question? It is needless to say that the dragon of the Apocalypse is the Satan of St. John. He is expressly declared to be "that old serpent, which is the Devil and Satan" (xx. 2). It is almost equally needless to dwell on the fact that the second enemy of the Apocalypse, the "beast out of the sea," is the world-power, or the spirit of the world. This interpretation is, no doubt, rejected by distinguished writers, but it possesses such a weight of authority upon its side that, in a paper like the present, its substantial correctness may be assumed without formal argument. One thing only let us observe, that just as, in the other writings of St. John, Satan is the "prince of this world," as "the world lieth in the wicked one," so here the dragon gives the beast "his power and his seat and great authority" (Rev. xiii. 2). Not only are the two enemies the same, but the relation between them is the same also. More careful inquiry will be necessary with regard to the third enemy of the Apocalypse, which is described in chapter xiii. in the 11th and following verses, and is again referred to in chap. xix. 20, as "the false prophet." The most plausible interpretation of this symbol yet offered is that which regards it, in the words of Principal Fairbairn, as "worldly wisdom, comprehending everything in learning, science, and art, which human nature of itself in its civilized state can attain to, the worldly power in its more refined and spirit-like elements, its prophetic or priestly class."\* Plausible as this may be, and adopted as it is by not a few of the most able expositors of this book, substantially adopted even by Auberlen and Hengstenberg, it seems impossible to accept it. It draws no sufficient distinction between this second beast and the first. The former is then really a part of the latter, or rather it is that which makes the latter

\* On Prophecy, p. 328.


what it is. Besides which, even allowing, as cannot be allowed, that we might with propriety speak of a "priestly," of a "prophetical," school of learning, or science, or art, various traits of the description would be totally inapplicable to it. We must certainly seek for this third enemy of Christ in something else. Nor does it seem difficult to determine what that must be. The lamb-like form of the horns is unquestionably a travesty of the seven horns of "the Lamb" so often spoken of in these visions, and carries us at once to the thought of antichrist, of one who sets himself up instead of the true Christ, of one who, professing to imitate Him, is yet his opposite. The speaking as a dragon, reminding us of the description given us by our Lord of those false teachers who "come in sheep's clothing, but are inwardly ravening wolves," guides us to the same conclusion. The "great wonders" done by the beast, the "miracles" of deceit performed, taking us again to the words of Jesus, "there shall arise false Christs and false prophets, and shall do great signs and wonders, insomuch that, if it were possible, they shall deceive the very elect" (Matt. xxiv. 24), or to what St. Paul says of him "whose coming is after the working of Satan with all power, and signs, and lying wonders, and with all deceivableness of unrighteousness" (2 Thess. ii. 9, 10), confirm the view. And, finally, the fact that this beast is also styled "the false prophet," the very term used by St. John when speaking of the false teachers that had arisen (1 John iv. 1), may surely be accepted as conclusive that we have here a symbol of the "antichrists" of the First Epistle. We say of its "antichrists," not of antichrist as one individual, personal manifestation; for there is a characteristic of this beast hitherto, so far as we know, not explained by commentators, which leads us to the thought of more than one agent being included under the terms of the symbol. The beast has "two" horns. Why two? We may be sure that this circumstance is not without a meaning, and that it has no connection whatever with the simple fact that the animal referred to has in its natural condition two horns. In other visions of the Apocalypse we read of a lamb with "seven" horns, and of a head of the beast with "ten horns," and the numbers are in both cases unquestionably symbolical. It cannot be doubted that the "two horns" before us are also symbolical; and, thus viewed, we are led at once by the expression to the thought of the "two witnesses," of the "two prophets" of truth (the opposite of the "false prophet") spoken of in the eleventh chapter. But these "two" witnesses, as will be readily enough admitted by almost every one, represent all faithful witnesses for Christ; and so "two" horns are spoken of here to represent the great perverters of Christian truth seen by the Seer springing up around him, those who, pretending to be Apostles of

the Lamb, yet overthrew his Gospel. In short, we have in this symbol not one antichrist, but "many antichrists," whose origin is not of God, but of the world, and who lend their influence to the power of the world in order to seduce the followers of Jesus.\* Are we not entitled to say that the coincidences under this second head of our inquiry are even more "marked" than under the first?

We shall resume the subject in a second paper.

WM. MILLIGAN.

\* We suggest for consideration in a note, rather than in the text, whether the difficult expression, met with several times in ch. xiii., *ἡ εἰκών τοῦ θηρίου*, may not be the spirit of the world considered as incarnate. The incarnate Redeemer is the *εἰκὼν* of the invisible God, Col. i. 15, and so here, according to that method of representing evil as the counterpart, the travesty, of good which marks the Apocalypse, the spirit of the world is looked on as becoming incarnate in its *εἰκὼν*. Could this interpretation be accepted, it would at once explain the great importance attached in various passages, besides those in ch. xiii., to the *εἰκὼν* of the first beast, xiv. 9, 11, xv. 2, xvi. 2, xix. 20, xx. 4, and would account for the "false prophet" being brought before us as if he were the minister of this *εἰκὼν*, making men worship it, and imprinting its mark upon their foreheads. It would also help to confirm the interpretation given in the text of the second beast, for it would show that that second beast cannot, as so often represented, be thought of as the spirit of the first. The first would then be a spirit itself, just as "the world" is in 1 John ii. 16, "the lust" of the flesh and of the eyes, "the pride" of life.



## WALTER SAVAGE LANDOR.

*W. S. Landor. A Biography.* By JOHN FORSTER.  
2 Vols. 1869.

*The Collected Works of W. S. Landor.* 2 Vols. 1846.

*The Hellenics* (enlarged). 1947.

*Last Fruit off an Old Tree* 1857.

**I** SHALL have as many readers as I desire to have in other times than ours. I shall dine late; but the dining-room will be well lighted, the guests few and select."

More than six years after his death, and from thirty to seventy years since the publication of his chief works, this prophecy of Landor concerning himself has yet to wait for its fulfilment. The guests at his board are still too few and select to have satisfied his moderate desire. They are to be found, we believe, for the most part among the survivors of the last generation. Not a dozen lines of his writing, in prose or verse, have passed into the language, as literary "properties." To scholars and men of letters his works are no doubt familiar, but to the reading world of to-day he is still a *nominis umbra*—not an obsolete, but an unknown author. Of the causes which have brought about this neglect we may speak more fitly hereafter. To put an end to it by demonstrating its injustice has been the ambition of Landor's friend and executor, Mr. John Forster, in composing the biography under consideration. It has many of the merits proper to a literary memoir. From the besetting vice of hero-worship, which renders so many biographies as untrustworthy as epitaphs, it is creditably exempt. In treating of Landor's infirmities of temperament, Mr. Forster is pitilessly just; some-

times, we think, over-harsh. It is inevitable that the disclosures of such a work should violate the privacy of the dead, but the present biographer has a more than ordinary justification in the general tenor of his friend's instructions. When labouring under an express obligation to record events which involve painful references to persons living, Mr. Forster has executed the difficult task with admirable taste. The book presents a portrait of its subject which, if imperfectly defined in a few features, is on the whole elaborately faithful; surrounded with appropriate scenery and familiar figures, and coloured by characteristic anecdote and personal reminiscence. It contains some graceful description, much just and acute criticism, and is written in clear, nervous English. On the other hand, its faults are likely to unfit it for general reading. It is disfigured by the same lack of proportion which rendered the writer's "*Life of Sir John Eliot*"—notwithstanding its noble theme, and its evidences of research and ability—one of the most unreadable of books. Episodes of little moment in the life of Landor, such as his embroilment in forgotten political controversies, criticisms of his suppressed writings, and biographical notices of his friends and acquaintance, are made unduly prominent. One or two events and persons of greater importance are thrown into the background. When dilating on these trifles, Mr. Forster has "the gift of tediousness;" while he is mysteriously allusive or reticent when we could willingly have heard him enlarge. His biography is very defective in its arrangement. Anecdotes belonging to one period of Landor's life are related in connection with another; dates are sparingly and awkwardly introduced, and no complete list is given of his publications. In spite of these faults, the book commends itself to all who are enlisted among Landor's "audience, fit though few;" and, to those who are not, affords an easy avenue of introduction.

The life of Walter Savage Landor is a changeful rather than an eventful story, such variety as marked it being due less to the action of external circumstances than to the restless working of his own volition. He was born in the town of Warwick, on the 30th of January, 1775, the eldest child of Dr. Walter Landor, by his second wife, Elizabeth Savage. Both his parents were representatives of ancient county families, and inherited considerable landed property, to the bulk of which he eventually succeeded. He was sent, at ten years of age, to Rugby, where his most prominent characteristics soon developed themselves. He "had the reputation in the school of being the best classic. The excellence of his Latin verses was a tradition at Rugby for half a century after he left." He wrote "vast numbers" of translations; and, at the age of

fourteen, composed an original poem on the story of Godiva. His violence of temper, self-assertion, and defiance of restraint involved him in repeated conflicts with Dr. James, the head master, and led to his premature removal from Rugby, but not before he had gained "nearly all in the way of scholarship she had to give." After spending two years with a private tutor, he was entered at Trinity College Oxford in 1793. Here he read hard, but would compete for no honours. He acquired distinction by other means. The stirring events of the French Revolution quickened his republican sympathies. When yet a boy, he had expressed a hope (for which his mother boxed his ears) that the French would invade England, and hang George III. between "those two thieves, the Archbishops of Canterbury and York." His republicanism was rather of the American type, and he hated the French to the last on account of their execution of Marie Antoinette; but his language and behaviour were sufficient to procure for him the reputation of a "*mad Jacobin*." He wore his own unpowdered hair in a simple queue (an eccentricity affected by the admirers of the minister Roland), and at a wine party is said to have given as a toast, "May there be only two classes of people, the republicans and the paralytic!" A mischievous jest—that of firing off a gun at the window-shutter of a fellow-student, whom he disliked for his Tory opinions and disagreeable manners—led to Landor's rustication from his college; to which, though invited, he refused to return. In consequence of a dispute with his father arising out of this occurrence, he went up to London, and there published, in 1795, his first volume of poems. Of these, the minor poems alone show evidences of original qualities—the most prominent being a humour that finds expression in biting satire and pithy epigram. Invocations to the Muse are common enough in Georgian literature, but such a concluding sentiment as this is probably peculiar to Landor's:—

"O whether, Muse! thou please to give  
My humble verses long to live;  
Or tell me the decrees of Fate  
Have ordered them a shorter date—  
I bow. Yet O, may every word  
Survive, however, George the Third!"

The terse language and fluent versification are noteworthy as indications of a style already formed. Apart from these signs of promise, Landor's first work contains no suggestion of his genius. The special gifts upon which his title to fame is founded, creative imagination and dramatic instinct, are only "conspicuous by their absence."

Through the intercession of his sister's friend, Dorothea Lyttelton, a charming girl with whom Landor had interchanged some careless

love-passages, he was soon reconciled to his father. Negotiations ensued between them respecting his choice of a profession, but without result. Preferring freedom, though coupled with the reduction of his allowance, he went to live at Tenby, where he spent nearly three years. Here, upon the seashore, with few companions beside his favourite authors, Pindar, Homer, the Greek tragedians, and Milton, he wrote "*Gebir*."

Some evidences may be discerned in it of the influences under which it was written—"the sandy sea-coast deserts" of South Wales, peopled by a half-savage peasantry, furnishing apt materials for its landscape, and appropriate figures. Two of the authors whom he was studying, Homer and Milton, contributed to mould his thoughts and language, which reflect somewhat of the largeness, if they lack the simplicity, of the one—much of the majesty, if little of the sweetness, of the other.

"The intention of the poem is, by means of the story of Gebir and his brother Tamar, to rebuke the ambition of conquest, however excusable its origin, and to reward the contests of peace, however at first unsuccessful. Gebir is an Iberian prince, whose conquest of Egypt, undertaken to avenge the wrongs . . . of his ancestors, is suspended through his love for its young queen Charoba, by the treachery of whose nurse he is nevertheless slain amid the rejoicings of his marriage-feast. Tamar is a shepherd youth . . . by whom nothing is so eagerly desired as to conquer to his love one of the sea-nymphs whom at first he vainly contends with, but who, made subject to mortal control by the superior power of his brother, yields to the passion already inspired in her, and carries Tamar to dwell with her for ever beyond the reach of human ambition."\*

Mr. Forster's praise of "*Gebir*," in the passage which succeeds the foregoing, appears to us indiscriminating. Far from thinking the poem "everywhere pervaded by passion and intellect," we rise from its perusal without any excitement either of thought or emotion. Its provocations to the former seem to us too trite, to the latter too laboured, to be effective. The ideas rarely follow in their natural sequence, but often stand detached without visible connection. The style has considerable terseness and dignity, but errs in the opposite directions of obscurity and turgidity. The workmanship is uneven, and a want of ease in handling gives to some passages the effect of being a translation.

The high poetic endowment to which Lander unequivocally establishes his title in "*Gebir*" is that of constructive imagination. Although founded upon the plot of an Arabian tale which he chanced to meet with, he could boast that it contained no sentence and no sentiment in common with its source. If its epical unity is not strictly preserved, the subordinate parts of the design are artistically grouped round its central motive, and its bright and exquisite

\* Forster, i. 81.

pictures have an epical breadth of treatment. Its abrupt transition from natural to supernatural scenery, and daring disregard of time and place, are faults which may be pardoned to a young imagination always more ambitious to create than to discover. The local colour of ancient Egypt, though not strongly marked, is conveyed in a few broad touches that describe—

“The dull and dreary shore  
Where beyond sight Nile blackens all the sand ;”

the plains over which

“The king who sat before his tent descried  
The dust rise reddened from the setting sun ;”

the cavernous tombs and temples, with “ Gods . . . imboast ;” the ruins in the desert among which the sorceress pursues her mystic craft ; the festive ceremonies where

“Went the victims forward crowned with flowers,  
Crowned were tame crocodiles, and boys white-robed  
Guided their creaking crests across the stream ;”

and the procession of ambassadors—

“borne  
On four white camels, tinkling plates of gold.”

The ideal conceptions and the landscape beauty of Greece are recalled in the scenes wherein the sea-nymph figures, whose

“mantle showed the yellow samphire-pod,  
Her girdle the dove-coloured wave serene,”

and from whose “ocean’s grot where ocean was unheard,” her lover beheld a vision of—

“The cloud-like cliffs and thousand towers of Crete.”

“Ithaca  
Like a blue bubble floating in the bay ;”

and the boundary of the Mediteranean where—

“With hugo golden bar  
Atlas and Calpe close across the sea.”

In the third book, which describes the descent of Gebir into Hades, where he witnesses the punishments inflicted upon his warrior-ancestors, the supernatural scenery is powerfully sketched. There are Dantesque touches in the painting of the infernal river with its “roar confused” as—

“With dull weary lapses it upheaved  
Billows of bale, heard low, yet heard afar ;”

and Dante’s political animosity is grotesquely reflected in the portraiture of George III.—

“With eyebrows white, and slanting brow,”

fulfilling the doom of torture assigned him for—

“the thousand lives  
Squandered as stones to exercise a sling,  
And the tame cruelty and cold caprice.”

Of the isolated pictures which “Gebir” offers, we select two of the most striking—

“The long moonbeam on the hard wet sand  
Lay like a jasper column half uprear’d.”

#### A BATH.

“Next to her chamber, closed by cedar doors,  
A bath of purest marble, purest wave,  
On its fair surface bore its pavement high :  
Arabian gold enchased the crystal roof,  
With fluttering boys adorned, and girls unrobed ;  
These, when you touch the quiet water, start  
From their ærial sunny arch, and pant  
Entangled ’mid each other’s flowery wreaths,  
And each pursuing is in turn pursued.”

Inferior only to the picturesqueness of the poem is the charm of its sonorous though somewhat monotonous music. Perhaps no writer of blank verse since Milton and before Mr. Tennyson, satisfies the ear so nearly as Landor in some of its passages. The beauty of style to which we have referred may be illustrated by two or three Miltonic lines—

“The silent and unsearchable abodes  
Of Erebus and night.”

Dawn’s—

“Sacred gate of orient pearl and gold.”

The next passage will be familiar to many who have read no other line of Landor’s. The sea-nymph is speaking—

“I have sinuous shells of pearly hue  
Within, and they that lustre have imbibed  
In the sun’s palace-porch, where when unyoked  
His chariot wheel stands midway in the wave.  
Shake one and it awakens ; then apply  
Its polish’d lips to your attentive ear  
And it remembers its august abodes,  
And murmurs as the ocean murmurs there.”

“Gebir” was published at Warwick, in 1798. A generous review by Southey speedily introduced it to the notice of men of letters ; but out of that circle its readers have never been numerous. For Shelley it had an absorbing attraction, and Charles Lamb was always turning to it “for things that haunted him.”

In 1805 Landor succeeded to a large estate on his father’s death, and went to reside at Clifton and Bath by turns. Here for a time

he laid aside literature, and lived as a man of fashion. This life was seriously interrupted by what appears to have been his only *grande passion*. Of Ianthe, the subject of his graceful and tender poems, we learn little more than they disclose. Mr. Forster's references to her being provokingly meagre. A few words in a letter from Landor to Southey sum up a tragedy—"I love a woman who will never love me, and am beloved by one who never ought. I do not say I shall never be happy. I shall be often so if I live; but I shall never be at rest." His suit was unsuccessful, and Ianthe became another's wife, but her name retained for him till death its old enchantment.

Early in 1808 he had made the acquaintance of Southey, who was known to him by name as the critic of "Gebir." The meeting laid the foundation of a noble friendship, which survived all shocks of political estrangement and literary antagonism. However exaggerated the estimate which each entertained of the other's powers, its sincerity will not be doubted by any who read their letters, and the picture which these present of the communion of thought and feeling between two such distinguished rivals in the same walks of literature is as pleasant as it is rare.

In August, 1808, Landor broke away from his luxurious life and sailed to Spain, where he enrolled himself in the army which the nation had suddenly raised against Napoleon's invasion. He remained there about three months, "engaged in petty skirmishing," when a misunderstanding of some words spoken by the English envoy provoked an outburst of temper and a hasty return home. His experiences in Spain coloured his next important work, the tragedy of *Count Julian*, written in 1810-11. Its subject is drawn from the same chapter of history which suggested to Southey his epic of "Don Roderick." The vengeance taken upon that prince by Count Julian for the violation of his daughter Covilla, was to recall the Moorish invaders whom he had just repelled. When the play opens, the allies have triumphed, and Roderick is a fugitive, but Julian is filled with remorse at the calamities he has brought upon his country. Roderick seeks his camp in disguise, and tries to regain his allegiance by promising to divorce the Queen Egilona and wed Covilla. Julian spurns the offer, but suffers the king to depart unpunished on condition of expiating his crime by a life of penance. Egilona, who interprets his departure as a sign that his offer has been accepted, denounces Julian to Musa, the Moorish chieftain, who regards his clemency as treachery, and puts to death his two sons.

Landor's treatment of this dramatic story is essentially undramatic. The play, as Mr. Forster observes, is but "a succession of dialogues." Its incidents are narrated, and from first to last it is wholly destitute

of action. This inherent defect of structure, though fatal to its *raison d'être*, and its primary purpose of representation, leaves unaffected its secondary aim of ideal portraiture, and enhances admiration of the skill with which Landor has contrived by means of dialogue alone to bring his characters into such strong relief. That of Count Julian especially impresses the imagination as a sublimely heroic conception. Torn by conflicting emotions of rage, love, revenge, remorse, justice, and compassion, he preserves his noble individuality to the last unshaken;—a shape which, in the “lonely splendour” of its agonized endurance, may not unfitly rank beside the Prometheus of Shelley.

There is a grave wisdom in several of the reflective passages which marks a decided advance from the level of “Gebir.” The following approach, if at a distance, to the Shakespearian cast of thought:—

“Justice, who came not up to us through life,  
Loves to survey her likeness on our tombs,  
When rivalry, malevolence and wrath,  
And every passion that once storm'd around,  
Is calm alike without them as within.”

“Man's only relics are his benefits;  
These, be there ages, be there worlds between,  
Retain him in communion with his kind:  
Hence is our solace, our security,  
Our sustenance, till heavenly Truth descends,  
  
And, like an angel guiding us, at once  
Leaves the loose chain and iron gate behind.”

*Count Julian* is less pictorial than “Gebir;” but there are rare passages of striking beauty. Here is a Spanish landscape:—

“Whether where Castro from surrounding vines  
Hears the hoarse ocean roar among his caves,  
And through the fissure in the green churchyard  
The wind wail loud the calmest summer day;  
Or where Santana leans against the hill,  
Hidden from sea and land, by groves and bowers.”

The character of Julian is thus imaged by one of his friends:—

“Wakeful he sits, and lonely and unmoved,  
Beyond the arrows, views, or shouts of men;  
As oftentimes an eagle, ere the sun  
Throws o'er the varying earth his early ray,  
Stands solitary, stands immovable  
Upon some highest cliff, and rolls his eye,  
Clear, constant, unobservant, unabased,  
In the cold light above the dews of morn.”

The language, though marred by an occasional tendency to rhetoric, has little of the obscurity observable in “Gebir.” It is somewhat less musical, and there are frequent signs of hasty composition. The play was published in 1812, but achieved no success.

Landor's extravagance soon obliged him to sell part of his estates ; but having "set his heart" on possessing the magnificent domain of Llanthony Abbey, in Monmouthshire, he effected some family arrangements by which he was enabled to purchase it in 1809. After planting "a million of trees," cutting new roads, and building "a house to pull it down again," in which manner he disposed of £70,000, he became involved in disputes with a perverse tenant, was provoked into the use of libellous language which entailed fresh litigation, and was driven by a succession of vexations and embarrassments to leave the place in 1814, never to return.

Three years before the date of these misfortunes he brought upon himself another even more serious. He fell in love with and married, after a slight acquaintance, a pretty and penniless girl, Julia Thuillier, who, in age and disposition, appears to have been wholly unsuitable for his wife. For the unhappiness which marred, and finally sundered their union, Mr. Forster holds Landor chiefly responsible. No graver cause of quarrel existed than incompatibility of temper ; but the grain of forbearance requisite to assimilate their temperaments was wanting to one or both. Their disagreement dated from 1814, when Landor's embarrassments rendered it desirable that they should live abroad. To this his wife objected, and her language was so reproachful and exasperating, that he left her in anger, and went to Tours alone. He was quickly reconciled to her on hearing of her illness, and she accompanied him to Italy, where they led a wandering life for six years, finally settling at Florence in 1821.

Since the production of *Count Julian* he had written little in English ; but some of the Latin idyls, afterwards translated into the "Hellenics," were composed between 1814 and 1820. His chief mental occupation during these years was in the study, observation, and reflection which bore fruit in the "Imaginary Conversations." Though an early design, no progress was made in its execution until 1820. A letter of the preceding year, wherein he tells Southey that he "left off *Count Julian* and his daughter twice, because each had said things which other personages might say," indicates the direction in which his peculiar powers might best be exercised—the delineation of character by dialogue without the intervention of dramatic machinery. "His five-act dramas," says Mr. Forster, "had been dialogues, but his dialogues were to be one-act dramas."

Considered as dramatic compositions, these "Conversations" are decidedly anomalous. Amid their infinite variety, there is a pervading homogeneousness of tone—throughout their changing masquerade a persistence of personal identity which cannot be mistaken.

In vain does Landor warn his readers to "avoid a mistake in

attributing to the writer any opinions but what are spoken under his own name." For purposes of criticism, speculation, satire, invective, and eulogy, his plan offered facilities too tempting to be resisted, and it is evident how often the speakers are puppets and their utterances his own. It is seldom difficult to ascertain when he is masking. Favourite opinions are emphasized or unchallenged; obnoxious opinions caricatured or demolished. Whenever the dialogue is controversial, and one antagonist is plainly over-matched, we cannot doubt who is arguing behind the other. It is noteworthy how rarely either disputant retracts. If his opponent's case be impregnable, he raises the siege, and tries a new issue. This dogmatism, which characterizes nearly all the speakers, is clearly a personal trait. Upon their language, moreover, however dissimilar may be the ideas which each expresses—however carefully the phraseology of a particular period may be imitated—a family likeness has been imposed by the mannerism of the author's style. His prose, like his poetry, is apt to be spasmodic; the thoughts presenting an abrupt succession like the peaks of a mountain-chain, instead of flowing into each other like the waves of the sea. He is generally terse—sometimes to excess. The language assigned to Porson, in the first conversation with Southey, is so charged with epigram and metaphor, that the reader staggers onward like a traveller down the Corso during Carnival, smothered beneath a shower of *confetti*. The most uniform feature of the style, however, is its polish, the sentences being often exquisitely balanced and rounded *ad unguem*.

It is a strong testimony to Landor's art that the dominant impression of his individuality in these "Conversations" should interfere so little with their dramatic faithfulness. To name those characters only with whom every educated Englishman has an ideal acquaintance—Sir Philip Sidney's knightly temper and philosophic romance, James I.'s theocratic pretensions and pedantic shrewdness, Milton's dignity and enthusiasm, Walton's quaint *naïveté*, Hume's passionless judgment, Chesterfield's keen *savoir faire*, Johnson's prejudiced honesty—are severally portrayed by touches so minute and delicate as to transcend analysis, but which convey the likeness intended with surprising accuracy. To illustrate this fairly it would be requisite to transcribe a whole dialogue; but one or two touches will indicate the method of handling. James I. and Isaac Casaubon are conversing upon Roman Catholicism, and the crimes committed under its sanction, and the latter, referring to the murder of the Prince of Orange at the instigation of Philip II., employs the word "assassin," when James interrupts him:—"Nay, v. M. Isaac! A king may, peradventure, slay unadvisedly,

rashly, wrathfully; but a king can never be an assassin, even though he should smite unto the death with his own right hand, forasmuch as the Lord hath given him the sceptre in Israel. . . . Therefore, were it only for the sake of rhetoric and euphony, I do think I would cast about for some palatable word." Again, Dr. Johnson is disputing upon English orthography with Horne Tooke, who happens to cite Hume as an authority. "Sir! do not quote infidels to me!" is the prompt retort. Tooke strikes home with an apposite passage from Milton. The Doctor parries the thrust with "The dog barked at bishops!"

Landor is an unequal writer, and this dramatic quality does not belong to all the conversations. But its place is amply filled. For variety and profusion of thought, learning, fancy, passion, humour, satire, we know no parallel to the series in English literature. If we except the domain of Science, there is scarcely a subject within the scope of the intellect that does not receive notice or illustration. Human nature in its manifold aspects of good and evil, joy and suffering; life, with its endless changes of retrospect and prospect; death, with its awful suddenness, its gracious peace, its mysterious hope; religion, theology, ethics, politics, jurisprudence, literature, language, art, history, biography, national characteristics, social manners, are each his theme in turn. The subjects are often intermingled in a single dialogue. Occasional desultoriness is the unavoidable result, but this, which would interfere with the regularity of an essay, is in keeping with the conversational form. Landor perhaps attains his highest flight in philosophical reflection. We select an example from a dialogue between Cicero and his brother Quinctus. Seated upon the shore of Formiæ, on the eve of a birthday which he foresees will be his last, the great orator discourses on life, death, and immortality:—

"Sleep, which the Epicureans and others have represented as the image of death, is, we know, the repairer of activity and strength. If they spoke reasonably and consistently they might argue from their own principles . . . . that death, like sleep, might also restore our powers. . . . Just as sleep is the renovator of corporeal vigour, so, with their permission, I would believe death to be of the mind's; that the body, to which it is attached rather from habitude than from reason, is little else than a disease to our immortal spirit: and that like the remora, of which mariners tell marvels, it counteracts, as it were, both oar and sail, in the most strenuous advances we can make toward felicity. Shall we lament to feel this reptile drop off? Or shall we not, on the contrary, leap with alacrity on shore, and offer up in gratitude to the gods whatever is left about us uncorroded and unshattered? A broken and abject mind is the thing least worthy of their acceptance. . . . There are few who can regulate life to any extent; none who can order the things it shall receive or exclude. What value then should be placed upon it by the prudent man when duty or necessity calls him away? Or what reluctance should we feel on passing into a state

where at least we must be conscious of fewer checks and inabilities? Such, my brother, as the brave commander, when from the secret and dark passages of some fortress, wherein implacable enemies besieged him, having performed all his duties and exhausted all his munition, he issues at a distance into open day."

When Landor's theme is theological, an unwonted narrowness of view will sometimes disappoint us. Fearless, and self-reliant, with a restless reason ever in advance of his faith, he makes insufficient allowance for the wants and weaknesses of others. The frequent intemperance of his attacks upon Roman Catholicism is probably due to this defect of sympathy. That it is the intellectual side of superstition, however, not the emotional, which repels him, he takes abundant pains to show. None of his portraits of character are more delicately limned than those which are distinguished by the single trait of devotional simplicity. Witness the following:—

"Father Fontesecco has the heart of a flower. It feels nothing; it wants nothing; it is pure and simple, and full of its own little light. Innocent as a child, as an angel, nothing ever troubled him but how to devise what he should confess. . . . He was once overheard to say on this occasion, 'God forgive me in his infinite mercy for making it appear that I am a little worse than he has chosen I should be.'—"Boccaccio and Petrarca."

The cold logic of Middleton and the warm feeling of Magliabecchi are contrasted with admirable art in their conversation upon prayer. The former has been defending the propriety of publishing a manuscript which he had written to dissuade from the practice on the ground of its inefficacy, and Magliabecchi, whom he has foiled in argument, but left unshaken in conviction, concludes with this appeal:—

"Suppose a belief in the efficacy of prayer . . . to be insanity itself, would you, meeting a young man who had wandered over many countries in search of a father, until his intellects are deranged, and who in the fulness of his heart addresses an utter stranger as the lost parent, clings to him, kisses him, sobs upon his breast, and finds comfort only by repeating, 'Father! father!' would you Mr. Middleton, say to this affectionate, fond creature, 'Go home, sit quiet, be silent!' and persuade him that his father is lost to him?"

"Middleton. God forbid!"

"Magliabecchi. You have done it; do it no more. The madman has not heard you, and the father will pardon you when you meet."

In dealing with ethical questions Landor seldom discloses the train of his reasonings, but, after the manner of poets, enounces the result in aphorisms, often gem-like in their lustrous concentration of value. We have but space for two:—

"It is better to suffer than to lose the power of suffering."

"We bear upon our heads an immense column of air, but the nature of things has rendered us insensible of it altogether. Have we not likewise a strength and a support against what is equally external, the breath of worthless men?"

Allowing for an occasional obliquity, such as the justification of tyrannicide, and the over-bitterness of some personal invectives, Landor's moral tone is generally healthy and noble. If his estimate of human nature be too cynical, his generous praise of individual excellence forbids us to misinterpret him. The character of the "Good Grand Duke" is especially noticeable as drawn by the hand of so pronounced a king-hater.\*

We pass over the political conversations, which mainly derive their illustrations from events that have retained their interest only for students of history. To them the shrewd comments and racy satire of so competent an observer as Landor will be worth tons of state-papers and blue-books. Every page testifies to the fervour of his political faith, a passionate attachment to the cause of liberty, an undying hatred of its betrayers and oppressors.

The critical conversations exhibit Landor at his best and worst. He is seen to most advantage when his subject is largest, as in discussing the principles of literary art, or the characteristics of an eminent writer. He cannot be blamed for availing himself of Pope's concession, that they may

"Censure freely who have written well—"

but in his detailed criticisms he is too apt to be captious, and fritter away his acumen in incessant splitting of hairs. The elaborate analysis of Wordsworth, to which he devotes two Conversations, is in his worst vein of hypercriticism. Several blots are hit in "*Laodamia*" and the "*Lyrical Ballads*," on the score of syntax and prosody, but his shots fly wide of the mark when his aim is higher. Thus, he laughs at the "*Anecdote for Fathers*" as nonsense, because he misses its moral, and thrusts a theological meaning upon one line of "*Laodamia*"—

"Spake, as a witness, of a second birth,"

which the words must be tortured to make them bear.†

The most strictly dramatic of the Conversations, such as the interviews between Henry VIII. and Anne Boleyn, Tiberius and Vipsania, Peter the Great and Alexis, Lady Jane Grey and Roger Ascham, which show Landor's mastery of intense feeling and passionate language, must be left undescribed. To quote from them piecemeal would be to spoil their beauty without conveying any adequate impression of it.‡ Nor would it be practicable to epitomize the fragile beauty of those which illustrate the intellectual culture, the moral efflorescence of ancient Greece and Rome. The "*Lucullus*

\* "Landor, Eng. Visitor and Florent. Visitor."

† Wordsworth, though not admitting the justice of this criticism, deferred to it by altering the passage.

‡ For a different reason, viz., that they are less worthy of their author, we pass over the Conversations devoted to the reform of English spelling—against the anomalies of which he was for ever waging a hopeless crusade.

and Cæsar," "Epicurus, Leontion, and Ternissa," "Pericles and Sophocles," are as indissoluble in their composition as a mosaic painting, and must be read to be enjoyed. Through others there runs a thread of narrative, of which the charm would be unappreciable if broken. There are few better story-tellers than Landor. He has much of Sterne's sprightliness and ease, with greater conciseness. The two writers are alike in their employment of humour and pathos—the force of the one lying in its diffusion, of the other in its suddenness. Landor's humour, after the fashion of fifty years ago, is sometimes too broad for modern tastes, and occasionally lapses into grossness for which dramatic fidelity affords but a poor excuse.

In his satire he is too prone to caricature and pasquinade; but we doubt if even Pope's exceeds it in pungency. An example offers in a dialogue wherein Pitt, in expectation that his mantle will fall upon Canning, bequeaths him a legacy of political advice:—

"For a successful minister three things are requisite on occasion; to speak like an honest man, to act like a dishonest one, and to be indifferent which you are called. Talk of God as gravely as if you believed in him. Unless you do this, I will not say what our Church does, you will be damned, but what indeed is a politician's true damnation, you will be dismissed."

Our last extracts will illustrate the epigrammatic force which characterises Landor's treatment of subjects the most dissimilar.

"A solitude is the audience chamber of God."

"*Newton*. I am not satisfied.

"*Barrow*. Those who are quite satisfied sit still and do nothing; those who are not quite satisfied are the sole benefactors of the world."

"Those who have failed as painters turn picture-cleaners; those who have failed as writers turn reviewers. . . . The readiest made critics are cut-down poets."—"Southey and Porson," I.

The readers of Mr. Disraeli's "*Lothair*" will here recognise an anticipation of one of its most admired witticisms. Scores of passages invite quotation, but these must suffice to give any yet unacquainted with the "*Imaginary Conversations*" a rude notion of their compass and quality. If our tribute of praise has been extravagant, we have erred in good company. For Julius Hare's comparison of their creations to those of Sophocles or Shakespeare, Hazlitt's praise of their historical figures as "transfused with the truth and spirit of History itself," and Mr. Emerson's expression of gratitude for the "resource that had never failed him in solitude,"—the reader may consult Mr. Forster.\*

The series embraced in this general review was issued to the world by three or four instalments. On the appearance of the first volume in 1824, public attention was at once aroused, and they achieved a genuine success.

\* i. 503, ii. 80.

In or near Florence, Landor lived about eight years, alternating with his literary labours the instruction of his four children, to whom he was tenderly attached, exchanging friendly intercourse with such residents and visitors as the Blessingtons, Francis Hare, Mr. Kirkup, Armitage Brown, Hazlitt, and Leigh Hunt, corresponding with Southey and Wordsworth, and collecting pictures by the old masters, a pursuit in which he displayed more enthusiasm than knowledge. In 1829, thanks to the generous aid of a friend, Mr. Ablett, he was enabled to purchase the Villa Gherardescha, at Fiesole, henceforth to be known as the "Villa Landora." Of this lovely abode, and its associations with the "Decameron" of Boccaccio, Mr. Forster gives a graceful description.\* Landor's six years' residence here, but for the domestic discord which brought it to a close, appears to have been "his happiest time in Italy." Here he wrote, in 1834, "The Examination of Shakespeare for Deer-stealing," which we shall notice very briefly.

Originally designed as one of the "Imaginary Conversations," it developed into a separate and more dramatic shape. It has probably suffered from this elaboration—its basement of burlesque being a little over-weighted by its medley superstructure of ballad, sermon, and story. Amid much admirable fooling, there is not a little which seems strained—some which is undoubtedly coarse. Possibly, however, the quaint, wire-drawn and unrefined quality of Elizabethan humour is herein designedly imitated. No play of character more sparkling occurs in any of Landor's writings than is struck out by the conjunction of such opposite types as are here presented—the boy-poet overflowing with genius, emotion, and animal spirits, witty, wise, joyous, and serious by turns—Sir Thomas Lucy, the justice, stupid, vain, devout and kind-hearted; Master Silas, the chaplain, hard-headed, vulgar, malicious, and sensual; Joseph Carnaby, the chief witness, superstitious and hypocritical, conscious of his tattered reputation while speaking truth for the nonce. Inimitable, too, is the description of Shakespeare's tactics with the justice, whom he handles after the manner of an angler, baiting his hook with tempting morsels of flattery, and spinning out a line of interminable digression, which he adroitly manœuvres until his prey is caught.

A composition of higher importance, mainly written during the last year of Landor's residence in Italy, is his "Pericles and Aspasia." It is fragmentary in shape, being a series of imaginary letters between a number of intimate friends, but obtains a wholeness of design from its skilful interweaving of biographical and historical incidents. The story of the loves of Pericles and Aspasia—who, by a bold licence, is represented as his second wife—is told with exquisite delicacy and tenderness. The course of events that marked his

\* ii., 223—4.

government of Athens is vigorously sketched, and the studies of character—especially the portraits of Alcibiades and Anaxagoras—are carefully painted. But the charm of the book is due, not so much to the beauty of its separate parts as of its pervading tone—the extent to which it is penetrated by the atmosphere, and steeped in the colouring of the Hellenic world. Quotations would avail nothing to convey a sense of the effect. As well could one give an idea of a peach by detaching a fragment of its bloom, or extracting a sip of its juice.

When the book was published in 1835, the author was in England. The wedded bliss he had so tenderly described was not reflected from his own. In April of that year occurred the final quarrel with his wife, which drove him from Italy. With the merits of this particular dispute we are not concerned, but it is right to say that by a spectator on the spot Landor was acquitted from blame. The cogency of the grounds upon which he based his resolve to render such scenes thenceforth impossible, by separating from his family, was admitted by one of his wife's relations, to whom the facts were known. For this step, which is severely censured by his biographer, his own justification must be given :—

“ ‘It was not willingly,’ he wrote to Southey, ‘that I left Tuscany and my children. There was but one spot upon earth on which I had fixed my heart and four objects on which my affection rested. That they might not hear every day such language as no decent person should ever hear once, nor despise both parents, I left the only delight of my existence.’ ”

Mr. Forster's view, that Landor, while using these words, considered his wife wholly unfit to be the guardian of his children in his absence, appears to us unwarranted. With himself he might reasonably hope that the cause of offence would be removed. His affection for them being indubitable, he must be credited with self-denial in parting from them, and the presumption seems fair that he believed this sacrifice to be the least of two evils. The consequences, however, were inevitable and disastrous. Occasional visits and the interchange of letters, however affectionate, could not make up for the loss of personal influence. The children naturally espoused the cause of the parent with whom they lived, and when in his old age he returned to their society, and by self-improvement for their sakes evinced his undiminished love, he found their hearts estranged.

For the next twenty-one years he lived chiefly at Bath, but paid long visits to London, where he became a lion in literary and fashionable assemblies. To residents in Bath no figure was more familiar than his, as in company with his white dog Pomero he “trudged up and down” the streets, or lounged into Empson's gallery to discuss art with its proprietor and politics with the Napiers. By the survivors of the brilliant circle at Gore House his “stout, stalwart presence,”

"broad, white, massive head," "large grey eyes" and mobile mouth, his vehement talk and *crescendo* thunder of laughter will not readily be forgotten. His vitality was at its highest, and the enduring friendships which he formed with Sir William Napier, Charles Dickens, and Mr. Forster consoled him for the death of Francis and Julius Hare, Southey, Kenyon, and Ablett, and made some atonement for the loss of home.

Landor's chief production of this period was the "Pentameron of Boccaccio and Petrarca," published in 1837. It is in substance the record of a five days' visit supposed to be paid by Petrarca to Boccaccio at his villa near Certaldo, just after his recovery from illness. The main subject of their conversation is Dante's "*Divina Commedia*," which undergoes at their hands a keen but not irreverent criticism. Most readers, however, will find their attraction in the episodes of fiction and sketches of character. The narration by the friends of their respective dreams is exceeded by no passage in Landor's writings for grace and tenderness, and it would be difficult to match for playful humour the description of Petrarca's preparations for church, or the portrait of the waiting-maid Assunta. An extract from Boccaccio's account of the dream in which his lost Fiametta appears to him, will illustrate the writer's delicacy of touch:—

"Sleep did not come until the break of morning, when the dripping of soft rain on the leaves of the fig-tree at the window, and the chirping of a little bird to tell another that there was shelter under them, brought me repose and slumber. Scarcely had I closed my eyes, if indeed time can be reckoned any more in sleep than in heaven, when my Fiametta seemed to have led me into the meadow. You will see it below you: turn away that branch. Gently! gently! do not break it; for the little bird sat there!"

This book shared the fate of its two predecessors in being ignored by the many, and worshipped by the few. Nor did Landor's next work, a dramatic trilogy (*Andrea of Hungary, Gioranna of Naples, and Fra Rupert*), written between 1838 and 1841, fare any better. In this instance the public can scarcely be charged with want of discernment. There are some fine scenes in the plays, but they have no strong central motive nor continuous interest. The characters are incomplete sketches, and the style is uneven. He retrieved this failure in 1846, when amongst his "Collected Works" appeared the "*Hellenics*." To these were added, in the year following, others, translated from the Latin in which they were first written. Some of the most heroic and pathetic of the Greek myths are embodied in these idyls. Breadth of handling, clearness of thought, and simplicity of language, that suggest their source in Homeric inspiration, characterize them generally; but are seen at their best in "*The Hamadryad*." This tender story of the loves of a wood-nymph and a

youth of Caria, wants but one or two refining touches to be perfect. We can only find space for this dainty morsel of description:—

“Behold! there sat  
Upon the moss below, with her two palms  
Pressing it on each side, a maid in form.  
Downcast were her long eyelashes, and pale  
Her cheek, but never mountain-ash displayed  
Berries of colour like her lip so pure,  
Nor were the anemones about her hair  
Soft, smooth and wavering like the face beneath.”

Most of these poems suffer from want of finish, but there is scarcely one without some passage remarkable for strength and terseness. We may instance the picture in “Chrysaor,” of the Destinies—

“Intent upon their loom, unoccupied  
With aught beyond its moody murmuring sound;”

and the dying words of Achilles, in the “Polyxena”—

“And now that Orcos hurries me away,  
My shade may all the greater shades receive  
And all the lesser fear!”

Many of the themes are intrinsically sensuous, but, as a rule, their treatment is very delicate; and the laws of art, which restrict the delineation of animal passion to the conditions of its healthy development, are never violated.

The miscellaneous poems among his “Collected Works” must not be passed without a word. They are of very unequal merit, a large number being marred by his “fatal facility” of versification, which was only second to Wordsworth’s; but many of the love-songs and *vers de société* are suffused with an antique grace and sub-humorous archness that are extremely fascinating. Here and there we come upon a brief lyric, sweet and plaintive as a robin’s song, in which a single chord of emotion is struck with almost faultless expression. Occasional lines, such as that wherein he apostrophizes his brother poets as

“Serene creators of immortal things,”

mark the perfection to which he might have attained, had his poetry been what he described his prose, a “business” rather than a “pleasure.”

His “Last Fruit off an Old Tree,” where this expression occurs, was published in 1857. It contains several imaginary conversations—some of them pitiless vivisections of contemporary monarchs and statesmen, one or two exquisite literary criticisms, and a collection of miscellanea. This is the latest of his works requiring notice. Soon after its publication his health began to fail, and his intellect for a time was so clouded, that he must be exonerated from complete responsibility for his actions. Such restraint as he had hitherto been able to put upon

his turbulent temper was withdrawn. Two ladies of his acquaintance at Bath having quarrelled, one of whom interested him by her youth and friendlessness, he espoused her cause, and assailed the enemy with lampoons, for which he was threatened with an action for libel. He was no sooner rescued (by Mr. Forster's aid) from this penalty, than he repeated the offence. In a collection of "the scrapings and rubbish of his desk," published in 1858 as "Dry Sticks," were included some of the scurrilous verses which his friends had undertaken should be suppressed. The threat of an action being resumed, he was advised to return to Italy, and make an assignment of his property. He had already transferred a large part of it to his children, and now made over the rest, reserving a slender provision for his own life. Heavy damages having been awarded in the action brought against him, after he left England, this was absorbed, and he returned to Fiesole at the age of eighty-three, dependent upon the charity of his children. Of the reception he met with we forbear to speak. Suffice it that his "old home could be a home to him no more," that the caprices of temper, which acquaintances and strangers could tolerate, were found intolerable by his own family, and that, after repeated scenes of discord, he was allowed to remove to Florence, and rely upon the kindness of two friends (Mr. Browning and Mr. Kirkup) for the very "means of existence." An allowance of £200 a year was eventually made to him by his two surviving brothers in England, upon which he subsisted until his death. He continued to write almost to the last, and in the "Heroic Idyls" (published in 1863), though the old intellectual fire burns feebly, there are evident traces of the old "sweetness and light." A small knot of admirers enlivened his solitude, and in the last year of his life he was reconciled to his two younger sons, and cheered by their attentions. A reverential visit paid to him by Mr. A. C. Swinburne was one of his latest gratifications. He died on the 17th September, 1864, and his remains are laid in the English burying-ground at Florence.

The first impression produced upon an observer of Landor's character is likely to be misleading. Impulse is so prominent, that we may easily overlook, as we think his biographer\* has done, the existence of principle. His moods are so strongly contrasted, that he may be accounted a moral paradox, the victim of undisciplined instincts—an Actæon devoured by his own dogs. Even from this point of view it is evident that vanity and irascibility were his worst defects, and that few have been more richly endowed with those qualities which always confer upon their possessors the power of inspiring affection. "Open-hearted, magnanimous," "genial, joyous, kind, and of a nature large and generous to excess;"—such was his

\* i. 3, ii. 593. ■

character among those who knew him best. His liberality was ever on a royal scale. Notwithstanding his limited income during most of the time that he resided in Italy, letter after letter to his friends in England announced the despatch of rare books and pictures suited to their several tastes. Though a copious reader, he never had any permanent library, his books being given away as fast as he read them. He seldom embarked on a literary venture without dedicating its anticipated profits to the aid of some obscure sufferer from poverty or persecution. In the letters addressed to his mother and sisters, the affectionate and gentle side of his temperament is very pleasantly portrayed. It is conspicuous, too, in the accounts of visitors to his Fiesolan home during its palmy days, and of those admitted to his intimacy at Bath. Mrs. Linton's recently collected reminiscences of his green old age\* strongly confirm this impression, and in the Boythorn of "Bleak House" it has received the sanction of a greater artist. The chivalry, the sincerity, the vehemence, the extravagance, the grace of manner, the boisterous laughter, the childish love of pets—every salient trait of Landor in the spirit or the flesh is reproduced in this life-like study. The tendency to exaggerate the expression of every momentary impulse, which is such a humorous feature in this character, must be taken into account in any judgment passed upon the failings of his prototype. Landor's self-assertion, for example, seems a caricature of what we ordinarily understand by it. One can scarcely believe that his letters to the Duke of Beaufort and the Lord Chancellor Eldon in 1812, on the rejection of his application to be made justice of the peace,† were not intended as a mock-heroic parody of a pompous and arrogant style. The explosions of vanity in one or two suppressed answers to unfavourable criticisms of his works (which his biographer is cruel enough to exhume) are hardly less grotesque. His worst exhibitions of temper, like those of a child, generally excite too much laughter to leave room for anger.

Of his proneness to act upon the random suggestions of impulse, whether for good or for evil, the proofs are sufficiently numerous; but they cannot gainsay the testimony of a long life, the prevailing tone of which was pure and upright, to the persistent control of principle. Of his power of self-restraint there is evidence in his relations with Southey, whose defection from the cause he had early espoused, followed by his installation as the avowed champion of reaction, must have jarred painfully upon the feelings of a partizan so ardent as Landor, one so sensitive upon the score of political honour, and the reproach of association with a suspected name. Yet in the letters which recorded his widest divergence of opinion, no sign of pain escaped him, and when the Conservative was publicly attacked for his tergiversation, the Republican's pen was the promptest to

\* *Fraser's Magazine*, July, 1870.

† Forster, i. 340—6.

move in his defence. On one occasion, when under the pressure of domestic sorrow, Southey had allowed several letters to remain unanswered, Landor's fear that some breach must have occurred in their friendship, drew forth an appeal\* from him which is really touching in its expression of manly tenderness and loyal humility. They rarely failed to evoke his nobler self who could thus exert over him the authority of affection. The sacrifices which he deliberately made for their interests, and the constraint which he imposed on his rebellious temper in deference to their judgment, all tend to confirm the view that, under the surface-currents and flying spray of impulse, his nature was profoundly obedient to tidal laws.

A *primâ facie* semblance of paradox is observable in his intellectual characteristics, but they display more definitely than his moral traits the presence of leading lines. He might plausibly be demonstrated a republican and an aristocrat, a king-hater and a Cæsarist, a reformer and a conservative in theology. On examination his Republicanism proves to have been of the oligarchical type, and his aristocratic tastes, which were congenital and habitual, were thus in keeping with his opinions. There is a notoriously close affinity between the theories of oligarchy and aristocracy, but he was not misled by it; his intense hatred of monarchy proving an effectual safeguard. An occasional lapse into the heresy of Cæsarism may be proved against him, but it is not to be explained, as in the case of ordinary men, by the fascination which the spectacle of successful strength exerts on the imagination. His reason was too clear, his love of liberty and justice too warm, for this evil glamour to retain any abiding influence. It was as an iconoclast, not an idol-maker, that a tyrant or dictator ever found favour in Landor's eyes. Sympathy ceased when that function had been discharged, and recoiled if it were exceeded. For one passage in his writings that betrays a leaning to the worship of force, twenty may be cited that repudiate and execrate it.

As respects his theological opinions we infer from such fragmentary evidence as his works and letters afford on the subject, that he was a liberal Christian theist, nominally a member of the Church of England, although by those who would narrow her fold he might be classed among Arian or Unitarian heretics. In personal immortality he had evidently an assured belief, and it is significant how often the theme recurs in the dialogues of his imaginary speakers. The spiritual side of his nature may have been inadequately developed; but if he fell short of devotion, he attained to reverence. An unvarying expression of faith in the Divine order of the world, when adopted by a writer so little prone to the use of unmeaning or fulsome phrases, carries the stamp of conviction. On fitting occasion, when his inmost nature was stirred, his

\* Forster, i. 429—30.

utterances of gratitude and trust were emphatically earnest. The epithet of Pagan often thoughtlessly attached to Landor's name is calculated to convey a very different impression respecting his belief, and has sufficient semblance of justification to make it worth while to show how little really exists. It was of the essence of his intellectual constitution that the past should have supreme attractions for him, and like the early scholars and artists of the Renaissance, of which he is perhaps our typical representative, he loved the masterpieces of Greek and Roman literature with passionate fervour. The reproduction of those forms of art which therein attained their highest development was the province wherein he was specially qualified to excel; and it was thus unavoidable that he should draw most of his illustrations, moral and political, from ante-Christian examples. The virtues of patriotism, civic probity, fortitude, love of liberty, contempt of death, which these exhibit, may be characteristically "Pagan," but that they are alien to or have been superseded by the ethics of Christianity, has yet to be shown. The virtues characteristic of its teaching—love, forgiveness of injury, humility—are as earnestly inculcated by him. The wisest Christian moralist might learn from the lips of his "William Penn,"\* the most orthodox divine might sit with profit at the feet of his Doctor Glaston.†

If those who call Landor a Pagan impute to him a Julian-like desire to put back the dial of history, and reverse the great spiritual current which streamed into the world from Palestine, we are at a loss to know upon what evidence the charge is founded. Far from attempting to "make old bareness picturesque," his aim seems rather to restore the simple beauty of primitive Christianity by lopping off the growth of tradition and the incrustation of falsehood. He continually assumes a tone of hostility, either avowed or covert, to many doctrines and practices popularly recognised as Christian; but between the stream and its source he draws a careful distinction. The teachings of Christ's followers, however traditionally sacred, he criticizes without scruple, but the standard by which he weighs them is the authority of their Master, whom he never names without a tribute of veneration.‡

Upon the whole, we think there may be discerned in Landor's writings, as in his life, a pervading principle of order under the superficial aspect of caprice. If he was less inspired than Shelley with "a passion for reforming the world," and took a lower view than Wordsworth or Coleridge of literary responsibility, he was excelled by none of his great contemporaries in the persistent advocacy of those tenets and institutions which he believed conducive to human welfare

\* "Penn and Peterborough."

† "Exam. of Shaks."

‡ *Works*, i. pp. 532—3. ii., pp. 127, 223. "Last Fruit," pp. 96, 179.

—in the vigorous denunciation of those which he believed hurtful. In "*Gebir*" he directly violates the canon of "*Art for Art's sake*," laid down by a recent school with which his name has been accidentally associated. The poem has a positive "*moral*," to which its artistic aim is subordinated. The same observation appears applicable to "*The Phocæans*," an epic published in 1802, but not reprinted.\* With riper years his views of Art widened, but he never ceased to regard it as a means rather than an end. The majority of the "*Imaginary Conversations*" are essentially and designedly didactic. Sometimes the subject-matter is deliberately twisted to force such an intention upon it—as in the conversation between Bishop Burnet and Hardcastle, where the vicious tendency of Byron's life and writings is denounced in an apologue. Similar applications to modern uses, or for moral ends, of themes possessing in themselves only an historical or æsthetic interest, occur more or less obviously in all Landor's leading works.

The criticisms already passed upon these in succession have anticipated nearly all that we need to say respecting his merits and defects as an artist. As a painter of pictures, a creator of character, he takes exalted rank. His failures are less in conception than in execution, the figures being often too large for the canvas, or their outlines too vaguely drawn. In his eagerness to accomplish the whole of a design, he sometimes overlooked the coherence of its parts. Occasionally, as in "*Gebir*," excess of compression may have assisted to obscure his style. In his later poetry there is a want of sustained power, but fineness of perception and touch rarely desert him, and lend a charm to his weakest efforts. Quick sympathies, buoyant humour, and a musical sense susceptible of high cultivation, if not naturally acute, swell the list of his poetic qualifications. The greatest poets of the century have characteristics which he lacks. The purity and calm of Wordsworth, the enthusiasm and "*other-worldliness*" of Shelley, Mr. Tennyson's spiritual insight, and Mr. Browning's analytic subtlety, are beyond his range. But among the objective poets he has a place of his own; and, if we may venture to assign it, it is not far removed from that of Keats. As a thinker he neither leads nor follows in any track of speculation—not interpreting the universe by the aid of one or two luminous principles, like Mr. Carlyle or Mr. Emerson, nor attaching himself to any school or party; but, alike in the simplicity with which he brings his keen observation and unfettered judgment to bear upon each subject that suggests itself, and in his sententious oracular manner of announcing his conclusions, he reminds us more frequently than any other modern writer of masters so incomparable as Shakspeare and Lord Bacon.

\* Forster, i. 177.

As to the influence he has exerted, it is probably premature to form an opinion. Among his contemporaries, Southey acknowledged an obligation to him, which others undoubtedly shared.\* Some writers of our own day may be equally in his debt, but none can be named who stand to him in the relation of disciple to master. Mr. Swinburne's reverential visit, together with the dedicatory and memorial verses prefixed to his *Atalanta*, may have led many to infer that he occupies such a relation, but we think erroneously. Among other influences which evidently operated upon the composition of this fine tragedy, that of Landor's "Hellenics," to which the dedication expressly points, may perhaps be discerned. Beyond this, and such resemblance as may be due to the possession of allied and exceptional powers, scholarly tastes, and political sympathies in common, there is no obvious affinity between the two writers. Had the "Hellenics" continued to be his model, Mr. Swinburne's later works would surely have exhibited less uncertain drawing and overloaded colour. We are bound to add that it was not in Landor's school that he learnt the tenets of which he has proclaimed himself the apostle.

As little can Landor's practice be cited to defend the morbid prudence which governs Mr. Swinburne in the selection of subjects, and to which the "Poems and Ballads" owe their unhappy notoriety as a text-book of moral pathology. None have felt more intensely than Landor the charm of consecration imparted to all that bears the name of Hellas; but his imagination turned with a wise eclecticism to her records of lofty heroism and pure affection, the wisdom of her philosophers, the dignity of her statesmen, and rejected her monstrosities and pollutions as themes unfit for Art.

It must be mainly by his influence upon "the few who influence the many," as Mr. Forster has observed, that Landor's mark will be left on English literature. The prevalent neglect of his writings may be easily explained by the predominance in them of certain elements, which appeal to only a limited class of readers, and the absence of others which are requisite to the enjoyment of the mass. His scholarship, refinement, and subtlety, his aversion to the "sensational" and the ornate, must effectually prevent his ever becoming popular. But that his audience will gradually increase can scarcely be doubted. The order of poets to which he belongs appears to be regaining that position in public estimation which it can never long cease to occupy. Some recent signs of a revived appetite for the classics of English prose are also encouraging. We venture to think that Landor's temporary depreciation betokens nothing more than is signified by the equivalent depreciation of the Old Masters in painting, and that as the range of education is widened, and the standard of taste raised, this injustice cannot fail to be redressed.

HENRY G. HEWLETT.

\* Forster, i. 84—5, 109, 142—3; "Last Fruit," p. 129.



## ON A FUTURE STATE.

A FRAGMENT.

BY THE LATE PROFESSOR GROTE.

**W**HEN we speak of the glorification of the body in a future state, it is well we should think also of the glorification of the *mind*.

Independently of anything that may happen to the earthly body after death, life itself, with its troubles and accidents, pretty well consumes it and wears it to pieces *before* that, so that there would be little left to represent and show, in a future state, what it was, and that little of such a kind that the recognition of it could scarcely be other than painful. The glorification of the body must be a reproduction of it in its *particular* ideal, *i.e.*, in such perfection of it as its individual nature and constitution admit of. We can form but little notion what kind of thing this is; still, it is what we are continually endeavouring, for one and another, to form a notion of: art, the art of the portrait-painter, sculptor, &c., is eminently concerned with it; the poet does what he can to describe it.

But of more importance than the glorification of the body is that of the mind. The mind must be reawakened in its particular ideal or individual perfection (not *moral* perfection, or perfection of *attainment*, but perfection of *integrity*), and I think we may suppose this will take place whatever have been the life and conduct here.

The remodelled body must bear traces of its earthly history, though

to what extent and in what manner we cannot say. The marks of its accidents, sicknesses, honourable injuries, must remain exhibited in some manner, as they remain in the remembrance, or else the remodelled body would not speak true; still they must remain in such a manner as to be consistent with the ideal or perfection described above.

And so for the mind. The reawakened mind will be a revival of the native inward man, yet not such as if he had never lived. The important marks of past life must all be faithfully and truly on it; and yet it will not, any more than the body, be merely such as the man *left off* to be, but such as he *began* to be, with the marks of all that has happened since; these marks not standing in the way of another life, another development of that first and native being, though that which they represent will live in its consciousness and be absorbed into it, causing feelings of whatever kind in the new and reawakened life.

The popular notions that at the day of judgment the past life of each shall be exhibited publicly before men and angels, do not seem to be either morally valuable, or likely, as far as we can judge, to be literally true. In that other world those who feel rightly will have no wish for, and take no pleasure in, the concealment of anything about themselves, and would feel nothing but pain at the revelation of the sins and weaknesses of others. Who then, at this great audit, will be the spectators of whom we are to be ashamed? Such spectatorship, unsympathizing and prepared for a merely human and curious interest, for triumph and contempt, belongs to earth, not to the future.

But the future world cannot be a world of disguises; none will wish it, even if for their part they could make it so. And what will make such undisguisedness both possible and not painful is, that it will be a world of sympathizing interest. Minds, it cannot be doubted, must there see into each other, far more than they do here; but they will have no desire and no care to do so in such a manner as to give pain; each will have his own burden to bear, and will only be concerned with those of others in so far as there may be a possibility of lightening them.

Let us suppose then minds reawakened in a future state in their ideal such as I have described them, whether on earth they may have been among the good or among the bad, and *now* with this great difference from what they were on earth, that they see and feel things rightly, or as the things truly are.

Suppose then (what would be the natural result of this), that all the ill and wrong done on earth is felt in its true character of injury, of unkindness to those looking to us for kindness, of unfaithfulness to those trusting us—if we are to be still the same beings, there must necessarily be, in another world, a real regret and remorse of

such a kind that no happiness can be felt without some effort at undoing the past, in so far as after kindness can undo former unkindness. There are those whom we must desire to meet in another world, because we have failed in what we have done to them or about them here. In that world forgiveness will not be difficult to gain, but that forgiveness which we shall wish for perhaps may ; we shall want to be replaced, not only actually, but deservedly, in that position with the injured which our past conduct has forfeited : we shall want to be loved again. *This* is a world of ready self-excuse within and of punishment from without ; *that* will be a world of self-punishment within and of ready forgiveness from without, far readier than from ourselves to ourselves. How different will all that we have done here seem from what it seemed before, and how we shall wonder that it could ever have seemed otherwise ! When the benefactor and the ungrateful, the friend and the betrayer of friendship, the hater and the causelessly hated, meet *there*, may we not imagine the scene will be, not of reversal and triumph, not of mere punishment and mere recompense, but of startling surprise, remorse, and horror on the one side, and of strange, unexpected pity, forgiveness, something even perhaps of sympathy, on the other ?

If there is any meaning in what one after another philosopher has written, as to the wicked or wrong-doer being under a delusion, "knowing not what he does" (which was the description given of the greatest crime which the world has seen by One who was the sufferer under it, and who could not be mistaken), then the difference in this respect in another world will be, that there the eyes of each will be opened to understand what it is that he has done. Others, so far as they think of and attend to it, will understand it too. But there is not likely to be much of condemnation. For each, in cases where he least thought of it, will find views of past wrong awakening up in *himself*. His feeling will be deep sorrow for himself that this should have been, and earnest desire to do anything if possible now to make it as though it had not been ; to set himself right even now with those that he has neglected and wronged : he will only sympathize with others in their earnestness for the same. When none sets up himself against others, when there is no self-interest to be provided for, and pride is overthrown, all indignation against others for their past faults, now bitterly repented of, will cease ; all contempt for their weakness will have vanished in company with pride ; the thought will be, In how many ways would it have been better for all of us that we had been other than we were ? how came so much of failure and going wrong ? how could we so far misunderstand each other, think so hardly of each other, so much mislead each other, tempt and provoke one the other into sin ? Now

that the smoke of the battle of life is cleared away and the passions which animated it have subsided, what a scene it appears of confusion, of miscalculation, of faithless hesitation, of wild madness!

Yet, after all, this supposed view backwards from another world to this is not what could take place *in* this, and the regret and repentance will not be despair. We are supposing action *done*; now it is *in doing*, and not only we but all around us are acting: we have not, and ought not to have, the independent leisure to look at things *here now* with a look anticipative of that which may be cast back from a future world upon them. *Now* the oppressor is not repentant and self-convicted, but is at his hateful business; and it is not sympathy with his wretchedness (wretchedness so much the greater the less it is felt to be such), but indignation at his wickedness, which we must feel about him. Now he and we are, or ought to be, engaged on opposite sides, and our pity for the sufferer, if it is to do its proper work and prevent the continuance of the suffering, will be so powerful and absorbing, that it will not leave us calm and leisure for the greater pity which, in another world, we shall feel for him who is now loading himself with all that crime, the dreadfulness of which that other world, too late, will reveal to him. This is a world of necessary passion, because of the evil and wrong which, as a matter of fact, there are in it; and of necessary passion of various kinds, because it is in the balancing of them, and the restraining one by means of another, that reason must exert itself: such a world is not so much for calmness and coolness, as for rightness of sensibility and fervour. For even as to ourselves, we want this fervour; in the unavoidable variety of impulse, and the necessary eagerness of action, we are ourselves, we may say, more than one—different people at different times—and what we call conscience is our feeling of moral indignation turned with full face inwards upon ourselves. We could not so turn it, if we had it not in the case of others.

The future life is at once another life and continuance of this, and we must keep in mind that it is both; if we do not, there are two mistakes which we may run into. If we think of it *only* as another life, this may lead us to attribute either on the one side too little, or on the other too much, importance to this—to despair of this life, or to be wrongly and unwisely anxious in it. We must not too much consider, either that the future life may repair the faults and mistakes of this, or that it merely follows as an appendix to this. We must not look at the future life as merely a place of reward and punishment for what has been done here. To do so would be to make *this* the primary and important life, *that* the secondary and dependent. According to what we have done here shall we receive there; according to what we have been here shall we be there. But

*there* is home, *here* is journey; there the permanent, here the fleeting; there the main or real being, here the rudiment, the embryo, the preparatory fragment, in which everything indeed is of infinite importance, and misgrowth in which may have sad consequences, reaching further than thought can foretell, but yet in which all is in a measure prophecy and presumption, about which we must think with faith, hope, and caution. The future life is before us in all its dimly-seen vastness; we know that *there* is immortality, but the candle of revelation shows us distinctly no more than is necessary for our conduct here. In what sense anything that is done here is irremediable and irrevocable, is more than we can say.

On the other hand, there may be some who are disposed to attribute too little importance to this life; they seem to say to themselves—Such a weakness, or vicious habit, or liability to wrong feelings, is a part of myself as I am here; the getting rid of it, however I may try, is quite impossible as I am; all I can do here is to long for freedom from it; the baptism of death must free me from it, and then I trust I shall be different; here I can guard against the indulgence of it, but I cannot, do what I would, uproot the evil itself.

This is well; but any such need to consider that they do really deal truly with themselves *here* in their warfare with the wrong thus besetting them; in that case they may perhaps fairly say what they do. But if any portion of their moral selves is to be left behind them in the grave, it must surely be only so much as—so far as the mind and spirit are concerned—may be said to be already conquered because so ardently hated, but which through habit is rooted so in the being and frame that it cannot be got rid of, but will recur. We may hope for a morally transformed mind in *these* respects, but a transformation which went further than this would be not a glorification but a falsification of the mind and frame as they were here. To the end of it, therefore, this life remains a thing to be made the best of morally in view of eternity, not a thing to be given up as hopeless in expectation of something better there. We must not say—I meant to be good and virtuous if I could; I have failed: it is now too late to make *this* life what it should have been; I must hope the best for another. If it is too late to make this life what it should have been, we must make the best which can be made of it now; and only on that condition have we a right to hope for anything in a future one.

In respect of this life being looked upon in *too* important a light as compared with a future one, it is evident that there is something to be said, though we must take care not to say too much. Such feeling may lead to wrong views about this life, somewhat akin to, and quite as dangerous as, that sort of despair of moral success in it which

I have just spoken of. And against such feeling and views, various Christian doctrines, independently of their dogmatic truth, are of great moral value. Such a doctrine is that of salvation being after all of the grace and mercy of God, and not by human merit (except where unhappily this doctrine is coupled with others which may lead people to the despairing imagination that they are out of the pale of God's grace). The insisting upon the all-importance of what is done in this life in reference to what is to take place in a future one, is that which makes religion of such vast moral value in keeping society together, and in keeping within the bounds of duty those who would otherwise stray. But this must not be carried so far as to lead to the absorption of all faith and trust (the noblest sources of human action always, and beyond all comparison the noblest when they are reposed in God), in anxiety for individual security, certainty, and salvation. Whether this takes a *moral* or an *emotional* form (by which I mean whether it is, on the one side, a feverishness and servility of conscientiousness, or, on the other, a nervous watching after particular feelings), it alike invokes a mistaken notion as to our position in this life in reference to our prospect of another. *That* is what we are created for, not this. *That* is not an after-thought—something made and set before us to keep us in a particular way in this—but it is what we are intended by God to arrive at, and what this is a preparation and apprenticeship for; and while we cannot say that mistake, failure, and error were what were meant for this world, we may yet say that it was meant they should not hinder final success. There is nothing which the analogy of any great pursuit or enterprise of any kind would more strongly suggest to us than that we may defeat God's purposes for us by our own over-anxiety and fearfulness about the particular steps which we have to take in them. We must walk in sincerity and simpleness of purpose, and then walk in *faith*.

Wrong that is done upon earth is done for the most part against some one or in respect of some one of our fellow-men, and it not only leaves a sting with the injured man himself, but also excites a feeling of moral indignation in other men, spectators and sympathizers. When we think of God's judgment of us, we combine in thought these two human feelings with another, belonging to Himself alone. God is injured in each one of his creatures; He sympathizes with (and has compassion on) all, and the moral indignation which the spectator feels He feels with tenfold force; He is again our Creator, Benefactor, and Master, and whatever we do against our duty to Him and against his law is an injury to Him. Our offence, therefore, is in *all* particulars against Him, and from Him we have to beg forgiveness; and forgiveness, not as we might beg it from a master who can be flattered or cajoled by servility:

forgiveness with Him is the change of His feeling towards us. We can only expect it (and shall be unworthy if we wish to have it otherwise) by such change of feeling and conduct on our part as would, if circumstances allowed it, put us into a different position with the injured man, and the sympathizing spectators, as well as with God in his character of our Benefactor and Master. The thought of sin being against God is not intended to swallow up the thought of its being against more really injurable, more sufferingly sensible, men, and of the cause of complaint which *they* have against us. God takes this to Himself, and represents not only Himself but *them*. And so must we consider Him.

When then we ask God to forgive us, our prayer is a sign before Him of our own repentance and change of feeling, and it is an expression of our earnest desire that He would make, so far as may be, that which we deplore as if it had not been; that He would take us again into his favour; that He would undo the ill consequences (unforeseeable by us) of what we have done; that as He makes the grief disappear from us, so He would do away with the injury or harm in those who have suffered by us; that He would make such sufferers now feel kindly to us, as so far deserving this, that we are sorry for what was done. So far as all this is done, inasmuch as such renewal of kindliness of feeling is by the nature of it, if different, yet possibly even stronger than the original, not only the grief, but the actual stain which is the cause of it, may vanish from our spirit, and *this* is God's forgiveness.

It is not the place here to inquire into the *manner* in which, by the death of Christ, God showed how He took all sins upon Himself, made Himself, so to call it, the great sufferer of all wrong that had been done, in order that He might have a right to forgive it *in that character*, as well as in His character of Sovereign Lord of all; that as He had always been and promised to be the redresser of wrong to those who had suffered, He might also be the pardoner of wrong to those who had done; and that His Incarnate Son, by voluntarily suffering the worst wrong which could be done to Him, and, in the suffering, pardoning it, might set an example which each, for his small wrongs, would be ashamed not to follow. All this gives us, we may say, one aspect out of the many in which that great atonement should be viewed. Christ in his death is at once the pledge of the completeness of God's pardon, and the universal Reconciler of all immortal men.

And in the future world, as compared with this, we may suppose the presence of God will be, as in our material world is the bright sunshine compared with the dim twilight. The sun, the more bright, and glorious, and gladdening, and life-elevating it is, is not neces-

sarily on that account the only thing to be looked at and thought of ; it is seen in the light it gives, and thought of for the delight which it gives. So even in another world may it be with God ; the clearer we see Him, the better and the more rightly may we see and know all *besides* Him, all his creatures, and all that He has made. We have no reason to think that our fellow-beings will be less interesting to us, or less cared for by us, there than here. It is the nearer presence and the clearer view of Him which will be the source of the truer understanding of, and better sympathy with, them.

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Death may seem in prospect grievous to us, either (1) from the thought of what we lose by it, and leave here ; or (2) from the thought of the strangeness and unfamiliarity of the circumstances in which it must place us, even supposing we do not fear annihilation ; or (3) from a fear of some kind of suffering or punishment which our conscience is likely to tell us we deserve.

In respect of (1) and (2) death is a journey, an absence, no *corse* at any rate ; and there is no more reason why feelings such as those above-mentioned should distress us, than why feelings of a different kind should make us rejoice at the prospect ; feelings such as these—how much there is of our being and circumstances which we are perhaps ashamed of, which anyhow we should be *glad* to lose and leave ; how much more of interest there must be for us to learn in “that undiscovered country” than in any country to which we could travel on earth ; to say nothing of Who it is whom, through His mercy to us, we may humbly hope to behold there.

With regard to (3), suffering or punishment of some sort, I think, if we are right-minded, we shall hardly more fear than wish for. If, with a frame of mind purified by death, we are to look back on earth and all that has gone wrong in our life here, the thought itself will carry punishment with it, but a punishment not shrunk from.



## CLASSICAL STUDIES IN INDIA.

**A**T a time when educational questions occupy so large a share of public attention, when not only the great problem of popular instruction seems at last to be taken up in earnest, but the old schools and universities are bestirring themselves, trying hard to adapt their powerful machinery to the requirements of a new age, it is not without some interest to watch the growth of the educational system now in force in India, which, with certain indispensable modifications, has been framed after the model of the schools and universities of England. We select for that purpose the last *Report on Public Instruction in the Bombay Presidency*, published at Bombay in 1870, and the *Bombay University Calendar* for the year 1870-71. The Bombay Presidency has for some years distinguished itself by its zeal in the cause of education, and the results obtained there may be looked upon as the most favourable that can be obtained in India. Sir Bartle Frere, the late Governor of Bombay, quickly recognised the paramount importance of the educational department, and he found in the late Mr. Howard and in Sir A. Grant able and hard-working coadjutors. The present Governor has carried on the work in the same enlightened spirit. Several of the officers now on the educational staff of that Presidency are well known in England, and their work in the East is watched with lively interest by their friends at home.

The plan of education which they have devised for the sons of native gentlemen extends, as far as we can see, over a space of fourteen years. A boy's education in the Government schools and colleges begins when he is eight years old. He is then sent to a Vernacular School, and is supposed to stay there for three years. When he is eleven, he would generally be transferred to one of the so-called Anglo-Vernacular Schools. After passing there another three years, he would, at the age of about fourteen, enter a High School. These High Schools correspond in the main to our Grammar Schools. The education in them is given entirely in English. Four years are required for passing through a High School, so that a young Hindu would have reached the age of eighteen or nineteen before he could offer himself for his matriculation examination previously to his entering the university. That examination has to be passed at Bombay. The examiners are appointed by the university, and the standard of the examination is fixed from time to time by that body. This is a point where the Indian universities are clearly ahead of Oxford and Cambridge. They admit no one to any of the affiliated colleges who cannot satisfy the Board of Examiners that he has acquired that *minimum* of knowledge which will enable him to follow with advantage the lectures of the professors and tutors. Such an examination, which has been for so many years a desideratum in England, acts beneficially in India both on the schools and the universities. It stimulates the schools, which are anxious to pass not only a few distinguished scholars, but as large a number as possible of their pupils; and it enables the professors of the university to start in their lectures from a definite point, knowing, as they do, that none of their pupils can be below the lowest standard of the matriculation examination.

The principal subjects of that examination which is to test the results of a boy's education at the age of eighteen or nineteen are the following:—*Languages, Mathematics*, and what is called *General Knowledge*. The number of languages in which a candidate may offer himself to be examined is large. First comes English, which is obligatory. Passages are given for paraphrasing, and questions in grammar, idiom, etymology, and prosody. The second language may be Sanskrit, Greek, Latin, Hebrew, Arabic, Portuguese, Marathi, Gujarathi, Canarese, Hindustani, Persian, or Sindhi. The candidate taking up any one of these as his second language, has to translate prose passages from English and into English, and to answer questions of grammar, idiom, and etymology. He is also called upon to read and to explain *ex tempore* in English a prose passage from a standard author. Though one can easily understand the reasons which have led to the adoption of so large a list of languages for the matriculation exa-

mination, it seems strange that no line should have been drawn between two classes, viz., the vernacular, which candidates learn by practice, and the classical languages, such as Sanskrit, Greek, Latin, Arabic, and Persian, which can be acquired by study only. The examiners will, no doubt, make allowance for this, yet one can hardly see how under any circumstances a colloquial command of Sindhi could be treated as an equivalent of a knowledge of Sanskrit or Latin. In mathematics the examination includes arithmetic, algebra to simple equations, and the first four books of Euclid. General knowledge is tested by two papers, one on history and geography, the other on the mechanical powers, the laws of chemical combination, the chemistry of air and water, the phenomena of combustion, and the solar system. A certificate is granted to every candidate who has satisfied the examiners in each branch of the examination, and this certificate seems to be coveted by many without any view of entering the university, as a recommendation for employment in the lower branches of the public service.

Those who enter upon their academical career may receive their instruction in any of the affiliated colleges or institutions of the Presidency. The time required for an M.A. degree is four years. Two years are generally required before passing the first examination, one more for the B.A. degree, and one more for the final examination. In the first examination the principal subjects are *Languages, Mathematics, Logic, History*, and one of the following, to be selected by the candidates:—A, Butler's "Sermons," i., ii., iii., with Preface; B, Analytical Geometry of the right line and circle by rectangular co-ordinates; C, Chemistry, heat, and electricity.

Of the languages, English is again obligatory, and a choice is allowed of a second language from among Sanskrit, Greek, Latin, Hebrew, Arabic, and Persian. Here we see that Portuguese, Marathi, Gujarathi, Canarese, Hindustani, and Sindhi have been omitted from the list of languages, and we should think that Hebrew, too, might safely have been struck off, as it can hardly be intended to encourage the study of that language in India, except in the case of students of theology. In mathematics two papers are given, one in arithmetic, with the nature and use of logarithms, and algebra to quadratic equations; a second paper on Euclid, books i. to vi., and on trigonometry, solutions of plain triangles, and expressions for the area. In logic the examination comprises easy questions in logical analysis, the handbooks recommended being those of Whately and Fowler. In history papers are given both on ancient and modern history, a definite period being fixed by the syndicate two years before the examination.

The examination for the B.A. degree comprises, again, Languages

and Mathematics, but a choice is now allowed of several subjects, to be selected from the following list:—History, logic, and moral philosophy, political economy, dynamics, hydrostatics, optics and astronomy, analytical geometry of two dimensions, chemistry, heat, and electricity, and physiology, vegetable and animal.

In the first examination for the M.A. degree the number of subjects or schools is reduced to four, viz.—1. *Languages*; 2. *History and philosophy*; 3. *Mathematics and natural philosophy*; 4. *Natural sciences*. Passing in one school entitles to the degree of M.A. In languages candidates must take up English, with one or more of the following:—Latin, Greek, Sanskrit, Hebrew, Arabic, and Persian. The books to be taken up in each language are announced two years before the examination. Comparative philology, criticism, and the history of literature form part of the examination in languages. In history and philosophy questions are proposed on a period to be announced beforehand, including constitutional law, manners, literature, political geography, and ethnology. Next follow politics as a science, including political economy; logic, with the philosophy of the inductive sciences; the history of Greek philosophy; the history of modern philosophy, from the time of Charlemagne to the end of the eighteenth century. In lieu of philosophy, however, candidates may bring up the historical or external and the moral or internal evidences of Christianity.

In Mathematics and Natural philosophy the principal subjects are:—Euclid and geometrical conic sections; algebra and trigonometry; Newton's "Principia," Book i., secs. i.—iii., and astronomy; analytical geometry, and differential or integral calculus; statics and dynamics; hydrostatics and optics.

In Natural Sciences questions are given (1), in zoology, comparative anatomy, and physiology; botany and vegetable physiology; geology; (2), on light, heat, electricity; inorganic chemistry; meteorology, and physical geography.

If we now glance at the result of these examinations, we find that in the years 1869—70, 803 candidates were examined, of whom only 142 passed the matriculation examination. This shows, at all events, that the examination is no sham. Of these, 30 passed for their second language in Sanskrit, 1 in Latin, none in Greek, 7 in Portuguese, 45 in Marathi, 52 in Gujarathi, 6 in Canarese, and 1 in Sindhi; 95 candidates were Hindus, 29 Parsis, 9 Portuguese, 4 Europeans, 2 Indo-Britons, 1 Sindhian, 1 Jew, and 1 Muham-madan.

For the first examination in arts there were 100 candidates, of whom 34 passed the examination. Of these candidates 23 selected Sanskrit as their second language, 10 Latin, and 1 Arabic.

Forty-six candidates offered themselves for the examination for the degree of B.A., of which 20 passed, all in the second class.

For the degree of M.A. there were only 6 candidates. Three took up languages, of whom one passed in English and Latin. One took up history and philosophy, and failed. Two were examined in mathematics and natural philosophy, of whom one passed.

There were besides examinations in law and in civil engineering. Sixteen candidates from the Government Law School were examined, and 6 passed for the degree of LL.B. Nine candidates were examined for the degree of LL.B., and 5 passed the examination. There were 5 candidates from the Poona Civil Engineering College, of whom 4 passed the first examination. Seven candidates offered themselves to be examined for the degree of L.C.E., of whom 3 were successful.

It will be seen that the number of those who finish the prescribed course of academical education is as yet very small. But it must be borne in mind that the University of Bombay dates only from 1855, and that the first matriculation examination was held in October, 1857.

"A university degree," says Mr. Peile, the present Director of Public Instruction, "is the central object of all educational ambition, the prize for which poor scholars are content to endure great privations. And yet, with all the progress to acknowledge, it is impossible to indulge in much elation while the total number of the youth of Western India under instruction has only advanced from a little less to a little more than 1 per cent. of the population; a proportion not to be named with that attained by the nations of Europe, and even by English settlements of much more recent origin than British ascendancy in this continent."

It would take too much space were we to attempt a selection from the questions proposed at the different examinations. They are, on the whole, of the same character as the questions for a pass examination at Oxford and Cambridge, but an attempt has evidently been made to combine, as far as possible, some Eastern learning with the teaching recognised in the schools of Europe. This is a very important, though at the same time a most difficult problem. The education desired by the people of India is evidently an English education, or at least an education that will fit young men for employment in the public service; and there has always been a most powerful party in the Civil Service of India, particularly since the days of Macaulay, which maintained that the Government should attempt nothing beyond giving the natives an opportunity of gaining an English education. Before Macaulay's stay in India, Oriental learning, owing to the influence of such men as Sir W. Jones, Colebrooke, Prinsep, and Wilson, had been strongly encouraged in the Government schools, to the detriment, if not the exclusion, of English learning. Macaulay and his friends tried to introduce an exclusively

English system, being convinced that the whole literature and learning of the Brahmins was mere rubbish. Neither of these views was tenable, neither produced the desired result of giving to the better class of the natives an education that should make them useful members of Indian society and loyal subjects of an English Government. After many years of wrangling, the two conflicting schools seem at last to have effected a practical compromise. That the traditional system of education carried on under the auspices of the Pandits, could not be upheld in India, is now admitted on all sides. It is perfectly true that the classical literature of India need not fear comparison with any other literature of the ancient world. It is perfectly true also that philosophy, grammar, rhetoric, mathematics and astronomy, law and divinity, had been cultivated for centuries with astonishing success by the native scholars of India. Had India remained an independent country, its literary and scientific life might well have developed itself from the rich germs of its own intellectual soil. But the conquest of India by a European power is a fact that cannot be ignored in determining what system of education is best suited to the wants of the rising generation. A lawyer acquainted only with the codes of Indian law would at present be almost useless. A philosopher, however deeply imbued with the tenets of Gotama or Kapila, would be helpless unless he could clothe his speculations in the language of European philosophy. The native system of grammar is in its way more perfect than anything in Greek, Latin, or English; but for practical and educational purposes it has become useless, as it requires almost a lifetime for its thorough acquisition. From one point of view we may regret that the old system of education, which formed the most excellent grammarians, rhetoricians, philosophers, and jurists, is becoming extinct, but the free competition that has been opened between the natives and their conquerors and rulers made the surrender of that ancient and cumbersome system of education inevitable. It does not follow, however, because an English education is more useful, that therefore a native pupil should be treated exactly like an English pupil. It is easy, no doubt, to ridicule the ancient literature and traditions of a country like India. Their poetry is not like our poetry. Their national traditions seem to us absurd, their heroes grotesque, their philosophy dreamy, their religion repulsive. But it would be the greatest misfortune to deprive the Indian nation of its past, or to teach the children to despise what their fathers have admired. It is far better that the natives should retain some reverence for the great names of their history, some national self-respect, even some national prejudices, and it seems at last to have been recognised by the more thoughtful statesmen of our age that a certain know-

ledge of the ancient language, literature, and culture of his country must form an essential element in the education of an Indian gentleman. Thus we see that in all university examinations Sanskrit now occupies the same place as Latin and Greek in Europe. Sanskrit is the Latin of India, and, in an Indian university, it might fairly claim even a more prominent place than the classical languages of Italy and Greece. No one can speak or write the modern vernaculars with neatness and effect who is ignorant of Sanskrit. No one can take a firm stand in handling the problems which occupy the native mind who does not know the different strata which underlie the intellectual surface of India. It is strange, no doubt, to see European professors instructing the natives in their ancient language and literature. But the foreign scholar is far better qualified to discover what is really important in the literature and history of ancient India, really worth knowing, really useful for educational purposes, than the native Pandit; and the European system of grammatical teaching, though less perfect theoretically, is for practical purposes the only one that could be worked within the limits assigned to the study of Sanskrit in a more general plan of liberal education. Anyhow, the system introduced by Sir A. Grant, and carried on with great energy by the present Director of Public Instruction, Mr. Peile, seems to answer all expectations. In his last report Mr. Peile writes:—"The number of students of English in Government schools shows a moderate increase in High Schools and First-Grade Anglo-Vernacular Schools, and a slight decrease in Second-Grade Anglo-Vernacular Schools, which is not to be regretted:—

	High Schools.	First-Grade Anglo-Vernacular Schools.	Second-Grade Anglo-Vernacular Schools.
1868-69 .....	2,667	5,365	2,893
1869-70 .....	2,722	5,581	2,872
	Increase, 55	Increase, 216	Decrease, 21.

In Sanskrit the numbers are as follows, according to divisions:—

	1868-69.	1869-70.
Northern Division .....	959	997
Central Division .....	583	776
Southern Division .....	10	119
Sind .....	309	472
Total.....	1,861	2,364 1,861 Increase 503

"I hope," Mr. Peile adds, "that this indicates a revival of Sanskrit study."

This revival is indicated in other ways too. We see in the colleges of Bombay and Poona the names of two distinguished professors of Sanskrit, Dr. Bühler and Dr. Kielhorn. Both are German by birth, and teach Sanskrit according to the methods followed in the universities of Germany. While they impart to the natives a better system of teaching languages, while they place before the scholars of the country the results obtained by a critical study of the literature and antiquities of India, they avail themselves in turn of the instruction of the Pandits, at least of the few that still remain of the old school, in order to learn what can be learnt in India only, and to preserve in this way the tradition of scholastic knowledge handed down from generation to generation, but now becoming rapidly extinct for want of pupils. They have evidently succeeded in inspiring the rising generation with a new love for their ancient literature, and they have called out among the scholars of India a new literary activity which hereafter may assume a national importance. As Dr. Haug, who preceded Dr. Bühler at Bombay, has kindled a literary revival among the Parsis, Dr. Bühler and Dr. Kielhorn are calling forth a spirit of literary inquiry among the Hindus which cannot remain without results for the moral and intellectual life of India. A contemptuous breaking with the past which is characteristic of "Young Bengal" does not forebode a healthy and continuous growth for the future. It is easy, no doubt, to teach the native pupils in an English school that the whole literature and learning of the Brahmans is mere rubbish; but the generation that has been brought up in the principles of this purely utilitarian philosophy has not answered the expectations of the real friends of India. Reverence for the past is an essential element in all education, and the past of India is not so poor as not to yield some grains of gold to those who know-how to test literary rubbish. Critical taste and historical sense are wanted for that purpose, two qualities in which the Indian mind is particularly deficient, but which can be implanted and strengthened by an impartial study, under European guidance, of the language, the literature, the traditions, and religion of ancient India. After the natives have learnt to distinguish between what is valuable and what is mere dross in their own literature, they will far more readily and honestly appreciate what must seem at first strange to them in the literature of England, but what rises above the narrow standards of national taste, and can rouse the sympathy of every human heart. Standards of taste differ even among European nations which have all passed through the same schools of thought. What is admired in England is not always admired in France, or Italy, or Germany. To attempt to force purely English tastes on the natives of India, shows a want of discrimina-

tion which cannot but injuriously affect the most honest attempts at improving the education of India. We hope for the best results from the system started in the Bombay Presidency under such auspicious circumstances. It may be a compromise, but it is an honest compromise, founded on the experience of the last fifty years, combining the good elements of two extreme systems, and avoiding, as much as possible, what has been proved to be useless or mischievous in each. It may not yet be the best system of education for the natives of India, but it represents at all events an honest attempt to raise the standard of education, and to plant schools and universities which can strike root in the soil of the country.

In conclusion, we may notice an interesting experiment that has been made both at Bombay and at Calcutta, in connection with this literary revival, viz., a kind of *census* of all Sanskrit MSS. preserved in public and private libraries in India. Government has sanctioned a small outlay for that purpose, and some extremely curious lists of MSS. hitherto unknown, have already been published. It is not the intention of Government to buy these MSS., but only to authenticate their existence, and in certain cases to order copies to be made of really rare and valuable works. In many cases the possessors of Sanskrit MSS. have expressed their willingness to lend them to scholars in Europe, and we know particularly of one collector, Dr. Bhao Daji, of Bombay, having sent some most valuable MSS. to students in England engaged in the publication of important Sanskrit texts. The old jealousy against foreign scholars is by no means extinct. Some native collectors declined to give leave to have their libraries examined, believing, as they did, that MSS., particularly those of the "Veda," would be desecrated if handled by strangers. Such bigots, however, form the exception, and if the search after MSS. is continued for some years according to the plan followed in the Bombay Presidency, we may hope to possess in time a complete catalogue of the whole of Sanskrit literature as far as it has escaped destruction, and to have copies at least of all the really important works kept in the custody of English libraries. We are glad to find that the example set in India has been followed also in Ceylon, where Sir Hercules Robinson has sanctioned not only a search after Pali MS., but also a complete survey of the still existing ruins of ancient Buddhist temples and monasteries.

Lastly, we find that for the encouragement of native literature, a fund has been formed at Bombay, chiefly from local endowments. Part of it is devoted to the publication of Zend texts for the benefit of the Parsi community. During the last year a Pahlavi Pazand glossary was prepared for the press by Dustur Hoshangji Jamaspji, and printed by Dr. Haug in Germany. Dr. Haug has added to it a

valuable introductory essay on the Pahlavi language, and the work has excited much interest and controversy among European scholars. As it is the direct object of this fund to encourage native scholarship, Mr. Peile, the Director of Public Instruction, has arranged that this should be done in a more effective and systematic manner by appointing Committees in the Marathi, Gujarathi, and Canarese districts, who will make it their business to direct the efforts of native writers by publishing lists of subjects on which books are required, by commissioning selected authors to undertake certain works, by offering prizes for competition, and by acting as committees of reference on questions of orthography and grammar.

Equally important for the encouragement of native scholarship is the publication of the "Bombay Sanskrit Series," under the editorship of Drs. Bühler and Kielhorn. What distinguishes these editions of Sanskrit works from all others is the attempt to edit each text according to the strictest rules of critical scholarship. Most of the Sanskrit texts which have been published in India, many also that have been published in Europe, are, like the *editiones principes* of Greek and Roman classics, mere reprints of one MS. If various readings of other MSS. were given, they were given at random, without any previous classification of MSS. ; and in many cases the editors themselves, not understanding the text as they found it, have altered the original wording and spoiled it. Drs. Bühler and Kielhorn, as well as their native colleagues, have honestly endeavoured to restore a text that is founded on the authority of those MSS. which, after a careful examination, had proved to be the most authentic, and they have persistently abstained from introducing conjectural readings. We hope that their example will be followed, and that we shall have no more of those so-called eclectic editions which have brought so much discredit on Sanskrit scholarship. The only thing which we regret is that the number of texts published in the Bombay Series should be so limited. If this should be owing to a want of funds, it would seem very desirable that the larger sum of money annually granted to the Asiatic Society of Calcutta for the publication of Sanskrit texts, should in future be divided between Calcutta and Bombay. Valuable as the volumes of the *Bibliotheca Indica* are, the scholars of Calcutta might do well to combine their forces with their colleagues at Bombay, and to agree with them on a common line of action. Some of the Calcutta texts are not edited as they ought to be, and since the departure of Professor Cowell from Calcutta there seems a want of supervision in the management of this important undertaking. Many scholars complain that they receive the numbers of the *Bibliotheca Indica* very irregularly, and frequently in an imperfect state. Some of the Bombay texts, on the contrary, are

not of sufficient interest and importance, as, for instance, the “*Raghuvansa*” or the projected “*Hitopadesa*,” works of which we possess already very numerous editions. As a specimen of what scholars in India ought to do, we shall mention Dr. Kielhorn’s edition and translation of a grammatical work, the “*Paribhāṣhendusekhara*,” with commentary and translation. Even in India, with all the help rendered by the Pandits who are in possession of the traditional teaching of their grammatical schools, the work that Dr. Kielhorn has done was by no means an easy task, and reflects great credit on his industry. Out of India few, if any, Sanskrit scholars could have accomplished such a work without shirking any of its difficulties, and without once misapprehending the quaint arguments of the native grammarians. We should like to see a similar combination of native and foreign talent for the purpose of editing and translating the more difficult works of Hindu philosophy, and some of the intricate treatises on the ancient ceremonial and laws of India. No country is so rich in ancient legal works as India. Dr. Bühler’s edition of the “*Laws of Apastamba*” is most welcome, and we hope it may be followed by critical editions and translations of many more of the old lawgivers of the country.

Whatever pride we may feel in the success that has crowned the study of Sanskrit in the Universities of Europe, nothing could be more gratifying than to see the work done by our scholars react on the native mind, and reinvigorate the intellectual life of India. With us the study of Sanskrit must always be restricted to a small number, and, as a literature, Sanskrit has wellnigh taught us all that it is likely to teach. It is not likely, nor is it desirable, that the epic poems of Vyasa or the plays of Kalidasa should ever replace in our schools the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, or the tragedies of *Æschylus*. In our Universities Sanskrit will in future be learnt by those only who devote themselves to a critical study of the Science of Language, or to a comparative examination of the ancient philosophies and religions of mankind. That in a University like Leipzig the classes of the Professor of Sanskrit should be attended by more than fifty pupils is probably the greatest triumph that Sanskrit scholarship has achieved or is likely to achieve in Europe. It is different in India. There, Sanskrit is the classical language of the soil, the source of the spoken vernaculars, the key to the ancient literature, the background and backbone of the whole intellectual life of the country. If fostered with care and prudence, the study of Sanskrit in the schools and universities of India may still have a great and bright future before it, and we trust that it will reawaken in the native mind a feeling without which no national character is perfect,—a loyal and loving affection for the past.

MAX MÜLLER.



## CHRISTIANITY AND MODERN EV

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*Modern Skepticism.* A Course of Lectures delivered at the request of the Christian Evidence Society. With an Explanatory Paper by the Right Rev. C. J. ELLICOTT, D.D., Lord Bishop of Gloucester and Bristol. London: Hodder and Stoughton. 1871.

*The Witness of History to Christ.* Hulsean Lectures for 1870. By the Rev. F. W. FARRAR, M.A., F.R.S. London and Cambridge: Macmillan & Co. 1871.

MR. CARLYLE somewhere says that if an unbeliever is sincere he is to be pitied, and if he is not sincere he is to be pitied all the more. It is sad enough for an earnest man to have lost faith in God and eternity, but the insincere scoffer is a spectacle over whom angels might weep. If there be any satisfaction at all in the thought that there are men without faith, it is that they are sincere in their unbelief. They have strained their eyes, but have not seen. They have waited for the light, but no day has dawned. So long as they are sincere there is hope. At any rate, they have the consciousness that they have done their best. But of the scorers it may be said as the psalmist said of the ungodly, "They are like the chaff which the wind driveth away."

It must be some satisfaction to right-thinking Christians, as well as to unbelievers, that Christian apologists begin to respect sincere scruples, and to sympathise with men who are troubled with doubts. The modern unbeliever must be thankful that he is no longer represented by Bolingbroke or Paine, and Christians may be equally thankful that the defence of Christianity is delivered from the ferocity of the Bentleys and the Warburtons. In reading old books on evidences it is painful to find that in order to achieve a victory over an unbeliever it was often necessary to charge him

with some immorality, to impute some bad motive for his unbelief, to misrepresent his meaning, and then to belabour him as one of the forlorn children of Belial. Of course this was the spirit of past times, and was quite in agreement with the love which militant Christians then showed to each other. The spirit of the lecturers at St. George's Hall contrasts favourably with this spirit. It shows that if Christianity does not develop, Christians do; that if the "faith once delivered to the saints" be always the same, its defenders at least make progress in Christian virtues.

It is not to be denied that at the present time we are in the midst of a great religious crisis. The educated classes, it is said, are renouncing Christianity. Reports concerning the universities represent scepticism as widely spread among the students. The highest intellects are no longer at the service of religion, and even the clergy themselves are said to be making shipwreck of faith. Some allowance must, indeed, be made for the exaggerations to which religious people are specially prone; but it is certain that the faith which served our fathers will not, at least in the same form, serve our children. During the last ten years we have been compelled to give up positions which we once thought were the strongholds of Christianity. We have entered on a new era, and all men are musing in their hearts what the end is to be. The subject of man's faith in God and his hopes for the future has been reopened. It is our duty to face it honestly, to make our inquiries, if we can, without passion or prejudice, and not suffer it to rest until, so far as in us lies, we have settled it once and for ever.

The first supposed enemy of religion is physical science. When Lord Bacon propounded his method of induction he was careful to say that it was not to be applied in religion. Natural knowledge only was to be derived from nature. Articles of faith were to be learned from the Scriptures. Spinoza made the same distinction, limiting the use of reason in Scripture to determining the meaning of Scripture. When the Royal Society was established it was opposed by Bishop Gunning, Bishop Barlow, and some other scholastic theologians, from a fear that the study of nature would be prejudicial to revelation. Bishop Sprat, the historian and vindicator of the Society, said that their fears were vain. The domain of nature was entirely distinct from that of revelation. Science and revelation, he said, must agree to a divorce. He added, that if the study of nature was to imperil the faith of Christians, that study must be abandoned. The theologians who opposed the Royal Society were right from their stand-point. The study of nature cannot be without an influence on our interpretation of revelation. If the study of nature reveals facts not in accordance with the Bible records, the question is immediately raised in what sense the Bible records are to

be understood. There was, however, wisdom in Bishop Sprat's proposal for at least a temporary divorce. The student of nature must be free. As a mere physical student, he has nothing to do with the physical science of the Bible. He has nothing to do, as Bacon justly said, even with final causes. He has not to inquire for what end anything exists, but simply how it exists. It is true that no well-developed mind can stop here. But when a man comes to the Bible or to teleology he becomes a theologian, and ceases to be a mere student of nature. Every man, however, has his choice whether he shall merely collect facts, or if he shall also reason from his facts.

It might be objected to the Archbishop of York's lecture that the lecturer is blaming the scientific men of the present day for not combining theology with natural science. He seems to be asking them to enter on a province which they wish to avoid, until at least they have proceeded further in their inquiries. He is blaming Bacon, Spinoza, Bishop Sprat, and many devout Theists and Christians, for pursuing natural studies in the spirit of pure science. If we want a verdict from scientific men it is surely not desirable that they should give it until they are prepared to give it. It is absolutely necessary that the freedom of science be absolute. It must be independent of theology. It must never be afraid of its own legitimate conclusions. It is not desirable that any truth in nature should be missed through fear of its being in conflict with anything in Christianity, much less with any belief which is merely an inference, and may be after all no part of Christianity. Galileo must not be made to say that the earth stands still if he is certain that it moves.

Against the Archbishop's main argument scientific men can have but little to say. He seems to be giving that verdict on religion from science which at present they decline to give. If indeed any of them say that matter is eternal, they are, as the Archbishop shows, deserting their own province. But we have no right to make inferences for them. It is one thing to deny creation: it is quite another thing to modify or change the popular view of creation. Supposing the hypothesis of development to be established, that would not exclude the operation of Deity in nature. Development is not the antithesis of creation. The growth of a human body is as much the work of God as the immediate creation of a full-grown man. Science and religion alike forbid us to conclude that if God works by the process of development there is therefore no creation and no God. Mr. Wallace, the most eminent advocate of development after Mr. Darwin, has distinctly declared that "it is simply a question of how the Creator has worked." To this the Duke of Argyll entirely subscribes, denying that he ever advocated "incessant interference," or "continual rearrangement of details."\* If Mole-

\* See Appendix to fifth edition of "The Reign of Law."

schott, speaking scientifically, has said "no phosphorus, no thinking," is it anything more than was said by Locke concerning thought and the material brain? and is not Locke's answer satisfactory, that God may have connected the faculty of thinking with matter? The Archbishop himself answers to the same effect, and his answer is sufficient to remove all suspicion that there is any necessary atheism in modern science.

Two more of the lectures in this series deal partly with science. Mr. Jackson inflicts severe wounds on the Positivists. He knows and understands his adversary. It may be unscientific, using the word in reference to physical studies, to mix up theology with the study of nature; but it is unphilosophical, in the widest and truest sense of philosophy, to limit the intellect of men to the study merely of what is cognizable by the outward sense. Comte and Comtism have been immensely overrated. Positivism is a heresy of this generation, and can scarcely be expected to outlive it. The few grains of truth which it contains are valuable. Wise men will appropriate them and pass on.

The Dean of Canterbury gives a cautious lecture in the style of Bishop Butler. He does not attempt to prove much; he tries to obviate some difficulties. He balances the arguments for revelation with those against it, and he shows not only its probability but its necessity as part of the system of this world—that is, supposing the world to be the work of a creator. There is, of course, the alternative that after all the world may be a bungle, our hopes but dreams, and our beliefs the wild nettles of a luxuriant imagination. But to the Theist this is all improbable. There is nothing, the Dean says, in nature—even according to Mr. Darwin's interpretation of nature—which has not its use, and for the neglect of which nature does not inflict a penalty. We have religious faculties, and for the exercise of them we expect a field. Natural religion is insufficient, and therefore we conclude the possibility or probability of revealed. The Dean does not go further. The only exception which can be taken to his argument is, that revelation may be something very different from what he understands it to be. It may come by an infallible Church, or by an infallible Bible, but it may also be an internal illumination never expressed in human words, and perhaps incapable of any outward expression.

The subject of Dr. Rigg's lecture is "Panthéism." From its contents, however, it should be classed with those that refer to the study of natural science. The Archbishop of York began his lecture by quoting—apparently, with approbation—the old devout Pantheistic utterance, "All things are full of God." Dr. Rigg, as a Wesleyan minister, must sometimes sing one of John Wesley's hymns where this verse is found:—

"In Thee we move. *All things of Thee*  
*Are full.* Thou Source and Life of all!  
 Thou vast unfathomable sea!  
 Fall prostrate, lost in wonder fall,  
 Ye sons of men."

This Deity of which all things are full, was the Deity of the old Greek philosophers, of the Neo-Platonists, and of how many philosophies and religions besides we cannot at present say.

A lecturer on Pantheism might really have said something important. The word itself is very indefinite, and Dr. Rigg rightly begins with a definition. But his definition only defines atheism, which he refutes under the assumption that the teachers of development and natural selection are atheists. This is a great mistake; but so common with men who ought to know better that we excuse Dr. Rigg. We cannot, however, excuse him for evading the subject on which he undertook to lecture. There are three well-known books on Pantheism — "Am Pantheismus," by G. B. Jäsche; "Essai sur le Panthéisme," by the Abbé Maret; and an "Essay on Pantheism," by the present writer. They are all written from different stand-points; but all agree as to what is commonly called Pantheism. M. Maret includes among Pantheists all who think of Deity otherwise than the Church has decreed—that is, not merely the old Pagan philosophers, but Catholics like Malebranche, and all Protestants whatever, especially M. Guizot.

"Pantheism," says Dr. Rigg, "agrees with atheism in its denial of a personal Deity. Its divinity of the universe is a divinity without a will and without conscious intelligence." If so it is no divinity at all, and Pantheism really is atheism. But under this definition of Pantheism are we to include Greek philosophers, and Neo-Platonists, Christian Fathers like Synesius, schoolmen like Erigena, mystics like Eckhart, philosophers like Spinoza, and the Transcendentalists? These and such as these, including, confessedly, Goethe and our own Carlyle, are the men commonly called Pantheists. Is their Deity "without a will and without conscious intelligence?" Manifestly they have either been misnamed Pantheists, or Pantheism is not atheism. The one word which has to be said on this subject is to explain in what sense God is either personal or impersonal. We are at the mercy of words. Most men use them as if they were meant for so many barriers and impediments to the freedom of the mind. A "*person*" in ordinary speech is an individual. It implies the conjunction of a conscious being with a bodily form. We do not call a brute a person, for a person is higher than a brute. We do not call a mind a person, for a body is necessary to the very idea of person. Some of the Fathers held that God was a body. They felt it difficult to

conceive of God otherwise than under the form of a man. Corporiety was to them personality. Socrates, the historian, says that the monks of Egypt made a riot in Alexandria because Theophilus denied that God was corporeal. This was to them a denial of personality. They were right. Personality must go with corporiety. Schleiermacher wisely dismissed personal from the attributes of Deity. The question, he said, between us and the Materialists is, not whether there be a personal, but whether there be a living God. The converse of personal is impersonal. In the sense of incorporeal God is impersonal. He transcends the limits of finite personality. He is an infinite mind. If words could always be understood, it would be the profoundest reverence to deny a personal God.

In logical order Dr. Stoughton's lecture might be said to follow the Dean of Canterbury's. It is the first approach to the subject of evidences proper. Christianity was established by miracles. There is a multitude of ideas connected with miracles, which it is necessary to keep very clearly and very distinctly apart from each other. We seem at last to have come to a tolerably unanimous agreement as to what a miracle means. It is something out of the *observed* course of nature—a "wonder" or "sign," but not, therefore, out of *the* order of nature. Miracles, Dr. Stoughton says, "are not spoken of as 'violations' of law, or as 'suspensions' of law, or as 'contradictions' of law." They are not, then, impossible, as Spinoza and Baden Powell are supposed to have taught. A word by the way for Spinoza. Mr. Farrar has settled him in a note by a quotation from Mr. Mozley. The quotation is: "The existence of God assumed, the law of the Divine nature is as much a law of nature as the law which it suspends." Mr. Farrar's comment is: "This is a complete answer to the objection of Spinoza." The answer was not only suggested by Bishop Butler, but it is really Spinoza's own explanation of miracles. He does not deny the miracles of the Bible. He only maintains that they were within the predetermined order of nature. They were always wrought by natural means. The locusts were brought by an east wind. The Red Sea was dried up by a west wind. There is always, he says, something more in a miracle than the absolute command of God. There is always the use of a natural cause. He admits that in the Bible miracles the cause is not always given, because they are, as he says, "expressed in such words and phrases as are most likely to stir men up to devotion." These words are almost repeated by Dr. Stoughton, who evidently did not know that he was only following "the holy but repudiated Spinoza." The scheme of Bible interpretation which Spinoza advocated was, that we should regard Biblical language and ideas as corresponding to the capacities of the people at the time when the different books

were written. Many things supposed to be miracles were not really miracles; yet Spinoza admits that God, for the purposes of revelation, worked miraculously—that is, in the way of wonders or signs. For instance, God spoke to Moses in a real voice when He delivered the ten commandments. To suppose the contrary, Spinoza says, is to wrest the Scriptures. He cannot, of course, believe that God “has the shape of a man, and speaks with a human voice.” But the Israelites did hear a voice, which may have been created for the purpose of uttering the law on that occasion. When he can find the natural cause he gives it; but, unlike Eichorn and Paulus, he does not propose an explanation of all Bible miracles. A physical explanation would be interesting to the student of natural science. But the religious element in a miracle is higher and more significant than the physical. Dr. Stoughton intimates, in accordance with popular belief, that Spinoza denies the transcendence of Deity. It is the peculiar characteristic of Spinoza’s system that it maintains pre-eminently the immanence of God in nature. Spinoza does not speak of God transcending nature; but, by another distinction, he teaches all that this transcendence can mean. “*Natura naturans*” is the conscious, intelligent, creative Deity, and “*natura naturata*” is that which is formed. It is, of course, easy to put a heterodox meaning on the system of any original thinker, but Christian prudence, as well as Christian charity, require us to give his words the best interpretation which they can fairly claim.

But this very uncertainty of the physical significance of a miracle affects the value of miracles considered as evidence. Inquiring men, who had learned to see God in the observed order of nature, were slow in admitting the miraculous. False miracles were common, and discrimination was required to distinguish the true from the false. To those who believe that miracles have now ceased, there is considerable difficulty in believing that there ever were any miracles. Roman Catholics believe that miracles still continue. Our old apologists, such as Bishop Parker and Daniel Whitby, believed that for centuries after Christ miracles were wrought in the Christian Church. Richard Baxter found the manna in the wilderness credible, for when he was minister of Bridgenorth there was a shower of manna on the church and the parsonage. Even the Thames had not then got into regular habits, for on November 2, 1660, it had three tides in twelve hours. Such miracles do not occur in our day. We therefore doubt if those recorded by Baxter were genuine, and we have at least a difficulty in believing the miracles in the Bible simply as miracles.

With the apologists of Baxter’s time—as, for instance, Archbishops Tillotson and Sharp—the great miracle question was to

show how the miracles wrought in old times were evidences to us. We did not see them, and we only have testimony that they were really miracles. The apologists showed that the testimony was good; that is, quite as good as we have for any other matters of history; and this, they said, was enough. Sharp even turned the argument, from the want of miracles now, to the confirmation of those recorded in the Bible. It was, he said, the order of Providence to work by settled and natural causes, the Deity only interfering when a necessity emerged. This was said in a sermon on the words, "If they believe not Moses and the prophets, neither will they be persuaded if one rose from the dead"—a text which evidently does not give even to immediate miracles the highest place as evidence. Hume's argument, that it is more likely the testimony should be false than the miracles true, had a deep meaning. It was, however, sufficiently answered by the consideration that there were circumstances which made miracles probable. But we cannot in any case get beyond the position that miracles are credible. We receive Christianity, and therefore we receive the miracles; but they really are in the way of faith, and cannot, by any possible alchemy, be made evidences of the truth of Christianity to the men of this generation. Mr. Farrar's reasoning is excellent, and so are some of Dr. Stoughton's arguments; but they never reach beyond the mere credibility of the miraculous. The miracles of the Bible are probably true, but they cannot themselves be converted into proofs.

The lectures of Professor Rawlinson, Professor Leathes, and Mr. Row, introduce us to some of the very ingenious schemes of attacking Christianity, and some of the complicated defences of its advocates. The perverse ingenuity of Strauss, and the brilliant but fallacious, and often inconsistent theories of M. Renan, have occasioned a great deal of writing in defence of Christianity, the sum of which is but sound and fury, and its significance nothing. It is easy to make counter theories quite as good as those of Strauss or Renan; but this is only fighting without the citadel, and withdrawing the attention from the central question. If unbelievers are really anxious for truth, they cannot take a more ready way of defeating themselves than by extravagant theories which make the most of every apparent mistake or contradiction in the Gospel histories. Every violent stroke is likely to recoil, to give an apparent triumph to the other party, and be a hindrance to calm investigation. Mr. Farrar gives evidence of this in his vindication of St. Luke's Gospel. It ought to have been enough for every sincere mind to have supposed that Luke could not have erred in simple matters of history that belonged to his own time. But because his statements could not be reconciled with all that we could learn from profane history, he has been

denounced as a careless compiler. Mr. Farrar says, "Sergius, the pro-consul of Cyprus, was believed to have been a *proprætor* till St. Luke's authority was finally confirmed by the evidence of coins. Lysanias, tetrarch of Abilene, was ridiculed as a clumsy invention, till even Renan has the candour to admit that his recent examination of the inscription of Zenodorus at Baalbeck has led him to believe that the evangelist was not so gravely wrong. The taxing in the time of Cyrenius had long been branded as a flagrant and damaging anachronism till the industry of Zumpt demonstrated that it was an historical datum implied, though not recorded, by other historians." This is a triumphant answer to all objections, but St. Luke may be an accurate historian without Christianity being true. Mr. Row is successful in refuting "Mythical Theories of Christianity." "If," he says, "the Gospels are not in their main outlines historically true, they are no more divine than Shakespeare." But they may be in the main historically true and yet not a revelation in the sense which Mr. Row intends. To refute opponents is often but a small step towards establishing our own position.

Professor Rawlinson removes some other historical difficulties, but makes the Bible subject to the same accidents as have befallen other books. The Old Testament, he admits, is incorrect in its figures, and the original, in some records at least, probably lost. Professor Leathes is more ambitious. He gives "a mythical theory" on the believers' side. If Christianity depended on the mere ingenuity either of its assailants or its defenders, we should say the combatants were about equal. The Professor manages a very small argument with very great skill. To Christians, that is, to those who already believe, it is interesting to find confirmations of belief in casual expressions which have hitherto been overlooked. But unbelievers are not generally convinced by minute reasoning. St. Paul mentions in an epistle to the Corinthians that five hundred persons had seen Jesus after His resurrection. Of these many had fallen asleep, yet it may be supposed that at least two hundred and fifty of them were still alive. St. Paul had lived among the Corinthian Christians, and doubtless had often spoken of the five hundred who had seen the Lord. The belief was general; the churches were founded on it. The early history of Christianity is inexplicable without this belief. St. Paul's epistles everywhere assure us that it was universally received. Now if Christ did not rise we have effects for which we can assign no adequate cause.

This argument is excellent, but we can easily imagine a really sincere unbeliever being simply provoked by it. His trouble is that there have been great delusions in the world; that very great facts have been founded on very great fictions. A man indeed who does

not believe that there is truth in Christianity must be haunted with the belief that the world is governed by imposture and superstition. This is his perplexity. Christianity too may be founded on a deception. This is part of the phenomena which he has to investigate. His first question to Mr. Leathes would be concerning the manner in which the five hundred saw Jesus after He was risen. They saw Him at once, and they only saw Him once. Were they at worship and under the influence of excited feelings? Had some powerful preacher, some Whitfield or Simeon of the early Church, held them entranced by a description of the glories of the risen Saviour? Did they see Jesus as Paul saw Him, whether in the body or out of the body they could not tell? It is strange that He should only have appeared once to a congregation of five hundred, and strange that that appearing should only be once mentioned. David Strauss can erect an ingenious argument on a very small foundation, but he certainly has a rival in Professor Leathes.

We can imagine the unbeliever, in no spirit of wantonness, but in solemn sadness, setting aside the inference from the unbelief of the Corinthians concerning the future resurrection which the Professor says cannot be set aside. It really argues no sceptical spirit on the part of the Corinthians. They had simply misunderstood what the Apostle had told them about the resurrection, supposing that it was "past already." We misapprehend the character of the first Christians if we suppose that they refused to believe until they were convinced by arguments. They were taken captive by the living spirit of the Gospel. They felt the new life and lived it. Modern evidences would only have made them sceptics. The first disciples of Jesus were the poor and the illiterate. The scribes did not believe on Him. When His Apostles went out into the world they subdued the hearts of men. Philosophers like Tacitus could only see in Christianity one of the "*atrocia aut pudenda*" which from all quarters flowed into the great city, and shrewd reasoner like Pliny found it nothing else but "*superstitionem pravam et immodicam*."

The Bishop of Ely has made the influence of Christ's character—or, what is the same thing, the inherent moral power of the Gospel—the subject of his lecture. This is an argument to which no ingenuous sceptic can take any exception. Many, indeed, whom the lecturers in this series regard as unbelievers, go entirely with the bishop in acknowledging the supreme and, in some respects, unique character of Gospel morality and Gospel holiness. They will, however, object to the argument which the bishop builds on it for his view of revelation. They will object also to some of the details. They will admit that Jesus was a higher development of humanity

than other men, and they will admit also that Gospel morality is clearer and more definite than Pagan morality. They will, however, deny the interval which the bishop tries to make and on which his main argument rests. No such break between Christian morality and that of Pagan philosophy was ever made by the Christian writers of the first centuries. Arnobius goes so far as to say that if the works of Cicero were read the Christians need not trouble themselves about Scriptures. Augustine finds in Plato, in Seneca, in Virgil, and other philosophers, the principles of the city of God. He even ascribes the beginning of his conversion to reading Cicero's "*Hortensius*." The bishop marks specially in the morality of Jesus, that He laid great stress on purity of thought. But to the familiar verse beginning, "If any man look on a woman," we can quote a parallel found even among the impurities of Ovid—

"Si qua metu dempto casta est, eadenique casta est,  
Quae, quia non liceat, non facit; illa facit."\*

The golden rule was uttered by Severus, "*Quod tibi fieri non vis, alteri ne feceris*." Forgiveness is taught by Plato, who introduces Socrates saying, "An injury by no means is to be done, nor may it be repaid to him that hath done an injury." And love to our enemies does not seem to have been unknown. Origen says that a man once destroyed one of Lycurgus's eyes, but Lycurgus instead of punishing him never ceased to give him good advice, till "he also became a philosopher." Origen also records that one of Zeno's enemies once said to him, "Let me perish if I do thee not a mischief;" and Zeno answered, "Let me perish if I do not reconcile thee to me."

The bishop's argument for the isolation of Christ from other great teachers raises the question of the genuineness of the fourth gospel; but even when that is admitted the question of the sense in which Jesus was divine, is still undecided. Was it the Neo-Platonic sense in which the Logos or wisdom of God was believed to dwell in all good men, and in virtue of which philosophers like Porphyry and Plotinus had occasional foretastes by divine absorption of their eternal union with the Deity? The statement which the bishop makes that all the apostolic Fathers are clear on the Godhead of Christ is denied in the bishop's sense by Saudius, Episcopus, and Curcellæus, among Protestants; and by the learned Petavius among Catholics. It is easy to say that Bishop Bull refuted them, but it is equally easy to say that he did not. The mere fact that the early Church was uncertain in what sense Christ was God, or, to put it in another form, that there is any uncertainty as to what the early

\* *Amorum*, lib. iii. el. iv.

Church taught on this subject, takes away the foundation for any argument that can have weight with an unbeliever. The distinction which the bishop makes between the divinity which Christ claims and that of all Pagan incarnations is ingenious, but it is also open to controversy. It is true, as he says, that the Gospel gives a deep sense of the greatness of sin and of the love of God in forgiving it, but Lord Herbert has shown that these things were deeply felt by many in the Gentile world. It is quite possible for God to give men a sense of sin and of forgiveness without any external revelation, such as we have in Christianity. To suppose this, would be to remove the objection from the want of universality in the outward revelation, which the Bishop of Ely feels to be a great mystery. It was no perplexity to Lord Herbert. He had an answer from the universality of the revelation within.\*

Without in any way disparaging the intrinsic value of any of these lectures, we give our decided preference to that by the Bishop of Carlisle. It is the most suggestive, and nearest the tract in which we think will ultimately be found the final solution of the difficulties which are in the way of an intellectual comprehension of the significance of the Christian revelation. The really essential question to be settled is what revelation means—what it is in its contents, and in what way it has been given. On this question and those connected with it, there are great diversities of judgment among Christians. Arguments for revelation are wasted until it is determined what revelation is. The Bishop of Carlisle tries to settle this question, and specially so far as the mode is concerned. To reveal is explained as to unveil. The unveiling was gradual. It was developed, that is to say, it was made "at sundry times and in divers manners." But the last development was contained in the original idea, as a bird existed in the egg or a plant in the seed. The process is under the divine superintendence. God is "the developer, and his eternal purpose the thing developed." It is desirable in our terrible fight with the imperfections and ambiguities of words to define at every step. With this definition of development on the authority of a bishop, let us not forget that it need not imply any godless or undivine process. It is, however, on the word "gradual" that the bishop wishes to lay most stress. Here we have an analogy between God's works in nature and His mode of revealing Himself to man. Four stages are distinctly marked. The first is

\* We have some scruples about calling Lord Herbert a Deist. His chief object was to show the certainty of natural religion, which is immediate, over merely traditional revelation, the truth of which however he nowhere denies. The Bishop has made a curious slip in calling him "the most eminent of the Deists of the last century." Lord Herbert, when a young man, was presented at the court of Queen Elizabeth.

the revelation to Adam and Eve, the second to Abraham, the third to Moses, and the last in and by Jesus Christ. Revelation at these stages was adapted to the capacities of men at the different periods when it was made. In the fulness of time the revelation was completed. This corresponds to the gradual work of nature and the gradual process of creation as described in the beginning of Genesis. Bishop Butler had shown from the analogy of religion to the constitution and course of nature that difficulties in revelation are not greater than difficulties in nature, and the Bishop of Carlisle adds, "Certainly those who are prepared to receive the Darwinian view of the development of man's body, ought not to find anything to offend them on the ground of improbability in the Scriptural account of the revelation made by God to the human soul."

In estimating anything which Bishop Butler said, it is always necessary to bear in mind the precise connection in which it is said. No man that ever reasoned, so thoroughly proved what he undertook to prove, but no writer on evidences ever undertook to prove so little. That we are to expect difficulties in revelation because there are difficulties in nature, is not to be received absolutely. We expect that revelation will remove difficulties in nature. Butler was arguing with Deists who believed in a wise and benevolent Deity. To them the argument had a force which it could not have to mere sceptics or inquirers. The difficulty in the way of believing Christianity is only increased by the additional difficulty in nature in the way of faith in the Deity.

The objection, however, that revelation should make natural difficulties plain, is made on the assumption that revelation is the immediate opposite of nature. Without ascribing to Butler more than he meant, he may be said to have given the first hint of learning the mode of revelation from the Divine working in nature. The Bishop of Carlisle has made a beginning with the application of this hint. Some ingenious theologian, some future Origen or Malebranche, may be able to complete the parallel between development in revelation and Mr. Darwin's development in nature. This will considerably modify our present views of Christianity, and enable us to embrace within the Christian fold many of the "educated classes," who are now supposed to be without "the city of God." Revelation will then be independent of the absolute truth of the Bible records. The Bible will maintain a place suitable to the nature of its contents and the manner of its composition. It will be regarded as the outward human expression of the divine impulse within,—the history of the highest religious experiences of the race. Instead of supposing that God adapted His revelation to the capacities of men, we shall then regard the different stages of development at different eras as

marking the capacities of the race for understanding the revelation of God.

The Bishop of Carlisle suggests a starting point which might serve for this theory. It is not necessary to set aside the story of Adam and Eve. It may be literally true, or it may not. But we have what the Bishop calls its "philosophical meaning." It represents the dawn of man's religious consciousness. It is the era in his history when he awoke to a sense of responsibility, of a moral law and of sin. All this might have happened by an internal unfolding, development, or revelation. There may have been an external voice; but this supposition is not indispensable. The revelation essentially was the fact that man became conscious of responsibility. In a conventional sense we have come to limit the use of the word revelation to the contents of the Scriptures. We speak of revealed religion as opposed to natural. We suppose our faculties to be inadequate for the discovery of truth, and so we posit revelation as the complement of natural religion. But this distinction is of our own making. It supposes that truth which we reach by reason to be a discovery of our own, and not a discovery which God has made to us. It supposes, in fact, that our faculties were not given by God. "Ungrateful man," cried Malebranche, "to call that knowledge natural which God has revealed." The conclusions to which we come by reason St. Paul calls revelation. Speaking of the knowledge of God which the Pagans had by reason, he says, "God hath *manifested* it to them." A legitimate distinction might, however, be made between reason and revelation corresponding to the distinction between reasoning and intuition, or knowledge mediate and immediate. The definition which limits revelation to the contents of the Bible is altogether modern. Bishop Williams, in his "Boyle Lectures," distinguishes between natural and supernatural revelation. Adam before his fall had natural revelation. Supernatural was added because of the necessity of restoration. But now that all miracles are regarded as within the order of nature, what was reckoned supernatural may be embraced in the natural. The future theologian, whom we are supposing to be setting forth this theory of revelation, will have to apply it to the different cases in the Scriptures. He will have least difficulty with the prophets, or those who simply professed to have been inspired. The words "the Lord said," and "the word of the Lord came unto men saying," may have meant an internal voice. But there will be no necessity to deny the literal truth of the external voices of which we read in the Scriptures. They may have been true; but the necessity of taking them all literally is not indispensable. An internal voice may have called Abraham out of Ur of the Chaldees. The "fierce ritual of Syria" may have told him to

sacrifice his son, and yet this may still in a sense be a voice from God ; but a voice speaking through the imperfections of man.

This view of revelation will supersede the necessity of explaining every occurrence in Bible history. To piety God will still speak to Moses in the burning bush, and go before the camp of Israel "an awful guide in smoke and flame." The truth of these appearances will not be denied ; but the mode of them may be questions for the free exercise either of reason or speculation. The details of Jewish worship may come from God, but not immediately. They will not be regarded as God adapting Himself to the capacity of Jews ; but as the expression of the stage of religious development which the Jews had then reached. They may show the wisdom of Moses in devising worship suitable to a people who had been used to the idolatrous ritual of Egypt. The antagonism of the spirit of the prophets to that of the priests will then be easily explained. The higher spirit of the prophets had virtually set aside the law. The ideal of the ceremonies, the ideal of the priesthood, was "a stand-point overcome." The revelation appears not in the details, but in the result—in the progress which the nation made in real goodness. The spirit of the prophets was perfected in Christ. No external voice speaks to Him. He reveals Himself, and that is revealing the Father. In Him the tide of Divine life overflows into the world. His own growth in wisdom, like His growth in stature, was subject to the laws of gradual development. Miracles are not necessary to make us believe in Him. We can dispense with all theories of the incarnation, Arian, Nicene, or ante-Nicene. It is not necessary to suppose that He was God in any other way than as all good men will ultimately be God. The eternal Logos that was in Him was enough to make Him divine. His birth may have been miraculous. He may have risen from the dead and ascended into Heaven. These things are probable ; so probable that we believe them. But they come to us only on testimony. They are, after all, but probabilities ; that of which we are certain is the revelation that was in Jesus, and through Him is made to the world. His words and the lessons of His life are the inheritance of the race for all time.

"God, who at sundry times and in divers manners spake unto the fathers, hath in these last days spoken unto us by His Son." This is the text on which the Bishop of Carlisle builds his doctrine of the development of revelation. It would not be right to ascribe to the author of this text the complete idea of a scheme of revelation such as we have supposed. He might, indeed, have included both the internal and the external revelations ; but evidently the latter were to him the more prominent. He did not extend revelation to the race. He did not make the great idea of revelation the unfolding of God in

the human mind. His stand-point as a Christian Jew led him to speak only of the revelations in the Jewish books. He supposed "occasional interpositions" from without, such as Mr. Darwin entirely excludes from the development of nature. He says nothing, indeed, of future revelations; but if we are to complete the analogy between nature and revelation we must suppose that revelation has never ceased; that God works unceasingly in the human mind as He works in nature. We know not what will be the end of progress or what the next great unfolding in the natural world. Future generations may surpass us as much as we surpass the quadrumana, and a light may dawn on our minds as much beyond Christianity, as we now understand it, as the mind of Jesus was beyond that of the distant man who first awoke to a consciousness of responsibility.

The great objection to this view of revelation will be the same as that made to Mr. Darwin's theory of development. It gives no certainty that God is the worker. It leaves the possibility that, after all, our beliefs may be but the creations of fancy, and our hopes never realised. It does not satisfy us to know that all nations have believed in God and a life to come, and that this belief is rational and agreeable to the moral constitution of man. We want a certainty without to confirm the consciousness within. This was the objection which Richard Baxter made to the scheme of Lord Herbert. He felt within himself an "unsatisfactory kind of apprehension till he looked to *supernatural* evidence." He confessed, indeed, that this was but the weakness of "a soul in flesh." Yet it was a feeling natural to us as we are now constituted. It was the same thing which the sceptic Simmias expressed in the "Phædo," when he longed for the assurance of what Socrates taught by "a word from God."

It is possible that this craving for an external certainty may have created the object which it craves. The philosophical student of Roman Catholicism must have seen how marvellous are the devices in the Church of Rome to meet every craving of the human mind. To the same craving is due the dogma of Scripture infallibility which long reigned among Protestants. Revelation has not been given us in the way that we could have wished it to have been given. It is not written in the heavens. It is not preached by angels. No immortals appear to men. The preachers of Christianity preach only what they themselves believe, and they speak to the world with a divergence of beliefs enough to distract the illiterate and to make the educated sceptics. Evidence-writers fill volumes with learned arguments which are beyond the reach of the multitude, and which only provoke controversy among those who have time to read them. When they offer "the word from God" which Simmias craved, they only give a tradition that there was "a word from God" in past times. The

"open vision" which we crave is still wanting. The absolute certainty never comes. But few of us ever act as if we really believed that we had an absolute certainty for what Christianity teaches. How few even of the most pious Christians regard the other life as a compensation for the loss of this! In words we do so every day. We give God "heartly thanks" for taking a "brother" out of the miseries of this sinful world, and yet we mourn the loss of friends as the greatest of calamities, not for our sakes, but for theirs. This divergence between our words and our thoughts is itself an evidence that we come short of absolute certainty. We have a devout hope, and this helps us to resignation; but only in cases of extreme suffering or ecstatic piety do we ever really feel that "to die is gain."

Protestant theologians have not yet understood how much was implied in giving up an infallible Church. While that remained there was ample ground for supposing the external certainty of revelation. The infallible Church existed always, a living incarnation of the "word from God." It was in itself a continuous external revelation satisfying every desire of man, provided he could take the Church on its own authority, without looking at its credentials. But with the rejection of the infallibility of the Church, men were thrown for certainty entirely on the internal word. The history of this is forgotten in our literature. It was ignored long before it was forgotten; but we can distinctly trace it in the great controversies of our church and nation. In Archbishop Laud's conference with Fisher the Jesuit, he was asked how, without the infallible voice of the Church, he knew the Scriptures to be the Word of God? The Archbishop objected that this was not a question which ought to be raised among Christians. The Jesuit was not willing that the sole point at issue should be ignored. His triumph was to press the Archbishop either to admit the infallibility of the Church, or uncertainty as to any external revelation. The Archbishop gave the usual Protestant answers—1, we have the testimony of the Church; 2, the Scripture shines by its own light; 3, the testimony of the Spirit to the Christian mind; and 4, the evidence of reason. He admitted that none of these was sufficient in itself, yet if taken together, the four links, insufficient in themselves, would make a strong chain. About the time of the Restoration, another Roman Catholic wrote an answer to Laud's argument, called "*Labyrinthus Contuariensis*," in which he pressed the Protestants of that day to answer Fisher's question to Laud—How we know the Scriptures to be the Word of God? This book was reckoned so formidable an assault on Protestantism, that Humphrey Henchman, Bishop of London, asked Stillingfleet, then Dean of St. Paul's, to answer it. The outcome of Stillingfleet's

answer was that our certainty of the truth of Christianity is only "moral," and not absolute. When we weigh the arguments, there is a balance of "probabilities" in its favour, but the assurance we have is that of the Spirit testifying within. Hooker had come to the same conclusion. He was charged by Travers with making the Word of God less certain than things of which the evidence comes by outward sense. The charge is substantially admitted. For sensible things, Hooker said, we have the certainty of evidence, but for the Word of God "the certainty of adherence." Chillingworth gave the same answer to Knott. He resolved evidence mainly into the inward testimony of the Spirit, which gave "obsignation and confirmation" to Christian minds. Locke, in the same way, made the certainty of revelation to depend on the internal evidence of the Spirit. He makes up by "the assurance of faith" for what is wanting in absolute certainty.

The next stage in this history was the rise of the Deists, who resolved all religion into that which we derive from our faculties. If there was no absolute certainty that the Scriptures were the Word of God, they could not have that place as an infallible authority to override conscience and reason which had been given to them by Protestants. The Deists denied, or at least doubted, the external word. The internal was of more importance to this conclusion. The way had been led by Hooker and Chillingworth, Stillingfleet and Locke. An opportunity had come for a fair and equitable settlement of the meaning of revelation. But the evidence-writers arose with their manifold proofs of the absolute certainty of that which theologians had just relegated to moral certainty. The Deists urged their difficulties, and the Apologists vehemently "proved" Christianity. But religion was independent of them both, and as if to rebuke them both, it came back without arguments, and its power was felt as that of a wind that "bloweth where it listeth."

We have not hitherto noticed Canon Cook's lecture on "The Completeness and Adequacy of the Evidences of Christianity." There is a double meaning in this title which is not removed, but rather confirmed, by the contents of the lecture. It covers both the literature of evidences and the evidences themselves. In the first sense the evidences are, as the lecturer says, "of vast extent;" but he surely over-estimates their value if he supposes them either complete or adequate. The writings of the early apologists of Christianity did great service in helping to destroy the old fabric of Paganism, but their arguments for Christianity would create amusement if repeated before any intelligent assembly of Christians in the present day. The great burden of them all is not the miracles or the character of Christ, but the miracles which continued to be performed in the

Church. Irenæus says that they could still cure the lame or the paralytic with a touch. Arnobius and Origen challenge the Pagans to cast out devils either from beasts or men as was done daily by "the most simple and rustic Christians." Even in Augustine's great work, "*De Civitate Dei*," the main arguments are a multitude of incredible miracles. The most sensible of them is one concerning a poor cobbler who was in want of a coat, and coming to the shrine of the twenty martyrs, he prayed that they would provide him with raiment. The boys followed him through the streets shouting, "Cobbler Flo, Cobbler Flo, have you been praying to the martyrs for a few halfpence to buy a coat?" But as he walked along the seashore, near the harbour of Hippo, he saw a large fish cast on the sands. He sold it to a Christian cook for three hundred pence. With this he bought wool, out of which his wife was able to spin as much cloth as made him a garment. Moreover, the cook found a gold ring in the fish's stomach, and being a Christian, he gave it to the cobbler saying, "How wonderfully the martyrs have provided you with garments!" As for the works of modern apologists, we cannot estimate them at the same value as Canon Cook does. Grotius can now be regarded only as a curiosity in Latin. The arguments of our own old English evidence-writers are as amusing as those of the early Fathers. Richard Baxter proves the Bible to be the Word of God because it is too good to be the word of the devil. Bishop Parker demonstrated the truth of Christianity from the story of "The Thundering Legion," from "The Acts of Pilate," and the "brief and pithy answer of Jesus" to the letter of Abgarus, King of Edessa. Dr. Whitby established the truth of Christianity from miracles being wrought by Gnostics, Carpocratians, and Saturnians; by Finland witches, Chaldean magi, and Egyptian sorcerers, and by the miracles of the early Church as attested by the Fathers. Joseph Glanvill refuted atheists and unbelievers by stories of "the demon of Tedworth" and "the witch of Shepton Mallet." Charles Leslie proved Christianity by the same "hard Church" argument which establishes the divine right of Episcopacy, or any other divine right that a wild imagination may devise. The apologists of the eighteenth century Canon Cook classes among "the foremost champions of the cross." We cannot accord to them this honour. Even supposing they were successful against the Deists, it cannot be said that religion owed much to them. Mr. Pattison says they proved Christianity, but what to do with it after it was proved they did not very well know. Earnest religion was to them mere fanaticism and madness. Warburton's estimate of Wesley's revival is a true index of the spirit of the apologetical writers of the eighteenth century. Even

the best of them had no religious influence. Butler was only intelligible to select audiences, and Paley preached to empty pews.\*

We do not think that Canon Cook is more successful in maintaining the completeness and adequacy of the evidences themselves. He says a few words of miracles, which we have already shown are defences that need to be defended, and proofs that require to be proved. We that already believe Christianity, take the miracles with it, but to urge them as arguments to an inquirer is to make a use of them which they will not bear. The lecturer also says a few words on prophecy, but here again we have nothing to present that will have any effect on the mind of a doubter. It is not true that Jesus was expected. The Jews expected a triumphant Messiah, but not such a teacher as Jesus was. It would be difficult, as Dr. Rowland Williams showed, to find a single prophecy in the Old Testament directly applicable to the Messiah. Anthony Collins settled this a hundred and fifty years ago in a way that has never been answered. Every one of the Messianic prophecies quoted in the New Testament is an application or accommodation of Old Testament words, often in a sense altogether new. We that are already Christians can justify the accommodations. They were to some extent arguments to the Jews; but to urge them on a modern inquirer would only be to perplex him. We agree more with the lecturer when he directs doubters to the contemplation of the personal character of Jesus, and the necessity of feeling truth previously to reasoning about it. Christianity has won its triumphs as a life, not as a creed. The life has co-existed with a thousand creeds diverse in kind, and often antagonistic to each other. Those whom the lecturer wishes to convince will be repelled by the alternative that they must give up the moral excellence of Jesus, or accept Him as God. We dislike this kind of reasoning. We dislike these dilemmas, which break the bruised reed, or quench the smoking flax. Christ may have been God and yet not in the sense which Canon Cook understands the divinity of Christ. It is said in the gospels that Jesus grew in wisdom. He says Himself that of the day and the hour of the final judgment He knew nothing. He predicted many things which were to happen before the generation to which He belonged had passed away; and, so far as we know, these things have not happened yet.

\* There is a story told in Sunderland, that when Paley was Rector of Bishopwearmouth, he was once visited by his patron, Bishop Barrington. The Bishop and the Rector walked down the High Street together till they came to the end of Sans Street, where a huge four-walled brick building had just been erected. When the Bishop saw it he exclaimed, "I say, Paley, what building is this?" "Why, my lord," Paley answered, "it's a Methodist chapel." "Methodist chapel!" said the bishop. "Does anybody go to it?" "I hope they do, my lord," said Paley, "for very few people go to Church."

It is possible to explain all these passages. We that believe do explain them, but they are difficulties in the way of believing that Christ was God. We do not care to have these difficulties pressed home to us in the form of a dreadful alternative, and we should not apply to others reasoning which we do not like applied to ourselves. It is neither fair nor wise to impale an inquirer on the horns of a dilemma which, after all, may only have its existence by a fallacy in our own logic.

We cannot conclude without a protest against an argument used both by Mr. Farrar and the Bishop of Ely. It is that of connecting the profligacy or the outrages of an era with speculative difficulties in religious belief. To the "infidelity" of the eighteenth century Mr. Farrar ascribes the profligacy of that century, culminating in France in the atrocities of the Revolution. To the Atheism of the eighteenth century the Bishop of Ely ascribes the recent outrages of the Communists in Paris. This is a kind of reasoning stereotyped in England, and sanctioned unfortunately by the stately eloquence of Robert Hall. But it is reasoning which has no definite data and which admits of diverse conclusions. The influence of Spinoza in England is only imaginary, and nothing that he taught could have done harm to any one. Hobbes had a great influence on speculation, but we only dream when we suppose that an abstract philosopher has any immediate influence on the morality of the people. The profligacy of the eighteenth century in England was inherited from the seventeenth, and then it was due far more to the Stuart kings and the servile clergy than to any speculative infidelity. This has its parallel in the history of France. The atrocities of the French Revolution were not due to Diderot or D'Alembert, not even to Voltaire or Robespierre. They were due to the Popes and the French kings, who kept the Church and the people in bondage, and they were due to the French bishops who sold the liberties of the Church and the freedom of religion that they might bask in the sunshine of a king's court.\* The priests who have been recently murdered in Paris may ascribe their murder not to infidelity or Atheism, but to the unfaithful bishops of the time of Louis XIV.

It is certain, as we have already said, that we are on the eve of a great change as to the meaning of Christianity. Dogmas which once were to us the expression of absolute truth, are slowly but surely evanishing before our eyes. We can no longer regard Christianity as embracing all truth, or as marking the confines of revelation. God, who has been shown to be immanent in nature, is immanent also in the mind of man. We can no longer make the distinction between

\* See on this subject the excellent article by Dr. Dorner, of Berlin, in the July number of this Review.

what God teaches and what we learn by means of our faculties, for all our knowledge must in some sense be co-ordinated under revelation. God gave us our faculties, and what we learn by them we learn from Him. It is not without a struggle that we relinquish old beliefs. We feel as the poet did when he says :—

“ I remember, I remember,  
The fir trees dark and high ;  
I used to think their slender tops  
Did reach unto the sky.  
It was a childish ignorance,  
But now 'tis little joy  
To know I'm farther off from Heaven  
Than when I was a boy.”

Yet the new faith may be deeper than the old, and not to put aside the beliefs of childhood may be the greatest unbelief. We crave a point where we can stand and say with certainty that now we know. But no such point is given us. In every case we are thrown finally on faith. It may be in a Church infallibly teaching us, or a Bible that speaks of the faith of those who have gone before, or in an all-pervading Spirit, slowly rearing the fabric of creation, bringing it to perfection in the roll of ages, developing Himself in a mysterious way in nature and in the human soul. Our life is a walk of faith. We should see it precisely as it is. We should not say there is light where there is only darkness. We should not tell lies for God or invent evidences where there are none. This is following our own way, and not submitting to God's way. It is true, as one of these lecturers says, that Christianity is not worn out, but it is also true that it gasps for freedom. We have made our narrow reasonings the laws and the limits for other men's faith, and God is saying, “ Who hath required this at your hands ? ”

JOHN HUNT.



## THE UNITED STATES OF AUSTRALIA.

*Documents and Correspondence connected with the Royal Commission on a Federal Union of the Australian Colonies.*  
Printed for the use of the Commissioners, by Authority.  
JOHN FERRIS, Government Printer, Melbourne. 1871.

TO all those who have some knowledge of the great wealth of Australia derived from the gold mines of Victoria—a wealth which, though fluctuating in its monthly amounts, seems likely to last for years, and which is open, any day, to the chance of some newly-discovered gold-fields (in one or other of these colonies) equal perhaps to those of 1851 and 1852, whereby a monetary impetus was at once communicated to the whole civilised world, unknown to the previous history of commerce—the Documents and Correspondence described at the head of this paper must possess a very great and peculiar interest. They have not at present been published, we are informed; the copy before us, however, is marked “by authority,” and signed by the Commissioners and the Chairman. But the value attached to Australia from its gold is only a minor part of the wealth of her colonies, when we take into consideration her produce in wool and in copper, and the incalculable sources of wealth she will soon develop in preserved meats and fruits, in corn, tallow, leather, silk, and cochineal (the mulberry and cactus growing prodigally, almost without cultivation), perhaps in precious stones of value, and yet more precious iron and coal, and certainly in the eventual production of wines, which are likely to rival those of Germany and France, not excepting the finest *hocks* and *burgundies*.\* And there are several

\* The complex problem of frost (the want of it for the vines), of fermentation, of cellarage-treatment, and the long voyage through two opposite temperatures, may

other things concerning which it would be premature to speak positively. Now, when all this is taken into account, together with the rapid increase in the populations of the leading Australian colonies, the enormous extent of their land—a continent, in truth, almost as large as Europe,—and the predominating influence they will exercise over the entire Australasian and Australindian groups, the Federal Union of those leading colonies becomes a question of profound importance for the best consideration of our statesmen and ruling powers. The possession of power does not, unfortunately, by any means secure foresight; on the contrary, it is often liable to induce a concentration upon immediate interests; but when facts present themselves with stupendous magnitude, it is not the degree of exceptional wisdom that is so imperatively required as that of broad practical sense, vigour of intellect, clearness of perception, and soundness in the conception of political duty; and we think the British Government will not, after all the warnings of past experience, be so insensible and purblind a parent as to slight the affection and undervalue the progress and combinate forces of so portentous a progeny.

The Correspondence of the Victorian Commissioners with the other Colonies commences with New South Wales, which is the elder sister of all these comparatively new settlers amidst the Southern Seas. The first letter is from the Hon. S. Samuels, M.P., late Treasurer of New South Wales, who “entirely approves of the proposal to apply for an Imperial Permissive Act for effecting a Federal Union of the Australian colonies;” but the next letter, which is from the Hon. Sir James Martin, M.P., Attorney-General and Premier of New South Wales, is in a very different strain. And here we feel bound to compliment the Commissioners on their liberality and good judgment in giving this letter in full, and at the outset, although it totally disagrees with the object of all their inquiries and labours. The athlete who can venture deliberately to let his opponent plant the first blow with all his force, displays, at any rate, no little confidence in his own powers of endurance. The reasoning of Sir James deserves to be well weighed.

“I must regret that I am unable to agree with the Commission in the proposals which they have submitted. So long as these Australian communities remain British colonies, I do not think that any advantage whatever would be derived by them from a Federal Union. As Independent States, having each of them but a comparatively small population, such a union would in some respects be beneficial to them, and chiefly in the increased weight which it would give them in their intercourse with other

require years to solve, with reference to an export trade; but already a *shiraz* and a *red hermitage* have been produced of a quality to ensure an immediate sale in Australia at 10s. a bottle.

nations; but as colonies no such union can augment the importance which belongs to them as integral portions of the British Empire. Whether forming together a federation of colonies, or ruled in all respects as they now are by separate Legislatures, they must in either case, while they continue to be colonies, enjoy all the prestige which their Imperial connection confers on them. Had the foolish colonial policy originally suggested by Mr. Goldwin Smith, and attempted to be carried out by Mr. Gladstone and his colleagues, obtained the sanction of the Parliament and people of England, a Federal Union of these communities would have become desirable, if not necessary. But there is now no danger of an English Ministry giving its sanction to so suicidal a measure as the abandonment of the colonies. The withdrawal of the Imperial troops may be regarded by some as a step in that direction. I, however, do not look upon that withdrawal as final. In this and in other matters, I hope and I expect that Mr. Gladstone's successors will reverse his policy, and show a more intelligent and patriotic regard than he and his colleagues have done for the greatness and stability of the Empire. But whether we are or are not hereafter to provide for our own military defences, I entertain no doubt that no future British Minister will advocate the dismemberment policy of Lord Granville and Mr. Goldwin Smith. If we are to assume the position of Independent States, such assumption will originate with ourselves. I sincerely hope that the day is far distant when we shall feel ourselves called upon to enter upon such a course. Until we do so, I am not in favour of a Federal Union of these colonies, and cannot therefore approve the steps which you are pursuing for the purpose of carrying such federation into effect."

We thus at once perceive that the Commissioners intend to allow the whole question to be fairly discussed, and the views on all sides, and from all quarters, to have a full exposition. The letter of Sir James touches upon another very important point—to the effect that if the Imperial Government conceded to these colonies the power of making treaties with foreign governments, "such concession would give them the right to remain neutral in the event of England becoming involved in war." No doubt but this is precisely what common prudence would make the colonies desire; and this, the writer thinks, would be a practical severance from the parent state. We agree with him that this would be a great calamity if it occurred; but we do not see that this should necessarily follow a precautionary movement of self-preservation, which a country without an army, and with a yet smaller commencement of a navy, must very naturally feel anxious to adopt. Sir James says he entertains "no dread of the dangers," in the event of such a war. That may be, and yet the dangers would certainly exist. He "feels persuaded" that both the land and sea forces of Great Britain would protect these dependencies and their extensive commerce with her merchants. But many colonists do not feel persuaded to so sanguine a degree, if at all; and supposing the war to be with the combined navies of two great maritime powers, it is by no means certain that Great Britain could spare an adequate force to operate at so great a

distance. Neither can the confidence of the Australian colonies in such protection be enhanced by the shameful disasters that have recently occurred to three of her ships of war. "No British Government that neglected this duty," concludes Sir James "would, in my opinion, retain office for a month after such neglect became manifest." Very possible; but if this manifestation consisted in the plunder of millions in gold bullion from the banks of Melbourne, and the sacking of that city as well as Sydney (after intercepting two or three ships homeward-bound with sundry millions in gold), it is impossible to see what consolation the ruined Australians would derive from that very proper change of Ministry.

The next letter is from the Hon. Henry Parkes, M.P., late Colonial Secretary New South Wales, who is "unreservedly in favour of seeking a Permissive Act from the Imperial Parliament" to effect the proposed federal union; which is followed by a communication from the Hon. Sir T. A. Murray, President of the Legislative Council New South Wales, who approves of the object, but confines his remarks chiefly to the "impracticability" of the colonies remaining or making themselves neutral in case of a war, so long as they remain a part or parts of the empire, whose "fortunes they must share in war as well as in peace." He concludes with the very sensible opinion that "no enemy that had the means or power to attack them, would respect their neutrality." They would be the most weak, or foolish, of enemies if they did so, when the extraordinary richness of the prize was only equalled by the facility of its seizure. The concluding letter of the New South Wales correspondence is from the Hon. W. Forster, M.P., late Colonial Secretary, who qualifies his assent to the principle of a Federal Union by observations of a philosophical and far-seeing kind, which deserve serious attention.

"It appears to me that, in so far as such proposed Federal Union of any particular group of British colonies, or of any particular section or sections of the British Empire, aims at future nationality for itself, a national sovereignty and independence for a particular group or section, or, in other words, at complete and final separation from its present Federal or Imperial Centre in Great Britain, the movement to that extent must be regarded as distinct from, and even in a certain sense antagonistic to, the idea of a grand Anglo-Saxon, or Anglo-Celtic, World-Federation, which should unite the various groups of colonies or sections of the Empire, with equal rights, privileges, and functions for each colony, group, or section, under one homogeneous Maritime Imperial Sovereignty, or Empire, possibly even extending to or including America herself, such as, I am apt to think, can alone save our race, or union of races, from the disintegrating and centrifugal effects of our present principles of representative self-government, by which in fact America was severed, and by which the British Empire, nay perhaps even Anglo-Saxon or Anglo-Celtic Nationality, threatens in course of time to be finally dismembered."

The foregoing sentence, though labouring and struggling among diverse parts and parentheses, and both creating and suffering the usual difficulties which attend a philosopher who cannot give his reader breath in a "full stop" till he has exhausted his immediate pressure of ideas, is yet pregnant with matter for thought. It will be noticed that the writer assumes the complete and final separation of the Australian colonies from the mother country to be "inevitable in the long run." Now this is what others protest against, and the Commissioners do not take into their view. We must agree, however, with the writer, that all of the future conditions which can reasonably be foreseen should be weighed and settled before this federation takes place; and he very prudently, and perhaps wisely, suggests that the union should be commenced by *two* colonies only, while "the more remote or indifferent colonies await the result of the experiment." While approving of this caution, there is yet something about it that causes an inward smile. As the colonies differ, here and there, in their views as to duties and tariffs, and those temporary modifications of free trade and protection, which should be quite excusable in young countries (especially when we recollect the prolonged struggle caused by that question in old and wise countries), the recommendation to the smaller colonies to remain quietly aloof till they see how lovingly, or otherwise, the sisterly union "works" with two, is somewhat amusing. The ethnological question as to the dismemberment, and possible submergence, or partial extinction, of the Anglo-Saxon and Anglo-Celtic races in future generations—not a little complicated by the writer's introduction of the powerfully advancing American element—is a most tempting theme for speculation, but we dare not risk being led to so great a divergence from our present subject.

We now come to the Correspondence from South Australia, which closes the letters from the leading sister colonies. They are all of last year's date, from Sydney for New South Wales, and from Adelaide for South Australia, the head-quarters of the movement being dated 1871—Melbourne, Victoria. The readers to whom all this is familiar will pardon it directly they are reminded of the general ignorance and confusion so continually observable with regard to the geography of the different Australian colonies. The views of the younger colonies, together with New Zealand, will be noticed subsequently.

The Hon. Jas. Boncault, late Attorney-General of South Australia, approves, on the whole, of the proposed union, but warns the Victorian statesmen and the Commissioners who direct the movement, that they must be very careful not to excite jealousies and other "local susceptibilities," with regard to their independence, by

presuming too much upon wealth and commercial influences. Referring to the desired neutrality in time of war, Mr. Boncault writes to the point:—

“In my opinion not one of these colonies could at present—certainly South Australia could not—successfully defend herself against an aggressive expedition seriously fitted out by any great naval power as France, Russia, or America, and although such an expedition might not conquer or hold the colonies, yet great destruction or loss would result, and steam has so revolutionized warfare that these colonies would be the first to suffer if war were actually declared. Although I have not lost faith in national bravery, yet no one who reads the signs of the times can avoid seeing that preparation for war is an essential element of success where blows are so heavily and rapidly struck as in these days, and every one knows not only that that has always been England’s weak point at the commencement of any war, but that the peace party and Mr. Gladstone’s policy tend to make England more unprepared than ever.”

The losses of life and treasure caused by our habitual unpreparedness at the opening of every great war, are indeed enough to make our rich dependencies tremble at such a prospect; and we coincide with the writer in the opinion that Australia—and the colony of Victoria especially—would be the first to suffer. He also directs a marked attention to the position of Russia on the Amoor, and utters warnings which have been pointedly uttered before by others. On the first discovery of coal-fields in Australia (1858), we submitted the following warning to the Home Government:—

“If Australia should be in a position to become a great *coaling-station*, her importance to *all* the great maritime powers must be sufficiently obvious. A ton of official reports could not equal the force of one glance at Mercator’s projection, where we see the smiling neighbourhood of New Caledonia, the peaceful and placid proximity of Tahiti and the Marqueses (all embattled links in the French chain of advanced outposts); while we may imagine the eye of the Russian eagle staring in our direction from the harbours, docks, foundries, and arsenals of the obscure and comparatively *forgotten* Petropaulovski.” \*

Reverting to Mr. Boncault’s remarks on Mr. Gladstone and the peace policy, we believe the country at large thoroughly approves of a peace policy; but it is not without a strong feeling that quite enough money has long since been expended to render our land forces and our sea forces efficient and ready at need, feeling at the same time that they are neither efficient nor ready, yet dreading to call aloud for the requisite improvements, knowing the additional prodigalities that invariably attend the slightest movement in such directions. The “susceptibilities” to which Mr. Boncault alludes are very strongly illustrated in the letter that follows—from the Hon. H. B. T. Strangways, M.P., late Attorney-General and Premier

\* “*Australian Facts and Prospects.*” Smith and Elder. London. 1859.

of South Australia, who literally postpones his consent, and his belief in the consent of South Australia to a union, "until the Government and Parliament of Victoria exhibit more liberal views in their legislation, affecting directly or indirectly the interests of their neighbours. The idea that appears to predominate in Victoria, as to the basis of a Union, is that all the other provinces are to adopt the legislation of Victoria." Nothing of this kind has been said, and, in any case, would probably not be insisted upon, although, as undoubtedly the leading colony, it might show some good grounds for the due recognition of that fact. Mr. Strangways thinks, however, that the union may eventually be effected, but that the question of the neutrality of the colonies in time of war should first be settled.

"I can see no reason why each of them should not be declared, by Act of the Imperial Parliament, an Independent Sovereign State for such purposes, but to remain subject to the jurisdiction of Her Majesty in manner and on the points to be declared in such Act. I believe that, if such a course is adopted, the ultimate federation of the colonies will be expedited. I can see no reason why *full powers* of legislation, *in all matters*, should not be conferred on these colonies, reserving merely to the Queen the right of disallowing an Act of any of the Legislatures, and providing that no legislation shall be repugnant to the law of England, whatever that may mean."

He does not see how this neutrality can be secured "unless England regards the colonies as Independent Sovereign States," but he points out certain difficulties and complications of a serious kind that may arise:—

"I do not see that the position I have mentioned would be in any way inconsistent with England protecting these colonies by means of her navy, though a difficulty might arise if England used any of the colonial ports to facilitate her operations in levying war on nations with whom such colonies were at peace."

From Queensland we find letters, dated Brisbane, 1870, from the Colonial Secretary, the late Attorney-General and Premier (the Hon. C. Gilley), and from the Speaker of the Legislative Assembly of Queensland. The general tone of these letters displays a feeling that the question is premature for such a young colony as Queensland, with a population not yet at all capable of dealing with its own "vast resources and extent," an extent in which many a German principality would be lost almost beyond discovery. While there is a disposition to look forward to the federal union, a degree of irritation is manifested at what the Queenslanders, or rather the Brisbanians, designate as the "meddlesome interference of 'colonial society' in England," which we take to be a not particularly grateful or even gracious recognition of the well-intended energies and services of Mr. Edward Wilson (chief proprietor of the *Melbourne Argus*) and others in Cannon Street and elsewhere in London.

From Western Australia, the reply from the Chief Secretary (dated Perth, February 21st, 1871) is a mere piece of cautious official formalism, excusable perhaps from the exceptional circumstances and local position of that colony; but from Tasmania (first called Van Dieman's Land) we have something very definite from the Hon. C. Meredith, M.P., dated from Oxford, Tasmania, December 16th, 1870. The purport of this reply is not at all encouraging to the hope of sisterly union among the colonies, when a leading man in an island so very near to Victoria, and which geologists think, and with good reason, though divided by nine hours' steaming, did once form part of the mainland of that colony, can pen such a sentence as the following:—

"Looking at the geographical position of Tasmania, an island blessed with a good climate, good harbours, rich in her forests and her mines, and containing a rich soil adapted to the growth of all those productions of the earth necessary for the perfect development of the human race in their highest forms, and believing that the future of Tasmania in the South Hemisphere must be similar to that of England in the Northern, I am not prepared to use any expression that would in any manner tend to the supposition of my concurrence in the annexation of Tasmania to any of the Australian provinces."

After this, the writer coolly and softly intimates that, so far as any advantage can be derived by the exchange of productions and commodities, the proposal would meet with his "hearty support,"—a sentiment worthy of the soul of a political cheesemonger and manufacturer of jams and jellies (figuratively speaking), but not otherwise to be much admired.

The respective numbers of the representative members of the different colonies in the prospective Federal House of Commons, is thus set down by Mr. Meredith:—

"Assuming that the Union of the Australias is based on the Dominion of Canada, the members of the '*House of Commons*' must be approximate thus:—

Victoria . . . . .	40
New South Wales . . . . .	26
South Australia . . . . .	9
Queensland . . . . .	6
Tasmania . . . . .	5 "

If five members be the just proportion of representatives, why object to it? One would have rather thought that this scrap of a colony, beautiful and most fertile as it is, yet still a mere scrap of land when compared with the enormous dimensions of her sisters, would have been only too proud and happy in being taken into an association from which she would certainly derive far more benefits than her scrap of beauty could ever hope to confer.

We have here completed the official Documents (the Com-

missioners' Report excepted) and Correspondence in epistolary form, and now come to the review of discussions in the daily and weekly press of London and Australia. Our summary will comprise leading articles from the *Times*, *Spectator*, *Daily Telegraph*, *Economist*, &c., and from the *Melbourne Argus*, *Age*, *Australasian*, *Sydney Morning Herald*, *Adelaide Advertiser*, *Hawke's Bay Herald*, and other journals of the antipodes, and may be regarded, together with the preceding correspondence, as exhaustive. Space can only be afforded for extracts from a few of the articles; but we shall endeavour to represent their exhaustiveness of the subject by a combined analytical and synthetical treatment of the majority. And it may be cordially admitted and declared at the outset that, never was any great political question affecting innumerable interests and extending visibly and invisibly into the future, so broadly, fairly, earnestly, and, on the whole, both conscientiously and generously dealt with by opponents as well as advocates (on both sides of the globe) as this question of the Federal Union of the Australian Colonies.

The subject is expounded in the *Daily Telegraph* (September 21st, 1870) in a careful and lucid manner, favouring and applauding the project, and defending the colonial policy of Mr. Gladstone and Lord Granville on the ground that its wisdom "was for a time misunderstood." The writer justly regards it as the glory of England that, of all countries in the world, she alone "is becoming the mother of nations, free like herself, and law-abiding, and destined to rival in greatness, if not to surpass, the great nations of Europe." The writer adds that the first Parliament of the Confederation of Australia alone, will rule over "a territory larger than the dominions of any European Power." The writer, though intending to be complimentary as to magnitude, could not well have said less; and he might have said that the combined territories would have been larger than most of the European Powers put together.

The next leading article we find is from the *Spectator* of August 27th, 1870, which opens with an allusion to the Hon. C. Gavan Duffy, M.P. (who, by the last mail from Australia, seems likely to become Premier), as the originator of this movement as early as 1857.

"Expatriation evidently suits the Irish genius. While the Irish hardly furnish a statesman in a generation to the English Parliament—Lord O'Hagan is, we believe, almost the sole member of it who, having really lived his life in Ireland, can yet make good his claim to that name, unless, indeed, Lord Dufferin can be said to have lived his life in Ireland—the expatriated Irish, the Irish who go to India, and Canada, and Australia, furnish far more than the ordinary proportion to the ranks of genuine statesmen. Sir Henry and Lord Lawrence—Ulster Orangemen by inheritance, at least—saved India. Mr. Darcy M'Gee, Irish Catholic, conceived and virtually effected the federation of the British Dominion in North America, and lost his life

through the insane hatred which his grand conception drew upon him from the American Fenians; and Mr. Gavan Duffy, Irish Catholic, who as we must admit, after sowing his political wild oats in early life, gave every sign, even before he left Ireland, that he was sobering and ripening into a true statesman, was the first to suggest to the Australian colonies, and seems not unlikely to be destined to carry out for them, a measure of federation as large and comprehensive as that which is already striking deep root in Canada. All these men—and they are but specimens of a much larger group—have shown political imagination of the higher cast in the designs they have sketched out, and something more than political imagination—a strong character penetrated by spirit, which understands the stimulus to mind and heart derived from sharing the hopes and anxieties of a widely-scattered and yet closely-united brotherhood of communities under the same common head. Mr. Duffy's speech on federation in the Victoria House of Representatives on the 2nd June last, terse and concentrated as it was, showed this kind of statesmanship in its strongest and soberest mood. He evidently carried with him not only the great majority of the House but all the more weighty organs of the Victorian press."

The only adverse speech of the least ability was from Mr. Higinbotham, who "though a free-trader by profession," continues the *Spectator*, "drew one of his chief arguments against federation from the danger of any colony relinquishing the power to deal with its own tariff on considerations exclusively derived from regard to its own interests," whereas Mr. Duffy looked forward to the advantage of "for ever rendering impossible hostile intercolonial tariffs." The same able journalist argues that the opponents of federation themselves furnish the best proofs that the time for it is ripe when they urge "that it will diminish the individual power of the separate colonies to consult their own selfish interests."

"If already a selfish policy of isolation is growing up in each, the time *must* be come to neutralize it by inviting the generous co-operation of all. Mr. Higinbotham and his friends were happy enough to furnish the strongest possible argument in favour of the opportuneness of this legislation, when they contended that it was inopportune *because* it would crush the separatist policy in the bud. We can hardly wonder enough either at the simplicity or the audacity of such a plea.

"One enormous advantage which the policy of colonial federation, wherever it can be applied, has over all other intermediate policies, is that it can be, and is, supported with equal earnestness both by those who believe—we fear the majority of our own Cabinet—that the time is near when the larger colonies must break off from the empire—and by those who, with ourselves and with Mr. Duffy, and with some of the best colonial statesmen in all our colonies, look forward to a future in which the bonds of the various British colonies all over the globe will be drawn closer, by some species of organized alliance, with the Government at home."

On the position of the Australian colonies in the event of Great Britain being involved in war, and with immediate reference to the late Franco-Prussian war, which at first caused apprehension, the *Times* of December 6th, 1870, thus writes :—

"If we had been compelled to draw the sword, our colonies would have received by telegraph the abrupt intimation that they were at war. A state of war, however, is a very serious position, and in this instance it would have been constituted without any participation of the belligerents in the causes of the quarrel or the counsel which led to the strife. The following statement of the case conveys the impression which such a prospect produced. It is taken from the report of a Commission appointed at Melbourne to consider the whole subject, and though it represents the opinions of a particular party only, it is well worthy of attention: 'The colonies are as liable to all the hazards of war as the United Kingdom, but they can influence the commencement or continuance of the war no more than they can control the movements of the solar system, and they have no certain assurance of that aid against an enemy upon which integral portions of the United Kingdom can confidently reckon.' The case is not in these words quite exactly stated, but the meaning is perfectly clear. It can hardly be said that the liability of the Australian colonies to the perils of European war is as great as that of other portions of the empire, and it is certain that the colonists, if attacked or threatened, might reckon with entire confidence on all the support which our resources or their remoteness might enable us to give."

This is handsomely said, but it is not satisfactory. For the "remoteness" might afford ample time for all the disasters to have occurred before succour could arrive; while the hostile presence of, possibly, two great fleets on the British coast, might render it unadvisable to detach any adequate force. "Nevertheless," continues the *Times*, "the main proposition is true. The colonies might hear any morning that they were at war without so much as knowing that a cause of war had occurred." Truly they might so; and the news might come from quarters little expected. For instance, there was an electric telegraph from St. Petersburg to Astrakan upwards of twelve years ago, so that in all probability it has long since been carried on to the Amoor.

What keen eye of the smartest English admiral (if any of the old smartness remains!) can watch over Australia when intelligence can be conveyed from France to Russia, and from St. Petersburg to the Amoor in a few minutes? It might be "carried on" by a hostile squadron to the friendly traders whom the Australians have supplied with provisions in New Caledonia.\* Alison, in his "History of Europe," has a fine passage which will apply to Great Britain as well as the Australian colonies. "To look danger calmly in the face and make preparations to meet it when still afar off, is the mark, not of a timid, but a resolute mind. The greater part of the want of previous arrangements, which so often doubles the weight of misfortune to nations" (let France as well as England bear this in mind) "as to individuals, is the result of mental cowardice. They are afraid of being afraid, and therefore they do nothing till the evil day has arrived, just as they delay making their wills till it is too late."

\* "Australian Facts and Prospects," pp. 162, 163.

The *Times* concludes its article with this equally just and generous assurance :—

“For ourselves, we desire only to repeat the assurance which the Australian journals seem now to have frankly accepted. Not only is there no disposition on the part of Great Britain to separate from her colonies, but such a policy never had any existence at all. No party in the State ever advocated it or entertained it, nor was any approach made to such a doctrine beyond this admission—that if, in the fullness of time, such a separation should be claimed by a colony, it would no longer be the desire of this country to resist the demand by force of arms. As for the rest, time and events will best teach us how to promote and secure those relations of amity and affection which at present are, happily, strong and undisturbed.”

The *Economist* (December 1870) very judiciously directs attention to the fact, that when the Federation Commissioners drew up their Report, the news of the great outbreak of European war had just reached Australia, and the British troops had but lately been withdrawn ; also that Mr. Childers had withdrawn the British cruising squadron, and that there was at that time a French man-of-war refitting at Sydney, a French iron-clad at Singapore, and a French fleet at New Caledonia, with the new Belgian treaty complications hanging in the tempestuous air. No wonder the Australians should say—“Who knows? As we cannot fight, let us be neutral!” We regret to find that the *Economist* thinks that neutrality will be impracticable without separation, yet the reasons adduced are very forcible :—

“Separation would be painful on both sides whenever it came, but would be plain and intelligible, and might be softened by a policy of cordial alliance ; but, as far as we can see, no intermediate alternative, such as the Melbourne Commissioners are hankering after, would be for any length of time feasible at all. A colony might be neutralised for a time as a sort of half-way house to separation, but to separation neutralisation must inevitably lead. The first time that a colony found itself compelled to close its ports against a ship of war of the mother country, to pass a Foreign Enlistment Act against us, and to exhort its citizens to take no part in our quarrel, the final dissolution between that colony and the mother country would be a mere question of weeks or days.”

The *Sydney Morning Herald* takes a similar view, and seems to prefer that the colonies should be in subordinate union with Great Britain, and contribute a proper sum towards their claim to be adequately defended in time of war. The *Melbourne Argus* looks forward with hope and confidence in the federation ; but is clearly alive to the difficulties involving the question of neutrality in war. So with the *Australasian*. The *Melbourne Age* is favourable to the proposed union, entertaining doubts, however, as to the time for this having yet arrived. The *Sydney Empire*, the *Melbourne Leader*, and

the *Adelaide Advertiser*, are tolerably unanimous in their approval of a federal union, while they each perceive, and sometimes differ about, the difficulties that intervene, and the means, if any, of meeting or evading them. But with all of them, the liability to suffer by wars with which they have nothing in common, is very naturally a predominating feature. The *Hawke's Bay Herald* (New Zealand) points out that the comparison of the connection between Great Britain and Hanover, and also the Ionian Isles, is "ominous," as both these states have been separated from Great Britain. The *Melbourne Argus*, in an article (October 7th, 1870) of great legal research and acumen, treats the question more learnedly than we have seen attempted in any other journal. It thus concludes:—

"There are, in fact, three courses open to us. We may endeavour to obtain a declaration from the principal nations of the world that in future wars they will not attack colonies. We need not say how unlikely it is that any such declaration would be made, or what little regard, as the present war has shown, such declarations receive when hostilities actually commence. We may execute a national declaration of alienage, and renounce our allegiance to the Queen. We shall then certainly become neutrals, if we choose to pay the necessary price for neutrality. Or we may make up our minds loyally to follow, for better or for worse, the fortunes of England in peace and in war. We have little doubt what the choice of this colony will be."

The daily and weekly journals of Melbourne and Sydney are conducted with great ability, and sometimes contain articles worthy in all respects of comparison with the best of those which appear in the great leading journals of Europe. But inasmuch as no book written in Australia, by anybody, and upon any subject, has any sale; and nothing—of an intellectual kind—is "believed in;" so the finest articles of their press are comparatively thrown away, or, at any rate, within a few hours, because the great mass of the people, like some of their long-enduring Ministries, *do not know one thing from another*. (Of course we except all their mineral and material riches.) The sympathies of the mother-country are thus too often restrained, if not reversed by what the late Colonial Secretary for New South Wales—the Honourable William Forster, M.P.—designates in the Correspondence as "the confusion and inefficacy by which the public affairs of all the Australian colonies are at present so largely characterized." In the Parliament of New South Wales we have too often seen perversity and perplexity displayed ostentatiously, as if they were virtues; in the colony of Victoria we have witnessed ignorance making a merit of its meanness, and meanness making a merit of its ignorance, and mainly because men born to be traders, who got into statesmen's seats, did not know one principle from another (where money, or any immediate interest, was not in

the way), nor one man from another, nor, as we said before, one thing from another. But time and discomfitures will correct all this, make room for statesmen, and gradually develop an intellectual gold-field open to the career of talents.

The impression we derive from the whole of the Documents and Correspondence, and journalistic arguments and opinions, added to a personal experience in the Australias of seventeen years, may be thus summarized. These colonies, so far from desiring to break off their relations with the mother-country, are proud and happy in the connection, and, notwithstanding the temporary complications which have been introduced, and may again arise, with regard to the presence or withdrawal of British troops and cruising squadrons, this amicable connection will continue unaffected by the progress of federation, or the actual accomplishment of such union. But if, unhappily, England should become involved in a great war, and the colonial neutrality be regarded as precarious (on whatever conditions that neutrality may have been supposed to be established), then the more wealthy of her colonies will be sure to require an adequate defence *by sea*. For this they may be expected to pay heavily, and they may agree to the terms. Then there will be no absolute need for separation up to this point. But if it should happen that the costly defending force is over-matched, and great damage and loss occur to the colonies, then indeed the need for separation would be palpable on the part of the colonies, and, probably, on both sides.

The Report of the Commissioners, modestly placed in the Appendix, is a masterly production for its perspicuity, conciseness, and breadth of view. The previous discussions, however, supersede the necessity for more than a brief examination. It is divided into three Parts. Part the First treats of the "Advantages of a Federal Union," upon which there is unanimity of opinion. The Report shows (Clause 4) that those colonies are occupied "by a population already larger than the population of many Sovereign States; and they yield a revenue greater than the revenue of six of the Kingdoms of Europe." This latter declaration furnished grounds for some brilliant banter on the part of the Melbourne Correspondent of the *Times*. But the grand point at issue is this: Is the statement true or false? It seems prodigious; but it is true. In like manner we might say of the enormous extent of territories, that if the United Kingdom of England, Scotland, and Wales, could have been set down in some unknown quarter, within a thousand miles or so, of the Gulf of Carpentaria, before the exploration of the ill-fated Burke and Wills had given some clue for the journey across towards the northern shores, it would have taken an exploring party six months

to discover those United Kingdoms. And it might have taken a year and a half, if the explorers had chanced to make two starts in the wrong direction. Where then is the wisdom of laughing at facts because they are too large?

The Second Part of the Report is on "The Best Means of Effecting a Union." This has been sufficiently displayed, and can only be properly commenced by obtaining a Permissive Act from the Imperial Government.


The Third Part discusses the most important and intricate question of "Neutrality" in time of war. This also has been dealt with sufficiently by the Correspondence in leading articles of journals. But there is one clause which requires special notice:—

"16. 'Two Sovereign States' (says Vattel) 'may be subject to the same prince without any dependence on each other, and each may retain its rights as a free and Sovereign State. The King of Prussia is Sovereign Prince of Neufchatel in Switzerland, without the principality being in any manner united to his other dominions; so that the people of Neufchatel, in virtue of their franchises, may serve a foreign Power at war with the King of Prussia, provided that the war be not on account of that principality.'"

Are we then to understand that the federated colonies, having been constituted Sovereign States, may be neutrals in time of war; *or*, that they may not only not choose to aid the mother-country (Clause 22), but be free to aid the war of any other country *against* her, provided it were not on their own account? If this be the fair reading of that clause, would any country, parent or otherwise, endure so anomalous a state of things?

Some alteration in several of the clauses in Part Three will be found imperative; and we do not doubt but the fertile and far-seeing brain that devised, and perhaps drew up, this Report, will strike out some means of solving this pregnant and explosive problem. If the combustion can be avoided, and this part of the scheme be remodelled in a way to convince and satisfy all parties on both sides—indeed it will be necessary on *all* sides—of the globe, a practicable plan for the foundation of a new empire of Anglo-Saxon, Anglo-Celtic, and other Nationalities will have been inaugurated, and (no direful curse of wars or convulsion of nature intervening) may prove to be the grandest scheme of statesmanship and philanthropy ever yet promulgated.

R. H. HORNE.



## RELIGIOUS REPUBLICANISM: JOSEPH MAZZINI AS A RELIGIOUS TEACHER.

THE horror excited in this country by the ghastly spectacle of fratricidal war in France; the shortsighted, narrow socialism of the Parisian Communists on the one hand, and the hideous excesses of their *soi-disant* republican conquerors on the other, have produced a reaction tending to discredit the democratic idea itself, in the minds of the superficial majority.

It is fortunate, therefore, for the reputation of Continental republicanism in England, that shortly before the late civil war in France, Joseph Mazzini—who has been for forty years accepted both by friends and foes as the representative man of the republican party—had published in the *Fortnightly Review* a succinct exposition of the republican doctrine, as conceived by its most distinguished advocate.

In that remarkable paper, Mazzini tells us that the Italian people are republican in opinion; and attributes the manifold mistakes and delusions which still impede the moral unification of the peninsula under a republican flag, to the fact that the Italians have no “deeply meditated and solemnly accepted faith in democracy as a principle.” Italian republicanism, being the “mere result of instinct and opinion, is easily allured from the straight path of duty and sacrifice—the sole path of national regeneration—by every temptation of apparent expediency or temporary interest. The republicanism

which is the offspring of faith, persists upon that path, even though it lead to martyrdom."

Nor is it only in Italy that, according to Mazzini, this absence of religious rule and sanction, retards the realisation of the democratic idea. "By decree of Providence, gloriously revealed in the progressive history of humanity, not Italy alone, but Europe is advancing towards democracy. The most logical form of democracy is the republic: the republic, therefore, is one of the facts of the future. *But this fact, in order to be lasting, must be founded upon a religious basis.*"

The extraordinary influence which Mazzini has exercised, not only over his own countrymen, but over the whole democratic party; as well as the equally extraordinary terror and aversion which his name has constantly inspired in the monarchical Governments of Europe—to the point that even at a period when Garibaldi himself was courted by the Italian monarchy, and caressed by native and foreign aristocracies, Mazzini was still an outlaw, condemned to death in two-thirds of Europe, and refused an asylum in every country but our own—surrounds every utterance of his upon this subject with peculiar interest. He himself declared to the Piedmontese Government immediately after the formidable insurrection of 1857, "For six and twenty years—if I am to believe you—I have been fatal to the Italian cause. . . . I have committed nothing but errors, nay, many times I have been declared utterly extinguished, null, unworthy of being spoken about—yet, nevertheless, grown grey in years and care, my means exhausted, opposed by all the Governments and spies of Europe, so that, England only excepted, there is not an inch of ground I can tread legally and without danger; from time to time I reappear, an agitator, followed, you can no longer say by a few, and feared by the Powers who are strong in public and secret association, strong in their armies, in their gold, and some of them even—if their press speak true—in opinion."

These words, which were alike true and significant then, are equally true and significant now. Their moral significance is even more remarkable now, than it was at the time when they were written. Materially speaking, the dream of the Utopist may be said to be realised. With the exception of some of the less important islands and a portion of Venetian Lombardy,—destined sooner or later to gravitate to their natural centre,—Italy is one. Moreover, the "sacrarium of Italy" is restored to her. Rome is, in name at least, the capital of Italy. Mazzini himself has been *pardoned* for having dreamed this dream forty years ago, and never rested until the vision became a reality; and unreflecting minds might wonder why it is that now that his material mission is accomplished, he still "reappears an agitator, followed, none can any longer say by a few."

Why is it that his pen, no longer, like Munzer's, "sharpened to a sword," is still a thorn in the side both of pope and king? why is it that his writings, now purely theoretic and making no appeal to force, are still continually sequestered, and the journals in which they appear, still a mark for the persecutions of the Italian Government?

The separation of the Spiritual from the Temporal Power, of Church from State,—the panacea of so many modern politicians,—does not appear to have quieted Italy by completing her unity in the moral sphere, and Mazzini's influence as an agitator, now exercised in that sphere only, appears rather to increase than diminish. Why is this?

Even before the publication of the autobiographical portion of Messrs. Smith and Elder's edition of Mazzini's Life and Works had for ever dismissed into outer darkness all idle tales of bloody conspiracies, secret vendette, and the like, and enabled us to form an idea of the extreme tenuity of the material means at his command, at the very time when he produced the most surprising results, the singular and increasing sway exercised by him over his fellow-countrymen, had always appeared to us a phenomenon only to be explained by the action of some powerful moral cause, worthy of serious study; and we have no hesitation in attributing his exceptional influence to the fact, that he is the unique example, among modern revolutionists, of a man founding his political theory upon, and governed, during his whole career, by a religious idea.

Arising at a period when his countrymen might be broadly described as divided into two sections; one given over to a blind reverence for an effete and lifeless superstition, and the other to an equally lifeless negation of all religion, in the name of individual human reason—Mazzini was himself possessed by an intense religious faith; a faith which he believes to be more than a mere development of the dogma which the thinkers of Italy had abjured; to be, in fact, the germ of a new religion, destined to become the religion of the future. "I believe, . . . in a new, great religious manifestation . . . which, while accepting those portions of the truth discovered by anterior religions, shall reveal a new portion and . . . disclose to us the path of future progress."

It is impossible to read the rare autobiographical records interspersed throughout the volumes to which we have alluded, without perceiving that Mazzini is indeed, emphatically, a believer; and that to this, more than to any other cause, we must ascribe his influence and power. Belief begets belief, and consequently his followers, though likely to be fewer than the followers of teachers who arose to preach individual liberty, *bien être*, rights of man, &c., were certain to be more enthusiastic and enduring. The doctrine of a divine law

to be fulfilled even unto death, is far less calculated to be popular than the doctrine of the greatest happiness of the greatest number; but those who once sincerely accept it, will die for their belief. And it cannot be denied that for thirty years Mazzini's followers did die for their belief, with a courage and devotedness recalling the early martyrs of Christianity; a devotion which it would be illogical to demand of those whose political creed is based upon a theory of *bien être*.

Mazzini's religious creed does not appear to have been slowly elaborated during the experiences and vicissitudes of his troubled life. At the very outside of his political career, during his first year of exile, he founded the secret society of Young Italy—as he declares that a lasting republic must be founded—*upon a religious basis*. In the *programme* of that association, in its first *manifesto*, and in the *instructions* given to the conspirators affiliated in its ranks, the religious theory which has been somewhat more fully developed in his later writings, is already shadowed forth. In these remarkable documents we find no eloquent phrases concerning the rights of man; we do find a solemn sense of his duties, and a deep faith “in the mission confided by the Creator to his creature.” “Young Italy was the first among the political associations of that day which endeavoured to comprehend all the various manifestations of life in one sole conception, and to direct and govern them all from the height of a religious principle.” Accordingly, Young Italy is declared to be “a brotherhood of Italians who believe in a law of progress and duty.” We are told that “whosoever would assume the position of initiator in the transformation of a nation . . . must have a *faith*. . . . Young Italy must be neither a sect nor a party; but a faith and an apostolate.”

The members were to be “not only conspirators, but believers.” The adoption of the republican doctrine was grounded then, as now, upon the belief that “theoretically, every nation is destined, by the law of God and humanity, to form a free and equal community of brothers, and the republican is the only form of government which ensures that future.” The members were to regard themselves “not as mere politicians, but as apostles.” “As the precursors of the Italian regeneration,” it was their duty “to lay the first stone of its religion,” &c. The conspirator took the oath of fidelity “in the name of God and Italy\* . . . by the duties which bind me to the

\* The formula “God and the People” dates from this first period of Mazzini's agitation, and was then declared by him to be the programme of the future. Twenty years later it was, in fact, inscribed upon the banners of Venice and Rome, and all the decrees of the short-lived Republic of 1849 were issued “in the name of God and the People.”

land wherein God has placed me, and to the brothers whom God has given me," and declared his belief "in the mission entrusted by God to Italy, and in the duty of every Italian to strive towards its fulfilment."

The following passages, culled from different portions of his voluminous writings, will suffice to explain the philosophy of Mazzini's constant endeavour to teach the Italians to base the political duties to which he called them, upon religion:—

"Man is one. You cannot divide him in half, and so contrive that he shall agree with you in those principles which regulate the origin of society, while he differs from you as regards his own origin, destiny, and law of life here below. . . . The world is governed by religions. When the Indians really believed that some of them were born from the head, others from the arms, and others from the feet of Bramah, they organized their society by distributing mankind into *castes*; assigning to one caste an inheritance of intellectual labour, to another of military, and to others of servile duties; and thus condemned themselves to an immobility which still endures, and will endure so long as belief in that religious principle shall last.

"Life is one. You cannot arrange its different manifestations so that they can remain independent, or find contradictory expression, without introducing anarchy. You cannot say to the people, *thou art half free and half enslaved; social life is thine, but religious life belongs to others*. You cannot dismember the soul. . . . When the Christians really believed that all men were the sons of God, and brethren in His name, all the doctrines of the legislators of antiquity, tending to establish the existence of two races of men, availed not to prevent the abolition of slavery, and a consequent radical reorganization of society. . . . Religion and politics are inseparable. Without religion, political science can only create despotism or anarchy. . . . Life is an educational problem; society the means of developing it, and of reducing it to action. Religion is the highest educational principle; politics are the application of that principle to the various manifestations of human existence. The *ideal* remains in God; society should be so arranged as to approach it, as nearly as possible, on earth. Worshippers all of God, we should seek to conform our acts to His law. Thought is the spirit; its translation into action, into visible, external works, is the social fact. To pretend, then, to separate entirely and for ever, earthly things from those of heaven, the temporal from the spiritual, is neither moral, logical, nor possible.

"For every advance in religious belief, we can point to a corresponding social advance in the history of humanity; while the only result you can show as a consequence of indifference in matters of religion, is anarchy."

In no portion of his writings does Mazzini spend words in argument as to the existence of a God. To him

"the attempt to prove it would seem blasphemous, as the denial appears madness; . . . humanity has been able to transform, to disfigure, never to suppress His holy name. The undying light of faith in God pierces through all the imposture and corruption wherewith men have darkened His name."

Indeed, his whole philosophic system, founded as it is upon man's duty to discover and fulfil the law of his being, implies the belief in a supreme Lawgiver.

"Apart from God, whence can you derive duty? Without God, whatever system you attempt to lean upon, you will find it has no other foundation or basis than force—blind tyrannical force. Either the development of human things depends upon a providential law, which we are all bound to seek to discover and apply; or it is left to chance, to passing circumstance, to that man who contrives best to turn these to account. If there be not one holy, inviolable law, uncreated by man, what rule have we by which to judge whether a given act be just or unjust? In the name of whom, or of what, shall we protest against inequality or oppression? Without God, there is no other rule than fact, the accomplished fact; before which the materialist ever bows his head, whether its name be Bonaparte or Revolution."

"How can we expect men to sacrifice themselves, or to suffer martyrdom in the name of our individual opinions? Can we transform theory into practice, abstract principle into action, on the strength of interests alone? . . . So long as we endeavour to teach sacrifice as individuals, or on whatsoever theory our mere individual intellect may suggest, we may find adherents in words, never in act. The cry which has resounded in all great and noble revolutions, the '*God wills it, God wills it*' of the Crusades, will alone have power to rouse the inert to action, to give courage to the timid, the enthusiasm of sacrifice to the calculating, and faith to those who distrust and reject all merely human ideas. Prove to mankind that the work of progressive development to which you would call them, is a part of the design of God, and none will rebel. Prove to them that the earthly duties to be fulfilled here below, are an essential portion of their immortal life, and all the calculations of the present will vanish before the grandeur of the future. Without God you may compel, but not persuade; you may become tyrants in your turn; you cannot be educators or apostles."

It is greatly to be regretted that Mazzini has never given to the world a complete and elaborate exposition of the faith which he believes destined to constitute the religion of the future. Occasionally, in searching his writings, we come upon what may be termed *professions de foi*, so absolute as to read almost like one of the early papal decrees; but at the same time so succinctly and synthetically expressed, that to a reader unprepared by previous study of the subject, they sound somewhat as an abstruse algebraic proposition might sound to one whose information did not extend beyond the first rules of arithmetic. But it may not untruly be said that the vital sap of his religious faith flows unceasingly through the farthest branches and penetrates to the outermost leaflets of his voluminous writings; and we therefore venture to hope that our long and serious study of these, will enable us to put before our readers as faithful and complete a picture of that faith—in its general outlines at least—as the limits of our space and the difficulties of the subject allow. As, however, the pages we select for quotation, are scattered throughout the vast

series of our author's works on moral, political, and religious subjects, we must ask the reader's indulgence if our synopsis of his views should at times wear a certain air of patchwork, as the extremely abstract and synthetic method of the writer, renders it almost impossible to condense the more important passages of his works, or to do full justice to his ideas in other words than his own.

"You live: therefore you have a law of life. There is no life without its law. Whatever thing exists, exists in a certain method, and is governed by a certain law. . . . To develop yourselves, and act according to your law, is your first, or rather your sole duty. . . . Unless you know this law, you may not pretend to the name and rights of man. . . . In order to be men, you must know the law which distinguishes the *human* nature from that of the animal, vegetable, and mineral kingdoms, and to it you must conform your actions."

But the vital question—

"the question which humanity has ever addressed to those who have pronounced the word Deity is, How are we to arrive at the knowledge of this law? And the answers are various even yet.

"Some have replied by pointing to a code, a book, saying: *The whole law of morals is comprised in this book.* Others have said: *Let every man interrogate his own conscience; he will find the definition of good and evil there.*

"Others again, rejecting the judgment of the individual, invoke the universal judgment, and declare: *Wheresoever humanity is agreed in a belief, that belief is the truth.*

"Each and all of these are in error. And facts, unanswerable in the history of the human race, have proved the impotence of all these answers.

"Those who declare that the *whole* moral law is contained in a book, or uttered by one man, forget that there is not a single code of morals which humanity has not abandoned after an acceptance and belief of some centuries; in order to seek after and diffuse another, more advanced than it; nor is there any special reason for supposing that humanity will alter its course now.

"It will be sufficient to remind those who declare the conscience of the individual to be an adequate criterion of the just and true; that no religion, however holy, has existed without heretics; dissenters who dissented from conviction, and were ready to endure martyrdom for their conscience's sake.

"The Protestant world is, at the present day, divided and subdivided into a thousand sects; all founded on the rights of individual conscience; . . . and perpetuating that anarchy of beliefs, which is the sole true cause of the social and political disturbances which torment the peoples of Europe.

"And, on the other hand, to those who reject the testimony of individual conscience, and invoke the consent of humanity in their faith—suffice it to say that all the great ideas which have contributed to the progress of humanity hitherto, were, at their commencement, *in opposition* to the belief accepted by humanity, and were preached by individuals whom humanity derided, persecuted, and crucified."

Each of these rules is then, Mazzini says, insufficient alone to enable mankind to obtain a knowledge of the law of God—of truth.

Yet both individual conscience and the common consent of humanity are sacred, and to refuse to interrogate either, is to deprive oneself of one essential means of reaching truth.

"God has given you both the consent of your fellow-men and your own conscience, even as two wings wherewith to elevate yourselves towards Him. Why persist in cutting off one of them? . . . Both are sacred. God speaks through each: whensoever they agree, whensoever the cry of your own conscience is ratified by the consent of humanity, God is there. Then are you certain of having found the truth, for the one is the verification of the other. . . . The voice of individual conscience does not suffice, at all times, without any other guide, to make known to us the law. Conscience may teach us that a law exists; it cannot teach us the duties thence derived. . . . How many martyrs have sacrificed their existence for imaginary duties, or for errors patent to us all at the present day?

"Conscience, therefore, has need of a guide; of a torch by which to illumine the darkness by which it is surrounded; of a rule by which to direct and verify its instincts. This rule is the intellect of humanity."

Life is brief, and individual faculties are weak and uncertain; they need alike verification and support, and for this, Mazzini tells us that the Deity has provided, by placing by the side of individual man

"a Being whose life is continuous; whose faculties are the result and sum of all the individual faculties that have existed for perhaps four hundred ages; a Being who, in the midst of the errors and crimes of individuals, yet ever advances in wisdom and morality; in whose development and progress God has inscribed, and from epoch to epoch does still inscribe, a line of His law. This Being is Humanity. . . . Each of us is born to-day in an atmosphere of ideas and beliefs, which has been elaborated by all anterior humanity; and each of us brings with him (even if unconsciously) an element, more or less important, of the life of humanity to come. The education of humanity is built up like those Eastern pyramids to which every passing traveller added a stone. We pass along, the voyagers of a day, destined to complete our individual education elsewhere; but the education of humanity, which is seen by glimpses in each of us, is slowly, progressively, and continuously evolved through humanity. . . . The spirit of God fecundates it and manifests itself through it, in greater purity and activity from epoch to epoch; now through the instrumentality of an individual, now through that of a people. From labour to labour, from belief to belief, humanity acquires a clearer perception of its own life, of its own mission, of its God and of His law.

"The law of God is one, as God himself is one; but we only discover it article by article, line by line; according to the accumulated experience of the generations that have preceded us, and according to the extension and increased intensity of association, among races, peoples, and individuals. No man, no people, and no age, may pretend to have discovered the whole of the Law. The moral law, the law of the life of humanity, can only be discovered in its entirety, by all humanity united in holy association; when all the forces and all the faculties that constitute our human nature, shall be developed and in action.

"But, meanwhile, that portion of humanity most advanced in education, does, in its progress and development, reveal to us a portion of the law we

seek to know. Its history teaches us the design of God ; its wants teach us our duties ; because our first duty is to aid the ascent of humanity upon that stage of education and improvement towards which it has been prepared and matured by time and the Divinity."

In order, therefore, to know the truth, Mazzini would have us interrogate both our individual conscience and the consent of humanity ; and in order to know our present duties, he would have us interrogate its wants. Morality is progressive, as is our education, and that of the human race. The morality of Christianity differs from that accepted by the Pagan world ; and the morality of our own age differs from that of eighteen hundred years ago.

"God, the Father and Educator of humanity, reveals His law to humanity through time and space." We are to "interrogate the tradition of humanity—which is the Council of our brother men—not in the restricted circle of an age or sect, but in all ages, and in the majority of mankind, past and present.

"Wheresoever that consent of humanity corresponds with the teachings of your own conscience, you are certain of the Truth ; certain, that is, of having read one line of the law of God."

The reader will understand from the above, how it is that Mazzini's republicanism is—as we stated at the commencement—no merely political doctrine ; but a necessary consequence of his belief in our individual responsibility ; in our duty to apply the divine law, and voluntarily to add our individual stone to the pyramid progressively built up by the passing generations of our race. To him the question must necessarily be, not that mankind should be well governed, but that they should learn to govern themselves well. Revolution is, for him, a work of education, a religious mission.

"The physical world, the workshop of humanity, was not given to the few—it was given to labour. Material instruments, neither good nor bad in themselves, but instruments of good or evil, according to the individual or collective end to which they are directed, belong to all those who work ; and they will be more beneficially and religiously distributed, as the gradually increasing education of the human race, shall teach the many how best to apply them to good. Nor will the law be humanly fulfilled whilst *a single poor man*, deprived of work and of the fruits due to labour, and abandoned to the alms of the rich, gives the lie to the tradition of the gift of the earth made by God to humanity in the person of the first man, and to that idea of fraternal communion, contained in the words, *in order that we all may be one*."

"And it is not true that every power comes from God ; it is not true that every fact brings with it a right ; it is not true that we owe submission and passive obedience to a government, whatsoever it may be. In the name of the inviolability of our immortal souls, the offspring of God, we pronounce this doctrine to be false, immoral, and atheistical . . . the sovereign power is in God alone ; and the sign of legitimate power on earth, is the interpretation and fulfilment of His law.

"No; it is not true that there exists antagonism or separation between heaven and earth. No; it is not true that whilst truth and the justice of God reign in heaven, submission to fact and reverence to brute force is the terrestrial law. No; it is not true that the salvation of the human creature is accomplished here below, as it is a place of expiation, by virtue of resignation and indifference. The earth is of God. The earth upon which Jesus, and, after him, the holy martyrs of humanity, have shed their tears and blood, is the altar upon which we are bound to offer sacrifice to God; the soul is the priest, and our works are the incense which rises to heaven and is acceptable to our heavenly Father. The earth is a ladder towards heaven; and, in order that we may be worthy to mount it, our whole life should be a hymn to God. The place now given to us wherein to bear testimony to our faith; the arena of trial now given to the free creature, wherein to furnish the materials for God's judgment, this earth, ought, by our efforts, to be transformed, ameliorated, and purified; and, as we are made in the image of God, it should be rendered more and more in the image of the *kingdom of heaven*, which Jesus foretold to us, and of the splendour of which, our conscience, from epoch to epoch, gains a glimpse.

"The law is one, and humanity is bound to fulfil every syllable of it. The soul's salvation, the progress of the individual being through the infinite, the development of the principle of life which God has placed in each of us, depends upon our activity, upon our struggles, upon the sacrifices cheerfully made, in order that the law may be fulfilled on earth. God in judging us will not ask, 'What hast thou done for thy soul?' but 'What hast thou done for the sister souls which I have given thee?' For those who admit the unity of God and the consequent unity of the human family, it is one of the truths of faith that we are all responsible for one another. We cannot abandon our companions in life to the woes of ignorance and servitude, without being condemned as traitors to the law, to our mission, to the souls confided to our care. The curse of Cain is upon him who does not feel himself his brother's keeper. . . . Every good thought and desire which we do not endeavour, come what may, to translate into action, is a sin."

The world is, for Mazzini, the incarnation of a divine idea of perfectibility, to be gradually realised through the labour of all God's creatures; but in the terrestrial existence of individuals, limited in education and capacity, this realisation can only be momentary and imperfect.

"Humanity alone, continuous in existence through the passing generations, continuous in intellect through the contributions of all its members, is capable of gradually evolving, applying, and glorifying the divine idea."

And the stone with which each passing traveller is bound to enrich the pyramid of humanity, is his individual recognition and application of this law, during his short sojourn on earth.

"I declared, from the time that my mind opened to Italian thought, that there had long been divorce between the religious and the political idea; . . . that this divorce was fatal; that without a *faith* no good thing was possible—neither a society of brethren, nor true and peaceful liberty, . . . nor any efficacious transformation of the corrupt element in which we live; that it was necessary at every cost to reunite earth to heaven; our earthly

life to the conception of the life eternal; man to God, his Father and Teacher.

"Our fellow-men are sacred; for God lives in all the men by whom the earth is peopled. The universe is his temple, and the sin of every unresisted or unexpiated profanation of the temple weighs on the head of each of the believers. . . . The image of God is disfigured in the immortal souls of your fellow-men . . . human nature is falsified in the millions of men to whom, as to you, God has confided the associate fulfilment of His design. And do you dare to call yourself *believers* while you remain inert?

"A people—Greek, Polish, Italian, or Circassian—raises the flag of nationality and independence, and combats, conquers, or dies to defend it. What is it that causes your hearts to beat at the news of those battles, that makes them swell with joy at their victories, or sink with sorrow at their defeats?

"A man—it may be a foreigner in some remote corner of the world—arises, and, amid the universal silence, gives utterance to certain ideas which he believes to be true; maintains them throughout persecution and in chains, or dies upon the scaffold, and denies them not. Wherefore do you honour that man and call him saint and martyr? Why do you respect and teach your children to respect his memory?

"Wherefore do you read so eagerly the prodigies of patriotism registered in Grecian history, and relate them to your children with a sense of pride, as if they belonged to the history of your ancestors?

"Those deeds of Greece are two thousand years old, and belong to an epoch of civilization which is not and never can be yours. Those men whom you still call martyrs, perhaps died for a faith which is not yours; and certainly their death cut short their every hope of individual progress on earth. That people whom you admire in its victories or in its fall, is a foreign people, almost unknown to you, and speaking a strange tongue. Their way of life has no influence upon yours. What matters it then to you whether they be ruled by Pope or Sultan, by the King of Bavaria, the Czar of Russia, or a free Government sprung from the consent of the nation?

"It is that there is in your heart a voice that cries unto you: 'Those men of two thousand years ago; those populations fighting afar off; that martyr for an idea for which you would not die—are your brothers; brothers, not only in community of origin and of nature, but in community of labour and of aim? Those Greeks passed away, but their deeds remained; and were it not for them, you would not have reached your present degree of moral and intellectual development. Those populations consecrated with their blood an idea of national liberty for which you too would combat. That martyr proclaimed by his death that man is bound to sacrifice all things, and, if need be, life itself, for that which he believes to be the truth. . . . You are all soldiers in one army: an army which is advancing by different paths and divided into different corps, to the conquest of one sole aim. As yet you only look to your immediate leaders; diversity of uniform and of watchword, the distances which separate the different bodies of the troops, and the mountains that conceal them one from another, frequently cause you to forget this great truth, and concentrate your thoughts exclusively on your own immediate goal. But there is One above you who sees the whole, and directs all your movements. God alone has the plan of the battle, and He at length will unite you in a single camp, beneath a single banner. How great is the distance between this faith, . . . which will be the basis of the morality of the coming epoch, and the

faith which was the basis of the morality of the generations of what we term antiquity!"

We have seen that while Mazzini declares religion to be eternal, he regards the various forms of the religious idea, successively accepted by humanity, as transitory and progressive. His theory is that when the vital principle of a given religion has attained its fullest development, and become identified with the progress of civilization, it passes away; to be succeeded by another, more in accordance with the wants of the age, and fitted to guide mankind throughout a further stage of progress; "a new idea, vaster and more fruitful than the idea then expiring, is revealed; the centre of faith is moved one degree onwards." And this theory he illustrates by a rapid view of the history of religion in the past.

"The first men *felt* God, but without comprehending, or even seeking to comprehend Him in His law. They felt Him in His power; not in His love. They conceived a confused idea of some sort of relation between Him and their own individuality; but nothing beyond this. Able to withdraw themselves but little from the sphere of visible objects, they sought to incarnate Him in one of these; in the tree they had seen struck by the thunderbolt, the rock beside which they had raised their tent, the animal which first presented itself before them.

"This was the worship which, in the history of religions, is termed *Fetishism*.

"In those days men comprehended nothing beyond the *family*—the reproduction, in a certain form, of their own individuality; all beyond the family circle were strangers, or, more often, enemies: to aid themselves and their families, was to them the sole foundation of morality.

"In later days, the idea of God was enlarged. From visible objects men timidly raised their thoughts to abstractions; they learned to generalize. God was no longer regarded as the protector of the family alone, but of the association of many families—of the cities, of the peoples. Thus, to *Fetishism* succeeded *Polytheism*, the worship of many gods. The sphere of action of morality was also enlarged. Men recognised the existence of more extended duties than those due to the family alone; they strove for the advancement of the people, of the nation.

"Yet, nevertheless, humanity was still ignored. Each nation stigmatized foreigners as *barbarians*, and endeavoured to conquer or oppress them by force or fraud. Each nation also contained foreigners or barbarians within its own circle—millions of men not admitted to join in the religious rites of the citizens, and believed to be of an inferior nature; slaves among free men.

"The idea of the unity of the human race could only be conceived as a consequence of the unity of God. And the unity of God, though forefelt by a few rare thinkers of antiquity, and openly declared by Moses (but with the fatal restriction of believing one sole people His elect), was not a recognised creed until towards the close of the Roman Empire, and through the teachings of Christianity.

"Foremost and grandest among the teachings of Christ were these two inseparable truths: *There is but one God; all men are the sons of God*. And the promulgation of these two truths changed the face of the world,

and enlarged the moral circle to the confines of the inhabited globe. To the duties of men towards the family and country, were added duties towards humanity. Man then learned that wheresoever there existed a human being, there existed a brother, with a soul immortal as his own, destined, like himself, to ascend towards the Creator, and on whom he was bound to bestow love, a knowledge of the faith, and help and counsel where needed.

"Then did the Apostles utter words of sublime import, in prevision of those great truths of which the germ was contained in Christianity; truths which have been misunderstood or betrayed by their successors. '*For as we have many members in one body, and all members have not the same office, so we, being many, are one body in Christ, and every one members of one another,*' (St. Paul, Rom. xii. 4, 5). '*And other sheep I have, which are not of this fold; them also I must bring, and they shall hear my voice, and there shall be one fold and one shepherd*' (St. John x. 16)."

But at the present day, says Mazzini, after eighteen hundred years of study, labour, and experience, we have yet to develop these germs; we have yet to teach mankind that as humanity is one sole body, all we, being members of that body, are bound to labour for its advance, and to organize both the family and the country towards that aim. And our actual impotence to achieve this, he believes to be attributable to the fact that all existing creeds are but the spectral forms and illusions of a faith from which the soul has departed.

"Our conception of heaven is changed; our former conception of life has been proved imperfect; our former solution of the problem of the relation between God and man is now rejected by the human heart, intellect, conscience, and tradition. . . . Humanity, Europe, is wandering in the void; seeking the new bond destined to link together all the individual beliefs, presentiments, and activities now lost in the isolation of doubt; without a heaven, and, consequently, without the power of transforming earth."

The dogma in which mankind has worshipped, is exhausted and consumed. It no longer inspires faith; no longer has power to unite the human race.

"Hesitating between Catholic despotism and Protestant anarchy—between the limitless authority which annihilated the human being, and the free conscience of the individual which is powerless to found a social faith—the world both invokes and foresees the coming of a new and vaster unity; destined to combine in holy harmony the two terms, tradition and conscience; which, though now disjoined, are, none the less, the two wings given to the human soul, wherewith to rise towards truth; a unity, which, starting from the foot of the cross, yet embracing all ulterior forms of progress, shall gather together all the various religions into one sole people of believers, and unite all the churches for the building of one vast temple—the Pantheon of Humanity—to God; a unity which from all the various revelations vouchsafed from time to time by God to the human race, shall compose the one eternal progressive revelation of the Creator to His creature."

The dogma itself, in which humanity has hitherto worshipped, "is

exhausted and consumed ; but the dawn of a new dogma is approaching."

"To any one guided and enlightened by the study of historical tradition, it is enough," Mazzini thinks, "to glance at the actual condition of Europe, in order to recognise on every side signs identical with those which eighteen centuries ago foreshadowed the dissolution of Paganism, and the inevitable advent of Christianity. The void created by the utter absence of any general, harmonious, civilizing initiative in the world, and the consequent moral anarchy; the wars promoted by dynastic or individual interests; the neutralities founded on the indifference of egotism; the peaces built up upon absurd theories of a balance of power, impossible of attainment while limited to material conditions; the question of the nationalities dominating every other, and pointing (as in those days) to a new division of Europe; the emancipation of the working classes become (as in those days the emancipation of the slaves) a source of universal and potent agitation; the uprising of the Slavonian race (as in those days of the Teutonic) in search of a national existence henceforth inevitably decreed; the spread of materialism, the result of an exaggerated negation of the former faith; the aspiration, revealed on every side, after a new religion; the insane attempts at an impossible reconciliation of the old and new—all these and other signs, proclaim the coming of a new order of things, founded upon principles radically different from those which presided over the epoch now visibly exhausted and consumed. A new conception of life and of the divine law by which life is governed, ferments beneath every manifestation of the two faculties of thought and action which constitute the human unity."

Thus it appears that, according to Mazzini, new religious truths are dawning upon the horizon, before we have reduced to practice the truths taught by the dogma he believes to be extinct. And this view might tend greatly to dishearten the inquirer, were it not that it appears to be a portion of his theory—verified, he says, by the history of past religions—that it is only when the new dogma is accepted by the intellect of mankind, that the teachings of its predecessor are reduced to practice, and identified with progress and civilization. In other words, each successive dogma—at first a burning and shining light, supported solely by the eye of genius, but which the darkness comprehends not,—when at length it is accepted by the multitude, supplies them with a torch, by the light of which they are enabled practically to execute the duties commanded by the foregone dogma.

"Every epoch has a faith of its own; every synthesis contains the idea of an aim, a mission; and every mission has its special instrument, its special forces, and its special lever of action."

Mazzini "looked upon the long series of epochs throughout the course of which the progress of humanity is gradually evolved, as an equation containing many *unknown quantities*, and saw that every epoch disengages one of these quantities, in order—to use the expression of the algebraist—to transfer it

to the number of known quantities contained in the other member of the equation."

He believes that we are entering upon a new epoch, now only in its dawn ; and that the unknown quantity it is destined to disengage, is *Collective Humanity*; and by the light shed by the recognition of this now synthesis, he believes we shall be enabled to realise and reduce to practice, the unknown quantity disengaged by the epoch now passed away—*Individual Man*.

"The positive application of a given term of progress to the different branches of the civil, political, and economic organism, can only be successfully begun, after its moral development in the intellectual sphere is complete. That moral development is the labour of an epoch ; and no sooner is it complete, than a power—either individual or people—arises to proclaim its results, and consign its formulæ to the keeping of the nations. A new epoch then begins, in which—while the intellect of humanity is occupied with a newly revealed term—the term of the past and exhausted epoch is, by degrees, practically realised and applied. The thought of one epoch is only verified in the sphere of action, when the human intellect is already absorbed in the contemplation of the thought of its successor. Were it not so, the connection and coherence of the epochs would be interrupted, and a solution of continuity would take place.

" . . . . I affirm that the unknown quantity of the middle ages is transferred to the member of the equation containing the known quantities : the *hypothesis* of the middle ages is the *principle* of the present day ; the idea of the middle ages is now a recognised admitted law. Does any one now deny liberty and equality in principle ? Does any one raise doubts as to the theory of rights ? The most illiberal monarch fails not to invoke the name of that liberty he secretly abhors ; to assert that he is the protector of the rights and liberties of his subjects, against the anarchy of factions. The question is, in the sphere of principles, decided. The only struggle is as to its application. The dispute no longer regards the law itself, but its interpretation."

It was, Mazzini says, the mission of the eighteenth century

"to take stock, so to speak, of the first epoch of the Christian world ; to sum up and reduce to a formula, that which eighteen centuries of Christianity had examined, evolved, and achieved ; to constitute *individual man* such as he was destined and designed to be—free, sacred, and inviolable. And this mission it accomplished through the French Revolution, which was the political translation of the Protestant Revolution. . . . *The declaration of the rights of man* is the supreme and ultimate formula of the French Revolution. And what, indeed, is man—individual man—if not a right ? In the series of terms of progress, does he not represent the human personality, the element of individual emancipation ? And the aim of the eighteenth century was to fulfil the *human* evolution ; which had been anticipated and foreseen by the ancients, proclaimed by Christianity, and, in part, realised by Protestantism. A multitude of obstacles stood between the eighteenth century and that aim : . . . the eighteenth century overthrew them. It waged a terrible but victorious war against all things tending to fractionize human power, to deny movement, and to arrest the flight of intelligence. Every great revolution demands a great idea to be its centre of action ; to

furnish it with both fulcrum and lever for the work it has to do. This conception the eighteenth century supplied by placing itself in the centre of its own *subject*. . . . Ruins there were without end; but in the midst of these ruins and negations, one immense affirmation stood erect; the creature of God, ready to *act*, radiant in power and will; the *ecce homo*, repeated after eighteen centuries of struggle and suffering; not by the voice of the martyr, but from the altar raised by the Revolution to victory—right, the faith of individuality, rooted in the world for ever."

The idea of the Christian epoch—the rights of individual man—thus resolutely summed up and affirmed, it remains to reduce it to practice; and this, as we have seen, is, according to Mazzini's theory, only possible by the light of a higher conception. Individual liberty and equality being theoretically admitted, it is necessary to appeal to something higher and holier than the individual, before the theory can be translated into action. Is the assertion of the rights of the human individual all that man has to seek? Ought man, gifted with progressive activity, to rest satisfied with his solitary liberty? Does no further mission remain to him on earth, than a work of consequences and deductions?

"Because the *unknown quantity* has been determined; because one among the terms of progress—that of the individual—has taken its place among the known and defined quantities, is the series of terms composing the great equation concluded? . . . . No, eternal God! thy Word is not all fulfilled: thy thought, the thought of the world, not all revealed. That thought creates still, and will continue to create, for ages incalculable by man. The ages that have passed have but revealed to us some fragments of it. Our mission is not concluded. As yet we scarcely know its origin; we know not its ultimate aim. Time and discovery do but enlarge its boundaries. It is elevated from age to age, . . . seeking the Law, of which, as yet, we know but the first lines. From initiation to initiation, throughout the long series of Thy successive incarnations, this mission has purified and enlarged the formula of sacrifice; it learns the path it has to follow, by the study of an eternally progressive faith. Forms are modified and dissolved; religious beliefs are exhausted: the human spirit leaves them behind, as the traveller leaves behind the fires that warmed him through the night, and seeks another sun. But Religion remains: the idea is immortal, survives the dead forms, and is reborn from its ashes. The idea detaches itself from the worn-out symbol; disengages itself from its *involucrum*, which analysis has consumed, and shines forth in purity and brightness, a new star in humanity's heaven. How many such shall faith yet kindle, ere the whole path of the future shall be illumined? Who shall tell how many stars—secular thoughts, liberated from every cloud—shall arise and take their place in the heaven of intellect, ere man, the living summary of the terrestrial Word, may declare: *I have faith in myself: my destiny is accomplished?*

"Such is the law. One labour succeeds another; one synthesis succeeds another; and the latest revealed ever presides over the work we have to accomplish,\* and prescribes its method and organization. It comprehends all the terms included in the preceding synthesis, *plus* the new term; which becomes the aim of every endeavour, the unknown quantity to be revealed

\* The realisation in practice of the foregone synthesis.

and added to the known.\* . . . The progressive evolution of the thought of God, of which our world is the visible manifestation, is unceasingly continuous. The chain cannot be broken or interrupted. The various aims are united together—the cradle is linked to the tomb."

The reader who has gone with us so far, will understand how—if Mazzini's theory be correct, that the results of the Christian synthesis were summed up and concluded by the eighteenth century, and the aim of that synthesis achieved in the intellectual sphere—it follows, as a necessary consequence, that a new unknown quantity should have to be determined; that a new intellectual aim should be set before the present generation; by the light of which higher aim the practical realization of the foregone synthesis may be accomplished.

"On every side the doubt has arisen—of what advantage is liberty or equality? What is a free man but a new activity, a force to be put in motion? In what direction shall he move? As chance or caprice may direct? But that is not *life*; it is a mere succession of acts, of phenomena, of emissions of vitality; without bond, relation, or continuity; it is anarchy. The liberty of the one will inevitably clash with the liberty of others; constant strife will arise between individual and individual, and consequent loss of force and waste of the productive faculties vouchsafed to us, and which we are bound to regard as sacred. The liberty of all, if ungoverned by any general directing law, will but lead to a state of warfare among men—a warfare rendered all the more cruel and inexorable, by the virtual equality of the antagonists."

Some deemed they had found a remedy for these evils in the formula of *fraternity*, bestowed by Jesus upon the human race: liberty, equality, and fraternity, were adopted as the formula of the future, and men attempted to confine progress within the circle marked out by these three points. But progress broke through the circle: the eternal *cui bono* reappeared; for we all of us demand an aim, a human aim; and fraternity neither supplies any general, social, terrestrial aim, nor even implies the necessity of such aim. Although the basis of all society, and first condition of progress, fraternity is not progress; it is not inconsistent with the theory of movement in a circle; although a necessary link between the terms liberty and equality, which sum up the individual synthesis, it does not pass beyond that synthesis; it might be denominated charity, and constitute a starting point whence humanity should advance in search of the new synthesis, but could not be substituted for it.

"Human research therefore recommenced: men began to perceive that

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\* "Analysis also has its share in the labour done; but it derives its programme and point of departure from the synthesis of the epoch. Analysis, in fact, has no life of its own; its existence is merely objective; it derives its purpose, law, and mission elsewhere. A portion of every epoch, it is the insignia of none. Those writers who divide the epochs into two classes—organic and critical—falsify history. Every epoch is essentially synthetic, every epoch is organic."

the aim, the function of existence, must also be the ultimate term of that progressive development which constitutes existence itself; and that, therefore, in order to advance rapidly and directly towards that aim, it was first necessary to determine with exactitude the nature of that progressive development, and to act in accordance with it. *To know the law, and regulate human activity by the law*; such is the best mode of stating the problem.

"Now the law of the individual can only be deduced from the law of the species. The individual mission can only be ascertained and defined by placing ourselves upon an elevation enabling us to grasp and comprehend the whole. We must ascend to the conception of Humanity, in order to ascertain the secret rule and law of life of the individual, of man. Hence the necessity of a general co-operation, of harmony of effort—in a word, of *association*—in order to fulfil the work of all.

"'Association,' I am sometimes told, 'is no new principle. By prefixing it as the universal aim, you neither create a new synthesis, nor yet the necessity for one. Association is only a method; a means of realizing liberty and equality; a part of the old synthesis.'

"I admit that association, in the usual acceptation of the word, is nothing more than the *method of progress*. . . . With every step in advance, association gains a corresponding degree of power and extension; and, in this sense, the tendency to association may be said to be contemporary with that progress, initiated—in regard to man—with the earliest existence of our planet. It has exercised an action in all the syntheses now exhausted, and will continue to exercise still greater influence in the synthesis we seek to enthrone.

"But although its action has always existed, mankind were unconscious of it, and influenced by it without being themselves aware of it. Such has been the case with progress itself, with the law of gravity, with all great physical and moral truths. Their action existed long before it was revealed to us.

"But is not the difference between a law unknown, and a law declared, promulgated, and accepted, sufficient to constitute a new starting-point for the activity of the human intellect? The law once defined, the regulation of our activity by it becomes a duty; its fulfilment becomes the aim of all human endeavour; and the method of deriving the maximum of utility from its fulfilment, becomes the study of every thinker. The human intellect no longer wastes precious time in researches the object of which has been realized. Power is increased a hundred-fold when it is concentrated, and a definite direction is given to its action. Previously to the promulgation of the law, the mere instinctive sense of its existence could do no more than constitute a *right*, and a right almost always contested.

"Great historical epochs do not date from the existence of a law, a truth, or a principle; but from the time of its promulgation. Were it not so, it would be idle to speak of distinct epochs or syntheses: truth is one and eternal; and the thought of God, in which was the germ of the world, contained them all. Equality existed, as a principle, long before Jesus, and the world was unconsciously tending towards it. Why then admit the existence of a Christian epoch? The earth described its revolutions round the sun, without awaiting the revelations of Copernicus or Galileo, or the Newtonian formulæ. Why then do we make distinct astronomical epochs of the systems of Ptolemy and Newton?"

The formulation of this new law of Association, necessitates,

Mazzini believes, a complete alteration in all our theories of government; in all our philosophical, political, and economic studies; which have hitherto been inspired solely by the principle of liberty.

"The sacred word *Humanity*, pronounced with a new meaning, has opened up a new world before the eye of genius—a new world hitherto only forefelt—and commenced a new epoch. . . . Have not all our schools of philosophy for the last twenty years\*—even when abandoning the true path, and returning to the past—been seeking the great unknown quantity? . . . And we daily hear the word humanity proffered by the lips of materialists, who are incapable of appreciating its meaning. . . . Whether as a real belief, or an enforced homage, the new epoch obtains its due acknowledgment from intellect, almost without exception. . . . We all feel, both in heart and brain, the presentiment of a great epoch; and we have sought to make of the negations and analyses of the eighteenth century, the banner of the faith of that epoch. Inspired by God to utter the sublime words—*regeneration, progress, new mission, the future*—we yet persist in striving to realize the material triumph of the programme contained in those words, with the instrument that served for the realization of a mission now concluded.

"We invoke a *social* world—a vast, harmonious organization of the forces existing in undirected activity in the vast laboratory, the earth; and in order to call this new world into existence, and to lay the foundations of a pacific organization, we have recourse to the old habits of rebellion, which consume our forces within the circle of individualism. We proclaim the future in the midst of ruins. Prisoners whose chain had but been lengthened, we boasted ourselves emancipated and free, because we found ourselves able to move around the column to which we were bound."

The great error of the revolutionary party of Europe, according to Mazzini, is that they come forward—

"like renegades, without a God, without a law, without a banner to lead towards the future. The former aim has vanished from their view; the new, dimly seen for an instant, is effaced by that theory of rights, which alone directs their labours. They make of the individual, both the means and the aim. They talk of humanity—a formula essentially religious—and banish religion from their work. They talk of synthesis, and yet neglect the most powerful and active element of human existence. Bold enough to be undaunted by the dream of the material unity of Europe, they thoughtlessly destroy its moral unity, by failing to recognise the primary condition of all association—*uniformity of sanction and belief*. . . . You marvel at the slow advance of the peoples on the path of sacrifice and association, and yet you propose to them a programme of individuality, the sole value of which is negative; the result of which is a method, not of organization, but of juxtaposition; and which, if analysed, will be found to be nothing more than egotism, wrapped in a mantle of philosophic formulæ."

But the advance of the revolutionary party in the nineteenth century cannot be guided by negations.

\* Written in 1835.

"The religious idea is the very breath of humanity; its life, soul, existence, and manifestation. Humanity only exists in the consciousness of its origin and the presentiment of its destiny; and only reveals itself by concentrating its powers upon some one of the intermediate points between the two."

And this is—he tells us—precisely the function of the religious idea. That idea constitutes a faith in an origin common to us all; sets before us, as a principle, a common future; unites all the active faculties in one sole centre, whence they are continuously evolved and developed in the direction of that future, and guides the latent forces of the human mind towards it.

"It lays hold of life in its every aspect and in its slightest manifestations; utters its augury over the cradle and the tomb, and affords—philosophically speaking—at once the highest and the most universal formula of a given epoch of civilization; the most simple and comprehensive expression of its knowledge (*scientia*); the ruling synthesis by which it is governed as a whole, and by which its successive evolutions are directed from on high. . . . We are standing between two epochs; between the tomb of one world, and the cradle of another; between the boundary line of the individual synthesis, and the confines of the synthesis humanity. What we have to do is to fix our eyes upon the future, while we break the last links of the chain that binds us to the past."

And, addressing himself to the Church, which still endeavours to maintain the authority of the "exhausted and consumed dogma" which "no longer inspires faith, no longer has power to unite the human race," Mazzini proceeds to break these last links in the following solemn manner:—

"I do accuse you of insanelly pretending that a beacon kindled eighteen hundred years ago to illumine our journey across a single epoch, is destined to be our sole luminary across the path of the infinite; . . . of destroying the unity of collective humanity, by dividing mankind into two arbitrary sections, one devoted to error, and the other sacred to truth; and of blaspheming against the eternally creative and revealing power of God, by imprisoning the Word within an insignificant fraction of time and space; . . . of crucifying humanity upon Calvary; rejecting every attempt to detach the idea from the symbol, and petrifying the living Word of God. You reduce all history (which is the successive manifestation of that Word) to a single moment; you extinguish free-will (without which no consciousness of progress can exist) beneath the fatalism of hereditary responsibility; and cancel all merit in works or sacrifice, by the omnipotence of grace."

The actual Church being thus opposed to the spirit of truth, and as there exists at present no other,

"We are now," says Mazzini, "the Church Militant of Precursors to the Temple, which shall be rebuilt, invoking the kingdom of God on earth as it is in heaven. We are the Church of Precursors, until the virtuous who feel the necessity of a true and living faith as the unifier of all human efforts, and inspirer of all human faculties,—having assembled in council, having

interrogated progress, having explored the evils, and decreed the remedies for our state,—shall lay the first stone of the Universal Church of Humanity.

“Religion is with us, not with you.\* You materialize it by the exclusive adoration of one of its forms; as if the living God could be enchained in a single form; as if any *form* of religion could ever be other than a finite symbol of the truth which He dispenses in the chosen measure of time; as if when one form were exhausted, it were possible that God should perish, or withdraw Himself from the world which is naught other than a manifestation of His thought; as if it were possible to assign a limit to the thought of God; as if any people, any epoch, or any religion might presume to have comprehended that thought entire; as if humanity were not bound constantly to labour and to advance, in order to acquire a knowledge of, and identify itself with that portion of the divine idea destined to be realized on earth.”

In thus saying *we*, Mazzini includes all who, like himself,

“reject the barren negations of the unreflectingly rebellious, who, because one form of religion is exhausted, imagine that the eternal religious life of humanity is destroyed; and the inefficacious pretences of a Church which has neither knowledge, will, nor power any longer to direct that life. I include all who, like me, abhor the loathsomeness of materialism, and are ready to do battle against it in the name of the ideal; all who reverently seek the *City of the Future*, a new heaven and a new earth, destined to gather together, in the name and in the love of God and of man, and in faith in a common aim, all those who now wander through your fault, mid fear of the present and doubt of the future, in moral and intellectual anarchy. I include those who know that from epoch to epoch God utters a new syllable of eternal truth to humanity; that every religion is an initiation towards the one destined to succeed it; and that an educational revelation ceaselessly descends, in manner varying with the times, upon the nations; that to arbitrarily seek to limit that revelation to a given fraction of time, to one sole people, or to a single individual, is the only heresy essentially denying God, the manifestation of His life, and the unbroken and continuous link existing between the divine Thought and humanity; which is destined gradually to discover and to incarnate that thought upon earth.

“I include all those who,—anxiously interrogating the signs of the times, and observing, on the one hand, the constant increase of egotism, the dissolution of every power, the impotence of every ancient authority; and, on the other, the universal agitation of the peoples, the growing though confused aspirations of intelligence; the apparition of new elements demanding admission into the social edifice; of new words potent to move the multitudes, and the tendency towards a new morality vaster than the former,—recognise in all these things the indications of a new epoch, and, therefore, of a religious transformation.

“The root of every religion is a *definition of life and of its mission*. For you, that definition of life is the doctrine of original sin, and of resurrection to God through a Divine Being, who descended upon earth to sacrifice Himself, in expiation of that sin.

“Our definition of life asserts the imperfection of the finite creature, and

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\* It may be objected that these words are addressed to the Pope. They are however addressed to him simply as the Head of the typical and representative Church of the dogma Mazzini has declared extinct.

its gradual self-correction, by virtue of a capacity of progression given to all men through works ; through the sacrifice of the egotistic instincts for the sake of the common improvement ; and through faith in a divine ideal, which each of us is bound to incarnate in himself.

"We believe in God, who is Intellect and Love, Educator and Lord.

"We believe therefore in a sovereign moral law, the expression of His intellect, and of His love.

"We believe in a law of duty for all of us ; and that we are bound to love, to comprehend, and, as far as possible, to incarnate that law in our actions.

"We believe that the sole manifestation of God visible to us, is life ; and in it we seek the evidences of the divine law.

"We believe that as God is *one*, so is life *one*, and one the law of life throughout its twofold manifestation, in the *individual* and in *collective* humanity.

"We believe in conscience—the revelation of life to the individual—and in tradition—the revelation of life to humanity—as the sole means given to us by God by which to comprehend His design ; and that when the voice of conscience and the voice of tradition are harmonized in an affirmation, that affirmation is the truth, or a portion of the truth.

"We believe that conscience and tradition, if religiously interrogated, will reveal to us that the law of life is progress ; progress indefinite in all the manifestations of being ; the germs of which, inherent in life itself, are gradually and successively developed throughout the various stages of existence.

"We believe that as life is one, and the law of life is one, the progress destined to be wrought out by collective humanity, and gradually revealed to us by tradition, must be equally wrought out by the individual ; and, since that indefinite progress, forefelt and conceived by conscience and proclaimed by tradition, cannot be completely realized in the brief terrestrial existence of the individual,—we believe that it will be fulfilled elsewhere, and we believe in the continuity of the life made manifest in each of us, and of which our terrestrial existence is but one period.

"We believe that, as in collective humanity, every presentiment of a vaster and purer ideal, every earnest aspiration towards good is destined—it may be after the lapse of ages—to be realized ; so in the individual, every intuition of the truth, every aspiration—even if at present inefficacious—towards good, and towards the ideal, is a pledge of future development ; a germ, to be evolved in the course of the series of existences constituting life.

"We believe that as collective Humanity in its advance, gradually acquires a knowledge and comprehension of its own past ; so will the individual, in his advance upon the path of progress, acquire, in proportion to the degree of moral education achieved, the consciousness and memory of the past stages of his existence.

"We believe not only in progress, but in man's *solidarity* in progress ; that as in collective humanity the generations are linked one with the other, and the life of the one fortifies, assists, and promotes the life of the other—so, also, is individual linked with individual ; and the life of one is of benefit to the life of the rest ; both here and elsewhere.

"We believe that pure, virtuous, and constant affection is a promise of communion in the future, and a link—invisible but powerful in its effect upon human action—between the dead and the living.

"We believe that progress, the law of God, must infallibly be achieved by *all* ; but we believe that we are bound to work out the consciousness of

that progress and to *deserve* it through our own efforts; and that time and space are vouchsafed to us by God as the sphere of *free will*, wherein we merit or demerit, in proportion as we accelerate or delay it.

"We believe, therefore, in human *free will*; the condition of human responsibility.

"We believe in human equality; that is to say, that God has given to all mankind the faculties and powers necessary to the achievement of an equal amount of progress; we believe that all are both *called* and *elected* to achieve it, sooner or later, according to their own works.

"We believe that all that tends to impede human progress, equality, and solidarity, is evil, and that all that tends to promote them, is good.

"We believe in the duty of each and all ceaselessly to combat evil, and to promote good by thought and action; we believe that in order to overcome evil and to promote good in each of us, it is necessary to overcome evil and to promote good in others and for others. We believe that no man can work out his own salvation otherwise than by labouring for the salvation of others. We believe that the sign of evil is *egotism*, and the sign of virtue, *sacrifice*.

"We believe our actual existence to be a step towards a future existence; the earth to be a place of trial, wherein, by overcoming evil and promoting good, we are bound to deserve to advance. We believe it to be the duty of each and all to sanctify the earth, by realizing *here* as much as it is possible to realize of the law of God. And from this faith we deduce our morality.

"We believe that the instinct of progress, innate in humanity from the beginning, and now become a leading tendency of the human intellect, is the sole revelation of God to mankind; a revelation vouchsafed to all, and continuous.

"We believe that it is in virtue of this revelation that humanity advances from epoch to epoch, from religion to religion, upon the path of improvement assigned to it.

"We believe that whosoever presumes at the present day to arrogate that revelation to himself, and declare that he is the privileged intermediate between God and man, is a blasphemer.

"We believe that authority is sacred when, consecrated by genius and virtue—sole priests of the future—and made manifest by the greatest power of sacrifice—it preaches truth, and is freely accepted by mankind as their guide to truth; but we believe that we are bound to combat and exterminate, as the offspring of falsehood and parent of tyranny, every authority not invested with these characteristics.

"We believe that God is God, and humanity is His prophet. . . .

"Humanity has worshipped in the religion of the Father, and in that of the Son. Give place to the religion of the Holy Spirit. . . .

"Such, in its broad outlines, is our faith. In that faith we reverentially embrace—as stages of the progress already achieved—all the manifestations of religion in the past, and—as symptoms and previsions of future progress—every earnest and virtuous manifestation of religious thought in the present.

"In that faith we recognise God as the Father of all; humanity as One in community of origin, of law, and of aim; the earth as sanctified by the gradual accomplishment of the divine design, and the *individual*—blessed with immortality, free will, and power—as the responsible artificer of his own progress.

"In this faith we live; in it we will die; in it we love, labour, hope, and pray."

E. A. VENTURI.



## THE GOSPEL OF ST. JOHN AND THE APOCALYPSE.

### SECOND PAPER.

WE return to the subject upon which we entered in the last number of this Review,\* and pass at once to the third point then proposed for consideration in connection with it.

3. *The character of the Saviour's work, and the manner in which it is accomplished.* Much stress has been laid upon this point by those who deny that the Gospel of St. John and the Apocalypse can have sprung from the same source. They find the methods of representation so different, the modes of conceiving Christ's work in the world so opposed, as to make it impossible to think that they could mark one and the same writer. Let us listen to the language of Lücke, the fact of whose separation, in this particular case, from the theologians with whom he generally acted, and whose rejection of the Apocalypse as Johannine notwithstanding the powerful external evidence in its favour, led him to express himself with even more than ordinary strength. He has been quoted with great approbation by Baur in his work on the Gospels. We take the following extract as given in Hengstenberg's "Commentary on the Revelation:"—

"But the Apocalypse exhibits more the external development of the divine kingdom and judgment than the internal; more the divine power and government in the prostration of the anti-Christian power than the quiet internal development of the Christian life springing from the power of the divine spirit and divine grace in humanity; more the external

\* See p. 87.

historical appearance than the internal foundation of principles; more the external epochs of conflict and judgment than the internal continuity of their development; more the external prostration of the opposing forces than the internal self-destruction of evil."

And again,—

"According to the Gospel and the Epistles of John, the eternal blessed life of believers begins with the period of the new birth and of faith. Where faith and love are, there the world is overcome and the wicked one chained; there the children of God reign and exercise dominion with Christ. So especially 1 John v. 1—5; iii. 14. All the glory of the children of God, in their full manifestation, consists in their being made like Christ, seeing Him as He is, and being with Him (1 John iii. 2; Gospel xvii. 24). Only the internal foundation and commencement, the internal increase, and the internal completion of the blessed everlasting life is described; but never is any trace found of epochs and periods externally defined and marked off. How entirely different is it in the Apocalypse! The saints have pain and suffering so long as they are in this world. Under the feelings of their distress and unjust sufferings they cry out, like the people of God in Old Testament times, for vengeance on the world that oppressed, persecuted, slew them. It is the tragical view of the world that prevails in the Old Testament from which the Apocalypse sets out. The joy and peace of the New Testament is rather the distant aim than the standing foundation of the Christian life. It is only after the opposing powers and wicked dominions have been either externally destroyed or externally bound that the saints attain, through the first resurrection, to dominion with Christ."

"Baur," adds Hengstenberg, "adopts these representations of Lücke, and sums up the whole argument in the following words: 'The difference, therefore, lies generally in this, that the mode of thinking and the whole representation is so internal in the Gospel, and so external in the Apocalypse.' "\*"

Having made these quotations, Hengstenberg sets himself to answer them. There is much in his answer well worthy of consideration, but we cannot repeat it here. We take another path, and we reply that, in so far as the idea of "development" enters into the Apocalypse, it is fundamentally the very opposite of what is alleged in the passages now quoted. Instead of being only of the "external" character spoken of in them, it is really, in the strictest sense of the word, in the first place internal, both as regards the piety to be blessed and the impiety to be doomed. As we have already had occasion to observe, there is in the visions of this book no "external development of the divine kingdom" whatever, as if that kingdom were making an outward progress in the world, and gradually bringing one part of men after another under its sway. There are no "epochs and periods externally defined and marked off," if by this language is meant that there are successive chronological epochs and periods within which the people of God have

\* Hengstenberg, u. s., ii. 460—1.

something else than the "internal increase and the internal completion of the blessed everlasting life." Only one great epoch is taken note of, and that is the whole period extending from the First to the Second Coming of the Lord. This is the three and a half years, the forty-two months, the one thousand two hundred and sixty days, so frequently referred to. The period of the seals covers it all; so does the period of the trumpets; so does the period of the vials. All these periods extend from the beginning to the end of the Church's militant history.

Again, just as the epoch spoken of in the successive visions is one, so from the very beginning the members of the Church are one, are complete, also. The sealing vision in chap. vii. does not belong to any chronological point between the sixth and seventh seals, as if only at that moment, in the course of long ages that have run, were God's people selected and sealed, their number not having been made up before. We shall by-and-by have to show that the one hundred and forty-four thousand includes them all, but it is more to our present purpose to observe that their sealing now has in it no element of chronology. It is a vision of comfort, given us, no doubt, just before a final stage of judgment is to be brought into view, but it sheds its consolatory influence upon all preceding times, and tells us that *through them all* God had known them that were His, and had been keeping them in the hollow of His hand. There is, indeed, as we saw in our first paper, a progress of things within the period with which the Apocalypse as a whole is occupied, a progress implied in the climactic character of the three series of visions just referred to, and connected with a corresponding progress both in the faithfulness of the Church and in those trials of hers by which the judgments of God are called forth. But the *development* on the part alike of the Church and of the world is wholly internal. It is a development, on the part of the one, to ever higher stages of meetness for the accomplishment of Christian hope, on the part of the other, to ever-increasing ripeness for eternal woe. It is true that we can hardly speak of an "internal continuity of development," as marked distinctly on the pages of the Apocalypse. But the attentive reader of the visions of the seals, the trumpets, and the vials, and especially of the consolatory episodes interposed at the same points in all of them, will not fail to see that there are implied in each successive stage higher attainments in the Christian life, as well as greater sufferings at the world's hands. Development of any other kind, external development, we not only have not, but cannot have. The plan of the book will not permit it; for that plan is not to trace the Church's growth as she rises from her mustard-seed beginning to be a mighty tree—it is to take her from

the first as ideally one whole, and to show us by a series of pictures, rising one above another, how as she is ever more faithful to her commission her trials increase, grace to sustain her increases, and judgment on her enemies increases also.

But this internal kingdom of God has a place in the world, and therefore, in relation to the world, it has a history. Here the peculiar point of view from which the author of the *Apocalypse* writes rises before us. He sees that that history is one of sadness, of trial, of persecution. Was he alone in so looking at it? Does not St. John quote our Lord as saying, "In the world ye shall have tribulation;" and, again, "Verily, verily, I say unto you, That ye shall weep and lament, but the world shall rejoice" (xvi. 33, 20); and these words occur in that most touching of all the Saviour's discourses, of which, more than of any other, we may say that it gives us the "quiet internal development of the Christian life springing from the power of the divine spirit and divine grace in humanity." If words like these remained upon the mind of the author of the Fourth Gospel, was a similar point of view likely to be strange to him, if, as the Apocalyptic Seer on the lone isle of Patmos, an exile "for the word of God and for the testimony of Jesus Christ," he felt in his own person what it was to suffer for his Master's sake? The kingdom of God in the world has two sides, its side of quiet internal development in the souls of men, its side of struggle with the world and opposition from it. Does the one thought exclude the other? Nay, is it not exactly the gentlest and the tenderest spirits, those who would themselves live most meekly, and do most for the very world that oppresses them, that feel most bitterly the thought of the world's enmity; and, if they are themselves suffering from that enmity, may we not expect the "tragical" side of things to strike their eyes quite as much as the peaceful and the joyous side? At all events, the one side is as real as the other. Now it is with this aspect of the case, and with it alone, that the *Apocalypse* concerns itself. Christians ask, in the midst of their tribulations, What is our encouragement and our hope? In reply they are presented with an ideal picture of Christ's truth and Church, in the midst of conflict safe and victorious. Whether the Gospel of St. John, notwithstanding what is alleged, and what is to a large extent true, of its peaceful character, knows anything of this kind with regard to the manner in which the work of Jesus is carried out, we shall immediately see.

*Conflict*, we allow, is the first key-note of the Apocalyptic visions. It is impossible to mistake it. The idea is plainly impressed upon them all from the moment when the first seal is broken to the final struggle of Gog and Magog against the camp of the saints and the

beloved city. Has this no correspondence with the Evangelist? Has it not again and again been shown, and that not by defenders of the Gospel alone, but by opponents hoping thus to establish their position as to its having proceeded from a dogmatic, instead of a historical, point of view, that one of its most leading characteristics is its presenting the Saviour's work under the aspect pre-eminently of conflict? Thus it is that Dr. Davidson says,—

“The contrasts in the Gospel are striking. Light and darkness, God and the world, heaven and earth, spirit and flesh, life and death, truth and error, love and hatred, the eternal and transitory, Christ and the world, Christ and the devil, the Church and the world, the children of the world and the children of the devil, present Christianity attaining to victory *through contest*.”\*

Thus it is that Baur exclaims, comparing our two books with one another,—

“In the one, as in the other, it is the unfolding of a *great conflict* in which the idea of Christianity realizes itself. In the Apocalypse it is the conflict with anti-Christian heathenism over which the congregation of the saints must achieve triumphs. In the Gospel it is the conflict with unbelieving Judaism which Jesus himself has to maintain.”

And then he draws the parallel still more close by the statement that the Evangelist represents the conflict with Judaism as “one with Satan the prince of this world” (xiii. 27; xiv. 30).†

Nor is it otherwise with Luthardt, although his object is entirely different from that of either Davidson or Baur,—

“Thus,” he says, “is the Evangelist led to divide with all sharpness the whole world into two great halves, *into two hostile camps*. In the oppositions of the life of Christ he sees the absolute opposition of principal spiritual powers; and, in the visible contest between Jesus and the Jews, he bids us see the invisible battle which these powers maintain.” (Comp. xiv. 30; xii. 31; xiii. 27.)‡

Such passages are enough to prove what we allege. Nor is it worth while to linger over the mistaken light in which Baur puts the conflict of the Apocalypse in contrast with the conflict of the Gospel. We have already both alluded to the fact that in the former the opposition to the cause of Christ proceeds from something wider than heathenism, from the spirit of the world, and have sufficiently explained the limitation of this opposition in the latter. That the conception of conflict is peculiarly characteristic of both is admitted, and no attentive reader can fail to notice it. The incidents of the life of Jesus given in the Gospel are not given simply because they are facts of history. They are selected with a special purpose on the writer's part. They are grouped under a special point of view.

\* Introduction, ii. 348. The italics are ours. † Die Kan. Evang., p. 380.

‡ Das Johann. Evang., i. p. 68.

He would set before us the *struggle* of light with darkness, and so on. In short, the one comprehensive formula under which all the facts of the Fourth Gospel are in the first place gathered is precisely that of the Apocalypse, viz., conflict.

But it is not conflict alone that meets us in the Apocalypse. It is *victory* upon the one side, total defeat upon the other. The three great enemies, the dragon, the beast, and the false prophet are not only warred against but slain. The redeemed, even when their blood is shed, are never permitted to forget for an instant that their being thus crushed is only temporary. Victory really belongs to them, both now and for ever. It is allowed by Dr. Davidson that "the use of 'to conquer' in the sense of overcoming the evil, opposition, and enmity of the world, with the implication of remaining faithful and active in the Christian cause, is peculiar to John and the Apocalypse."\* But it is not the word only that is thus peculiar to these writings, it is the thought, a thought which so pervades the Apocalypse that it is unnecessary to quote texts, and which is hardly less characteristic both of the Gospel and the First Epistle of St. John. Even in the Gospel, notwithstanding all His trials, Jesus is constantly the Conqueror. "Be of good cheer, I have overcome the world;" "As soon then as he had said unto them, I am He, they went backward and fell to the ground." Nor less so in the Epistle: "I write unto you, young men, because ye have overcome the wicked one;" "Ye are of God, little children, and have overcome them;" "Whatsoever is born of God overcometh the world: and this is the victory that overcometh the world, even our faith" (John xvi. 33; xviii. 6; 1 John ii. 13; iv. 4; v. 4). So characteristic of the state of believers is victory, that it marks them even before the battle is begun. Nay, even the very death upon the cross is victory. It is not defeat, it is the completion of a triumph. "It is finished," *τετέλεσται*—not merely it is ended, but it is completed, the work is accomplished: that parting word of the Redeemer has been preserved for us by the Fourth Evangelist alone; and through all his Gospel the Crucifixion is looked forward to as if, more than anything else, it were the placing of the crown upon the Conqueror's head. It is being "lifted up;" "when ye have lifted up the Son of man, then shall ye know that I am He;" "and I, if I be lifted up from the earth, will draw all men unto me" (viii. 28; xii. 32). What is all this but another form of the teaching of the Apocalypse, that the slain lamb is "the lion of the tribe of Judah," that the rider who comes forth, at the close of all, with a vesture dipped in blood, is "King of kings and Lord of lords?" (v. 5, 6; xix. 16).

Once more: Victory is not all that is set before us in the Apoca-

\* Introduction, i. p. 329.

lypse. So far as the enemies of the Redeemer are concerned, there is also *judgment*, and nothing but judgment. Principal Fairbairn, indeed, thinks that the prayers spoken of in viii. 4 are prayers, at least in part, for mercy to the world.

"The prayers," he says, "of all saints are the united cry of the Lord's people, this royal priesthood, not for the destruction, but for the salvation, of the world; for judgment, in so far as that might be necessary to hold in check the power of the adversary, and bring home to men's bosoms the knowledge and conviction of sin; but still, in the midst of this, and through this, for mercy, that the way of peace and blessing may be found."\*

We cannot take this view. It is out of keeping, not only with the whole strain of the book, but with the immediate context. Let us compare the fact mentioned in the fifth verse, that the angel took the golden censer and filled it with fire of the altar, and cast it into the earth, with the other two facts mentioned in the third verse, that the golden censer thus spoken of is the one out of which the angel had just caused the smoke to ascend up with the prayers of the saints before God, and that the fire is taken from the golden altar upon which these prayers had just been offered, and we shall at once feel that it is impossible to accept such an interpretation. There is no thought then of mercy for the world. The prayers are for judgment only, they are prayers that God will vindicate His own cause, and they are answered by Him who, when His people cry to Him, will arise to judgment. To a similar effect is the cry of the souls under the altar in vi. 10, "How long, O Lord, holy and true, dost thou not judge and avenge our blood on them that dwell on the earth?" and, when God's judgments are poured out, how do the whole hosts of heaven behold in this the brightest manifestation of His glory. After the judgment on Babylon there was heard by the Seer "a great voice of much people in heaven, saying, Alleluia; Salvation, and glory, and honour, and power, unto the Lord our God: for true and righteous are his judgments; for he hath judged the great whore. And again they said, Alleluia" (xix. 1, 2; comp. xi. 17, 18). The fact now noted, it will be at once seen, is in the closest harmony with what has been already spoken of as so characteristic of the Apocalypse, its division of men into the two great classes between which the line of complete demarcation has been drawn from the very first, and drawn for ever.

But can anything of this kind also characterise the Fourth Gospel, that Gospel which we are accustomed most of all to associate with the thought of leaning on the breast of the compassionate Redeemer, with the thought of the inexpressible tenderness of that last discourse in which He not only soothed His sorrowing disciples at the time, but has soothed them through all past ages from that hour until now? Let

\* On Prophecy, p. 408.

us look at it, and do we not find Jesus saying in it of himself, "For judgment I am come into this world;" "the Father judgeth no man, but hath committed all judgment unto the Son;" "and hath given him authority to execute judgment also, because he is the Son of man;" "and when the Comforter is come, he will convince the world of judgment" (ix. 39; v. 22, 27; xvi. 11). In all these passages we are not to understand by "judgment" simply a trial out of which one may come acquitted, as well as condemned. It is a judgment issuing only in condemnation. In both books too this judgment is present as well as future. It is so in the Fourth Gospel, "now is the judgment of this world, now shall the prince of this world be cast out" (xii. 31); and in the Apocalypse it is not only at the end that judgment takes effect. Through the whole period of the Church's militant state, under the seals, the trumpets, and the vials, and in the fall of Babylon, there is judgment at every stage, ever darkening, deepening, until it culminates in the lake of fire.

Thus, then, in the Apocalypse, Christ's work as regards His enemies may be summed up in the three particulars of conflict, victory, and judgment; and, when we turn to the other writings which claim also to be St. John's, the same great line of thought pervades them. Did our space permit, it might be well to dwell a little on the other side of Christ's work, His keeping of His own. But it is not necessary to do so. The one is the converse of the other. It is only not so fully wrought out, and can hardly be called so characteristic.

There is, however, one other particular connected with Christ's work which we cannot omit, and which will be best considered under this head, before we turn to our fourth and last point. It is one upon which great stress is laid by those who deny the possibility of a one authorship of the books before us. Are the benefits of Christ's work represented in the Apocalypse as bestowed upon all who share them, whether Jew or Gentile, upon perfectly equal terms? That this is the case in the Gospel of St. John is universally allowed. The very distinctness with which it is done is one of the things thought to show that that Gospel cannot be the production of the Apostle John, but must belong to an author of wider views and of a later age. It is not only, however, denied that the same thing is to be observed in the Apocalypse, it is urged that the very contrary is the case. It is maintained both by Baur and Davidson that a complete equality is not assigned in it to Jews and Gentiles, and that such passages as vii. 4, 5, 13; xii. 1; xxi. 12, show that, "although the heathen are not excluded from the communion of the heavenly Jerusalem, they are yet to be regarded as, properly speaking, only an appendix to the 144,000 sealed out of all the tribes of Israel;"\*

\* Baur, *die Kanon. Evang.* p. 348.

while the "saved heathen, though a great multitude, are farther from the Almighty's throne. They are the crowd—an appendix, as it were, to the chosen representatives of the faithful people."\* Dr. Davidson, indeed, is more impartial than Baur, for he allows that "the 144,000 presented to view in vii. 1—9, xiv. 1—5, xv. 2—4, may be regarded as the whole multitude of Christians collected out of nations and peoples," although he adds that "even there the universalism of the Apocalyptist has a Judaising aspect, since the entire number of believers is classified according to the old division of the twelve tribes, and every Christian is put into one tribe or other." The latter part of this statement has already in our first paper been sufficiently met. The former has not; and it is of most material importance to ask whether the saved heathen are really viewed as an appendix to the saved of Israel; and all the more that, upon the face of the Apocalypse, there seems to be some countenance given to the idea. The answer to the question turns upon the light in which we are to regard the vision of the 144,000 in chap. vii. Does this number include the whole company of the redeemed? or is it only a select portion, not identical with, but included in, the "great multitude which no man could number," of vii. 9? We answer that the two companies are identical, and for this answer the following reasons may be assigned, although our space forbids our doing more than mentioning them:—(1.) The number 144,000 is the complete number in its highest perfection; twelve, the number of the Church, not of Jewish Israel, multiplied by twelve, and then taken a thousand fold. (2.) There is no limitation in the description given of the 144,000 in vii. 3, "Hurt not the earth, neither the sea, nor the trees, till we have sealed *the servants of God* in their foreheads." Surely this implies that all are to be sealed, and not merely a selected portion. The whole earth, and not a part of it only, is to be left unhurt; the "servants of God," and not a part of them only, are to be sealed. (3.) In the fourteenth chapter we have again the 144,000 brought before us; and there the vision follows the description of the enemies of Christ, as these enemies had reference not to any one portion of the Church, but to it all, while it precedes that harvest and vintage of the earth which were to be wide as the whole world in their effects. Remembering the symmetrical structure of the Apocalypse, we can have little hesitation in saying that the vision of consolation cannot be more restricted in its scope. (4.) In xiv. 1, the 144,000 standing with the Lamb upon Mount Zion are spoken of as having "his Father's name written on their foreheads;" and this trait marks in xxii. 4 *all* the inhabitants of the New Jerusalem—"and they shall see his face, and his name shall be on their foreheads." (5.) The changes

\* Davidson, *Introd.*, i. 325.

made in the tribes numbered in chap. vii., although the grounds of them may not be very clear, indicate in part, at least, that we are not to think of the literal Israel, and strengthen the argument. (6.) In xxi. 12, the "twelve tribes" evidently include all believers. (7.) There is another sealing spoken of in various passages of this book, the sealing by Satan of his own, xiii. 16, 17, xiv. 9, xvi. 2, xix. 20, xx. 4. There cannot be the slightest doubt that this sealing is the direct antithesis of the sealing by God. It consists in receiving "a mark in the right hand or *in the forehead*," xiii. 16, while the seal of God is "the Father's name written *in the forehead*," xiv. 1, comp. vii. 3. It will not be denied that the former seal is imprinted upon all the servants of the beast, "and he caused *all*, both small and great," &c., . . . "and that *no man* might buy or sell," &c., xiii. 16, 17. The antithesis of God's sealing requires that His seal should be equally understood to be imprinted on *all* His people. (8.) We add another consideration adduced by Hengstenberg in his comment on the passage:—

"The following argument," he says, "is irresistible:—The plagues against which the sealing brings security pass over the whole earth, threaten alike all who, according to v. 9, 10, have been redeemed by the blood of Christ out of every kindred and tongue, people and nation, and made kings and priests to their God; not a word being said as to any separate division of Jewish Christians. But how unlikely is it that the seer should have obtained consolation only for a part of those that were in danger! What should fill all with anxiety required to be met with consolation for all; and so, according to v. 3, the servants of God generally must be sealed."

Finally, if any difficulty be felt in connection with xiv. 4, "The first-fruits unto God and to the Lamb," it is at once removed by a reference to James i. 18, where the same expression evidently includes all believers. We must therefore conclude that the 144,000 are *identical* with the "great multitude, which no man could number, of all nations, and kindreds, and people, and tongues," of the next following vision. Nor is it difficult to see why they should be numbered in the one vision and not in the other. In the one they are looked at as they are sealed by God, and He knoweth his own; He calleth them by their names; to His eyes they are a definite number. In the other they are seen by man, and man cannot count them; he beholds only a great multitude which no man can number.

The saved heathen then are no "appendix" to the saved of Israel. The 144,000 and the "great multitude" are the same. They are the same, viewed only in another scene and in other relations. Distinction between Jew and Gentile we have none. The universality of the representation is complete.\*

\* Notwithstanding what has been said in the text of the identity of the 144,000 with *all* believers, it is possible that some may still be struck with the line of demarcation which certainly seems to be drawn between the twelve tribes of Israel, and the great

4. Our fourth point yet remains to be noticed—*The close of all.* The alleged difference between the Apocalypse and the Gospel of St. John is urged even more confidently in connection with this point than with any of those already noticed. Admissions as to a greater or less amount of similarity may be made as to the first three topics we have considered. Here the stand is firm. The Gospel, it is said, knows nothing of a personal coming again of the Saviour in glory, of the reign of a thousand years, of a first and second resurrection. Let us again listen to Lücke rather than to more suspected theologians. Our extract partly precedes and partly follows that already quoted in this paper from the same author.

"According to the Gospel and the Epistles of John the return, the full presence, of Christ is nothing else than the internal completion of His Church. Thus, every advance made in His work, every increase to His society, every victory of His word and spirit over the world, is an act of His return."

And again:—

"The dominion which the saints attain" in the Apocalypse "is both an external one, and it also lasts but for a thousand years. It is to be again interrupted by the loosing of Satan from his confinement. And not till this last outbreak and disturbance have been externally put down, does the heavenly Jerusalem visibly come down with its peace and its blessedness from the new heavens on the new earth."

The answer to this is to be found partly in a more accurate examination of the Gospel, partly in a more consistent interpretation of the Apocalypse.

As regards the Gospel, and we shall again take along with us the First Epistle of St. John, it is not the fact that they know nothing of a second and external coming of the Lord. That return is not indeed largely dwelt upon in the Gospel, because its object is not to trace the history of the Church down to the end of the present dispensation, but to set forth the Redeemer, in his life on earth, as the true object of his people's faith, and the great principle of their life—"These are written that ye might believe that Jesus is the

multitude of all nations, and may be unable to overcome the feeling that the former can refer only to the saved of Israel. Even in this case, however, it would be impossible to admit the correctness of the representation that makes the latter "an appendix" to the former. We should have only expression given to the idea, so distinctly expressed in John iv. 22, that "salvation is of the Jews." Israel is, undoubtedly, throughout all the New Testament, the theocratic stem on which the nations of the world at large are grafted. It is the historical precedent of the universal church, and it would not be necessary to think that more than this is implied in the relation to one another of the two visions in the chapter before us. Yet we persuade ourselves that, the more the matter is reflected on, the more clearly will it appear that there is good ground for maintaining the identity of the "great multitude" with the "Israel" spoken of although the latter is so definitely specialized. We cannot fail to notice the "twelve stars" of xii. 1, and the "twelve gates" of xxi. 12.

Christ, the Son of God, and that believing ye might have life through his name" (xx. 31). But the discourses of Jesus contained in it are not without the most distinct traces of a coming different in character from the mere advance of His Church, of a coming of an external kind, and associated with a definite epoch—"In my Father's house are many mansions; if it were not so I would have told you. I go to prepare a place for you. And if I go and prepare a place for you, I will come again and receive you unto myself, that where I am there ye may be also." So also we read of "the last day" and of Christ's work on it—"and this is the Father's will which hath sent me that of all which he hath given me I should lose nothing, but should raise it up again at the last day;" and once more, "If I will that he tarry till I come, what is that to thee?" (xiv. 2, 3; vi. 39; xxi. 22). Passages such as these leave not the slightest doubt that the Evangelist did know another coming of Jesus than that which consists in "the internal completion of His Church." He knows also of a "last day" and a resurrection. The second of the texts just quoted testifies to his knowledge of the one; the very important passage in ch. v. 28, 29, and which, whether we look at it in itself or compare it with the verses going before, it is impossible to interpret only spiritually, testifies no less decidedly to his knowledge of the other—"Marvel not at this, for the hour is coming in the which all that are in their graves shall hear his voice and shall come forth; they that have done good unto the resurrection of life; and they that have done evil unto the resurrection of damnation," or rather "judgment." Further, although it may be that this last passage allows the thought of an interval between the resurrection of the just and of the unjust, it must be admitted that such, at least, is not its simple and natural meaning. The two resurrections spoken of seem to follow closely on one another. Once more, we have to advert to a very remarkable statement in John v. 24—"Verily, verily, I say unto you, He that heareth my word and believeth on him that sent me, hath everlasting life, and shall not come unto condemnation" (or, as it certainly ought to be translated, judgment), "but is passed from death unto life;" and we shall quote Dean Alford's note upon it rather than express our sense of its meaning in words of our own.

"In this sense the believers in Christ will not be judged according to their works; they are justified before God by faith, and *by God*; their 'passage over' from death into life *has already taken place*,—from the state of spiritual death into that *ζωὴ αἰώνιος*, which, in their believing state, they *ἔχουσιν* already."

Gathering now these points together, we find in the Gospel and First Epistle of St. John that there will be a second appearing, a

second personal coming, of the Lord; that, when He comes, there will be a resurrection both of the just and of the unjust, and, as certainly seems most probable, at the same time; that the just will pass into a glorious and eternal life without coming into judgment; and that the unjust will be condemned in the judgment then to take place. The correspondence of this teaching in its main features with the general teaching of the New Testament must at once be obvious to all. Its peculiarity, especially in reference to the just who do not pass through the *kρίσις*, is not less obvious.

The next question that meets us is, How stands it with the Apocalypse? On one point of the parallel, that which relates to the second coming of the Lord, almost nothing need be said. It is the main theme of the book, everywhere anticipated, everywhere prominent to the Apocalypticist's eye. We pass rather to the other points referred to, the resurrection, the reign of a thousand years, the judgment.

As to the first of these, the resurrection, it is at once to be admitted that in xx. 4, 5, a resurrection both of the just and unjust is taught, although apparently with the interval of a thousand years between them. It is impossible to interpret the "lived" of ver. 4 only spiritually. Alford's remarks upon such an interpretation are strong, but it can hardly be said that they are too strong:—

"If, in a passage where two *resurrections* are mentioned, where certain *ψυχὰι ἐζήσαν* at the first, and the rest of the *νεκροὶ ἐζήσαν* only at the end of a specified period after that first,—if, in such a passage, the first resurrection may be understood to mean *spiritual* rising with Christ, while the second means *literal* rising from the grave;—then there is an end of all significance in language, and Scripture is wiped out as a definite testimony to anything."

We admit the soundness of the criticism, and recognise in the *ἐζήσαν* of both verses a similar resurrection, a "coming forth from the grave" (John v. 29).

While we admit this with regard to the *ἐζήσαν*, a different view must be taken of the *ἡ ἀνάστασις ἡ πρώτη* of ver. 5. That expression must be understood, not of the *act* of rising alone, but of the whole *state* into which the risen are introduced. For, in the first place, the *αὐτῇ* which precedes these words cannot be referred to the "living" of the saints alone. It must refer also to their "reigning" with Christ a thousand years—"And they lived and reigned with Christ a thousand years; the rest of the dead lived not till the thousand years were finished. This is the first resurrection." It is impossible so to separate the "living" and "reigning" here as to say that the word "resurrection" shall apply only to the former and not to the latter. "This" refers to the whole description going

before, and not simply to one particular part of it. In the second place, the "first resurrection" spoken of is contrasted, not with a second resurrection, but with a "second death." Did it mean simply the rising of the righteous from their graves, it seems natural to suppose that we should have had a second resurrection to contrast with it. But that is not the case. We see clearly from ver. 6 that the contrast is found in the "second death," and what the second death is we learn not less clearly from ver. 14—ὁ θάνατος ὁ δεύτερός ἐστιν ἡ λίμνη τοῦ πυρός. The second death is not a death at all in the ordinary meaning of the word; it is a metaphorical expression for the *state* of torment and woe to which the ungodly shall be consigned. Is it not a legitimate inference that the first resurrection with which it is contrasted is a *state* also?

Upon these grounds (we have no space for others), we are constrained to come to the conclusion that, although in the word *ἐξῆσαν* a rising from the grave is spoken of, the words "first resurrection" must be interpreted of a state rather than an act. They do not speak of a first rising from the grave, to be followed at a long-distant interval by a second, but they present to us a particular aspect of the blessedness of those who have suffered for the testimony of Christ and for the Word of God, and who have not worshipped the beast, neither his image, neither have received his mark upon their foreheads, that is (comp. xiv. 9, xv. 2), of all believers.

The second point demanding our attention is the reign of a thousand years, the supposed millennium of the saints. In approaching this we feel strongly how much we shall stand in need of the calm, even of the indulgent, consideration of our readers. It is not an easy thing to offer an interpretation of this period entirely different from any hitherto proposed, and still less easy is it to do so when we remember that the topic is one which has so deeply interested the Church of Christ for centuries, and by which a more extensive literature has probably been called forth than by any other disputed portion of the Bible. We may be permitted, before entering on it, to say that we shall speak in no spirit of presumption, and that the view we have to present is the result of no desire simply to effect a reconciliation between the Apocalypse and the Gospel of St. John upon a point which has never been satisfactorily explained. Whatever judgment may be pronounced on what is to follow, let it at least be believed that the view taken springs from a study of the Apocalypse itself, and from that alone. Let it be judged wholly by that standard; and, if it cannot be maintained on grounds altogether independent of efforts at reconciliation, let it be set aside; only let it not be set aside too hastily. Let it be deliberately weighed in the

light of the general structure and analogy of the visions of the book ; and let it not at least be an argument against it that it is too simple and easy a solvent of its hitherto unsolved difficulties. Our space compels us to be briefer than we would fain have been. With these preliminary remarks, we turn to the question essential to our present inquiry—What is meant by the thousand years ?

Many will at once be ready to grant that the number is not to be understood literally. They will allow that, of the various numbers mentioned in the Apocalypse, there is not another—and the remark applies even to the number seven of the Seven Churches of Asia—which is strictly literal, and that it would be against every principle of sound interpretation to depart in one single instance from a rule so largely exemplified throughout these visions. They will admit that it may mean some long time whose actual length is unknown to us, but they will be unwilling to allow that the expression is not intended to mark a period of time at all. Yet such is the view which forces itself upon us. *The thousand years denote no period of time.* They symbolize, under a figure taken from time, the completeness, the thoroughness, of the work represented as accomplished in them. On the one hand, as applied to Satan, who is bound for a thousand years, they represent the completeness of his overthrow ; on the other hand, as applied to believers, they represent their confirmation in happiness at the coming of the Lord, their establishment in the joy just about to be revealed in fulness, the perfected glory of their state when the enemy of souls has been vanquished and driven from the scene, and when immediate entrance is to be given them into the New Jerusalem. They are simply an exalted symbol of the great glory and blessedness of the redeemed at the particular moment referred to by the Seer. Let us endeavour to make this good.

That “years” may be taken in this sense there can be no doubt. In Ezekiel xxxix. 9, it is said that the inhabitants of the cities of Israel shall prevail against the enemies described, and “shall set on fire and burn the weapons, both the shields and the bucklers, the bows and the arrows, and the handstaves and the spears, and they shall burn them with fire *seven years*”—i.e., they shall utterly destroy them, not a vestige shall be left. Again, at the twelfth verse of the same chapter, when the prophet speaks of the burying of “Gog and all his multitude,” he says, “And *seven months* shall the house of Israel be burying of them, that they may cleanse the land,” where the expression marks only the thoroughness with which the land should be cleansed from every remnant of heathenish impurity.\* The use of “years” in the passage before us seems to be exactly similar ; and the probability that it is so rises almost to certainty

\* Compare the Commentaries of Fairbairn and Haevernick on Ezekiel *in loc.*

when we remember that, as proved by the vision of Gog and Magog in the subsequent part of the chapter, this prophecy of Ezekiel is before the Seer's eyes, constituting the foundation upon which his whole delineation rests.

Nor is it difficult to explain the "thousand" prefixed to the "years" if we attend to a circumstance which has hitherto, we believe, escaped the notice of commentators, that throughout the Apocalypse the number "thousands" seems to be connected with what is perfect, glorious, in the Church's condition, while the lower number "hundreds," in contrast with it, is used in connection with what lies under the wrath of God. Thus the twelve times twelve sealed was associated with thousands, 144,000. The agents of the divine purposes in ix. 16 are "two ten thousands of ten thousands." The angels round about the throne in v. 11 are in number "ten thousand times ten thousand and thousands of thousands." The New Jerusalem when measured is found in xxi. 16 to be in length, in breadth, and in height, 12,000 furlongs. This last example is peculiarly instructive. The idea of a city 1,500 miles high is in itself so monstrous that it is absolutely necessary to think of a symbolical meaning in the "thousands," quite as much as in the twelve, where all will allow that symbolism is to be found. On the other hand, we have "hundreds" associated with the beast in xiii. 18—"His number is six hundred threescore and six," and with the furlongs covered with the blood of the wine-press in xiv. 20,  $4 \times 4 = 16$ , and then the hundreds.

Let us apply these remarks to the "thousand" in our present passage. The Seer has before him the vision of Ezekiel, where the complete cleansing of the land from the weapons of the enemies of Israel was symbolized by their being burned for "seven years." But seven years is too short a time to express the complete overthrow of Satan, the complete confirmation of the saints in their eternal victory, and, therefore, in accordance with the general analogy of numbers in his book, Satan is bound, and the saints reign with Christ, not for seven, but for "a thousand" years.

To the interpretation now given it may be objected that, though perhaps admissible had we nothing to deal with but the words of Rev. xx. 2, it is irreconcilable with those of vers. 3 and 7, where it is said of Satan, "and after that he must be loosed a little season," "and when the thousand years are expired, Satan shall be loosed out of his prison," as also with those of ver. 5, where we read, "but the rest of the dead lived not until the thousand years were finished." We take the first two texts as the most difficult first, and, in doing so, must make one or two observations on the vision of Gog and Magog, to which both have immediate reference. It is utterly im-

possible to understand that vision literally. The whole earth is gathered together to battle. Satan has gone out to deceive the nations which were in its four quarters—that is, not only in its four distant corners, but in the whole space enclosed within them. He has gathered them all together, and their number is as the sand of the sea. They have gone up “on the breadth of the earth,” over its whole wide extent, and these innumerable hosts now compass the camp of the saints and the beloved city, or Jerusalem. We forbear to point out the inconsistencies of interpretation into which literal interpreters are led regarding those who constitute this host. The one consideration above adduced is sufficient to show that the literal interpretation is absurd and impossible. What, then, is its meaning? It is founded on the remarkable prophecy regarding Gog in Ezekiel xxxviii., xxxix. It occupies the same relative place in the book, for that prophecy comes immediately after that of the restoration of the Jewish theocracy. It is cast in the same mould. Many of its details are taken from it. It must be interpreted upon the same principles. But Ezekiel’s prophecy cannot be understood literally; \* it is an ideal picture. So also is the picture of these verses. It is a picture intended to present us with a last view of the completeness of the Church’s victory over all her foes; of their struggle against her, and its defeat. It is a closing representation of the triumphant issue of all the trials of the people of God. It is, as it were, a prophetic peroration in which we obtain another and a final glance at what has formed the theme of the whole prophecy of this book, the assault of the devil and his instruments upon the children of God, and its total failure.

And now let our readers recall for an instant what has been said. Let them familiarize themselves with the idea that the “thousand years,” taken simply as an expression, may denote completeness, thoroughness, either of defeat or victory. Let them next bear in mind that the Seer of the Apocalypse is about to present us with a final, *but ideal*, picture of the Church’s victory over her foes. Let them further take into account, what could easily be proved by an induction from many other passages, that the verb *τελέω*, to finish, does not so much mean in the Apocalypse to bring to an end in point of time, as to accomplish, to bring to completion, the work with which it is connected. Above all, let them place themselves in the position

\* Compare the strong language of Dr. Fairbairn in his commentary on Ezekiel. We must content ourselves with a very short extract. Speaking of the literal interpretation he says, “It bids defiance to all the laws of nature, as well as the known principles of human action; and to insist on such a description being understood according to the letter is to make it take rank with the most extravagant tales of romance, or the most absurd legends of Popery.” Words equally strong might justly be applied to the literal interpretation of the vision of Gog and Magog.

of the Seer, and catch as far as possible the spirit in which he writes. They will then enter better into our explanation when we say, that the loosing of Satan at the end of the thousand years is not to be understood literally. *It is a mere incident intended to give verisimilitude to the poetic delineation.* The prophet has described Satan as completely subjugated; but the whole evil of the earth is once more to be presented to us gathered together against the saints. Satan, the head of its kingdom, the prince of this world, must be there, that he may direct its energies and share its fate. For this purpose it is necessary that he should be spoken of as loosed. The loosing, then, is not chronological, not historical; it is only poetic, designed to give consistency to the prophet's vision.\*

If this be the meaning of ver. 7 the words of ver. 6 will not occasion difficulty. It is the order of thought, rather than of chronology, that is there before us. The saints of God are confirmed first, and then, in thought at least, the resurrection and judgment of the wicked follow. In short, we have simply the same order of thought as in the words of our Lord in John v. 29, "All that are in their graves shall hear his voice, and shall come forth; they that have done good unto the resurrection of life; and they that have done evil, unto the resurrection of judgment."

One other point connected with this chapter remains to be noticed. What is the judgment spoken of in vers. 11—15? Is it a general judgment, or is it that of the wicked only? We can only indicate, in the briefest possible manner, one or two reasons which lead us to the conclusion that it is the latter. In the first place, the mention of "the dead" in ver. 12 leads us back to "the rest of the dead" in ver. 5, words that can only mean all the ungodly. It reminds us too of the language of xi. 18, "And the nations were angry, and thy wrath is come, and the time of the dead that they should be judged, and that thou shouldest give reward unto thy servants the prophets, and to the saints, and them that fear thy name, both small and great." The "dead" here are the ungodly dead. It is they alone to whom the being "judged" applies; and that judgment is the grand circumstance which fills up the whole scene, constitutes its essence, and draws forth that song of the twenty-four elders, of which the words now quoted form a part. In the fate at length

\* Let us apply this principle to the passage already quoted from Ezekiel xxxix. 9, by supposing that the Prophet, immediately after saying "and they shall burn them with fire seven years," had desired to mention some other circumstance that then took place, or some other vision that followed the complete destruction of the weapons of war referred to. Would he not have gone on, "and when the seven years were finished," &c.? Is not such a method of expression involved in the very nature of the figure previously employed? The figure itself may be a strange one. That is not the question. It is simply, whether, *having been used*, the use of it does not naturally draw along with it the method of expression subsequently employed?

overtaking the ungodly the Church beholds the reward of her prophets and her members. In the second place, the *ἐκρίθησαν* of ver. 12 can apply to the wicked alone. The verb is used seven times in the Apocalypse, in addition to the two times it occurs in the verses before us; *κρίσις* is used four, *κρίμα* three, times; and, in every case, these words denote not a mere process of trial, where a sentence of acquittal *may* be pronounced, but an executing of the righteous judgments of God upon sin and sinners. The use of *ἐκρίθησαν* in the passage now under consideration would be the only exception to this rule if it here refers to the judgment of the good as well as the wicked. The improbability is therefore great that it has any such reference. In the third place, the books opened in ver. 12 are clearly books containing the record of evil deeds alone. In direct contrast to them the "book of life" is spoken of with the names written in it of the saved. It harmonizes with this, that the book of life is not expressly mentioned as used to prove of any that they are to escape the lake of fire, but only (ver. 15) to prove that the condemned were condemned justly, because their names were not found written there. In the fourth place, the mention of the quarters from which "the dead" appear leads us to the same conclusion. They are three, "the sea," "death," and "hades." That "the sea" is not the ocean can hardly admit of a moment's doubt. In that sense it would form no proper parallel to death and hades: few comparatively could come from it; in xxi. 1, "And there was no more sea," it cannot be literally understood. It is the emblem, therefore, of all disorder and confusion, and from it the wicked alone can rise. "Death," again, cannot be the neutral grave, for it is cast into the lake of fire; and a similar remark applies to hades. "The sea," "death," "hades," all are symbolical, and symbolical only of what is bad. Not one of them has in it any righteous to give up.

The whole passage is applicable to the judgment of the ungodly, and to that alone.

And now we can look back upon the whole chapter. At the end of the one preceding, the beast and the false prophet have been cast into the lake of fire burning with brimstone. But three things remain before the New Jerusalem can appear in its glory. Believers have to be confirmed in their condition, and this is expressed under the image of a thousand years' reign with Christ. There is here nothing chronological. It is simply a figure, setting forth the passing through that final stage which separates the warfare and pilgrimage of earth from the peace and God-built city of Heaven.

Then Satan has to be finally overthrown; and that we may the better estimate the greatness of his overthrow, we must see him in his might going up with all his hosts over "the breadth of the

earth " to attack the city of God, and, whenever he appears before it, devoured by fire from heaven and cast into the lake of fire. Therefore he is "loosed." Finally, we have the last stage of the great drama. It is the judgment of the wicked. Nothing remains except to gather them from all the evil quarters where they have been in keeping for this hour, that they may be consigned to the fate of those three great enemies of God whom they have honoured and obeyed. Then shall everything be ready for the New Jerusalem.

Such is the eschatology of the Apocalypse. Need we pause to point out its striking and wonderful harmony with the eschatology of the Gospel and First Epistle of St. John? Precisely in the most characteristic features of the latter, in those features where there is a mode of looking at the "last things" distinctive of St. John among the writers of the New Testament, it is marked by the same views. The second coming; the resurrection both of the just and of the unjust; the last day; above all, the confirmation of the righteous in their joy without passing through judgment; the "judgment" of the wicked alone — all are here exactly as they are there. A more marked illustration of identity of view, of identity in the most peculiar points of St. John's method of conception, it would surely be impossible to produce.

We must hasten to a close. Under the second division of our subject four points of comparison between the Apocalypse and the other writings of the New Testament ascribed to St. John have engaged our attention. On every one of these points we have found that in the Gospel and First Epistle of St. John there is a way of presenting it which differs from that of the other writers in the canon, and which forms, therefore, a special characteristic of that apostle. We have seen also that the very same way of presenting each appears in the Apocalypse. The outward form is, no doubt, different, but the kernel of the matter, the substance, is the same. We see at once that, apart altogether from the question of *form*, St. Paul could not have written in the apocalyptic style of thought, could not have given utterance to his views in the ideas that are embodied in the apocalyptic book. We see also that St. Peter could not have done so, nor St. James, nor St. Jude, nor any one of the writers of our first three Gospels. The thoughts and views of the Apocalypse correspond, and that in the closest manner, with the other writings assigned to St. John, and with them alone.

The correspondence being so close it may naturally enough be asked, How should it have escaped the notice of men who, while denying the identity of authorship, were well able to form a judgment, and whose minds were surely open to conviction? It has not wholly

escaped their notice. Dr. Davidson, many of whose remarks on the Gospel of St. John appear to us to be most valuable, writes thus on the Revelation: "But after every reasonable deduction, enough remains to prove that the correspondences are not accidental, and either betray the same author or show that the writer of the one book was influenced by the ideas and language of the other."\* Baur leaves us no alternative of this kind. We shall quote his words as the theory of accounting for the resemblances in question proposed by the ablest representative of the school to which he belongs. After saying that we cannot but see that the Seer puts himself in the position of the Evangelist, and desires to make use of the influence of his name, he goes on—

"Nay, it is not merely an outward taking advantage of a much-honoured name that we see. There are not wanting inward points of affinity between the Gospel and the Apocalypse, and one can only wonder at the deep geniality and fine skill with which the Evangelist has taken up into himself those elements which lead us from the standing-point of the Apocalypse to the freer and higher point of view of the Gospel, in order thereby to spiritualize the Apocalypse into the Gospel."†

Such is the theory. What does it amount to? The Apocalypse was written, let us remember, upon this view, before the destruction of Jerusalem; the Gospel of St. John about the middle of the second century—that is, after an interval of eighty years. The former was thoroughly Judaic, composed almost entirely in the spirit of the narrowest and most local Jewish Christianity of Palestine. More than three-quarters of a century afterwards, in another part of the world, in an altogether different stage of the Church's history, when old controversies are dying out, and new ones have emerged, in the midst of new thoughts, new views, new difficulties, and new struggles, a person unknown to us, but, from the very fact that he so successfully embodied the ideas of his time, evidently one of its ripest products, resolves that he will write a history of Jesus that shall connect all these ideas with him. The ideas he would express are, indeed, wholly foreign to the age of Jesus, and to the general strain of that Apocalypse which dates from a period very near to it, and certainly similar in character. Yet he must connect them with an apostle in order to attain his end. St. Paul, though offering so many points of contact, he lays aside. St. Peter he also lays aside. He will connect himself with St. John, whose only work is one betraying an altogether different spirit from his own, and full of views which he is to controvert. He knows, however, how to set about his task, and he takes the Apocalypse as it is. He looks at it in a light in

\* Introduction, i. p. 332.

† *Kirchen-Geschichte*, i. p. 147.

which, so far as appears from the remains of early Christian literature possessed by us, no other looked at it in his day. He discovers in it thoughts which it was not then believed to express; and he so identifies himself with it, works upon it with so much geniality and skill, that the Gospel produced by him becomes a new Apocalypse, only refined, spiritualized, all the narrow notions weeded out, the very bloom and fruit of a few scattered hints which his eye only was able to discover.

Such is the theory of the keenest critic of modern times, of one whose name ought never to be mentioned without that respect which his unequalled services in adding to our knowledge of early Christian antiquity demand. We may accept it as a tribute to the fact that the relationship between the two books is of the closest kind. More merit to it few will allow. That it solves the problem to which the writings of St. John give rise few will admit. Even those who think the problem still unsolved will, for the most part, reject a solution so arbitrary, and in every respect so improbable. They may still say that there are differences in language and style which they are not able to overcome. But, so far as concerns the course of thought, they will surely not deny that a careful comparison, in that respect, of the works in question, exhibits an amount of agreement highly corroborative of the tradition of the Church, that their authorship was the same.

WM. MILLIGAN.



## OBER-AMMERGAU AND SYMBOLIC CHRISTIANITY.

IT is often made a subject of philosophical or artistic complaint that the facilities of railroad intercourse have created or exaggerated in most men an unhealthy taste for constant and rapid change of scene. Those, however, who seldom escape from the monotony of home work and home troubles may be allowed to yield to this taste occasionally, as ideas of contrast are often ideas tolerably well worth having, and may lead to useful comparisons and generalizations.

This must be an excuse for a somewhat distant connection of thought in this essay, which owes its existence in a great degree to a recent and too rapid journey lately made from Ravenna and its mosaics to Ober Ammergau and its Passion-play, by way of Venice, and not without revisiting Verona and Padua. We must appeal both to the courage and the patience of the reader if we suggest and trace a connection between the mosaics of Justinian, of Theodoric, and of the earlier days of Venice, on the one side, and on the other, that acted and spoken symbolism of the Bavarian Highlands, which to some minds, we understand, appears profane realism. We hope to be able to set forth, within very modest limits, some pervading principles which guide or which run through all Christian teaching by visible symbol — by painting, sculpture, mosaic, or even by acted and spoken pictures of recorded events. For the ancient *Passions-Vorstellung*, though somewhat modified, no doubt, from its original *mise en scene* of 1634, is a series of pictures, representing events rather than delineating

character. It is highly dramatic without being in the least theatrical. For the present, at least, the devout simplicity of the actors gives them the rarest power of imaginative self-surrender: so that all seem alike to forget their own personality, and to throw themselves entirely into their parts, as representatives of Scriptural record, and that only. Each prominent character, even that of Judas, which is acted with vehement intensity and power, is conceived according to the text of Scripture, or the accepted interpretation of it. It may be said that literally no attempt to define, draw out, or give an interpretation of the character of our Lord is made by the thoughtful enthusiast who represents Him; that the realisms of the scene and *obligato* touches of homely character are given principally to the inferior parts; and that familiarity and realization are graduated, so to speak, from the soldiery and buyers and sellers of the Temple, who are not only vivid, but vulgar and everyday characters, through Caiaphas, Pilate, and Judas, who are historically worked out,—to the central figure, which repeats abstractedly, and with grandeur sprung of awe and self-forgetfulness, the heavy-laden words of Him who spake as never man spake.

There is no space here to dwell on the power of pictorial illustration, or on the necessity of appeal to the imagination of those whom you want to teach, or even, within bounds, to their emotions. The study of history is the study of record; and it is only just beginning to be understood in our own country that early art is as truly record as early chronicles. Art instructs, or impresses the history of facts, by investing them for the spectator with their original emotions. He is not only told in words that battles are tumultuous and sunsets are calm, but is made partaker of the din of strife and the pensiveness of evening. It may be done by poetry, or by painting and sculpture; but the result is the same.\*

The importance of pictorial symbol as history may be best judged of by the bas-reliefs and paintings of Egypt and Assyria. The picture does not illustrate the history there; it is the chronicle of

\* The impressions conveyed by these lines of Tennyson are both pictorial and poetical; and just such crowded images are conveyed to the mind by Egyptian and Assyrian bas-reliefs, or Raffael's corridors in the Vatican, or by the historical pictures in the Doge's Palace at Venice:—

“And I saw crowds in column'd sanctuaries;  
And forms that pass'd at windows and on roofs  
Of marble palaces;

“Corpses across the threshold; heroes tall  
Dialodging pinnacle and parapet  
Upon the tortoise creeping to the wall;  
Lances in ambush set;

“Squadrons and squares of men in brazen plates,  
Scaffolds, still sheets of water, divers woes;  
Ranges of glimmering vaults with iron grates,  
And hush'd seraglios.”

history itself. The celebrated Camp of Rameses (Rossellini, *Tavole*, tom i., p. 83) contains some of the most perfect historical descriptions ever placed on record; and so also of the earlier tablets or records of conquest cut in the living rock of Wady Magharah. This is not our subject now. It will be granted on all hands as historically true, that the Christian churches have made use of pictorial teaching, historical and symbolic, from the earliest times. It is also generally agreed that for the first six or seven centuries this teaching was altogether good, or at least harmless. Its object was instruction, from the first; and its degeneracy in the Western Churches consists in its becoming less directly instructive and more emotional. Though it may have been thus misused in the Church of Rome, especially since the Reformation, it is still fairly and rightly used there to teach the plain facts of the Faith; and it has been so used there throughout with sincerity, from the days of Giotto and Angelico to those of the present Munich school; whatever comparative value we assign to the works produced, as to mental or artistic power. We wish to illustrate the unity of purpose and principle which runs through all this body of doctrine in marble, canvas, and inlaying; and its traditional use, that is to say, to explain, impress, and enforce the chief facts of the Faith.

It has from the first been taught by painted symbol, as well as in words, that the world being subject to evil, God became man to deliver it from evil, submitting to human life and death; that the New Testament is the documental history of the facts of this Redemption, with comment of eye and ear-witnesses, and the Old Testament a similar record of matters closely bearing on those facts. "*Lex antiqua Novam ferinat, Veterem Nova complet*," says or sings St. Paulinus of Nola, with sound doctrine in a halting hexameter; and all Christian art in the true sense of the word has always striven to illustrate this principle of its first professor.

When art has not been historical, for narrative assertion of the facts of the old and new dispensation, it has been symbolical for enforcement of the doctrines—that is to say, of the facts as phenomena of the Christian soul, *teachable* by man to man. Fallen man, and the cross as the sign of God's victorious humiliation to death and life; sin, and deliverance by sacrifice, these are the key-notes of Christian teaching, spoken, written, and painted. So it was in the earliest days when the Lord's person and life were most dwelt on; so in after days, when his death and the manner of his death filled men's hearts; and so it is, down to the sacramental instructions of Bishop Wilson, the *Christus Consolator* of Ary Scheffer, and the festival of Ober-Ammergau. The acted introduction or argument of the whole consists of the Fall; the Vision of the Cross of com-

pleted Sacrifice; and the typical sacrifice of Isaac.\* We apprehend that this may be called Bible Christianity with absolute correctness; only to see that it is so a man must have read nearly the whole of his Bible with an open heart, instead of studying isolated portions for polemical purposes, and "reading into" Holy Scripture the meanings he professes to find there.

When one wishes to be accurate, it is always necessary to say a good many words about words. "Symbol, *σύμβολον*, a sign by which one knows a thing; *σύμβολα*, tallies," say Liddell and Scott, and our use of the word and its cognates will be in this wide sense. Symbolism consists always in the use of a more intelligible thing or conception to convey the idea of one less understood, whether such use is common and conventional, or novel and vivid. A symbol may stand in the place of a thing, as notes stand for gold, and gold for labour. But in exchange of ideas, the symbol suggests the thought of a thing, not itself then and there producible, or not at all producible, as the picture of a great man not present, or of a past event,

\* The following is the order of the Ammergau tableaux; the silent *verbilde* from the Old Testament always preceding the spoken pictures from the New. The asterisk marks a subject commonly represented in the Catacombs and earlier Christian monuments:—

OLD TESTAMENT.	NEW TESTAMENT.
1. * (a) The Fall, and (b) Promise of a Redeemer, a vision of the Cross. * Sacrifice of Abraham.	* The Entry into Jerusalem.
2. Brethren of Joseph in council against him. Well of Dothan.	Council of Caiaphas.
3. Departure of Tobias. The Bride forsaken (Song of Solomon).	The Departure to Bethany.
4. Rejection of Vashti, Jerusalem.	The Weeping over Jerusalem.
5. * Fall of Manna.	The Lord's Supper.
6. * Joseph sold by his brethren for thirty pieces of silver.	Judas accepts the thirty pieces.
7. * The Curse on the earth. Labour and Pain. The kiss of Joab and Amasa.	The agony in the garden. The betrayal with a kiss.
8. Micaiah before Ahab.	Christ before Annas.
9. Naboth and the false witnesses.	The false witnesses before Caiaphas.
10. Cain the outcast.	Remorse of Judas.
11. * Daniel condemned to the lions.	* Christ before Pilate.
12. The blood-stained coat of many colours. * Isaac on the altar.	The scourging and crown of thorns.
13. Joseph in Egypt. Moses, Aaron, and the Scapegoat.	Ecce Homo.
14. * Isaac bearing the wood of his offering. The Fiery Serpents. * The Brazen Serpent.	The Way of the Cross.
15.	The Crucifixion.
16. * Jonah.	The Resurrection.
* Israel passing the Red Sea.	The Ascension.

or the Serpent of Eternity, or the Cross, which signifies the Lord's perfect humanity. All pictures in our sense are symbolic in proportion to their suggestiveness. Realization or pictorial illusion have nothing to do with the matter here. They are required of the artist to a certain extent, measured by his powers and training, if he be an artist at all; but under special circumstances, pictorial symbol may be used to good purpose, as in early illuminations, without any attempt at realization, still less at deceptive finish. Religious symbol is not deceptive, but interpretative; the sign is necessarily *connected in thought* with the thing signified, not necessarily *like* it. Deceptive realization is only a form of speech after all. The herrings and sliced lemons of Dutch art may be taken for real herrings or lemons, at a certain distance, and if you don't touch; but the deceptiveness even of these small accessories is limited; *solvuntur ambulando*, if you walk up to them. Again, Hunt's scapegoat and landscape are a grand example of undeceptive realization; but the whole picture is solemnly symbolic from end to end.

Again, when symbolism has learnt to call art or the sense of beauty, grandeur, &c., &c., to her aid, she bears with her a train of emotions, and gains proportionally in power of impression; but for all that, pictorial signs may be of the greatest value without possessing any beauty, like maps and diagrams. It is strange how vigorously practical men in practical England make use of beautiful and feelingless art, while spiritual teachers are afraid to use art as a spiritual weapon, or to appeal to high emotion by lofty means—though we encourage each other to stick at nothing whatever in the use of rhetoric.

Our present use of the word symbolism in fact extends to all ocular substitution of image for reality, in appeal to the imagination. When the carved or painted image is inadequate, either through weakness of the artist or greatness of the subject, his work becomes grotesque; and this term, though we have nothing to do with it here, applies to nearly all art-work done in the infancy of technical skill and knowledge.

Now the main drift of the Passion-spiel is to enforce by symbolic action the doctrines of incarnation and sacrifice. In spite of evil, man hopes for all things through the Lord's life and death,\* and he

\* We hope Mr. Swinburne may live to accept, in the central doctrine of the Incarnation, the fulfilment of the heathen appeal which he has set to perfect music of noble words in "Atalanta." (P. 51.)

"I would the wine of time, made sharp and sweet  
With multitudinous days and nights and tears  
And many mixing savours of strange years,  
Were no more trodden of them under feet,  
Cast out and spilt about their holy places;  
That life were given them as a fruit to eat,

[And

has had hope since the beginning of evil. That hope and its history is the centre of Christian symbolism. As a method of teaching, it has this advantage, that it cannot be obscured by controversy; and it labours for ever at the answer to the great question, *Cur Deus Homo?*—from the earliest paintings beneath the ruins of old Rome, to the multitudinous pageant of the German Highlands. The first painted lessons of man's hope are in the Catacombs; the Vine of sacrifice, and the Shepherd of his people, are its earliest signs. Then the mosaics of Ravenna take up the tale in their dumb language of glorious colour. There are the confessions of the faith of Placidia, and the half-converted Dietrich. There the Ostrogoth receives the Gospel as he may, from the half-scorned, half-venerated Byzantine. He wanes before the Lombard, and Arianism with him. A new life of strength and fierceness comes on art and on the faith. The garment of outworn civilization is sold, and the Lombard war-sword is in Christian hands, bought in exchange for it. The Scandinavian pupil of the Greek produces his couchant griffins and varied bas-reliefs at Verona and Pavia. And he drives the fugitives of Aquileia farther to sea, to their refuge at Torcello and Rio Alto; and Venice is built halcyon-fashion, on calm waters stilled for her sake—and all the history of the old dispensation and its fulfilment in the new begins to be inlaid on St. Mark's. Meanwhile Greek workmen preserve or extend the traditions of their art north and south of the Alps, preaching the faith in their own way, until as their torch sinks and goes out, its light springs up again in the early Renaissance of Pisa; and there, and at length in Florence, Christian art culminates and declines, going home, as it were, to Venice, to die with Tintoret and Veronese. In Roman Catholic art, no less than in other forms of Christianity, we see the convergence of the Christian mind on the central and primæval tradition of salvation in the life and death of God for man. Many additions to this faith the painters endured with patience, or at least in silence; but this was the faith they believed.

The main difference between the art-teaching of the Eastern or Primitive and the Western Churches seems to be this—that the first

And death to drink, like water; that the light  
Might ebb, drawn backward from their eyes, and night  
Hide for one hour the imperishable faces.  
That they might rise up sad in heaven, and know  
Sorrow and sleep, one paler than young snow,  
One cold as blight of dew and ruinous rain;  
Rise up and rest and suffer a little, and be  
Awhile as all things born with us, and we,  
And grieve as men, and like alain men be alain.  
For now we know not of them. . . ."

In our day, we may know of One "touched with all our infirmities, and in all points tempted like as we are."

dwells on the nature, office, and life of the Lord on earth; and the second insists more continually on the meaning and manner of his death. His sufferings are not represented either in the Catacomb paintings or on early sarcophagi,\* which leave Him where the Passion-play introduces Him, entering Jerusalem with the applauding people. Father Martigny (*"Dictionnaire des Antiq. Chrétiennes"*) passes a general sentence of condemnation on the crosses so frequently observed in the Catacombs, as, without exception, the work of pilgrims of later date; and places the public use of the cross in Rome as late as the fifth century. The only crucifix found in the early cemeteries is agreed, on all hands, to be of as late date as Adrian I. and Charlemagne. In the Ravenna mosaics the cross represents the person of the Lord, without sacrificial meaning, and is richly ornamented accordingly; and, in the earliest times, there is great difficulty in distinguishing its use from that of the monogram.

Nevertheless, there can be no doubt that the thought of Christ's death attached itself in the very earliest times to the decussated figure; and this is marked, in all probability, by a change of form in the monogram, about the end of the third century, when the upright cross takes the place of the decussated X, or is combined with it. What really connects the earlier symbolisms, carved or painted, with the Bavarian drama of action, is the sustained appeal which is made in both to the Old Testament as typical and confirmatory of the New, in St. Paulinus of Nola's sense. The appeal to the Hebrew Scriptures, begun by the Founder of Christianity, and taken up at once by his apostles, is continued, in their way, by the artists of the Christian sepulchres. His own comparisons of Himself to the Vine and the Good Shepherd are the earliest illustrated.†

It is quite probable that Pagan workmen may have been employed to paint them, in many instances. But the Christians would attach their own symbolic meaning to what might appear the ordinary floral decoration of a heathen tomb. The beautiful Vine-mosaic, with boys, in Sta. Constantia, at Rome (A.D. 320), closely resembles this painting in the Domitilla vault. It is given in woodcut in Mr. J. H. Parker's *"Mosaics of Rome and Ravenna,"* a work un-

\* See the works of Bottari, Aringhi, and De Rossi.

† This is confirmed by the impartial testimony of Dr. Theodore Mömmsen (see *CONTEMPORARY REVIEW*, May, 1871). He refers to the paintings of the cemetery called that of Flavia Domitilla, near SS. Achilles and Nereus on the Ardeatine Way. He has doubts as to the foundation of the burying-place in question by the grand-daughter of Vespasian; but still considers it the most ancient Christian sepulchre in Rome, and appears confident of the authenticity of its paintings—that is to say, that they are coeval with the building. The vine and boys gathering its grapes are worthy of the Augustan age.

fortunately out of print. Frequent adaptation of heathen imagery to Christian thought seems to have been one of the natural consequences of an age of persecution.

With the Vine and the Good Shepherd (in the Domitilla vault, and *passim* in the Catacombs) are found Noah in his ark with the dove, Daniel between the two lions, and an Agape with bread and fish. With these are associated, in the earliest known work, the fall and curse of Toil, the mattock given to Adam, and the distaff to Eve,\* the sacrifice of Isaac, the Rock of Moses, the translation of Elijah, Jonah, and Daniel, and the three children. The sacrifices of Abel and Melchisedeck are added to these in the later mosaics of Ravenna. S. Paulinus's list ("Pœmata," p. 641. Muratori, Verona, 1730) adds to these the history of Joseph and the passage of the Red Sea. Almost the only non-scriptural emblems are the anagrammatic fish; and the peacock, for the resurrection. The Dove, in all its meanings, palm, fish with the bread, the Lamb in both its senses, the stag, the four rivers, &c., are all from the Old or New Testaments. But neither at Rome nor at Ravenna is there any special reference, in the earliest work, to the manner of our Lord's death. His life and sacrifice are taken as one mystery, the one as part of the other. The private use of the cross, which may have taken place before Constantine, and its publication by that emperor, as a sign of the Lord's death (or rather, in the first instance, of baptism into his death), no doubt were the logical beginnings of a course which ended in the use of the crucifix. This was publicly enjoined at the end of the seventh century, at the Council in Trullo or Quinisext Council, which commanded that the literal or human form should be placed on the cross ἀντὶ τοῦ παλαίου ἀμύνου. Hitherto only the crowned lamb, bearing a cross, had been placed at the intersection of the Cross. There is no doubt that, in considering our redemption, its completing act and hour of fulfilment must for ever appeal to us creatures of the hour more strongly than the preparatory years of human life and sacrifice. The German Passion-play does no more than vividly represent this crisis of the world's history. Yet, for six centuries, the Church refused to do so, and though we rightly admit representations of the crucifixion into church windows and frescoes, there is no doubt that that is an innovation, however permissible. It should not be forgotten that the earliest crucifix in existence is probably the hideous Graffito of the Palatine,† or that the first known Christian representation of the crucifixion is

\* Hence probably "When Adam delved and Eve span."

† Mr. Parker's collection of photographs contains one of the Graffito *Blasfemo in situ*. It is accurately drawn in woodcut in Martigny's Dictionary, and described in Dr. Liddon's "Bampton Lectures," with references to Garucci.

the pathetically quaint and grim work of the Syrian monk Rabula, in 586.\*

In comparing the primitive art of Rome with that of Ravenna, one is struck by the obvious difference between art derived through Rome from ancient Greece, and the purely Christian work of the Adriatic city, wrought by Byzantine hands, and with Eastern splendour of colour. Beauty of form is scarcely aimed at, or is merely decorative (see, however, *infra*); but the principle of symbolic art-preaching is in full force. Until these great mosaics are copied in the same material, it is to be feared that a good idea cannot be obtained of them without a journey to Ravenna. They are distinguishable from those in St. Mark's at Venice by the subordination of the gold backgrounds to the most wonderful gradations of dark azure and green in the figures and decorations, which range in colour from the hues of deep sea and purple night to those of malachite and emerald. The high lights in all of them are put in boldly and precisely with golden tesserae, and white figures are introduced as freely as in the atrium of St. Mark's. Crimson and scarlets are more rarely used, and made *precious* in the work, as Mr. Ruskin says. The processions of male and female saints in St. Apollinare Nuova are a delightful illustration of this; and so many distressing photographs of them are in circulation, necessarily conveying ideas of utter gloom, blackness, and barrenness to the public, that we will vainly try to describe the glorious hues which deck those forgotten walls with the after-glow of the sunken Past.

The purple and white marble columns of the central aisle of the basilica support on each side a processional frieze in mosaic of male and female saints, ended on the male side with the Lord in Glory, a head and face of extreme beauty, though with something of the sadness of later and fallen art; on the female side, by an Adoration of the Magi exactly like some in the Roman Catacombs. All the figures are white-robed, and tread on emerald-green turf, separated from each other by upright palms bearing scarlet dates.† They are shod also with scarlet, and bear small crowns in their hands lined with the same colour. The background is of gold, not bearing a large proportion to the size of the figures; but above them are white single figures with ample golden spaces; and a third course of singular representations of New Testament subjects runs round just below the roof, with backgrounds of alternate gold and black; black,

\* This matchless MS. is in the Laurentian Library at Florence. See Asseman's Catalogue, tab. xxiii. p. 194. The miniature of the Crucifixion in it distinguishes it from all others by the detail of the soldiers, who are not casting dice for the coat without seam, but playing at the world-old game of "mora" on their fingers.

† The palm is used in Rome as in Ravenna: but the Eastern workmen seem always to insist on the fruit, which is generally omitted in Rome.

or the darkest purple, also prevailing, relieved with gold, in the roof.\* The splendid and jewelled effect of the whole is beyond praise, and its brilliant lightness makes it especially suitable to the dark aisles of a great city. We cannot but hope that it may find favour with the restorers of our metropolitan cathedral, where processions of figures must certainly be a part of the decorations, and reflected light will necessarily be a great object.

As has been said, the symbolism of the Ravenna church walls are similar in subject with those of the Catacombs, consisting both of emblematic objects, as lambs or palms, and of historic symbolic pictures of events. Birds are imitated with delightful realism in St. Vitale; but the Gothic energy is strongly repressed as yet by Byzantine rule and its languor; and non-symbolic or secular carvings are rarer than in the Catacombs—far more so than in the Veronese churches. The transition thither from Ravenna is the passage from Ostrogothic or semi-Byzantine art to the untamable vigour of the Lombard fancy. It is true, that knights on horseback, running stags, ducks, a grotesque head and legs, and a mermaid, bear witness to some Teutonic sculptor in St. Giovanni Evangelista at Ravenna; and the vestry of the same church contains a barbaric first attempt at an historical mosaic (of Theodoric's siege of Constantinople, and other profane and sacred subjects), which we take to be the most powerfully comic art-production in all the wide world. But in Verona, by the period of the older remaining work of the Duomo and St. Zenone, the descendants of Alboin† are at work in earnest. They make strong pupils in sculpture, and use hammer and chisel as energetically as axe and sword. Their love of war and chase is recorded on those ancient church-fronts, and their edition of the world-old symbol of the cherub or griffin.‡ But with all this they abide by the ancient symbolism of their new-found faith; and set the lamb bearing the cross on the keystone of the Duomo door-arch, with the Old and New Testament subjects in the bronze and marble of St. Zenone,

\* Giotto may have derived his taste for blue backgrounds, &c., from Ravenna. Nothing can be more interesting than to compare his lovely frescoes in the northern chapel of St. Apollinare Nuova with the mosaics of the nave.

† The chronicle of Paul the Deacon ("De Gestis Longobardorum") contains careful descriptions of the paintings and mosaics executed by Agilulf and Theodolinda. But as far back as the time of Alboin (with whom his great-grandfather had entered Italy) Paul speaks of his countrymen's progress in handicraft, especially, of course, in smiths' work and the making of weapons. One ancient specimen he has seen, of the greatest interest, but of the grimmest character; the goblet of Alboin, made from the ornamented skull of Cunimund.—*Gibbon*.

"Veritatem in Xto loquor, ego hoc poculum vidi Rachis (sic)  
manu tenentem, ut illud convivis suis ostentaret."

*De Gestis Longobardorum*, ii. 28, *Murator*.

‡ Cherub, γρῦψ, gryps. See Dr. Hayman's article; Smith's "Dictionary of the Bible."

type and antitype again and again repeated. Noah stands with the dove in his traditional chest or ark, as in the Catacombs; Adam and Eve are set to plough and distaff; the angel stays the hand of Abraham, armed to slay his son with a formidable straight Gothic sword; and the souls of the faithful come as fish to the hook, St. Zenone. And here the development or divergence of Western Art and religion in representing the manner of the Lord's death is fairly established, and the brazen serpent appears on a cross, with a human crucifix clothed and crowned. There is a similar one in the crypt of St. Zenone also. The Lombard as yet avoided the irreverence of over-realization, and preferred conventional or symbolic dealing even with the crucified form, as in the one just mentioned, and the famous cross of Lucca, where the Lord is robed and crowned as King and High-Priest. In after days, the Norman spirit of discipline and arrangement, scholastic logic and over-definition, was to turn this spirit of meditation on Christ's death into a spirit of inquiry about its nature and manner; we know not for what good, and we know for what evil. At the same time the ascetic spirit, considering bodily pain as sacramental, began to encourage meditation on the corporeal sufferings of the Redeemer, by means which inspire disgust rather than devotion in ordinary minds.

This still prevails both north and south of the Alps; but it is hardly noticeable in the Ammergau representation, which is, it must be repeated, doctrinal rather than sensational, and framed for popular teaching rather than excitement. Whatever the extravagances of the mediæval mysteries may have been, they were meant as a means of knowledge for the people. We know hardly anything of them except their abuses; but if this be a fair specimen of their Scriptural teaching—if people were then taught the typical connections between the Old and New Testament thus, by pictures in the absence of books, then all those among them who would learn were right well and widely taught. The rich and great would have their psalters and evangeliaries glowing with colour and vivid with miniature; but these acted pictures were the illuminations of the poor; and the poor require aid and teaching in our own times also. But what was before called *gradation* is applied at Ammergau as carefully to the representation of the bodily sufferings as it is to the acted realization of the characters. Judas and Caiaphas work out their parts vigorously, according to the received interpretation of their characters, while the representative of Christ uses no action, and scarcely any words, but those recorded in the Gospels. So, as to the bodily sufferings, the scourging was only suggested, ceasing the moment after the curtain rose on it. There were no repeated falls under the Cross, as in the Nuremberg and other bas-reliefs. In the scene of the Crucifixion all

the facts and action were simply Scriptural. The bodily pain was supposed, not acted or insisted on. With what seemed to us a great felicity of good taste, derived from reverential awe, the ancient half-symbolic treatment of early miniatures was revived in this scene. Sharp hammer-strokes were heard just before the curtain rose, and the Cross was raised immediately after; but the grouping then greatly resembled that of the Laurentine MS. and of some very early Crucifixions, executed in Germany, apparently by Eastern workmen. The apparently crucified Form was thickly clad in white fleshings, and the body slightly and conventionally marked with blood, so as to give the idea of one of the wayside crucifixes of Tyrol or Bavaria. The soldiers cast dice as in a MS.; just enough dialogue was assigned them to show unconscious indifference. The thieves were bound unpierced to Egyptian, or tau, crosses, according to the treatment of most early MSS. The blood from the Lord's hands and feet was dwelt on as it always is, both with sacramental reference and to recall the prophecy of Psalm xxii. 16. The Form uttered the "seven words from the Cross," and those words only; the only added detail was the entreaty of the Virgin-mother, that a bone of Him should not be broken. Of the horror and anatomical agonies of modern *quasi* religious art there were none. Perhaps, though the mind be fixed ever so attentively on the scene, the eyes cannot quite shut out the blue pines and green pastures of the Ammerthal, and the thoughts wander to the actors, and the seclusion which has preserved for us a scarcely adulterated fragment of middle-age piety. But both the realistic illusion and power of impression of the Ammergau Crucifixion are certainly less than those of a great picture. In the Crucifixion of Tintoret, for instance, the unity of the mighty master's conception prevails over all scenic realization, were it ever so startling; and the unknown power of composition, giving interest or beauty to every figure on the canvas, throws all the action and passion of the scene, backed by dim feeling of its greatness, on the spectator's mind at a glance. It seems to us that the Passion-spiel may have lost as well as gained by its recent improvements and amplifications. The hand of modern Munich is rather visible in the present *mise en scène* : \*

\* The colours used in some of the dresses appeared to us painfully raw and ill-matched, though in some (as St. John's) great pictures had been successfully followed. It was right, doubtless, that St. Mary Magdalene should wear a saffron robe; but the violent yellow need not have been opposed to dark green or blue.

late date. Even the *Ecce Homo* of Correggio seemed a strange association with a mystery of ancient days. The unchanging hills, and the solemn presence of their fir-woods, seemed a fit enough background. They were all as of old; but we almost wished for the ancient conduct of the scene, as if that too had been as solemn and as unchanging. Having eyes and notions much accustomed and attached to mosaic and MSS., and the ancient documents of Christian art, we would gladly have been reminded of them by the representations of the fall of Noah, of Abraham and Isaac, of Daniel and Jonah. Yet the representations were there, and the law and history of Israel were set forth once more to the people as fore-showing the Gospel. Each scene of the Passion was preceded by its typical scene from Hebrew history, expounded in recitative or choric hymn, with noble voices and modest gesture; and the argument was still the humanity of God for man's sake, to atone for and do away with evil. Its logical gist, so to speak, was exactly that of Bishop Wilson's first chapter on the Holy Communion, reasoning from the fall to sacrifice for sin, and from that to the conclusive sacrifice. And though their mediæval quaintness was gone (probably to most people's satisfaction), the silent tableaux of the Old Testament had a vigour and originality of their own. Some of the more crowded scenes, as the two of the brazen serpent, reminded us of the multitudinous pictures of ancient German art (to be seen in the galleries of Munich and Nuremberg), where the canvas is heaped with faces and expressions. They must have employed a very large part of the infant population of Ober-Ammergau; and the perfect success of all of them showed a combination of high training, discipline, and enthusiasm, which we must take leave to attribute (along with the general honesty and high character of these mountaineers) to genuine religious feeling. If not "taken out of the world," they seem, as far as man can see, to be kept from much of its evil.

No repetition or imitation of the play can ever be endured in our own time or country, nor indeed can it or ought it to be attempted or insinuated. Its great interest is as a relic of the belief and picturesque teaching of the middle ages, which used acted symbolism as well as painted or carved imagery, to impress history and doctrine on the people, when books and illuminations were only for the few. But we shall go to the middle ages, and they cannot return to us. Yet if we can never again make use of scenic illusion in the service of religion, a great opportunity is now offered us of nationally recognising art as the handmaid of religion; and defining, by example, the right use of mosaic and sculpture in the instructive decoration of St. Paul's Cathedral. These words are written very shortly after the news (to ourselves peculiarly sad and distressing) of

the death of him whom we can hardly yet call the late Dean. The ties of old pupilage at Oxford, and much kindness for many years on his part, excuse, and demand, some words of regret, even here, for a dead friend tenderly regarded; and perhaps one of the original contributors to this Review may be allowed in its pages a short tribute to another of them passed away. But those who knew him best may think with us, that the best tribute to a good man departed may be that his survivors take up his thoughts, like an unextinguished torch or a fallen banner, and carry his purposes on towards perfection. It may be said that the completion of his cathedral was the leading hope and wish of Dr. Mansel; exhausted with brain-labour, free from worldly cares, and cold to low ambitions. It remains to be seen how much or how little the British public cares for this work. Those who do care about the tradition, or handing down, of the Faith, will be anxious for, and glad to contribute to, a great pictorial Bible on those walls and vaultings which now stand naked and forlorn in gigantic barrenness, waiting for their clothing of thought and colour.

The highly commendable scheme now under consideration cannot be called hopeful, in spite of its merits, until it, or some other, has a decided prospect of being carried out. There are promises in Mr. Napier Broome's letter to the *Times* of mosaics of Old Testament histories in the nave cupolas, of the new dispensation in the choir, of the Redeemer in glory in the apse—as at St. Mark's and all Byzantine churches. May it be so; and may the purples and deep greens and glory of gradation to emerald and gold—may the pure whites and rare scarlets of Ravenna be remembered and repeated. They will be as suitable to the northern cathedral, dark with defect of light, as to the thick-walled and dim Italian temples, which are closed against excess of sunshine. And may the ancient symbolisms of the martyr-ages have their place, somewhere, and in their time and turn; bearing witness to all men that there really was a past, and that there really is a future, and that men have learnt, and will learn, the substance of the faith in both; the faith is true in both, foreshadowed and symbolized to the spiritual apprehension of high and low, if it cannot be realized to their sight or thought. Few men can pass under the illuminated Bible-histories of St. Mark's without a new inner sense of the unity of the Christian faith. That was taught thus in the principal temple of Venice, the emporium of the mediæval world. It remains to be seen if the merchant princes of the nineteenth century, and the millions whose trade they represent, will also attempt, in their great church, this form of teaching. Much may depend, to them and England, in their decision on this matter.

R. ST. JOHN TYRWHITT.



### “THE BLOODY MACKENZIE.”

AMONG those persecutors of the Covenanters, whose names are mentioned “with a peculiar energy of hatred wherever the Scottish race is found on the surface of the globe,”\* the subject of our paper has long held a place of especial abhorrence. “What, sir, wad ye speak to me,” said Davie Deans, when a neighbour had suggested a youthful relative of Mackenzie as a suitable lawyer to take up poor Effie’s plea, “about a man that has the blood of the saints at his fingers’ ends? Didna his eme (uncle) die and gang to his place wi’ the name of the Bluidy Mackenyie? and winna he be kenned by that name sae lang as there’s a Scots tongue to speak the word?” In confirmation of this grim prophecy, we need only refer to two testimonies—one of them again from Sir Walter Scott, who by no means exaggerates the popular feeling against the memory of these men. But turn to that wonderful story in “Redgauntlet,” supposed to be told so late as this century, about the tenant who swore he would go to hell to see his savage old laird, and suddenly found himself in a great hall amid the ghastly revellers, now, as of old, “birling the red wine and speaking blasphemy and sculduddry” after a day of persecution. “There was the fierce Middleton, and the dissolute Rothes, and the crafty Lauderdale; and Dalzell, with his bald head and a beard to his girdle; and Earlishall, with

\* Lord Macaulay.

Cameron's blude on his hand; and wild Bonshaw, that tied blessed Mr. Cargill's limbs till the blood sprang; and Dunbarton Douglas, the twice-turned traitor baith to country and king; and Claverhouse, as beautiful as when he lived, with his long, dark, curled locks, streaming down over his laced buff coat;" and, prominent among the doomed ghosts, "there was the bluidy Advocate Mackenzie, who, for his worldly wit and wisdom, had been to the rest as a god." But we need not go to books, either of fiction or history. Sir George Mackenzie's tomb in the Greyfriars churchyard of Edinburgh is a gloomy structure of stone, erected by him in his lifetime, surmounted by a ponderous cupola, and shut in by a massive door, locked and barred. At the present day, as for generations back, the boys of the old town of Edinburgh (those of them especially whose parents are connected with the moorland districts of Scotland), hold it a feat of daring to go to the persecutor's tomb as the gloaming darkens into night, and with trembling lips and feet prepared for instant flight, to shout through the key-hole the quaint and horrible adjuration—

"Lift the sneck and draw the bar,  
Bluidy Mackenyie, come out an ye daur!" \*

Now who was this man, buried for centuries under the execration of a whole people? He was, as a political adversary, but a wise judge and a most candid contemporary observer,† confessed, "the brightest Scotsman of his time." Even Dryden, at the summit of his fame, avowed that his poetic efforts and successes were originated by the conversation of "that noble wit of Scotland, Sir George Mackenzie."‡ He was an eminent lawyer, in the great age of the lawyers of a nation which has always been governed by its lawyers; and his institutional works are to this day of high authority in the jurisprudence of Scotland. He was not only a lawyer, but a reformer of the law, and he claims, with justice, that the changes in its administration which he procured were in the direction of protecting the rights of the subject and of the accused against the influence of the Crown and the Bench. Lastly, we shall be able to prove that this alleged persecutor was anything but a bigot; that he was imbued with large and latitudinarian principles in all matters relating to religion; that these principles had the strongest influence over himself personally, and were the rule and guide of his whole public course; and, in particular, that they had the closest connection with those political measures against the Presbyterians which he originated as a minister of the Crown, or carried into execution as public prosecutor.

\* Anglice:—

"Lift the latch and draw the bar,  
Bloody Mackenzie, come out if you dare."

† Lord Fountainhall.

‡ "Discourse on Satire."

Sir George Mackenzie of Rosehaugh was born in 1636, a son of the Laird of Lochslin, near Tain, of the powerful family of Seaforth. In his tenth year he had become "master of his grammar and of all the common classic authors," at Dundee; in his sixteenth he had finished his studies in Greek and philosophy at Aberdeen and St. Andrews, and for three years more he read civil law at Bourges, then "the Athens of lawyers." It is unnecessary to trace his professional success and eminence. In 1661 he was already counsel for the great Marquis of Argyll on his trial for treason, and met the reproof of the bench for the freedom of his defence with the bold and true rejoinder, "That it is impossible to plead for a traitor without speaking treason." When the famous quarrel between the Faculty of Advocates and the Supreme Court, before which they practised, took place, and the former, banished by royal command from Edinburgh, emigrated to Linlithgow, as to a *Mons Sacer* over against their forsaken halls, Sir George, now King's Advocate, cast in his lot with his brethren, but appeared alone before the incensed tribunal, and successfully urged an amnesty in an address still preserved, concluding with the words, "Oblige in this your native country, who miss us, as ye know; oblige in this your law, that needs such instruments, especially in its infancy." From 1677 to the revolution, with a very short break, he was Lord Advocate and a member of the Privy Council of Scotland, and the year after his appointment he published his "Laws and Customs of Scotland in Matters Criminall," which became the manual of criminal law in Scotland for a hundred and thirty years. But some parts of his legal writings have a more general interest, and among these we may reckon his "*Idea Eloquentiæ Forensis Hodiernæ*," and a corresponding treatise in English on "What Eloquence is fit for the Bar." It appears that at the first institution of the Scotch College of Justice it was appointed by an Act of that body (half of whom were Churchmen), that "All argunning (which term was used in that age for arguing) should be *sylogisticè*, and not *rhetoricè*:" a regulation against which the King's Advocate defends "the auguster and more splendid manner of debating which is now used." His arguments are not very convincing, though there is something in his advice to "my friends who *begin* to speak, first to study fluency, and when they are arrived at a consistency there, they may easily refine the large stock they have laid together." But the following passage is curious:—

"It may seem a paradox to others, but to me it appears undeniable, that the Scottish idiom of the British tongue is more fit for pleading than either the English idiom or the French tongue; for certainly a pleader must use a brisk, smart, and quick way of speaking; whereas the English, who are a grave nation, use a too slow and grave pronunciation, and the French a too soft and effeminate one. And, therefore, I think the English is fit for

haranguing, the French for complimenting, but the Scots for pleading. Our pronunciation is like ourselves, fiery, abrupt, sprightly and bold: their greatest wits, being employed at court, have indeed enriched very much their language as to conversation; but all ours bending themselves to study the law, the chief science in repute with us, hath much smoothed our language as to pleading. And when I compare our law with the law of England, I perceive that our law favours more pleading than theirs does; for their statutes and decisions are so full and authoritative, that scarce any case admits pleading, but (like an hare killed in the seat) 'tis immediately surprised by a decision or a statute."

"For my own part," says Mackenzie, in conclusion, "I pretend to no bays; but shall think myself happy in wanting, as the fame, so the envy which attends eloquence; and I think my own imperfections sufficiently repaid by fate, in that it has reserved me for an age wherein I heard, and daily hear, my colleagues plead so charmingly, that my pleasure does equal their honour."

And this brings us to notice, in passing, the celebrated "characteres" of some of his contemporaries by Mackenzie, with which Boswell beguiled Johnson's leisure in distant Dunvegan. Some of these are exceedingly pithy—for example, his description of the great feudal lawyer Craig, whose learning and authority made him independent of eloquence, and "trunco, non frondibus, effecit umbram;" Hope, who when he proposed an argument or objection, "rationem addebat, et ubi dubia videbatur, rationis rationem;" Lockhart, that "corpus alterum juris civilis;" and young Gilmour, "pecuniæ contemptor famæ avarus;" the elder Gilmour, whose massive common-sense, without learning, made him seem "jura potius ponere quam de jure respondere," and who, like another Hercules, "nodosa et nulla arte perpolitata clava adversarios prostravit; sine rhetorica eloquens, sine literis doctus;" while Nisbet, the King's Advocate immediately before Mackenzie, had exactly the opposite qualities, so that when Gilmour and he contended, "penes Gilmorum gloria, penes Nisbetum palma fuit, quoniam in hoc plus artis et cultus, in illo plus naturæ et virium." But perhaps Mackenzie's best legal monument is the Advocate's Library of Edinburgh, an institution over the origination of which he carefully watched, and at whose opening, in 1689, he, as Dean of Faculty, delivered a quaint and stately Latin oration. It has since risen to be one of the few great libraries in Britain; but not all who have enjoyed its advantages have remembered to whom they owed the opulent leisure, close to the din of the forum, amid which we pen these lines—"nobis hæc otia fecet." He claims for it the title of the first existing library of law, and urges the advantages of possessing in common, "as was the manner in the age of gold," all the books which could aid or illustrate that jurisprudence which they venerate as Queen of the Sciences, from the reported judgments of the Bench—"veras illas et immortales judicium imagines"—up to the civil law itself, "quod cælo potius quam Romæ debemus."

But enough of him as a lawyer. When he was only twenty-four years old he published his "Aretina," or "Serious Romance," "wherein he gave a very bright specimen of a gay and exuberant genius." This is not included in the two folio volumes of his works which were published about 1716, but certain poems are, the chief of which, "Cælia's Country House and Closet," is serious rather than romantic, and *ennuyéux* above all. But what Sir George valued himself upon as much as upon any of his public acts, was his Moral Essays, some of them written in his youth, others composed, or at least published, in his age, and giving (the former at least) a very fair insight into the man. One of the most artificial of these was published in 1665—"A Moral Essay: preferring Solitude to Public Employment, and all its Appanages, such as Fame, Command, Riches, Pleasures, Conversation, &c." It is, as might be expected, addressed to Celadon, quotes the seraphic Mr. Boyle, and perhaps the best thing in it is the motto on the title-page, which gives the response of the Shunamite woman of quality to the question of the Hebrew courtier, "Wouldst thou be spoken for to the king, or to the captain of the Host? And she said, I dwell among mine own people." His biographer quaintly intimates that this was written "in that great man's youth, when he was free from business," and that the dislike to public employment did not survive his advancement, after which "his thoughts and studies were wholly taken up in the service of his king and country." It is quite clear, however, that a half-stoic, half-epicurean self-restraint was the ideal which Mackenzie had set before himself in youth, and that this doctrine was not without influence on his public conduct. In 1667, he published a much pithier treatise, on "Moral Gallantry," "a discourse—wherein the author endeavours to prove that *point of honour* (abstracting from all other ties) obliges men to be virtuous, and that there is nothing so mean (or unworthy of a gentleman) as vice." This, afterwards the argument of Steele's "Christian Hero," fell very appropriately to the Scotch cavalier lawyer, one of whose most careful quasi-legal works is on the science of heraldry, which he took up because "I found it looked upon abroad as the science of gentlemen," and the concluding sentence of which is worth quoting as the quintessence of this feeling:—

"Thus have I, for the honour and satisfaction of my country, interrupted so far the course of my ordinary studies at spare hours; . . . and as it is much nobler to raise a science than to be raised by it, so having writ this book as a gentleman, I design as little praise or thanks, as I would disdain all other rewards."

The Discourse on Point of Honour is dedicated to "the dissolute Rothés," with the boundless flatteries of the time; but is preceded

by an address to the nobility and gentry, in which the author claims to have "lighted this, though the smallest and dimmest of Virtue's torches, at Honour's purest flame," while in a third prefatory statement of his design, he apologises in the most curious way for his undertaking:—

"I find that it is a part of my employment, as a man and a Christian, to plead for virtue against vice; and really, as a barrister, few subjects will employ more my invention, or better more my unlaboured eloquence, than this can do. And I find that, both by writing and speaking moral philosophy, I may contract a kindness for virtue; seeing such as repeat a lie with almost any frequency do at last really believe it."

To the Earl of Rothes he says he designs these to be his last words in print; but they are succeeded by "A Moral Paradox, maintaining that it is much easier to be virtuous than vicious," dedicated appropriately enough to one of the honourable members of the Royal Society, and ending with the sentence "Adieu for ever to writing." Unfortunately, however, a certain "Consolation against Calumnies" is subjoined also to this discourse, "because of the contingency of the subjects;" but this does at last come to an end, and closes with what he calls elsewhere "my beloved verse"—

"Hi motus animorum, atque hæc certamina tanta,  
Pulveris exigui jactu, compressa quiescunt."

Many years passed, and Mackenzie, after serving Charles II. and James II., and in vain defending the latter in the Scots Parliament against its downright declaration of forfeiture of the Crown, retired in dread of assassination to Oxford, and was admitted in a congregation of Regents in June, 1690, to study in the public library. He survived only a year; but here he published one or two works which need not detain us, a "Moral History of Frugality," dedicated to the University, and an "Essay on Reason," which gained more reputation. It is dedicated to the Hon. Robert Boyle, "as a token of our friendship," and immediately on its being published at London in 1690, attracted the attention of the learned Grævius, who "put a preface to it, and published it in Latin at Utrecht the same year, under this title, *De Humanæ Rationis Imbecillitate*." There is nothing very striking in it, however, except some sentiments on bigotry, which we shall presently notice, and a spirited argument in defence of the position, "I know no greater enemy to just thought or reasoning than railery and satyrs, and the new way of reasoning, ridiculous similies." There is, he grants, a justice in "scourging, defaming, and banishing vice; and this jurisdiction is given by heaven immediately to such as have sense." But wit is a salt, and should be used "plentifully in conversation, moderately in business, but never in religion," the use of it there having, he thinks, a close

connection with bigotry. It may be feared that Sir George, in his old age, safe in the peaceful halls of Oxford from the distant execration of his Whig and Presbyterian foes, was more sensitive to the few personal sarcasms which penetrated his retreat than to the reasonings or the wrath, both of which he had always been ready to confront.

But by far the ablest of Mackenzie's books, and the one also which throws most light on his private sentiments and public career, is his "*Religio Stoici*," published in 1663. The title reminds one of Sir Thomas Browne; and not the title alone. The quaintness of the first words, "Albeit man be but a statue of dust kneaded with tears, moved by the hidden engines of his restless passions," suggests an inferior imitation of the same model, and no one who has ever reverentially studied the "*Hydriotaphia*" or the "*Religio Medici*" can be at a loss to know whom the following sentences by Sir George recall:—

"That brain hath too little *pia mater*, that is too curious to know, why God who evidences so great a desire to save poor man, did yet suffer him to fall."

"Albeit the glass of my years hath not yet turned five-and-twenty, yet the curiosity I have to know the different limbos of departed souls, and to view the card of the region of death, would give me abundance of courage to encounter this king of terrors, though I were a Pagan; but when I consider what joys are prepared for them that fear the Almighty, and what craziness attends such as sleep in Methusalem's cradle, I pity them who make long life one of the ofttest repeated petitions of their *Pater Noster*."

The author's design in this discourse he states to be "this one principle, that speculations in religion are not so necessary, and are more dangerous than sincere practice. *It is in religion, as in heraldry, the simpler the bearing be, it is so much the purer and the ancienter.*" The sentiment of this admirable comparison he expounds throughout his treatise, and particularly in "*The Stoic's Friendly Address to the Fanatics of all Sects and Sorts*," which precedes the treatise itself.

"I am none of those who acknowledge no temples, besides those of their own heads. And I am of opinion that such as think they have a church within their own breasts, should likewise believe their heads are steeples, and so should *provide them with bells*. I believe that there is a Church militant, which, like the ark, must lodge in its bowels, all such as are to be saved from the flood of condemnation: but to chalk out its borderings lines, is beyond the geography of my religion. He was infallible who compared God's spirit to the wind that bloweth where it listeth: we hear the sound of it, but know not whence it comes or whither it goeth. And the name graven on the white stone none knows but he who hath it."

"Most of all Christians," he says, in his chapter of the strictness of churches, "do, like coy maids, lace their bodies so strait that they bring on them a consumption;" but—

“Since discretion opened my eyes, I have always judged it necessary for a Christian to look oftener to his practice of piety than to confession of faith; and to fear more the crookedness of his will, than the blindness of his judgment; delighting more to walk on from grace to grace, thus working out the work of his own salvation with fear and trembling, than to stand still with the Galileans, curiously gazing up into heaven.”

Few writers are more severe than he whom his countrymen have called “the bloody Mackenzie” against all persecution for the sake of truth; nor can there be any doubt of his sincerity in this.

“Opinion,” he argues, “kept within its own proper bounds, is a pure act of the mind; and so it would appear that to punish the body for that which is a sin of the soul, is as unjust as to punish one relation for another. . . . Matters of religion and faith resemble some curious pictures and optic prisms, which seem to change shapes and colours, according to the several stances from which the aspicient views them. . . . God (who loves us all infinitely better than any one of us doth another) leaves us, upon our own hazard, a freedom in our choice; albeit we poor miscreants compel each other, denying to our fellow-creatures that freedom which He allows all the creation.”

A few of these sentences almost remind one of the more sceptical utterances of the school of Hobbes; but, as a general rule, Mackenzie is quite orthodox, and the positions he takes up might very well be those of an earnest Churchman of those days, with a scheme of comprehension added on to his earnestness. It is not so much the positions he adopts, as the tone of the whole, that makes it clear to the reader that there was not very much earnestness in the matter, and, in particular, not much earnestness about truth. The “stoical indolency” which he admires and claims, is certainly here along with Christian charity; and the other title which he gives to his book, “*The Virtuoso*” in religion, hits off exactly the freedom from that personal subjection to truth, that absolute obligation to obey it in all its details, which characterized the other or Puritan side. The whole legislation of Mackenzie’s country is characterized, since the Reformation, by the absolute authority which it ascribed to religious truth, and by the assumption that a body or organic whole of truth can be found in Scripture—two positions which our lawyer avoids admitting, but does not attempt to deny. But, he says—

“Albeit the knowledge and acknowledgment of a God, be the basis of true Stoicism, and a firmer one than any the heathens could pretend to, yet that knowledge of Him which, by the curiosity of schoolmen, and the bigotry of tub preachers, is now formed in a body of Divinity, is of all others the least necessary and the most dangerous;”

and that, as he goes on to explain, not because the existing theology was false or mischievous, but because theology itself is a superfluous thing for the people in general, and for the pulpit. The pulpit, of course, in the country of Knox, was Mackenzie’s greatest

enemy; and his speculations upon it are quite prophetic of that severe legislation of which he was afterwards the chief promoter.

"Nothing hath more busied my thoughts than to find a reason why the heathens, who were as assiduous, and zealous too, in the worship of their gods as we Christians, did never frequent sermons, nor know no such part of Divine service; whereof probably the reason was because their governors (whose commands amongst them were the sole *jure-divino-ship* of all ecclesiastical rites) feared that Churchmen, if they had been licensed to harangue to the people, would have influenced too much that gross body; which was the reason likewise why, in the Primitive Church (as one of their historians observes), *ex formula populo prædicabant, tantum antiquitas timebat δημογωγους*. They preached only approved sermons, so much did antiquity fear those leaders of the people—a practice, it is reported, lately renewed by the Duke of Russia. And this seemeth also to have been the reason why all liturgies have picked texts for their preachers, lest, if they had been left a freedom in their choice, they had chose such as might in the letter have suited best with such seditious libels as are now obtruded on the people, in lieu of pious homilies at remarkable or festive occasions."

That political considerations such as these had much to do with the Conventicle Acts, and other detestable statutes of the time in Scotland, there can be no doubt, any more than there can be of the frequent turbulence and violence of the pulpit. But it is still more instructive to trace the deeper ground of opposition between the two schools. Then, as afterwards, the pulpit was the chief organon by which the rugged-minded peasantry of Scotland were taught to think; but even this characteristic was distasteful to those now rising into power.

"Among all the innovations introduced by our infant divines, I hate none more than that of giving reasons for proving the doctrine, which being Scripture itself, can be proved by nothing that is more certain. As for instance, where the doctrine is, *that God loved us freely*, how can this be proved more convincingly than thus, *my text says it?* And that is *idem per idem*, a most unlogical kind of probation. When I then go to church I should love to spend my time in praises and prayers"—

in which also, unfortunately, the Presbyterians show an unnecessary earnestness and length, and "screech like Baal's priests, as if God were no nearer to them than the visible heavens."

A religious stoic is not necessarily much of a Churchman, and a religious virtuoso may be very little of one. But the road which Sir George Mackenzie took to being so is a very intelligible one.

"I have travelled no further in theology than a Sabbath-day's journey, and, therefore, it were arrogance in me to offer a map of it to the credulous world. But if I were worthy to be consulted in these spiritual securities, I should advise every private Christian rather to stay still in the barge of the Church, with the other disciples, than by an ill-bridled zeal to hazard drowning alone with Peter, by offering to walk upon the unstable surface of his own fleeting and water-weak fancies, though with a pious resolution to meet our Saviour."

And the very next sentence shows that the position thus taken by our author differs *toto caelo* from that originally held by all the

Reformed Churches, and emphatically by his own stubborn countrymen. Scotland has always been an ecclesiastical country, and rather an intolerant one; yet, age after age, nothing there draws down deeper contempt and condemnation than the renouncing or suppressing of individual opinion in order to conform to a Church majority or creed. In Mackenzie's time, and before it, many a man must have done this; but no man ever confessed it, or regarded the imputation as other than one of scoundrelism. The following utterance by Sir George Mackenzie would have made Knox and his compeers turn in their graves, could they have read it:—

“Albeit, one may be a real Christian, and yet differ from the Church, which says, that the wise men who came to bow before our Saviour's cradle-throne were three kings, and in such other opinions as these wherein the fundamentals of faith and quiet of the Church are no ways concerned; yet certainly he were no wise man himself, nor yet sound Christian, who would not, even in these, bow the flag of his private opinion to the commands of the Church. The Church is our mother, and therefore we should wed no opinion without her consent who is our parent; or if we have rashly wedded any, it is in the power of the Church and her officials to grant us a divorce.”

Twenty years of the boot and gallows could not make the opposition of Scotland to these doctrines more deadly and irreconcilable than it was when they were first uttered. At the same time it is quite clear from them that Mackenzie's aversion to persecution *for the sake of truth* was abundantly sincere. What is not as yet equally clear is, whether he was opposed to persecution *for the sake of conformity*.

But other passages in the “Religious Stoic” leave no doubt on this point, and they are by far the most interesting in a historical point of view. Thus in an interesting passage on the variety of opinions of Churches:—

“It is remarkable, that albeit infallibility be not by all conceded to any militant Church, yet it is assumed by all; neither is there any Church under the sun which would not fix the name of heretic, and account him (almost) reprobate, who would refuse to acknowledge the least rational of their principles; and thus these Churchmen pull up the ladders from the reach of others, after they have scaled the walls of preferment themselves. . . . The fanatic believes the Lord's Supper but a ceremony, though taken with very little outward respect; the Presbyterian allows it, but will not kneel; the Episcopist kneels, but will not adore it; the Catholic mixeth adoration with his kneeling. And thus most of all religions are made up of the same elements, albeit their asymbolic qualities predomine in some more than in others. And if that maxim hold, that *magus et minus non variant speciem*, we may pronounce all of them to be one religion.

“The Church, like the river Nilus, can hardly condescend where its head lies, and as all condescend that the Church is a multitude of Christians, so join all their opinions, and you shall find that they will have it to have, like the multitude, many heads. *But in this, as in all articles not absolutely necessary for being saved, I make the laws of my country to be my creed.*”

This is perhaps the most significant statement in the treatise, and it is not surprising to find the author start a little at the sound he has made, and in the following "Postscript" to the last chapter attempt to explain it away into ambiguity.

"By the *laws of this country* the author means that religion which is settled by law. In other respects the author recommends himself to the gloss of the reader's charity."

This explanation—the only touch of positive disingenuousness in this able tractate—was of course useless to mitigate the condemnation which the original proposition drew down. There has never been a time in Scotland in which even the amended proposition, that in matters of less importance "I make the religion settled by law *to be my creed*," would not be received with loathing and indignation. The other formula, "I make the laws of my country to be my creed," is a little more naked and offensive in expression; but the moral objection to both is precisely the same, and the putting into express propositions the suggestions already made (of suppressing or dissembling personal belief at the bidding of authority) fixed a gulf as deep as hell between this youthful Scotchman, the brightest of his time, and the whole mass of his countrymen. The real importance of the phrase about "the laws of my country" was that the men in the court of Charles II., who were beginning to use such phrases, and who honestly hated persecuting either themselves or others for the sake of truth, were now in power. And there was just such a chance that they might be disposed to make the laws of their country the creed not only of themselves, but of their unfortunate fellow-subjects.

We have already seen that Mackenzie deprecates persecution, and that not only because it is or when it is for the sake of truth. In the "Stoic's Address to the Fanatics" he points out with much wit the *uselessness* of this way of compelling others for their good.

"I am apt to believe that, if laws and lawgivers did not make heretics vain, by taking too much notice of their extravagancies, the world should be no more troubled with these than they are with the chimeras of alchemists and philosophers. And it fares with them, as with tops, which, how long they are scourged, keep foot and run pleasantly, but fall how soon they are neglected and left to themselves. . . . *Albeit, I confess, when these not only recede from the canonized creed of the Church, but likewise encroach upon the laws of the State, then, as of all others they are the most dangerous, so of all others they should be most severely punished.*"

A man who defines a heretic to be one whose opinions may be not only sincere *but true*, but who will not suppress them in favour of the religion settled by law, and who follows this up by a declaration that such heretics should be most severely punished, has already sown the seeds of what the unimpassioned Hallam calls the "thirty infamous years that completed the misfortunes and degradation of

Scotland."\* But it appears to me that a great characteristic of the religious oppressions of which Charles II.'s Advocate has always been held the mainspring, has been somewhat overlooked. Up to this time there had been persecutions in Scotland, for the sake of religion, on both sides. But they were, or professed to be, persecutions for the sake of truth, and the most sacred of all names was abused by the sword and the axe being used in its defence. Now for the first time there was risk of a religious state tyranny, in which the actors were infidels in the opinions which they forced upon others. And it remained to be seen whether the intolerance of indifference would be more tolerable than the intolerance of conscience.

Sir George Mackenzie long afterwards published a "Vindication of the Government in Scotland," the comparison of which with his early Stoical Essay is invaluable. The Vindication opens with the statement, that "the civil government in Scotland was never bigot in that king's reign," and on that account he thinks it unnecessary to consider either Episcopacy or Presbytery in themselves, neither of them having been held to be *Jure Divino*. We are inclined to think that the claim he here puts forward is a true one; nor perhaps is the other assertion which he goes on to make false, that "the governors for the time can truly and boldly say that no man in Scotland ever suffered for his religion." It was not of religious opinions entertained in secret that the Government was afraid, it was the honest and open profession of them that it sought to crush. Mackenzie, indeed, had put the thing exceedingly well in his early treatise—"Stoic's Address to the Fanatics") :—

"As every private Christian should be tolerated by his fellow-subjects to worship God inwardly according to his conscience, so should all conspire in that exterior uniformity of worship which the laws of his country enjoin. . . . That traveller were absurd who would rather squabble with those among whom he sojourns, than observe those rites and customs which are required by the laws of the places where he lives."

Of course, to persecute for inward opinion, or worshipping inwardly, is a pure impossibility. No man can do it, and no man ever tried to do it. All that can be done by the most relentless, is to insist on outward dissembling of belief, or suppression of belief, or "exterior uniformity of worship," and if this is enjoined by the laws, and failure in it punished by them, it matters little whether the State is bigot enough to believe in the sacredness of the worship it commands, or lax enough to hold it sacred only because it is commanded. Which of these was the case in Scotland during the evil days of the last two Stuarts? On this point we shall call no

\* "No part, I believe, of modern history for so long a period, can be compared for the wickedness of government to the Scots Administration of this reign."—*Constitutional History of England*, ch. xvii.

other witness than the official apologist of the Government itself, in the carefully composed Vindication which he printed after the Revolution of 1688.

After the Restoration, he says, "the Parliament of Scotland being called, enquired very seriously into the occasion of such disorders" (those during the Commonwealth), "and soon found that they were all to be charged upon the Solemn League and Covenant, and those who adhered thereto"—those who signed it including most of the members of the Parliament itself, as well as the king—"and therefore they endeavoured to persuade the Presbyterians to disown the Covenant, all favour being promised to them *on that condition.*"

"But finding that the Presbyterians generally thought themselves bound to own the Covenant, the Parliament, concluding that the same men, owning the same principles, would be ready upon occasion to act over the same things, *therefore* they, by vote (which may be called unanimous, seeing only four or five dissented), *restored Episcopacy*, and that so much the rather because *that government* had in no age nor place forced its way into the State by the sword, *but had still been brought in by the uncontroverted magistrate*, without ever thrusting itself in by violence. *And yet the Government did sustain Episcopacy as a part of the State, but never as a hierarchy wholly independent from it.*"

He goes on to tell how the Presbyterians still frequenting their conventicles, the State forbade all above five to meet at worship in a house; and when they, to evade this, met in the open air, the State forbade this also, ultimately under the penalty of death—all carrying out the "exterior uniformity of worship" which is lawful for a State to enforce, while respecting the free exercise of conscience in the individual heart or the private family. We may leave it to constitutional historians to criticise the very disreputable transaction glossed over in the paragraph last quoted: all that it is necessary now to point out is that Episcopacy was confessedly brought in as a piece of State machinery, and not as a matter of conscience.\* Sir George Mackenzie indicates this, and he may be very fully believed. Had it been a question as to Charles I. and Laud, there might be more doubt. But neither Charles II. nor the set of singularly unprincipled men who formed his Privy Council in Scotland—Mackenzie in many ways the most respectable of them all—need be supposed to have cared more upon the subject than they professed to do. A religion which could be "brought in by the magistrate," and which could be patronised by men in power as "part of the State," but without their accepting any burden of duty or conscience

\* The doctrine of the Episcopal was identical with that of the Presbyterian Church. Even "the way of worship in our Church," as Mackenzie says in his Vindication, "differed nothing from what the Presbyterians themselves practised (except only, that we used the Doxology, the Lord's Prayer, and in Baptism the Creed, all of which they rejected); we had no ceremonies, surplice, altars, or cross in baptism." The change was made purely for the purpose of subordinating and overruling the Church.

from it, was in every way the best for them. It was easy for them to "make it their creed;" but it came to be a very hard matter for Scotland.

Besides, we are not left to Mackenzie's testimony, sufficient and conclusive as that is. The statute itself, "Restoring the ancient order of bishops," frankly takes the bull by the horns, and attacks in its preamble that Church independence which the Presbyterians held sacred. There is no pretence of referring the question to the Church itself. On the contrary, "Forasmuch as the ordering and disposal of the external government and policy of the Church doth properly belong unto his Majestie, as an inherent right of the Crown, by virtue of his royal prerogative and supremacy in causes ecclesiastical," therefore, "in discharge of this trust," the change is ordered. No one knew better than Mackenzie that the Presbyterians held organic changes made in the Church by external authority to be unlawful, or indeed to be null and void; and that the Church's liberty in this respect had been again and again recognised in Scotland by Acts of Parliament. On this last point the enactment itself is conclusive, for it goes on to "Rescind, cass, and annull all Acts of Parliament by which the sole and only power and jurisdiction within this Church doth stand in the Church, and in the general, provincial, and Presbyterial assemblies and kirk-sessions; and all Acts of Parliament or Council which may be interpreted to have given any Church power, jurisdiction, or government to the office-bearers of the Church, or their respective meetings, other than that which acknowledgeth a dependance upon, and subordination to, the sovereign power of the King as supreme." And the first statute of Charles's second Parliament was devoted to a formal reasserting of the royal supremacy over the Church. No conception can be formed of the systematic and deliberate tyranny of the time ensuing, unless we advert to this statutory foundation of all the acts of administration. It was a cruel thing to force multitudes of Scotch peasants who were weak enough, as Mackenzie asserts, to believe in the *Jus Divinum* of Presbytery, into conformity against their conscience, and to do it by fines and executions. But even those Scotchmen who might not believe in the *Jus Divinum* of either form, believed earnestly in the sole right and duty of the Church itself to choose the form. Consequently, most of them held conformity to the new system to be sinful, not merely because of any odiousness of that system itself, but because also of the unlawful authority by which it was imposed. But this was the very bribe by which the Scotch Privy Council was induced to impose it. They introduced the system, not although it was tyrannical to do so, but *because it was tyrannical*. Of course, Episcopacy is in its own nature no more tyrannical than Presbytery; and in practice it has often been found to be less so.

But on this occasion in history it was introduced by the civil power as a "part of the State," with no statutory pretence of consulting either the Church or the people, and with the scarcely disguised purpose of thus bringing the exercise of private judgment in Church matters under the edge of the civil and criminal law.

And this was but the first step. Mackenzie, though he explains and defends it, had probably less to do with it than with the subsequent legislation. There can be no doubt that he was connected with the Acts of Parliament on the subject of religion which crowd the statute-book from this date, not only as the King's Advocate who enforced, but as the draughtsman who prepared, or at least as one of the council who passed them. The "Bloody Advocate" has been hitherto hated as the too-willing tool of the arbitrary Government he served. We shall afterwards give some reasons for thinking that he may have been harshly judged in this respect. But it has been forgotten that he was probably the contriver, as well as the administrator, of these infamous measures. And he was so, we cannot doubt, on the same ground of enlightened latitudinarianism and hatred of the bigotry of private judgment. Thus, shortly after the bishops were appointed, the Presbyterian ministers already ordained were ordered to seek institution at their hands. Three or four hundred left their manses, rather than thus deny their previous vocation, and the country was filled with mourning and dismay. The outed men were forbidden at once to preach under penalties of "sedition." The people were forbidden to hear them. Men, whose character and attainments are described by their own bishops as generally contemptible, hastily succeeded them; and a law was passed forcing the people to come to their churches. The people refused; and were fined ruinously, and dragoons quartered upon them till the fines were paid. It was made incumbent upon all, under pain of banishment or imprisonment, to reveal whom they had seen at a conventicle. Abjuration, not only of the Covenant, but of the independence of the Church in ecclesiastical causes, was demanded of all under severe penalties. Every curate was ordered by statute to keep a list of non-conformists; every sheriff and county to proceed severely against the names in the list under pain of heavy fines. Fines, imprisonment, and exile were denounced for having a child baptized by an outed minister, or for being absent for three Sundays from the parish church. And, lastly, to preach at a conventicle in the open fields was made *death*, with confiscation of goods.

Now all this network of horror, the results of which quicken into passion the blood of the most cold-hearted historians of the period, was, we have no doubt, originally woven—was certainly thereafter held and tightened round the heart of Scotland for twenty or thirty

dismal years—by the "virtuoso," or religious stoic, whose large-minded and liberal "Address to the Fanatics," written in his twenty-fourth year, we have already quoted. Private men, he held, should yield up their opinions on minor matters, both to the Church and to the State; and though dissenters from the creed might be let alone, those who did not yield to the law should be severely punished. All that remained was to *make* the law such, that those who did not abjure their national opinions and practices should be caught and crushed by it. And this was done promptly, systematically, and increasingly, until, in 1681, the "Act anent Religion and the Test" pointed out, with perfect justice, that the only thing that could give confidence to "schismatical dissenters from the Established Church" was "supine neglect of putting in execution the good laws provided against them."

Sir George Mackenzie provided the good laws: Turner, Dalziel, and Claverhouse, with their brutal soldiery, enforced them in the villages where they were quartered, and in the field; but the final consummation in council chamber and judiciary came round to Mackenzie again. And it is from his official position as public prosecutor or informer, and from the tragical scenes in which he was thus called upon frequently to take part, that the bloody mark has come to be affixed to his name. We have already intimated a doubt whether this condemnation can be sustained to the extent that is popularly supposed. Sir George Mackenzie's writings show that steady and discriminating love of justice which every great lawyer possesses, if not as an original passion, at least as a slowly-acquired and deep-founded habit. Not even his famous chapter on witches is an exception to this; for though it begins, "That there are witches, divines cannot doubt, seeing that the word of God hath ordained that no witch shall live, nor lawyers in Scotland, seeing our law ordains it to be punished with death," it goes on to argue that "from the horridness of this crime I do conclude, that of all crimes it requires the clearest relevancy and most convincing probation; and I condemn, next to the witches themselves, those cruel and too forward judges, who burn persons by thousands as guilty of this crime." And as an administrator of criminal justice generally, Sir George Mackenzie seems to have merited well of his country. Before his time the accused never knew what witnesses the crown was to bring against him; he procured a law that a list should be furnished to the prisoner fifteen days before trial. Of old the King's Advocate (strange to say) had the naming of the jury; Sir George got an Act passed by which it was transferred to the judges to select forty-five men, out of which the defendant chose fifteen, to try the case. In all Scotch criminal cases the King's Advocate, when prosecuting, was the last speaker, till Sir George established

the existing practice, by which the defendant has the last word, "because ordinarily the greatest impression is supposed to be made by the last pleading." And, finally, the clerk of the court, appointed by the Crown, used always to be enclosed with the jury for their direction, till Charles II.'s law officer got an Act empowering them to choose their own clerk. Sir George claims to have been the originator of all these changes in favour of the liberty of the subject, and we see no reason to doubt that they were promoted by him from a pure regard to abstract justice—as he puts it himself elsewhere, "to oppose arbitrariness, where it is most dreadful, and that is in matters criminal." Nor can we deny that such facts must be set over against the unpleasant stories which tradition preserves of him—that occasional passion and browbeating of juries of which even Fountainhall complains, and the darker tragedies of Mitchell and the Marquis of Argyll, in which the law seems to have been stretched, if not wrested, to bring Presbyterians accused of crime to torture and death.

The truth seems to be, that Mackenzie was not an unjust man, but he was an admirer of despotism, and had a hatred of private judgment; and he was engaged in a contest with a nation which was getting wearied of the former, and was determined to have the latter. Too much uprightness must not be exacted from a man who tells James II. that "Heaven only was governed by a better King" than his father, and that Scotland "cannot boast of a rich soil, or a warm sun; but it may, that it hath given these happy islands those gracious and glorious kings," the three Stuarts. We may read and admire that fine dedication of Mackenzie's great work on criminal law to the Duke of Lauderdale—

"The greatest statesman in Europe, who is a scholar; and the greatest scholar, who is a statesman; for, to hear you talk of books, one would think you had bestowed no time in studying men; and yet, to observe your wise conduct in affairs, one might be induced to believe that you had no time to study books, . . . who spend one-half of the day in studying what is just, and the other half in practising what is so."

But it is well to remember as to the nobleman addressed, that while he had not only signed the Covenant, but had of old been the representative of the Scottish Kirk at the Westminster Assembly, it was this same Duke of Lauderdale who at a later date is said to have "made bare his arm, and sworn by Jehovah" (at the council-table where Mackenzie sat) that he would crush the Westland shires into submission to Episcopacy by even greater severities, if need be, than those under which they groaned at the time. And the praise Sir George Mackenzie ascribes to the truculent president of the Council may to some extent be his own apology, that "you continue no longer your unkindness to any man, than you think he continues his

opposition to his prince." Yet so it came to pass that the young Scotchman, who in his assumed character of "the Stoic" had, while not yet in office, written to his countrymen, "My heart bleeds when I consider how scaffolds were dyed with Christian blood, and the fields covered with the carcasses of murdered Christians"—so it happened that the same man has become associated in the minds of his countrymen with religious persecution beyond all others in the past, with the single exception of Grahame of Claverhouse. Nor is it strange that so it should be. For on the opposite page of the same "Address to the Fanatics" of his time, and in the course of the same exhortation to peace and against bigotry, we find grim and significant allusions:—

"May not one, who is convinced in his judgment that monarchy is the best of Governments, live happily in Venice or Holland? And that traveller were absurd who would rather squabble with those among whom he sojourns, than observe those rites and customs which are required by the laws of the places where he lives. What is once statuted by a law we all consent to, in choosing commissioners to represent us in those parliaments where the laws are made; and so, if they ordain us to be decimated, or to leave the nation if we conform not, we cannot say when that law is put to execution, that we are oppressed."

It is the true tone of despotism, and could not be acceptable in a country which produced Buchanan's "De Jure Regni," and Rutherford's "Lex Rex." Nor is the Hobbes-like theory much improved by the allusion to representation in a Parliament; the essence of the fallacy being that the subject in Scotland is supposed to have given up to the supreme power (king or Parliament it matters not) all his original rights, even to decimation.

Yet Scotland, slow and late in the growth of its civil liberties, would scarcely, as yet, have resented with so much animosity Mackenzie's mere sycophancy and proneness to despotism. What doomed the one to thirty years of misery, and the other to an immortal hatred, was the application of his theory to matters of conscience and religion. This lesson at least, that matters of conscience have not been given up to the civil power, whether that power be Parliament or king, Scotland had already learned; and to Scotland this became, quite otherwise than in England, the root of all subsequent attainments. Now against this doctrine Mackenzie had steadfastly set himself, and therein he set himself against the highest aspirations of his country. No doubt the men who were most irreconcilably opposed to him were quite willing to entrust to the Church, that authoritative and persecuting power which they earnestly denied to the State. But, strange as it may seem, they found in this distinction a rest for conscience and a hold on freedom and truth. It is not hard to understand. All over Europe the original distinction between Church and State was


founded in this very claim of freedom of conscience.\* And while the old Scotch thought, quite rightly, that in maintaining the freedom of the Church they were doing battle for freedom of conscience, they also thought, wrongly but naturally, that this was doing *enough* for it. But their quarrel against the whole State interference was clear and good, and the interference at this time threatened was considerably worse than what they had previously dealt with. For it was now plain that if the State was to meddle with their religion, it was to do so in the way not of believing it, but of merely patronising it. A religion was to be set up and established, and conformity was to be enacted by force; but at the same time it was significantly enough intimated to the nation that if they conformed externally they might do as they pleased about inward belief. And for Sir George Mackenzie it was reserved, after having made that hateful suggestion in the theoretical writings of his youth, to carry it out in manhood through years of dark laws and relentless administration. Plainly, this able man fell upon evil days, and was unfortunate in the country of his birth. He was no bigot. Better for him almost if he had been. He would at least have escaped the bitter contempt of his own generation for one who made the laws of his country his creed, and the infinite hatred which still pursues the unhappy ghost that sought to force a creedless creed on others.

But in the meantime we seem to have ascertained one fact, of considerable interest. "The persecuting times," as they were popularly called in Scotland, were due to the same influences which caused what are known in Church history as The Persecutions *par excellence*. The tolerant character of the great Roman power, so far at least as regards any real belief in the religions with which it had to deal, is now pretty well understood. It is acknowledged on all hands that the great Aurelius and Antonine enforced the old religion only "as a part of the State" † (to use Mackenzie's words), and that the resulting persecutions were due purely to that intolerance of falsehood and false profession which the new faith inspired in its children. It was precisely so in Scotland in "the killing time." It was not Episcopacy that was in fault, as the Scotch peasantry unwisely believed. It was the resolve to establish State supremacy in religious matters, and to make the people conform in things which the Government proclaimed to be indifferent. Claverhouse was the too zealous minister of an enlightened latitudinarianism, and the Bloody Mackenzie was a religious stoic.

ALEX. TAYLOR INNES.

\* See Guizot's "History of Civilization in Europe."

† "La seule chose à laquelle l'empire romain ait déclaré la guerre, en fait de religion, c'est la théocratie. . . . Il n'admettait aucune association dans l'Etat en dehors de l'Etat. Ce dernier point est essentiel: il est, à vrai dire, la racine de toutes les persécutions."—RENAN's *Les Apôtres*. 1866.



## LITERARY ASPECTS OF PRAYER-BOOK REVISION.

THE Church of Ireland has, immediately on its liberation from State control, resolved to enter upon the work of the revision of the Prayer-Book. It is not my intention in the present article to discuss the wisdom of that resolution. It can now avail nothing to comment on the temper with which the determination of the majority was pressed upon the Synod, on the question of the fitness of the time at which it was chosen to undertake a task at once so extensive and so delicate, or on the general competence of the Committee which has been appointed to report on the subject. Nor is it my wish, whatever may be the anxious forebodings of my heart, to say anything on the deeply momentous dogmatic questions which must needs arise, as in truth it has been these that have brought the Revision-Committee into existence. My object in the present article is to consider some of the aspects of the revision of the Prayer-Book that do not trench upon doctrine, and these, chiefly with reference to structure, sequence of parts, and form of expression; in a word, what may be called the *literary* as distinguished from the dogmatic aspects of revision.

Weighty and momentous as are the dogmatic considerations involved in alterations in the Prayer-Book, scarcely less weighty and momentous are these other, which affect directly and at once the spirit of the Church's worship, and hence the well-being and

freedom of the Church's spiritual life. All will admit that the Prayer-Book might very easily undergo such alterations as would remove it further away from the hearts of the worshippers; and we maintain that it may be so treated by wise and reverent hands as to be brought even yet closer to them than it now is, and be made even yet more dear. How great may be our gains, how tremendous our losses, every student of liturgiology knows well. It is a serious thing to reflect how easily the hold that the Prayer-Book possesses over so many minds would be at once enfeebled and relaxed by alterations that would obscure, and in any degree disfigure the *beauty* of our present services; or, what seems an evil yet more threatening, by imposing upon the Church's worship newly-constructed forms of questionable taste, possibly of barbaric fashion and phraseology, or, worse yet, such as might carry with them an audible *falsetto* in the tone of devotional feeling. Every day on which such prayer should be heard (not to speak of the loss of possible gains to heart and mind from worthier forms), the offence of vulgarity would be again renewed, or the sense of unrealness would be ever working out its effects in hardening the religious sensibilities, and perhaps even perverting them till they half-accepted the unreality as a truth. Nor must we neglect to bear in mind that the sensibility to beauty and fitness—to the æsthetic excellences of divine worship—is spreading widely among the various classes of society, step by step, with the spread of general culture. Thus, I suppose, most clergymen of large parishes have discovered how the better educated young people among the Protestant Dissenters are forcibly drawn by the superior beauty of our services as contrasted with those of the meeting-house or chapel. And I am not now thinking of ritual ceremonial, but merely of such beauty as lies contained in the prayers themselves.

The Committee appointed on the motion of Professor Salmon to report on the subject of Revision to the General Synod of next year, has been bound by no restrictions.\* And from the speech of Professor Salmon it is quite plain that his design, at least, was much more extensive than merely the consideration of those expressions in the Prayer-Book whose dogmatic import, it was alleged, had been misconceived or perverted by English Ritualists.†

\* Not like Master Brooke's Committee of the previous year, which was appointed "To consider whether, without making any such alterations in the Liturgy or formularies of our Church as would involve or imply a change in her doctrines, any measures can be suggested calculated to check the introduction and spread of novel doctrines and practices, opposed to the principles of our Reformed Church."

† It is hopeless now to attempt to restrict the word *ritualist* to its original sense—one *learned in ritual*.

"Some changes," he said, "it is generally held have been made necessary by the passing of the Irish Church Act. I suppose we ought to appoint a Committee to inquire what those changes are. I think it unlikely that such a Committee would confine their Report to the alteration of such phrases as 'the true religion established among us' in the prayer for the Lord-Lieutenant, or the 'order of this realm' in the Consecration Service. The whole question of the State Prayers would probably be gone into. Further, we have taken to ourselves power to make at once changes recommended unanimously by the Ritual Commission. Some of these changes have been already brought under your considerations, and others remain behind, in particular the very important question of a new Lectionary. There remain a number of other points on which the Ritual Commissioners were not unanimous, but on which the Church of Ireland has surely a right to form its own opinion. One glance at that Report will dispel the idea that our friends in England insist on the unalterableness of the present Prayer-Book. . . . .

"Further, the desirableness of some new services suggests itself; and those rich treasures of ancient devotion, on which our Reformers drew so largely, are by no means exhausted. Thus, if we were not to touch on a single point involving doctrine, a number of changes might, with great advantage, be made," &c.

Again, the Primate declared, on behalf of the archbishops and bishops, that in consenting to act on Dr. Salmon's Committee, they considered themselves pledged

*"to a careful and conscientious weighing and considering of whatever suggestions for amendment and improvement might from any quarter be brought forward,"* while "fully persuaded that the Prayer-Book, as it now stands, doth not contain in it anything contrary to the word of God, or to sound doctrine, or which a godly man may not with a good conscience use and submit to."

Again, there is another consideration which must weigh heavily with every thoughtful churchman. If it is sought now to obtain for the Prayer-Book "a final settlement—that is to say, as far as anything human can be said to be final" (Dr. Salmon's speech, p. 11 \*),—*now* is the time for any improvement, literary or liturgical, which it is hoped to secure. Indeed, as Revision is now certain, and as it is rightly sought to make it final, or, at least, such as may last for very many years, we believe that *it is not morally optional with the Revisers to leave the Prayer-Book untouched where they may bestow upon it any the smallest benefit, but that a solemn and urgent obligation lies upon them to dismiss from consideration nothing that could make the Prayer-Book*

\* Dr. Salmon is modest in his notions of Irish finality. A settlement—"that we may, at least, hope to last our lifetime"—he hopes for the Irish Prayer-Book. And he is more correct than people little acquainted with Ireland would suppose. If fifty years ago there had existed a free representative Synod of the Irish Church, constituted as the present Synod, but for perhaps the opposition of some of the bishops, the Irish Articles of 1615 might easily have been enforced. Calvinism, even of Ussher's type, is now uncommon among the clergy.

more helpful, or more dear, to any human soul. And beyond these considerations there is another consideration yet higher. It is that which springs from the sense of perfectness that we feel should belong to all that pertains to the worship of the All-perfect God. In our weakness, our consciences find no apology for not doing all we may to render His service in all things perfect. It was the feeling that would not allow the Greek sculptor to be less careful in his work upon the back of the statue, though it was to be placed against the wall of the Temple, than upon the parts of the figure most visible to the worshippers, "because the gods see all things." It was the feeling that in the Mosaic ritual required that the very "snuffers" and "snuff-dishes" should be made of "pure gold." It is a noble sentiment, and fruitful of good. May it be granted to those who in the Irish Church have been appointed to this most responsible task to feel that nothing is light or trivial in the work before them—that the heading of a collect, the alteration of a letter, the shifting of a comma, is each a work to be done in the Name, and to the glory of God, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost.

Dogmatic considerations having been set aside, we purpose, in the following remarks, to point out some few, out of very many, of the chief practicable acquisitions, we should seek to gain for the Church, and some of the most serious dangers that we should strive to avoid.

I. It is hardly probable that any serious alterations in the general structure of our services will be attempted by Dr. Salmon's Committee, and certainly none such are to be desired. Were the Irish Church doing now for the first time the work done for her in the sixteenth century, in the reformation of her service-books, a greater liberty of entertaining suggestions from the Eastern rituals, and other sources, might, without question, be used to great profit; but, as things are, it will be felt, I trust, that such changes should be studiously avoided as would bring about any multiplication of marked and striking distinctions between the Irish and the other churches of the now wide-spread Anglican family. For this reason, as well as for others yet more weighty, some of the changes of the American Prayer-Book are to be deeply regretted. I cannot but think that few will anywhere now be found who would advocate the permission given by the Protestant Episcopal Church of the United States to use the *Gloria in excelsis* after the conclusion of the Psalms at morning and evening prayer, as an alternative with the *Gloria Patri*. The sacred associations of this sublime hymn with the solemn Eucharistic service—connected together as they are in the English Church for above twelve hundred years—should surely not be weakened by making it common to daily matins and evensong. The fact that it is in the daily morning office that this Δοξολογία μεγάλη appears in the Greek

service-book, is no sufficient argument for its restoration to that place in *our* daily services, constructed, as they are, on a plan so dissimilar. Much, however, I am aware, may be said in favour of the restoration of the *Gloria in excelsis* to the place it generally holds in the Western liturgies, viz., early in the ante-communion service. But the natural objection to changes, as changes, will, it is to be hoped, be supported among Irish Revisers, by the fact that in an ancient liturgy (probably of the seventh century), belonging to the Irish monks of Luxovium, this hymn is found in the place it now occupies among the thanksgivings of the post-communion. Yet more objectionable, on historical as well as other grounds, is the substitution of the Nicene for the Apostles' Creed, permitted by the American Prayer-Book at morning and evening prayer. Certain offices for special occasions may be added with advantage to our Prayer-Book; but, with the exception of some such shortening of morning and evening prayer as has been unanimously recommended by the Ritual Commission, we trust that the general structure of our existing services will remain unchanged.\*

II. But, while any large structural alteration is to be earnestly deprecated, much serviceable work may be done in slight modifications and changes here and there, which, while scarcely, if at all, noticeable to the eyes or ears of the ordinary crowd of worshippers, and hence rousing none of the popular objections to change, will add much to the beauty of the Prayer-Book, increase its excellence as the service-book of our common worship, and yet further endear it to the hearts of Christian scholars.

I purpose here to illustrate my remarks by considering some few out of many of the changes that I believe might be effected, with much profit to the Church, in the collects.

But why may not the collects be allowed to stand as they are?

This is a question that will be anxiously asked by those who love the Prayer-Book. Are not the collects among the chief and special excellences of our services? and is there not serious danger, by in any wise meddling with them, of marring or utterly destroying their beauty? A serious danger we must admit there is. Of this the history of the English Prayer-Book can leave us in no manner of doubt. We feel, let us confess, some apprehensions of fear, pardonable, surely, when we think of the treasures at stake; but we feel

\* In shortening the service, where prayers are said daily, the excellent form of the first Prayer-Book of Edward VI. strongly commends itself. Welcome, indeed, would be the relief, not only from "Dearly beloved brethren," but also from that other barbaric composition—the general confession. The absence of forms of confession and absolution might be supplied by two brief prayers (of the collect-type) after the Lord's Prayer in the beginning of the service, or, better still, after the first collect.

also many hopes—hopes, we believe, not ill-founded—that real and important gains may be acquired for the honour of Christ and the benefit of his Church. The collects are good and excellent—*how* good and excellent we surely cannot easily overestimate; but examination shows that they may be made yet better and yet more excellent. Blots spotting the fairness here and there may be removed. Sometimes a collect will be given a new and beautiful significance by some merest touch that restores it to its original form; and occasionally some of the more meagre might give place with advantage to others more worthy, drawn from the same ancient sources. Nor, again, is there any reason why the voice of the living Church may not in the collect form give expression to her special and peculiar needs. This much we say deliberately, having a very clear perception that no portion of their arduous and delicate task will demand higher qualifications on the part of the Revisers. There will be needed extensive ecclesiastical learning, a thorough apprehension of the essential character of this particular devotional form, and, what is, perhaps, of even yet more importance, a keen sense of the beauty that belongs to a strict severity of literary style.

I take an example of the loving service that may be rendered to the Prayer-Book, and of the obligations which, as it seems to me, are imposed by the opportunity of revision, from the collect for the Sunday after Ascension Day. It now runs—

“O God the King of Glory, who hast exalted thine only Son Jesus Christ with great triumph unto thy kingdom in heaven; We beseech thee, leave us not comfortless; but send to us thine Holy Ghost to comfort us, and exalt us unto the same place whither our Saviour Christ is gone before, who liveth,” &c.

This beautiful collect was constructed in 1549 from the yet more beautiful Antiphon of the Magnificat, in the old vesper service for the Ascension. Eight hundred years before that its sweet words had soothed the dying hours of Bede, whose grateful tears of love flowed freely as he chanted with feeble, laboured breathing—“O Rex gloriæ, Domine virtutum, qui triumphator hodie super omnes cælos\* ascendisti, ne derelinquas nos orphanos, sed mitte promissum Patris in nos Spiritum veritatis. Alleluia.”† How pregnant with allusion, recalling the jubilant psalm of the Ascension, “Atollite portas principes vestras,” “Lift up your heads, O ye gates, and be ye lifted

\* *Super omnes cælos.* How much nobler than our “Unto Thy kingdom in heaven.”

† Vide *Cuthberti Epist. de obitu Ven. Bedæ.* “Cantabat etiam Antiphonas secundum nostram consuetudinem et sui, quarum una est: ‘O Rex gloriæ, Domine virtutum, qui triumphator hodie, etc.’ et cum venisset ad illud verbum ‘ne derelinquas nos orphanos,’ prorupit in lacrymas, et multum fleuit. Et post horam coepit repetere quæ inchoaverat.”

up, ye everlasting doors, and the King of glory shall come in. Who is the King of glory? *Dominus virtutum, ipse est Rex Gloriæ*" (Ps. xxiv. [xxiii.] 10). It is the Lord Christ who promised that He would not leave his disciples comfortless, and who is here reminded of his promise, and entreated to send that other "Comforter, which is the Holy Ghost."\*

Thus we see how much both of beauty and of force is gained by restoring the invocation or address of the collect, as it was originally in the Antiphon, to the Second Person of the Blessed Trinity.† The change of the concluding words follows as a matter of course.‡

Another striking example of an improvement that can be effected with equal ease will be found on examining the collect for the fourth Sunday in Advent, as it appears in our Prayer-Book and as it appears in the Sarum Missal. This collect, again, which in our Prayer-Book is addressed to the First Person of the Trinity,§ in the form in which it exists in the Sarum Missal, is addressed to the Divine Saviour, and it may be restored to its original character by merely changing the conclusion according to the usual formula. The prayer thus becomes the advent cry of the Church to her Lord—"Come among us;" of the bride to the Bridegroom—"Come quickly, Lord Jesus." The prayer is thus applicable, though in different degrees, whether we direct our thoughts chiefly to the final advent, or, as Dr. Neale takes for granted it was designed, to the Advent through the Incarnation about to be celebrated at Christmas, the prayer speaking "with the dramatic effect which," he justly remarks, "permeates every ecclesiastical office," and entreating the Lord "to

\* The touching *orphans* of the Vulgate (Joan. xiv. 18) we have unhappily lost in our version. Could we be sure that the revised New Testament would give us "orphans" in the text (as our present Authorized Version does in the margin), it would be a matter much to be regretted that the reference should be lost in the collect.

† In the following adaptation it is sought still to preserve the petition at the close belonging peculiarly to the prayer as it stands in the reformed books, while the beginning is brought nearer the original. "O Lord of Hosts, the King of Glory, who hast [this day] ascended with great triumph above all heavens, we beseech Thee, leave us not comfortless [or orphans here below], but send thy Holy Ghost to comfort us that we may be exalted whither Thou hast gone before, who with the Father in the unity of the same Spirit," &c.

‡ The following old lines, which appear in various forms, supply the usual formulæ for the conclusions of collects:—

*Per Dominum dicas, cum Patrem prosbyter oras;  
Cum Christum memoras per eundem dicere debes;  
Cum Christo loqueris, qui vivis dicere quæras;  
Qui tecum si sit collectæ finis in illo;  
Et si spiritus almus, ejusdem dicere debes."*

§ The Reformers, indeed, when in 1549 they altered the form of the collect, might plead that they were restoring it to its ancient shape; for it is a curious fact that in the Gelasian sacramentary it is addressed to the Father. In the Gregorian the meritorious change of the address to the Son was effected.

be born for our sakes," as if the work of our redemption were not yet begun;\* or, in the direction towards which, as I fancy, its original intent may perhaps have looked—viz., that other advent of the Lord ever being repeated upon earth in the fulfilment of his words, "Behold I stand at the door, and knock; and if any man hear my voice, and open the door, I will come in to him, and sup with him, and he with me."†

The skill with which the Reformers of the sixteenth century rendered the old collects into the vulgar tongue cannot but attract admiration. While declining to accept his language to the full, we can understand the enthusiasm of Mr. Burgon when he says that "in countless instances they have transfused the curtest, baldest, and darkest of the Latin collects into truly harmonious and transparent English." It may be that what Mr. Burgon considers curt, bald, and dark, others may esteem as severe, simple, and devout. Yet none can hesitate to acknowledge the ability so unconsciously exhibited in the happy renderings and happy adaptations of many of our forms. Take as examples—a few from very many at hand—the collects for Whitsunday, and for first, twelfth, fifteenth, and nineteenth Sundays after Trinity. But excellent as in general are the renderings and adaptations of the ancient forms, no one will be found to assert that they are without exception incapable of improvement. Here, too, careful and reverent hands may confer on the Church a lasting benefit; and, as I am maintaining, are most solemnly bound to make the attempt. Sometimes, indeed, what has been substituted is either preferable in itself, or else, being good, has gained so much of additional sweetness in the sacred associations of the worshippers that we should regret, or not venture upon a change. Thus, who would surrender the phrase, "whose service is perfect freedom," in the morning collect "for peace," even with a view that it might be brought nearer the noble "*Cui servire regnare est*" of the original? Indeed, apart from the real excellence of the English collect referred to, it will be found true that the more familiar the words the more difficulty will there be in finding an acceptable substitute for them—so endearing is use and wont; and hence that improvements which could be easily effected in some of the less known parts of the service (*e.g.*, many of the collects for the Sundays after Trinity) would be practically impossible in the fixed prayers of the daily offices. Admitting all this, why is it in any wise necessary

\* "Essays on Liturgiology" (2nd edition), p. 51.

† It is such a coming that is clearly referred to in the Gelasian collect:—"Stir up, O Lord, Thy power and come; and mercifully fulfil that which Thou hast promised to Thy Church unto the end of the world."—(*Vide Gregor. Saer. Hebdom. V. ante Nat. Dom.*)

—to take an example—that we should lose the beautiful imagery suggested by the words of the collect for the thirteenth Sunday after Trinity—"Tribue ut ad promissiones Tuas sine offensione curramus." Or why could we not render more nearly in the collect for the sixth Sunday after Trinity, "*Ut te in omnibus et super omnia diligentes,*" &c.? To cite but one other instance, if we gain in comprehensiveness, we lose in point and depth in the collect for the fourth Sunday after Trinity in the phrase, "*Sic transeamus per bona temporalia, ut non amittamus æterna.*" Every separate form in the Prayer-Book will demand an examination for itself; and while most will remain untouched, many, I trust, will profit by this reconsideration.

But by far the greatest gains which can be acquired for the Church of Ireland at this revision are to be sought in the many ancient service-books, which are at last obtaining from ecclesiologists a somewhat fairer proportion of the attention which they really deserve. No person of devout mind can look through Canon Bright's exquisite little book of "Ancient Collects" without feeling profoundly how great is the opportunity that may now be held fast, or let slip—perhaps never to be recovered. With its offerings from the Greek, the Syriac, the Coptic, the Gothic, and the Mozarabic, as well as from the more familiar rituals of Italy and France—and these but "a few drops from a cup filled to overflowing"—it carries with it the conviction of the inestimable value of the riches lying hidden in these ancient treasure-houses. A few of our existing collects, it must be admitted, are meagre and feeble; and of a few the objection made by the Puritans at the Savoy Conference holds good—that the prefaces "have not any clear and special respect to the following petitions, and particular petitions are put together which have not any due order, nor evident connection with one another." No one, however, will now desire with the Puritans "that instead of these various collects there may be one methodical and entire form of prayer composed out of many of them." If a *real* objection lies against any of our collects, collects more apt (as regards the other *propria*), and more beautiful, may be found in abundance, often suited exactly, or most nearly to our needs. That in this matter unmanly fear may not be mistaken for reverence I earnestly pray.\*

In the substitution, here advocated, of one ancient form for another

\* "It is indeed most true," says Archbishop Trench ("On Authorized Version of New Testament," p. 212), "that no man having drunk old wine, straightway desireth new; for he saith, 'The old is better;' but it is on 'straightway' that the emphasis, in this saying of our Lord, must be laid. In those spiritual things to which he intended we should transfer this saying a man may, and will, if he is wise, after a while desire the new. It may have a certain unwelcome harshness and austerity at the first; the man may have to overcome that custom which is as second nature before he heartily affects it."

not so excellent, we shall be following the precedent (if we need precedent) of the English Reformers in the case of the collect for the Sunday after Ascension considered above. The collect for that day ran—"Omnipotens sempiterne Deus fac nos tibi semper et devotam gerere voluntatem, et majestati tuæ sincero corde servire. Per"—which, however good, falls far below the excellence of the antiphon, which has been so adapted as to take its place.

But even if it be determined (as I am convinced it ought not to be) that such removals and substitutions are on the whole unwise, there seems nothing to hinder a selection of carefully chosen and carefully rendered collects being added to our Prayer-Book. The six collects "to be said after the offertory when there is no communion, every such day one or more," supply a kind of precedent. So, too, does "O God, whose nature and property, &c."—the "prayer that may be said after any of the former." The fifth canon recently decreed by the General Synod of the Irish Church indicates another reason, in addition to those that are obvious, for the adoption of this suggestion. It provides, in language probably made intentionally vague, that "a prayer" may be used "at the beginning or end of the sermon." Without in any way wishing to circumscribe the liberty afforded by the canon, sure I am that the excellence of the gift bestowed in such a *collectarium* as I have in view, both preacher and people would quickly learn.

In the Prayer-Book of 1549 we find for Christmas Day and for Easter Day *two* collects (each with its Epistle and Gospel), to be used one "*at the first communion*," the other "*at the second communion*."\* The practice of frequent celebrations of the Holy Communion is happily gaining ground in the Irish Church; and some of the large city churches have more than one celebration on other days beside the two great festivals of Easter and the Nativity. The advantage of a second collect, at least, on the principal holy days (as suggested above by the first Prayer-Book of Edward VI.) would, I am sure, be highly appreciated by many.

We have said that there is no reason why the living voice of the Church may not express her present and more peculiar needs in prayers of the collect-form. Yet any one who some few years ago examined the books of family-prayer generally in use, might well believe that the art of constructing a collect had perished out of the land. Manuals of private devotion supported the same belief. But

\* The first collect for Christmas Day (an adaptation of the Christmas Eve collect in the Sarum Missal) is so very beautiful that I am tempted to transcribe it—"God, which makest us glad with the yearly remembrance of the birth of thy only Son Jesus Christ: Grant that as we joyfully receive Him for our Redeemer, so we may with sure confidence behold Him when He shall come to be our Judge, who liveth," &c.

more recently we can see several indications that the spirit of devotional writers has been sensibly affected by the study of the ancient rituals; and we could point to more than one book where may be found collects quite worthy, or all but worthy, of St. Leo and St. Gregory.

Responsory *preces* not being taken under consideration, the superiority, for the purposes of common worship, of the collect-type of the Western rites over other forms of prayer, few liturgiologists will hesitate to acknowledge. The longer forms of our Prayer-Book, bearing a certain likeness to the varied and elaborate *εὐχαὶ* of the Greek offices, are not without merits of their own. They soothe or elevate the soul of the worshipper in a manner that resembles in its effects the recitation of pious musings; but they lack the firm grasp and concentrated force of the collect. More especially is this want felt in the products of the seventeenth century, such as the prayer for Parliament (1625), and the prayers (of the Caroline revision) "for all conditions of men,"\* and the General Thanksgiving. The same desire for amplification issued in yet more melancholy results under the fostering care of the Royal Commissioners of 1689, who left scarcely one collect untouched, and few unharmed by their feeble enlargements. We wish that we could believe that in our time there are no grounds for suspecting danger of a like kind. But the prayers put forth by authority from time to time on both sides of St. George's Channel are not of a character to reassure us. In these forms we too frequently notice an absence of the simplicity and severity that belong to the best period, and the tendency to rhetorical expansion that characterizes inferior models. Before the next occasion on which their services may be required, we earnestly urge the Archbishop's chaplains to give many days and nights to the study of the old Roman sacramentaries.

One of the causes which helped to spoil many of the collects in the Prayer-Book of 1689 was an over-straining after comprehensiveness in thought and doctrine. Hence, for example, the awkward introduction of the alternative in the collect for Sexagesima:—

\* Entitled, "A collect or prayer," &c.—so imperfectly was the essential character of the collect-form then apprehended. The State services for Nov. 5, Jan. 30, and May 29 (now happily abolished) were also the work of this period, and exhibit its liturgical vices and incompetence in a manner still more striking.—See the remarks of Mr. F. D. MAURICE in his "Lectures on the Prayer-Book," p. 174. In the above remarks on the superiority of the collect it must be remembered that we are not treating the subject of private devotion; some of the noblest and most touching prayers of the Western devotional writers are of great length. The chief advantage of the collect over longer forms seems to me to lie in the encouragement which it gives to a definite impetrative outgoing, or effort, of desire after each petition, having its audible expression in the *Amen*.

"O Lord God, who seest that we put not our trust in anything that we do; Mercifully grant that by thy power we may be defended against all adversities; or so mightily aided by thy grace, that we may not faint under them, but having heard thy holy word," &c.

And hence the addition on Ash Wednesday, "——that we truly lamenting our sins with unfeigned sorrow and abhorrence, and acknowledging our wretchedness with sincere resolution of amendment of life, &c." The ancient collects possess themselves in contentment with a single thought, or a single phase of feeling, and make no effort to compress the plan of salvation into a single sentence.

There is another moral, too, that is pointed by the handiwork of King William's Commissioners—the blunder of overpacking the collect with allusions to, and quotations from, the Epistle or Gospel of the day to which it is proper. Contrast the collect for the second Sunday after the Epiphany as it stands in the Prayer-Book with the following (which exhibits at once all the worst vices of this revision):—

"Almighty and everlasting God, who dost govern all things in heaven and earth; Mercifully hear the supplications of thy people, and so rule and guide us that we may do our duties faithfully in the several places and relations: constantly abhorring that which is evil and cleaving to that which is good; being fervent in spirit, serving the Lord, rejoicing in hope, patient in tribulation, and continuing so instant in prayer that we may enjoy thy peace all the days of our life; through Jesus Christ our Lord. Amen."

At once we are sensible of the deficiency of that *implicit* force, of that unity of thought and unity of desire, which mark the ancient collects and those constructed after the ancient models; and we are conscious of no corresponding gain by the lengthy transcription of the phraseology of the Epistle. If a collect strikes the key-note of the subsequent *propria*, it is, I believe, as much as can be desired. And it must be remembered that any supposed gains by reason of the *appropriateness* of the prayer to the subsequent scriptures will not be generally apprehended, at all events, when the collect appears in its place in Morning and Evening Prayer.\*

If we desire, however, to do justice to the Commissioners of 1689, we must remember that the age in which the style of the collects was "*polished* by Tillotson" was that in which even Dryden, with his real veneration for the great masters of the past, rewrote "*The Tempest*" and the tales from Chaucer.† In our day I do not know

\* I do not know how far the work of the Commissioners was influenced by the notion, which has gained so much acceptance, that a collect should *collect*, as into a focus, the rays of the Scripture teaching of the day. On the various theories of the etymology of the word "*collect*," see the Appendix to Bright's "*Ancient Collects*."

† Evelyn in his *Diary* writes—"I saw *Hamlet, Prince of Denmark*, played, but now

of any attempt to improve Shakespeare; and I believe we may feel considerable confidence that no *positive* wrongs will be done the collects in the way of adornment and amplification. But anxiety is not unreasonably felt about the *new* prayers that must now be written. For such as shall be needed, I urge that the collect-type is certainly the best. The collect should be short, should consist of but one sentence, and should contain but one principal petition. It is thus that the best of the ancient collects are constructed; and, without rigidly insisting that there should be no deviation from the normal type, it should certainly be never allowed to pass out of sight, nor be departed from except under the pressure of peculiar necessities. The requirements of the form forbid diffuseness—that besetting sin of modern writers of prayers. Even as many a poet has found the restraints of the sonnet to be a help rather than a hindrance, so the requirements of the collect compel a concentration and a simplicity that save from many evils.

I should not, of course, assert for a moment that the Church of each age has not the liberty and the right to express herself in her own characteristic forms of prayer—in those forms which should be the vital body moulded and fashioned by the energizing of the spirit within—the mobile features stirred and illuminated by inward desires and longings—even as I hold it to be most true both of the words and music of her hymns that in the construction of either there should not of necessity be a rigid adherence to ancient precedent. If the age has indeed its “new wine,” “new bottles” will be needed to hold it. It is not in imitations of Ravenscroft’s Psalter, or of Tallis, that the truest expression could be given to “The Church’s One Foundation,” or “O Paradise,” or “Hark! hark, my soul.” And if the Church of to-day manifests a real power of uttering her supplications, her desires, and longings, in new and adequate forms of prayer, who would take upon himself the presumptuous task of forbidding her? But when we see no faintest sign of the possession of such power, it remains simply to determine whether we shall choose to work upon the lines of good or of bad models. And the more study is devoted to the subject the stronger will grow the conviction that the collect presents a model incomparably superior to that generally adopted, and entirely adequate to the present needs of the Church.\*

the old plays began to disgust this refined age,” &c. It is only fair, too, to the Commissioners of 1689 to acknowledge that much may be learned from the study of their work (*e.g.*, their treatment of the Marriage Service). Tillotson and Burnet and Patrick—not to speak of Beveridge—were not men to leave profitless labour behind them.

\* The following is a prayer put forth by the Archbishops of Armagh and Dublin to be used on January 1, 1871, and on “other suitable occasions” :—

“O God, who knowest the manifold dangers that surround us, the untried paths on which we are entering, may Thy presence and Thy power be with us, according to Thy

III. We have chosen to speak more largely of the collects, but, of course, all other parts of the services will demand an equal share of attention from the Revisers. Why should the poor and unlettered, as they join in the *Te Deum*, be deprived any longer of the beauty of allusion that lies in the "*Te Martyrum candidatus laudat exercitus*"? Why in the Litany should one deprecation be open (if change be considered necessary) to the American monstrosity, "From all inordinate and sinful affections," when it ran originally "*A spiritu fornicationis: Libera nos Domine*," and might run similarly in the English? Why should not the old Sarum deprecation, "*A subitanea et improvisa morte*," save us from any further continuance of the bickering and contention that have been occasioned by the corresponding clause in our Litany from Hooker's time till to-day? Why should we not at the close of the Creed in the Communion Service, by the simple help of a comma† after the word "Lord," or by the repetition of the article *the*, assert for the Divine Spirit what the Constantinopolitan Fathers asserted in τὸ κύριον καὶ τὸ ζωοποιόν, and what was expressed not only in the Latin, "*Dominum et vivificantem*," but also in the old English "lord and quyknor?" Why add unnecessarily to the puzzle of "Let us pray" by keeping it before

sure promise to Thy Church. Build Thou the walls of our Zion, repair its breaches, and keep the city which we cannot keep ourselves. Remember not our old sins, all which we and our fathers have wrought frowardly in Thy covenant, provoking most justly Thy wrath and indignation against us. Turn away from us the rebukes which we are afraid of. Put far from us the jealousies and suspicions, the pride and passion and prejudice, which would hinder godly union and concord among us. Knit our hearts to Thee, and in Thee to one another. Give us a willing mind that we may not keep back those offerings which Thou art graciously pleased to accept at our hands; and grant, we beseech Thee, that by Thy over-ruling grace, the one pure perpetual doctrine of the Gospel, and of the true Catholic Church of God, may be preserved unto us and unto this land both now and evermore. And these things we ask for Jesus Christ's sake, our Lord. Amen."

While freely acknowledging the earnest piety of tone and the deep sense of the special needs of the Irish Church that mark this prayer, its form seems to me in the last degree unsatisfactory. Two collects after the ancient model—one for agreement in the truth, the other for the grace of liberality (either of which might be used without the other)—were to be much preferred. The alliteration, "pride and passion and prejudice," so painfully attractive to the ear, should be carefully avoided. Here we may take the opportunity of entreating that the cacophonous "sins, negligences, and ignorances" in the litany, and the formal pairs "peace and happiness, truth and justice, religion and piety" in the prayer for the Parliament may be somehow dealt with.

\* In an early English life of St. Kenelm, dating about 1300, edited from the Harleian MS. by Mr. Furnivall, and printed in the Philological Society's Transactions, 1858, we read that St. Kenelm was singing the *Te Deum* when he met his death. When he came to the "holi vers," "The white campaignye of martirs," his head was smitten off. "White-robed army" is our phrase; Milton has "white-robed truth" (On the Death of a Fair Infant).

† The comma that has crept into the first invocation of the Litany, after "Father," is of questionable service.

“the lesser Litany” in Morning and Evening Prayer, where it got mischievously in 1552? why not rather help it to explain its own meaning by restricting it, without exception, as a prefix to the longer forms of prayer said by the minister without interruption (*orationes*)?

Again, a careful revision should be given to the translation of the Athanasian Creed. It is well known in Ireland that an attempt will be made to remove this Creed from the Irish Prayer-Book, or, at least, to forbid its use at the public services of the Church, relegating it to some place among the Articles. We consider that it is improbable that the attempt will be successful; but no one is likely to oppose a motion for the revision of what is universally acknowledged to be a faulty translation. It is not respect for this venerable symbol that will induce any one to retain “Whosoever will be saved” as a rendering of “Quicumque vult salvus esse,” or “none is afore or after other, none is greater or less than another” as a rendering of “nihil prius aut posterius, nihil majus aut minus;” and several other *maculæ* could be pointed out. It has rejoiced many hearts that at a recent sitting (June 14th) of the Convocation of Canterbury, one so deeply respected by every branch of the Church as the Bishop of Gloucester should bring this matter before the House, and that the bishops with such entire unanimity agreed to the resolution proposed by the Bishop of Winchester, that the Archbishop of Canterbury should be requested to invite the bishops of the Anglican Communion generally to a consultation upon the subject. It is to be earnestly hoped that Irish Churchmen may restrain their hot haste till the result of the Episcopal Conference is declared.

These are a few of the very many questions of deep interest that in prospect of Revision at once suggest themselves to the liturgical student.

IV. The treatment of obsolete and archaic words, and of words not themselves disused, but employed in senses now obsolete, will, it may also, I suppose, be assumed, form part of the task that Dr. Salmon’s Committee will set before itself. Of words that are gone wholly out of use, being simply sounds without significance in common English (excepting, of course, such words of ecclesiastic art as “Faculty,” “Synodals,” “Pie,” “Briefs,” “Invitatories,” “Responds,” “Nocturn,” &c., in the old preface and rubrics) I can call to mind only *one*, “shawm,” (Psalm xcvi.), rendered “cornet” in the Authorized Version.

Of words and expressions archaic, but yet quite intelligible to the ordinary worshipper, I know not that anything better can be said than what has been said on this subject as relating to the revision of the Authorized Version of the New Testament, by one who is now

happily for Irish Churchmen among them in person to counsel and help. There are archaic words

"which while they are felt by our people to be old and unusual, are yet, if I do not deceive myself, perfectly understood by them, by wise and simple, educated and uneducated alike. These, shedding round the sacred volume the reverence of age, removing it from the ignoble associations which will often cleave to the language of the day, should on no account be touched, but rather thankfully acknowledged and carefully preserved. 'The dignity resulting from archaisms,' in Bishop Horsley's words, 'is not to be too readily given up.' For, indeed, it is good that the phraseology of Scripture [and of the Prayer-Book] should not be that exactly of our common life; that it should be removed from the vulgarities and even the familiarities of this; just as there is a sense of fitness which dictates that the architecture of a church should be different from that of a house." \*

Contrast with the above sober words the extravagance of Dr. Neale ("Essays," &c., p. 201, *et sq.*):—

"Three hundred years ago, in opposition to the then prevailing practice, a national Church decreed as follows:—'It is a thing plainly repugnant to the Word of God, and the practice of the primitive Church, to have public prayer in the Church, or to minister the Sacraments in a tongue not understood of the people.' Three centuries passed, and the office then compiled has become so obsolete in its phrases as certainly to fall not very far short of incurring the condemnation there pronounced. . . . We may fairly ask the question, Is it not almost impossible to find any one collect which shall be intelligible to an uneducated person?"

But, in addition to the two classes of words now referred to, there is yet a third that will demand consideration—words still used but with an altered meaning, sometimes so far altered as largely and materially to pervert the sense. In striving to make good to our people the losses that the lapse of time has brought with it, we shall be only following the example of those who in former days made the Prayer-Book as we possess it. Thus in 1661 the bishops conceded the change of some obsolete words objected to by the Puritans—*e.g.*, "aread" and "wits" were removed by adopting "the new translation" in the Gospels; and the word "depart," used in the old formula of betrothal for some four hundred years previously, was changed into "do part." Besides such obsolete words in the Epistles and Gospels as may receive correction with the new revision of the Authorized Version of the Bible, it is an obvious and simple task to deal with such as "alloweth," "convenient," "curates," "ghostly," "incomprehensible," "indifferently," "kindly," "let," "prevent," "surcease," "Turks," "wealth," "worship." The following words and phrases (several of which have been dealt with by the American Prayer-Book) deserve a careful consideration, though few of them, I

\* Trench "On the Authorized Version of the New Testament," p. 50.

trust, need be surrendered:—"affiance," "*after* our sins," "*after* our iniquities," "ensample," "ensue," eschew," "estates," "endeavour ourselves," "enterprised," "graven" (Ps. vii. 16, P.B.), "honourable," "injury," "instantly" (Ps. lv. 18, P.B.), "intend," "lighten upon," "lively," "naughty," "picking," "pitifully," "ports" (Ps. ix. 14, P.B.), "ravish" (Ps. x. 9, 10, P.B.), "vulgar."

V. The opportunity of a revision should not be allowed to pass without an earnest effort to revive, in a modified way, the use of the Invitatory, and perhaps even that of the Antiphon and Respond. Of course, anything that would break in upon the Psalms or Lessons and interrupt their meaning should be avoided; but who can fail to see the gain of striking early the key-note of the service, and of emphasizing it from time to time? The first of these desiderata may be easily attained by a large addition to the opening "sentences," some of which could be made *proper* to seasons and holy-days. The American Prayer-Book has added three, but not as *propria*. On Christmas Day, for example, the service might be begun with, "In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God, and the Word was made flesh and dwelt among us;" or "Unto us a child is born, &c." In Advent with "Watch ye, for ye know not what hour your Lord doth come," or some other appropriate verse, and so on. The Antiphon and Respond would be more difficult to introduce; and in the present article I am not able to enter further into the question; but the Invitatory, a variable verse, taking the place of "Praise ye the Lord," and the objectionable respond (1662), "The Lord's name be praised," preceding the *Venite* could be easily secured. The following are specimens of invitatories from the Roman breviary:—Christmas Day, "Christ is born for us, O come let us adore Him;" Advent, "O come let us adore the King, the Lord that is to come;" Ascension Day, "Christ our Lord has ascended into the heavens, O come let us adore Him;" Trinity Sunday, "O come let us adore the true God, the Unity in Trinity, and Trinity in Unity;" Easter, "The Lord is risen indeed, Alleluia." Thus a special character would be early impressed upon the services.

In addition to the liturgical desiderata already noticed, on the present occasion I cannot do more than enumerate—

- (1) The revision of the rubrics.
- (2) The shortening of the services.
- (3) The construction of new services, and of a
- (4) New lectionary.

There is much to be done. I trust the Revisers will remember how often the proverb comes true, "The more haste the worse speed."

JOHN DOWDEN.



## MR. BROWNING'S NEW POEM.

*Balaustion's Adventure: including a Transcript from Euripides.*  
By ROBERT BROWNING. London: Smith, Elder & Co., 1871.

SOME record of a new poem of one hundred and seventy pages by Mr. Browning must find a place in this Review ; but at first sight "Balaustion's Adventure" does not present a large field for such comment as can be made at very brief notice. We have a vague recollection that the story of Alcestis is told by Mr. Morris (in the same volume as that which contains the Cupid and Psyche) ; but we are not certain about it, and we fear the majority of the spectators of Mr. Leighton's striking picture in the last Exhibition of the Royal Academy did not make much of it, and that the greater number of even the admirers forgot to supplement it by a reminiscence of the tenderest of Milton's poems—

" Methought I saw my late espouséd saint,  
Brought to me, like Alcestis, from the grave,  
Whom Jove's great son to her glad husband gave,  
Rescued from death by force, though pale and faint."

But what we may gather or guess from hints in Mr. Browning's new work, coupled with the dedication, is that the picture made a strong and permanent impression upon an English lady, the Countess Cowper, and that "Balaustion's Adventure" is the result. In the latter part of the poem, the Greek girl, Balaustion, speaking for Mr. Browning with his eye upon Mr. Leighton, is made to say :—

"I know, too, a great Kaunian painter, strong  
 As Herakles, though rosy with a robe  
 Of grace that softens down the sinewy strength :  
 And he has made a picture of it all.  
 There lies Alkestis dead, beneath the sun,  
 She longed to look her last upon, beside  
 The sea, which somehow tempts the life in us  
 To come trip over its white waste of waves,  
 And try escape from earth, and fleet as free.  
 Behind the body, I suppose there bends  
 Old Pheres in his hoary impotence ;  
 And women-wailers, in a corner crouch  
 —Four, beautiful as you four—yes, indeed !—  
 Close, each to other, agonizing all,  
 As fastened, in fear's rhythmic sympathy,  
 To two contending opposite. There strains  
 The might o' the hero 'gainst his more than match,  
 —Death, dreadful not in thew and bone, but like  
 The envenomed substance that exudes some dew  
 Whereby the merely honest flesh and blood  
 Will fester up and run to ruin straight,  
 Ere they can close with, clasp and overcome  
 The poisonous impalpability  
 That simulates a form beneath the flow  
 Of those grey garments ; I pronounce that piece  
 Worthy to set up in our Poikilé !"

And the dedication of the book runs as follows :—

“ TO THE COUNTESS COWPER..

“ If I mention the simple truth : that this poem absolutely owes its  
 existence to you—who not only suggested, but imposed on me as a task,  
 what has proved the most delightful of May-month amusements—I shall  
 seem honest indeed, but hardly prudent ; for, how good and beautiful ought  
 such a poem to be !

“ Euripides might fear little ; but I, also, have an interest in the perform-  
 ance : and what wonder if I beg you to suffer that it make, in another and  
 far easier sense, its nearest possible approach to those Greek qualities of  
 goodness and beauty, by laying itself gratefully at your feet ? ”

This all speaks for itself ; and though the interpretation is by no  
 means as Greek as the picture (not even when Mr. Browning is  
 frankly translating from Euripides), we may all be pleased to see  
 such a picture wedded to such a poem—with such an exceedingly  
 graceful and fascinating dedication. Our account of the approaches,  
 so to speak, to the poem will be as complete as we can make it when  
 we have added that by way of motto or epigraph Mr. Browning  
 has prefixed a quotation from his wife :—

“ Our Euripides, the human,  
 With his droppings of warm tears,  
 And his touches of things common  
 Till they rose to touch the sphere,”—

Words which in part also find their way into the mouth of Balaustion towards the close of the poem.

The "Alcestis" of Euripides occupies about seventy pages of the size of those on which "Balaustion's Adventure" is printed. A good part of the drama is, in fact, recited by Balaustion; but she is Chorus, and much more than Chorus. She has, indeed, a great deal to say which is excellent Browning, but which would very much have puzzled Euripides (we are merely recording a fact, not making a complaint). She has her own adventures to tell, and she necessarily deals with the original as a person giving an account of it, not quoting the whole. Hence, interruptions, expansions, and other forms of "handling," which considerably extend the narrative. Take this passage, occurring, of course, towards the close:—

ΗΡΑΚΛΗΣ  
 ἔχεις. φθόνος δὲ μὴ γένοιτο τις θεῶν!  
 ΑΔΜΗΤΟΣ  
 ὦ τοῦ μεγίστου Ζηνὸς εὐγενὲς τέκνον  
 εὐδαιμονοίης, καὶ σ' ὃ φίτυσας πατήρ  
 σώξοι! σὺ γάρ τ' αἶμ' ἐξανώρθωσας μόνος  
 πῶς τήνδ' ἔπεμψας νερθεν εἰς φάος τοῦδε;

In Mr. Browning's version we have the following:—

"Take care, nor wake the envy of the Gods!"  
 'O thou, of greatest Zeus true son,'—so spoke  
 Admetos when the closing word must come,  
 'Go ever in a glory of success,  
 And save, that sire, his offspring to the end!  
 For thou hast—only thou—raised me and mine  
 Up again to this light and life!' Then asked  
 Tremblingly, how was trod the perilous path  
 Out of the dark into the light and life:  
 How it had happened with Alkestis there."

In which it will be seen the question of Admetus is not given, but we are told, in four lines for one, that he asked it. Another instance (here, again, we of course are not criticising, but merely mentioning a fact) occurs at the commencement of the play, at the end of the dialogue between Apollo and Death. The recitation of the dialogue breaks off at the words of Death—

"οὐκ ἂν δύναιο πάντ' ἔχειν, ἂ μὴ σε δεῖ."

And we have this treatment:—

"And then Apollon prophesied,—I think,  
 More to himself than to impatient Death,  
 Who did not hear or would not heed the while,—  
 For he went on to say 'Yet even so,  
 Cruel above the measure, thou shalt clutch  
 No life here! Such a man do I perceive

Advancing to the house of Pheres now,  
 Sent by Eurustheus to bring out of Thrace,  
 The winter world, a chariot with its steeds!  
 He indeed, when Admetos proves the host,  
 And he the guest, at the house here,—he it is  
 Shall bring to bear such force, and from thy hands  
 Rescue this woman! Grace no whit to me  
 Will that prove, since thou dost thy deed the same,  
 And earnest too my hate, and all for nought!"

This gives some idea of the mechanism of the poem, and we confess—while admiring the amount of fusion that has taken place under the hand of the modern poet—we would rather have had more Browning and less Euripides. In fact we should have preferred that the former had taken the story and done wholly as he pleased with it, ignoring Euripides altogether. This, however, could not be; it was not the conception: Wild-pomegranate-flower had her Euripides to recite, and do it she must, for the legend's sake—we mean the "adventure" as it is here given. Besides, she gives us at the end a new reading of the story, which is, indeed, very beautiful; but as wide of the original as the reading which the poet of the Day-Dream gives to the story of the Sleeping Princess when Lady Flora, whose "finer female sense" is offended by "a random string," shakes her head, and is understood to demand a moral. It is very beautiful Browning, but portentously incredible Balaustion. The manner in which the lady deals with the difficulty of the masks fairly made us laugh outright. and we believe few readers will get over it without a not unpleasant shock:—

"Why, mark!

Even when I told the play and got the praise,  
 There spoke up a brisk little somebody,  
 Critic and whippersnapper, in a rage  
 To set things right: 'The girl departs from truth!  
 Pretends she saw what was not to be seen,  
 Making the mask of the actor move, forsooth!  
 "Then a fear flitted o'er the wife's white face,"—  
 "Then frowned the father,"—"then the husband shook,"—  
 "Then from the festal forehead alipt each spray,  
 And the heroic mouth's gay grace was gone;"—  
 As she had seen each naked fleshly face,  
 And not the merely-painted mask it wore!  
 Well, is the explanation difficult?  
 What's poetry except a power that makes?  
 And, speaking to one sense, inspires the rest,  
 Pressing them all into its service; so  
 That who sees painting, seems to hear as well  
 The speech that's proper for the painted mouth;  
 And who hears music, feels his solitude  
 Peopled at once—for how count heart-beats plain  
 Unless a company, with hearts which beat,  
 Come close to the musician, seen or no?  
 And who receives true verse at eye or ear,

Takes in (with verse) time, place, and person too,  
 So, links each sense on to its sister-sense,  
 Grace-like.

\* \* \* \*

Who hears the poem, therefore, sees the play."

This is all as true as gospel, and beautifully said (we have omitted a few lines), but the sudden introduction of the "brisk little critic and whipper-snapper" for the purpose of raising an objection so easily answered, and then the crushing retort of Wild-pomegranate-flower, delivered at length in such resonant, naked Browningese, have a rather startling effect. A parenthesis would have done it—but it is one of Mr. Browning's characteristics to expand parenthetical topics into high magnitudes. Some of his most splendid passages arise upon us in this way. Nevertheless the characteristic in question leads to an occasional want of proportion; and we are now and then suddenly tossed out of the main current of emotion by an irrepressible burst of surprise at the ingenuity of the poet. To have done at once with very small things, we will, in our capacity of "whipper-snapper," complain of the word "serpentiningly," which is applied to the winding of ivy; and also of the touch with which the poem opens:—

"About that strangest, saddest, sweetest song  
 I, when a girl, heard in Kameiros once,  
 And, after, saved my life by? *Oh, so glad*  
*To tell you the adventure!*"

Surely no respect for the genius of Mr. Browning need prevent any one's saying that this suggestion of "gush" seems to strike a false note. We also object, and are as free to state our objection as Mr. Browning is to spell *Æschylus* or *Æschylos*, *Aischulos*, to his way of spelling Greek names. Of course he anticipated the objection, and deliberately did as he chose, but though we prefer the termination in *os* to that in *us*, and in some few cases the *k* to the *c* (even Mr. Browning cannot always use the former), we do not believe anything will ever reconcile us to *Olumpos*, or *Phullis*, or *Psuttalia*, or *Ortugia*, or *Eurustheus*. Nor do we believe that the *u*, as it is at all likely to be pronounced by English lips, so accurately represents the sound of the original as the *y*. These, however, are matters in which every man must have his own way; we simply state a personal dislike which we believe will be widely shared—we do not pretend that criticism can have anything decisive to say about such trifles. When Landor spells "still" *stil*, and "read" *redd*, it amuses him and does not hurt us, and there is an end. Mr. Browning has much more reason and much more good example on his side, and some eyes may soon get accustomed to this spelling of Greek names.

We will call upon Balaustion to tell her adventures in her own words:—

"When poor reluctant Nikias, pushed by fate,  
 Went falteringly against Syracuse;  
 And there shamed Athens, lost her ships and men,  
 And gained a grave, or death without a grave,  
 I was at Rhodes—the isle, not Rhodes the town,  
 Mine was Kameiros—when the news arrived:  
 Our people rose in tumult, cried 'No more  
 Duty to Athens, let us join the League  
 And side with Sparta, share the spoil,—at worst,  
 Abjure a headship that will ruin Greece!'  
 And so, they sent to Knidos for a fleet  
 To come and help revoltors. Ere help came,—  
 Girl as I was, and never out of Rhodes  
 The whole of my first fourteen years of life,  
 But nourished with Ilissian mother's-milk,—  
 I passionately cried to who would hear  
 And those who loved me at Kameiros—'No!  
 Never throw Athens off for Sparta's sake—  
 Never disloyal to the life and light  
 Of the whole world worth calling world at all!  
 Rather go die at Athens.

•   •   •   •

To Athens, all of us that have a soul,  
 Follow me!' And I wrought so with my prayer,  
 That certain of my kinsfolk crossed the strait  
 And found a ship at Kaunos; well-disposed  
 Because the Captain—where did he draw breath  
 First but within Psuttalia? Thither fled  
 A few like-minded as ourselves."

The vessel sails, and being, as the captain thinks, in sight of Crete, a pirate ship bears down upon her. Balaustion inspirits the sailors to row hard:—

"I sprang upon the altar by the mast  
 And sang aloft,—some genius prompting me,—  
 That song of ours which saved at Salamis:  
 'O sons of Greeks, go, set your country free,  
 Free your wives, free your children, free the fanes  
 O' the Gods, your fathers founded,—sepulchres  
 They sleep in! Or save all, or all be lost!'

•   •   •   •

Oh, luckless we!  
 For here was Sicily and Syracuse:  
 We ran upon the lion from the wolf.  
 Ere we drew breath, took counsel, out there came  
 A galley, hailed us. 'Who asks entry here  
 In war-time? Are you Sparta's friend or foe?'  
 'Kaunians'—our Captain judged his best reply,  
 'The mainland-seaport that belongs to Rhodes;  
 Rhodes that casts in her lot now with the League,  
 Forsaking Athens, you have heard belike!'  
 'Ay, but we heard all Athens in one ode  
 Just now! we heard her in that Aischulos!  
 You bring a boatful of Athenians here,  
 Kaunians although you be.'"

After some more parley :—

“ ‘ Wait ! ’

Cried they (and wait we did, you may be sure)  
 ‘ That song was veritable Aischulos,  
 Familiar to the mouth of man and boy,  
 Old glory : how about Euripides ?  
 The newer and not yet so famous bard,  
 He that was born upon the battle-day  
 While that song and the salpinx sounded him  
 Into the world, first sound, at Salamis—  
 Might you know any of his verses too ? ’ ”

Balaustion volunteers to recite the *Alcestis* :—

“ But I cried ‘ Brother Greek ! better than so,—  
 Save us, and I have courage to recite  
 The main of a whole play from first to last ;  
 That strangest, saddest, sweetest song of his,  
 ALCESTIS ; which was taught, long years ago  
 At Athens, in Glaukinos’ archonship,  
 But only this year reached our Isle o’ the Rose.  
 I saw it at Kameiros ; played the same,  
 They say, as for the right Lenean feast  
 In Athens ; and beside the perfect piece—  
 Its beauty and the way it makes you weep,—  
 There is much honor done your own loved God  
 Herakles, whom you house i’ the city here  
 Nobly, the Temple wide Greece talks about !  
 I come a suppliant to your Herakles !  
 Take me and put me on his temple-steps,  
 To tell you his achievement as I may,  
 And, that told, he shall bid you set us free ! ’

Then, because Greeks are Greeks, and hearts are hearts,  
 And poetry is power,—they all outbroke  
 In a great joyous laughter with much love :  
 ‘ Thank Herakles for the good holiday !  
 Make for the harbour ! Row, and let voice ring,  
 “ In we row, bringing more Euripides ! ” ’  
 All the crowd, as they lined the harbour now,  
 ‘ More of Euripides ’—took up the cry.  
 We landed ; the whole city, soon astir,  
 Came rushing out of gates in common joy  
 To the suburb temple ; there they stationed me  
 O’ the topmost step : and plain I told the play,  
 Just as I saw it ; what the actors said,  
 And what I saw, or thought I saw the while,  
 At our Kameiros theatre, clean-scooped  
 Out of a hill-side, with the sky above  
 And sea before our seats in marble row :  
 Told it, and, two days more, repeated it,  
 Until they sent us on our way again  
 With good words and great wishes.”

Balaustion carries home to Athens a husband, and sees Euripides. She now repeats the recitation of the “ *Alcestis* ” to please her four friends Petalé, Phullis, Charopé, Chrusion, and so the story is com-

menced, Death challenging Apollo at the portico of the palace of Admetos—the story which we need in no wise tell here.

For serious criticism in any high sense, we are writing this at infinitely too short a notice; and if it were not so, every time a reader says, "Your work makes such or such an impression upon me in this place or in that place, and I do not like it"—the poet may answer, "Yet that was just the impression I intended to produce, or at all events knew *could* be produced; you must take my work as you would take me personally, just as I am—it cannot be broken up." To this, when the work and the workman are alike entitled to respect, there is no replying. But one's impression remains.

In spite of the fact that there are in this poem, as we shall show, passages which are, in the true Miltonic sense, "simple, sensuary, and passionate," passages of continuously unperplexed and pellucid writing such as the narrative demands, it cannot be said that Mr. Browning's is an unperplexed manner. It is, we all know, interrogative, critical, and—what word shall we coin?—and confidential—abrupt, with occasional touches of defiance, and too frequent sidelong disclosures of what we do not know how to call anything but consciousness of the reader. Now to wish these and other peculiarities away would be to wish Mr. Browning unfrocked of himself—for they actually belong to his whole moral and intellectual nature—and accordingly we take them as they come. But then they *do* come; and we seem here to want a steady continuance of simple unperplexed writing, such as we get in some of (what appear to us) the best passages of the poem. The gothic freedom and roughness of handling which have an attractive congruity in "Paracelsus," do not attract us in Balaustion, they break the unity. Nor does it mend matters, so far as our impression goes, that Mr. Browning every now and then flings down a commonplace or a modernism which almost suggests the newspaper. Here are examples:—

*"One thing is certain; there's no laughing  
As out thou bearest the poor dead old man."*

This is not at all compelled by the single line in Euripides, for which these two stand:—

*"οὐκ ἰγγελας γέροντα βαστάζων νεκρόν."*

Though, of course, Mr. Browning has a perfect right to introduce the phrase. Again:—

*"Muttered, now, this or that ineptitude."*

Again:—

*"All the truth in her  
Claimed to assert itself."*

Again :—

"The boast remains permissible."

Again :—

"Subjoinest thou this comment."

Again :—

"You see, the worst of the interruption was."

Surely there is nothing fantastic in saying that these turns of phrase, and others familiar in much lower ranges than those with which the poem is familiar, and yet not "household words" (and so sacred), carry with them an association or odour, which, like the "Oh, so glad!" of the opening sentence, is unfavourable to poetic effect. At all events, that is how it strikes us.

A far deeper sense of incongruity, which, however, does not so immediately arise, is produced by the putting of such a weight of thought into the mouth of a woman, even a woman of genius, under such circumstances as are pre-supposed. We say simply *weight* here, leaving another matter aside for the present; and all the small, graceful touches introduced by the poet to lighten the effect do not remove the feeling that Wild-pomegranate-flower goes far beyond the functions of a reciter and creator of bright reminiscences of a work of art in which, being great of soul, she had taken much delight. Something, however—nay, much—must be granted to the fundamental hypothesis of a poem like this; and the point just noted would not press itself upon the mind, if it could be in the nature of things dissociated from another.

But besides the weight of what Balaustion says, there is its quality—which, on the whole, is essentially modern. One of the most attractive parts of the poem is the conception of Heracles, the beneficent, indefatigable worker, and true, firm friend, with the *fond gaillard*. It reminds you at once of Mr. Carlyle's Mirabeau; but who does not at once feel that the order of moral criticism to which it belongs is much more modern than Greek? We are affronted rather than helped by an attempt to read moral form and consistency into every Greek myth, just as we are affronted, though in a different way, by Ewald's astounding assumptions in (say) his "History of Israel." Here, again, we speak only for ourselves. What displeases is not, be it observed, the mere putting of a *morale* or character into what in a certain stage of history was a mere crude mythologic figure—Hercules may very well stand for the Beneficent Worker, with the *fond gaillard*. But such a conception must be very gently touched, if it is introduced into a story like that of the "Alcestis;" and generally we do not want in such a case any *manipulation* for ends of high moral consistency. We feel perfectly clear that if the Greek imagination conceived Heracles as the Jolly Worker, it would not only have conceived him with all the faults and vices natural

to such a character, but would have thrust them forward, and never have entertained the idea of putting him in any way to rights. The ideas of a pantheon and of the moral unities cannot coexist.

It must not be supposed for a moment that we are saying all this to Mr. Browning; we are merely showing how it strikes a reader who has very hastily to record his impressions of the poem. The story, in its essence, seems to us unmanageable from any modern point of view. Once get rid of the vague presence of Destiny—which, if you retain it, makes the moral unities impossible, while it shrouds everything in a vapour of *must-have-been* which half-stifles criticism and blurs all dividing-lines—once get rid of that, we say, and Admetos becomes a person to kick, and the tragedy something rather like a farce. Our readers know in what other ways than this the same idea has found expression, or half-expression. Hence, Mr. Browning has to go about to make Admetos presentable, and Balaustion informs us that Heracles discerned that he was, after all, “weak, not bad.” If that is not a false note, there never was one in this world.

Still more strongly do we hear the voice of Mr. Browning through the mask, and feel the incongruity of the story and the “moral” when we come to the beautiful rendering of the former at the close of the work—“the new Admetos, new Alkestis” as the girl calls her version. This version we shall not do the book the injustice of quoting, and indeed it is too long for quotation; but, except for the unnecessary and far too lengthy illustration of the two athletes, it is one entire and perfect chrysolite. True, it is a good deal more like Fouqué than like anything Greek; but it is so exquisitely beautiful that we rise from the volume in a mood of warm thankfulness to the poet, and more than forgive for its sake whatever has not pleased us. One passage in this “version” will remind the reader of a passage in “Paracelsus:”—

“’Tis an old tale. Jove strikes the Titans down,  
Not when they set about their mountain-piling;  
But when another rock would crown their work.”

In Balaustion’s “version” we have this:—

“Then she ‘O thou Admetos, must the pile  
Of truth on truth, which needs but one truth more  
To tower up in completeness, trophy-like,  
Emprize of man, and triumph of the world,  
Must it go ever to the ground again  
Because of some faint heart or faltering hand,  
Which we, that breathless world about the base,  
Trusted should carry safe to altitude,  
Superimpose o’ the summit, our supreme  
Achievement, our victorious coping-stone?’”

But of the very numerous parallelisms that have struck us, we can

only quote one more; being rather anxious to quote a few of the finest passages. In Mr. Browning's poem we read this in the new "version":—

"Whereat the monarch, calm, addressed himself  
To die, but bitterly the soul outbroke—  
'O prodigality of life, blind waste  
I' the world, of power profuse without the will  
To make life do its work, deserve its day!  
My ancestors pursued their pleasure, poured  
The blood o' the people out in idle war,  
Or took occasion of some weary peace  
To bid men dig down deep or build up high,  
Spend bone and marrow that the king might feast  
Entrenched and buttressed from the vulgar gaze.  
Yet they all lived, nay, lingered to old age:  
As though Zeus loved that they should laugh to scorn  
The vanity of seeking other ends,  
In rule, than just the ruler's pastime. They  
Lived; I must die.'"

It must be a dull memory which does not instantly recall Mr. Matthew Arnold's "Mycerinus":—

"Not by the justice that my father spurn'd,  
Not for the thousands whom my father slew,  
Altars unfed and temples overturn'd,  
Cold hearts and thankless tongues, where thanks were due;  
Fell this late voice from lips that cannot lie,  
Stern sentence of the Powers of Destiny.

"I will unfold my sentence and my crime.  
My crime, that, rapt in reverential awe,  
I sate obedient, in the fiery prime  
Of youth, self-govern'd, at the feet of law;  
Ennobling this dull pomp, the life of kings,  
By contemplation of diviner things.

"My father lov'd injustice, and liv'd long;  
Crown'd with grey hairs he died, and full of sway.  
I lov'd the good he scorn'd, and hated wrong:  
The Gods declare my recompense to-day.  
I look'd for life more lasting, rule more high;  
And when six years are measur'd, lo, I die!

\* \* \* \* \*

"Ye men of Egypt, ye have heard your king.  
I go, and I return not. But the will  
Of the great Gods is plain; and ye must bring  
Ill deeds, ill passions, zealous to fulfil  
Their pleasure, to their feet: and reap their praise,  
The praise of Gods, rich boon! and length of days."

And now we will devote the remainder of our space to the pleasant task of reproducing a few of the lines which have struck us as particularly fine.

From the opening of the recitation this :—

“ Out from the portico there gleamed a God,  
Apollon : for the bow was in his hand,  
The quiver at his shoulder, all his shape  
One dreadful beauty.”

From the same, these verses in which, of course, Death, as he meets Apollo, is spoken of :—

“ Like some dread heapy blackness, ruffled wing,  
Convulsed and cowering head that is all eye,  
Which proves a ruined eagle who, too blind  
Swooping in quest o' the quarry, fawn or kid,  
Descried deep down the chasm 'twixt rock and rock,  
Has wedged and mortised, into either wall  
O' the mountain, the pent earthquake of his power :  
So lies, half hurtless yet still terrible.”

Later on in the poem :—

“ For thee, Alkestis Queen !  
Many a time those haunters of the Muse  
Shall sing thee to the seven-stringed mountain-shell,  
And glorify in hymns that need no harp,  
At Sparta when the cycle comes about,  
And that Karneian month wherein the moon  
Rises and never sets the whole night through :  
So too at splendid and magnificent  
Athenai. Such the spread of thy renown,  
And such the lay that, dying, thou hast left  
Singer and sayer.”

Still later :—

“ Thee, Apollon's very self,  
The lyric Puthian, deigned inhabit once,  
Become a shepherd here in thy domains,  
And pipe, adown the winding hill-side paths,  
Pastoral marriage-poems to thy flocks  
At feed : while with them fed in fellowship,  
Through joy i' the music, spot-skin lynxes ; ay,  
And lions too, the bloody company,  
Came, leaving Othrus' dell ; and round thy lyre,  
Phoibos, there danced the speckle-coated fawn,  
Pacing on lightsome fetlock past the pines  
Tress-topped, the creature's natural boundary,  
Into the open everywhere ; such heart  
Had she within her, beating joyous beats,  
At the sweet reassurance of thy song !  
Therefore the lot o' the master is, to live  
In a home multitudinous with herds,  
Along by the fair-flowing Boibian lake,  
Limited, that ploughed land and pasture-plain,  
Only where stand the sun's steeds, stabled west  
I' the cloud, by that mid-air which makes the clime  
Of those Molossoi : and he rules as well  
O'er the Aigaian, up to Pelion's shore,—  
Sea-stretch without a port !”

In Balaustion's "new Admetos and new Alkestis," towards the end of the poem, occur these fine verses :—

"Since death divides the pair,  
'T is well that I depart and thou remain  
Who wast to me as spirit is to flesh :  
Let the flesh perish, be perceived no more,  
So thou, the spirit that informed the flesh,  
Bend yet awhile, a very flame above  
The rift I drop into the darkness by,—  
And bid remember, flesh and spirit once,  
Worked in the world, one body, for man's sake.  
Never be that abominable show  
Of passive death without a quickening life—  
Admetos only, no Alkestis now!"

The "flesh" and the "spirit"! One does not know which to admire most, the beauty of the lines, or the audacity which puts them into the mouth of Wild-pomegranate-flower in the time of Nicias. We fear the Syracusans—but no, let us not get upon that tack again. Let us rather conclude upon the thought that the poet must have known his own intention, and openly faced this, that, or the other, which we confess jars upon us at present. Deliberate and repeated readings of "Balaustion's Adventure" may make harmonious what now seems not so; but they will not increase the love and homage which the students of Mr. Browning are always eager to fling at his feet.

MATTHEW BROWNE.



## BENJAMIN WHICHCOTE.

THE name of Whichcote is barely known in the history of English theology. Burnet's notice\* is quoted occasionally; but beyond this, little is understood either of the character or writings of one who was among the most influential preachers and theologians of his age—an age in which both preaching and theology still exercised a real influence on all the affairs of national life. Whichcote not only possessed great credit with the most eminent statesmen of the Commonwealth,† but he was probably, during this important period, the teacher who, more than any other at Cambridge, impressed his own mode of thought both upon his colleagues in the University and the rising generation of students. Tillotson, Patrick, and Burnet all look back to him as a truly memorable man, whose whole life and studies were devoted to the most elevating objects, and who set the thoughts of the young in a new and higher direction. In a true sense he may be said to have founded the new school of philosophical theology, although it is chiefly known by the more elaborate writings of others. Like many eminent teachers, his personality and the general force of his mental character were obviously greater than his intellectual productiveness. A few volumes of sermons are nearly all that survive of his labours to help us to understand them. Yet his sermons, comparatively neglected as they have been,

\* "Hist. of His own Times," vol. i. pp. 339-40.

† Ib.

are amongst the most thoughtful in the English language, pregnant with meaning, not only for his own, but for all time. It is strange that he should have been so little known and studied; but the obscurity which has overtaken him is not without some relation to his very greatness, and the silent way in which he passed out of sight at the Restoration after he had done his work at Cambridge. There are some kinds of influence which perish in their very fruitfulness, as the seed dies and wastes away at the root of the ripening grain. Whichcote's influence was of this kind. He was careless of his own name, providing the higher thoughts for which he cared were found bearing fruit. He possessed that highest of all magnanimity—a magnanimity comparatively rare—of forgetting himself in the cause which he loved, and rejoicing that others entered into the results for which he laboured. It is all the more necessary therefore that we should endeavour to do some degree of justice to his name and opinions, to bring before us as complete an image as we can of the man, and of his academic and theological activity. Standing as he does at the fountain-head of one school of thinkers, it is especially important to catch the spirit of his teaching, and to present it in its historical and intellectual relations.

Benjamin Whichcote was born of "an ancient and honourable family" in the county of Shropshire in the spring of 1609-10. The exact date of his birth is given as March 11. His father was apparently a country squire, the owner of Whichcote Hall. His mother was of the same rank of life, being the "daughter of Edward Fox, Esq., of Greet, in the same county."\* He was sent to Emmanuel College, Cambridge, in 1626. Of his previous life, or the training of his boyhood, we know nothing. His tutor at Emmanuel was Mr. Antony Tuckney, the correspondent of his later years, of whom we shall learn more immediately. Tuckney was about ten years older than himself, and had passed a very distinguished academic career. He had been chosen fellow of his college when only twenty years of age, and after a brief interval of residence in a noble family, had returned to Cambridge, and acquired special distinction as a tutor at Emmanuel. This well-known college owed its foundation to Sir Walter Mildmay, in the reign of Elizabeth (1584), and was designed for the special encouragement of Calvinistic theology. Sir Walter was Elizabeth's Chancellor of the Exchequer

\* Preface by Dr. Salter, Prebendary of Norwich, to Whichcote and Tuckney's "Correspondence," published in 1753. To this preface and to Whichcote's own letters, and, of course, Tillotson's and Burnet's notices, we are indebted for the facts of his life and the course of formation of his opinions. Tillotson preached his funeral sermon, in 1683. I do not know of any other sources of information beyond the biographical dictionaries. There is a story as to Whichcote's MSS., and how they came into Dr. Salter's hands, which will be told in the sequel.

for a lengthened period (from 1566 to 1589). He is described by Fuller as a statesman of rare integrity, zealous "to advance the Queen's treasure," and yet "conscionably without wronging the subject," as a man of learning and deep and earnest convictions. Sympathising with the more decided Protestantism of the time, on which his mistress looked coldly, he devoted his means to its encouragement. There is a good story told by Fuller of a conversation between them on the subject—a story in all respects creditable to the Chancellor, to his wise tact no less than to his zeal. The Queen is said to have addressed him one day, "Sir Walter, I hear you have erected a Puritan foundation." "No, madam," was his reply, "far be it from me to countenance anything contrary to your established laws; but I have set an *acorn* which, when it becomes an *oak*, God alone knows what will be the fruit thereof."

Whichcote took his degree of B.A. in 1629, and of M.A. in 1633, and in the latter year became fellow of his college. In 1636 he was ordained both deacon and priest by Williams, Bishop of Lincoln, an irregularity for which his biographer\* is unable to account. During the eventful years which followed, he appears to have busied himself with pupils at the University till 1643, when he was presented by his college to the living of North Cadbury, in Somersetshire. There he is supposed to have married and begun to settle himself, when in the succeeding year he was recalled to Cambridge to succeed Dr. Collins, who had been ejected by the Parliament from the provostship of King's College. It appears to have been a grave perplexity to Whichcote whether or not he should accept this preferment. The idea of superseding a man whom he greatly respected, and whom he must have held to be wrongfully deprived of his office, was distasteful to his mind. He weighed anxiously the whole business, and the reasons for and against it, and even drew them out in writing for his guidance; but at length consented to accept the office, under condition of continuing to Dr. Collins one half of the salary payable to the provost from the college revenues.† He acted wisely; but the step was one which he was not allowed to forget at the Restoration, and even Tillotson remembers it apologetically in his funeral sermon. Tillotson adds at the same time that Whichcote "did not stoop to do anything unworthy to obtain the place, for he never took the Covenant." Not only so, but by the friendship and interest he had with some of the chief visitors, "he prevailed to have the greatest part of the fellows of King's College exempted from that imposition, and preserved them in their places."

\* Dr. Salter, *Prebendary of Norwich*, who edited his "*Aphorisms*," 1753.

† Salter, *Biographical Preface*, p. xviii. A schedule giving the heads of such reasons, *pro* and *con.*, was found amongst his papers after his death.

It may be inferred from this promotion, as also from his training at Emmanuel College, that Whichcote had grown up amongst Puritans, and that his relatives and friends belonged to that party. Whether he himself had ever professed Puritan tenets it is impossible to say. In his early years he probably fell in with the tone of his college. Nor is there any reason to believe that up to this time he had attracted notice by any singularity of opinion. In his first letter to Tuckney, in 1651, he says, "I do not, I cannot, forget my four first years' education in the University under you; and I think I have principles by me I then received from you."\* In the same letter, however, he also indicates that some of the opinions to which Tuckney objected, had been long entertained by him; so long back as when he disputed in the college chapel.† The fact appears to be that Whichcote was from the first a thoughtful and independent student in religious matters. Whatever may have been his early associations or upbringing, his mind sought its own path. He was but little indebted to books, he distinctly asserts, when accused by Tuckney of borrowing his views from the Dutch Arminians, and other special sources. "You say you find me largely in their 'Apologia;'—to my knowledge I never saw nor heard of the book before"‡—a singular enough confession. "I shame myself to tell you how little I have been acquainted with books. While fellow of Emmanuel College, employment with pupils took my time from me. I have not read many books; but I have studied a few. *Meditation and invention hath been rather my life than reading.*"§ Slowly forming his opinions in this manner, and carefully testing them, rejecting whatever was not "under-propt by convincing reason or satisfactory Scripture," he would not be ready to break the ties of circumstance which bound him. The most thoughtful and meditative minds are often the most reluctant to separate from old associations and surroundings. Hales remained strongly attached to the High Church in the civil struggle, and Chillingworth also, long after they had unlearned every dogmatic principle on which High Churchism rests. And Whichcote doubtless remained among the Puritans and was reckoned on their side from similar accidents of personal connection and training, although he never imbibed their spirit, and seems from the first to have rejected their doctrinal narrowness. The quick eye of Tuckney had seen the growing independence of his pupil, and his tendency to freedom and originality. "I loved you," he says,|| in allusion to their early connection at Emmanuel, "as finding you then studious and pious, and very loving

\* Letters, p. 7.

† Ib., p. 12.

‡ Ib., p. 53.

|| Ib., p. 54.

§ Ib., p. 36.

and observant of me ;” but “ I remember I then thought you somewhat cloudy and obscure in your expressions.” The mind of the pupil, notwithstanding his affectionate respect for his teacher, was evidently, even in these years, on a different track. He seems to have taken a larger and more philosophic view of religious questions, and given them different turns of expression. And dogmatic Puritanism has always been jealous of new modes of expression. It tolerates fundamental opposition almost as readily as phraseological differences. “ Cloudiness and obscurity ” are to this day the favourite terms by which it designates all attempts to freshen or remould the language of theology.

The date of Whichcote’s appointment as Provost of King’s, 1644, may be said to mark the rise of the new philosophical and religious movement at Cambridge. Not for some while after this, indeed, did it attain significance and general intellectual interest. But from the time that he was placed in this position of authority Whichcote seems to have become a power in the University, and gradually it was felt that there was a new life, other than Puritan or Anglo-Catholic, moving the academic mind. “ A nobler, freer, and more generous set of opinions ” began to prevail, especially among the young Masters of Arts, to the no small alarm of the older authorities, who remained fixed in their dogmatic opinions. The chief instrument of this new movement, as of the older religious spirit which had so stirred and changed the country, was preaching. It was as Afternoon Lecturer in Trinity Church that Whichcote spread his views and kindled that fervour for a rational Christianity which was destined to have such enduring effects. The correspondence with Tuckney\* helps us in some degree to understand the growth of the movement. We could have wished further information ; but at least we can trace in these letters the diverse forces at work, and the odd mingling of personal and theological influences with the deeper currents of thought, which were to leave their impression upon the mind of future generations.

The aim of the Puritan authorities in 1644 was, of course, to promote the cause so dear to them, and to remodel the Universities after their own mind. Whichcote’s appointment to be Provost of King’s was only one of numerous appointments which they made at the time with the same intention, and his position, and the movement which he initiated, will be best understood in relation to the men who surrounded him, and with whom, no doubt, it was expected he would cordially co-operate. These men are especially mentioned as his friends ; Tuckney, formerly his tutor, who was made Master of

\* This correspondence, as will be afterwards explained, was first published in 1753, edited by Dr. Salter, Prebendary of Norwich.

Emmanuel, and Arrowsmith and Hill, who were placed respectively at the head of St. John's and of Trinity. "Thus," says Dr. Salter, "four very intimate friends after a separation of some years, save that the three last met in the Assembly of Divines at Westminster, saw each other again in the several most honourable stations of the University to which their learning and piety had deservedly recommended them."

Tuckney, the oldest of the four, as we have already seen, had acquired distinction as a tutor at Emmanuel, where he had "many persons of rank and quality admitted under him." He was "a man of great reading and much knowledge, a ready and elegant Latinist, but narrow, stiff, and dogmatical; no enemy to the royal or episcopal power as it should seem; but above measure zealous for Church power and ecclesiastical discipline."\* He was, in short, a doctrinal Puritan, as his letters fully show, of a somewhat extreme type, equally opposed to Papists, Arminians, and Independents, all of whom he attacks vigorously "in the same breath." Some idea of his dogmatic fierceness may be gathered from his strong denunciation of Milton on the subject of divorce, whom he calls *infamis et non uno laqueo dignus*. He is said to have taken an active part in the dogmatic work of the Westminster Assembly of Divines, and "particularly to have drawn the exposition of the Commandments in the larger Catechism."† Of his ability there seems no question, as he was unanimously chosen—*invito et pæne coactus*, he himself says—to fill the chair of Regius Professor of Divinity on the resignation of Arrowsmith in 1655. While stoutly dogmatical in his own views, he seems to have been by no means a bigot practically. He voted in the Assembly "against subserving or swearing to the Confession." And in his elections at St. John's, to which he was promoted from Emmanuel, "when the President, according to the cant of the times, would call upon him to have regard to the godly," he would answer, "no one should have a greater regard to the godly than himself; but he was determined to choose none but *scholars*, adding very wisely, they may deceive me in their godliness, they cannot in their scholarship." "This story of him, so much to his honour, is still upon record in the College." So says Dr. Salter in 1753; and the story is one eminently characteristic and deserving of preservation. Tuckney was plainly a man of shrewdness and insight as well as learning and zeal, and no unworthy antagonist of his distinguished pupil. His letters reveal very much the same qualities that Salter describes. They are narrow and deficient in sympathy and elevation, but they are terse, well-reasoned, and keep closely to the subject from his own point of view.

\* Dr. Salter's Preface, p. xii.

† Ib. p. xv.

Hill was also a student at Emmanuel, where he was admitted in 1618, about the same time as Tuckney. Like him also he worked for some time with the famous Mr. John Cotton, "Vicar of Boston, a very zealous Nonconformist," who afterwards emigrated to New England. He "spent some good time with this Puritan worthy," as many other zealous young men of the time seem to have done, "for his further perfecting, and the more happy seasoning of his spirit." He appears to have excelled as a preacher, having been appointed during the sitting of the Westminster Assembly to preach "often before the House of Commons on solemn occasions, as public fast-days, and also chosen one of their morning week-day preachers at the Abbey." On his promotion to the headship of Trinity College he "set up two lectures in the town of Cambridge, one of which he supplied himself altogether, and was much resorted to." "He printed only a few sermons, which are now little known or inquired after;" and at the time of his death, in 1653, "he had made fair progress," says Tuckney, who preached his funeral sermon, "in a learned confutation of the great daring champion of the Arminian errors, whom the abusive wits of the University, with an impudent boldness, would say none there durst adventure upon." The "great daring champion of the Arminian errors" was John Goodwin, who had dedicated, two years before, his volume entitled "Redemption redeemed" to Whichcote, as Vice-Chancellor, along with the other heads of houses at Cambridge.

John Arrowsmith was the only one of the four not educated at Emmanuel. He was "admitted" at St. John's College in 1616. Afterwards he was chosen fellow of Catherine Hall, but seems to have retired early from the University, and settled at Lynn in Norfolk, where he continued, "very much esteemed, some ten or twelve years." He preceded Tuckney in the Regius Professorship of Divinity, the duties of which he discharged with ability; but he seems to have been chiefly remembered for his sweet and admirable temper. He was, says Salter,\* "like his friends Tuckney and Hill, a very learned and able, but a stiff and narrow divine; was, like them, offended with the popularity and credit of Dr. Whichcote; for, though they all respected and loved his person, they could none of them bear with his freedom." But Arrowsmith's natural temper was incomparably better than his principles; and he is represented by both sides as a man of a most sweet and engaging disposition. This even appears through all the sourness and severity of his opinions in his "*Tactica Sacra*," a book written in a clear style and with a lively fancy, in which is displayed at once much weakness and stiffness, but withal great reading, and a very amiable candour to-

\* Preface, xxxiii-iv.

the persons and characters of those from whom he found himself obliged to differ. Whichcote speaks of him in his first letter as "a later acquaintance;" that is to say, than Tuckney and Hill, both of whom had stood in the relation of tutor to him at Emmanuel; "but my friend of choice, a companion of my special delight, whom in my former years I have acquainted with all my heart. I have told him all my thoughts, and I have scarcely ever spoken or thought better of a man, in respect of the sweetness of his spirit and the amiableness of his conversation."\*

Such were the four friends, "very dear to each other," now in 1644 settled together at Cambridge. Whichcote was younger by about ten years than any of them; and while the others had been consolidating their early principles in the labours and ambitions of the Westminster Assembly, he had been spending his time in comparative quietness and meditation, either at the University or in Somersetshire, where for a short while he held the living given him by his college. His studies had been of a very different nature from theirs; and gradually there had been forming in his mind trains of thought of which they knew nothing, and, as it turned out, were little able to comprehend. We have seen already that Tuckney professed to have early detected in him the budding of new opinions, or, at least, the use of a new language; and in the same passage he says to his former pupil,—“I have heard that when you came to be a lecturer in the college, you in a great measure for the year laid aside other studies, and betook yourself to philosophy and metaphysics, which some think you were then so immersed in that ever since you have been cast into that mould both in your private discourses and preaching.”† Still, not even Tuckney could appreciate the divergency of thought and feeling which had been growing up in Whichcote's mind from the Westminster theological standard. To men of the class of the Westminster Divines, in whom the spirit of dogmatic affirmation is strong, and the spirit of speculative insight weak, if not utterly wanting, few things are more difficult to understand than a theological stand-point different from their own, and, indeed, not only different, but incommensurate—stretching widely beyond their doctrinal particularism, and taking it up into a higher synthesis as of little or no account. They are out of their reckoning before the advance of a new line of thought, which overlooks rather than crosses or opposes their favourite dogmas, and starts on a fresh career. On the other hand, a mind like Whichcote's, meditative rather than polemical, speculative rather than dogmatic, does not court notice for its growing light, but adapts itself as far as possible to the theological atmosphere and associations surrounding it. He was far

\* P. 7.

† Letters, p. 36-7.

too wise and broad-minded to be intent merely on the assertion of his own views, and not to feel that all changes of opinion which are really worth promoting must be gradual, and spring organically from the natural decay of pre-existing modes of thought.

There is no evidence, therefore, that at first the four divines did not work cordially together, and seem to themselves to be pursuing the same objects. But gradually the change in Whichcote made itself felt. The new tone of his preaching began to stir the University mind, and to awaken distrust amongst his colleagues and old friends. How long the fire smouldered before it burst forth we cannot tell; but at length a Commencement Sermon, preached by Whichcote as Vice-Chancellor, in the autumn of 1651, drew from Tuckney, acting evidently not only for himself but also for his friends Hill and Arrowsmith, and probably others, the vigorous remonstrance contained in his first letter. The background of personal feeling is very noticeable in the letters; and the air of the old tutor gives here and there a curious piquancy to the tone of discussion.

Tuckney opens with an allusion to the gossip and discussion which Whichcote's teaching had for some time excited. It had been said that he and his friends dealt "disingenuously" with the Provost of King's in speaking against his opinion without privately remonstrating with him.

"Though I do not fancy," he says, "as some others, that affected word *ingenuous*; and I wish the thing itself were not idolized, to the prejudice of *saving grace*; yet, if I must use the word, truly, Sir, I desire to be so *ingenuous* with you, as out of that ancient and still continued love I bear you, to have leave to tell you that my heart hath been much exercised about you; and that especially since your being Vice-Chancellor I have seldom heard you preach, but that something hath been delivered by you, and that so authoritatively, and with the big words—sometimes of 'divinest reason' and sometimes of 'more than mathematical demonstration'—that hath very much grieved me, and I believe others with me; and yesterday as much as any time. I pass by many things in your sermon, and crave leave to note three or four.

"I. Your second position—'That all those things wherein good men differ may not be determined from Scripture; and that it in some places seems to be for the one part, and in some places for the other'—I take to be unsafe and unsound.

"II. Your first advice—'That we would be confined to Scripture words and expressions—in which all parties agree—and not press other forms of words which are from fallible men; and this would be for the peace of Christendom'—I look at as more dangerous, and verily believe that Christ by His blood never intended to purchase such a peace, in which the most orthodox (for that word I must use, though it be now-a-days stomached), with Papists, Arians, Socinians, and all the worst of heretiques, must be all put into a bag together; and let them hold and maintain their own, though never so damnable heresies; yet as long as they agree with us in Scripture expressions they must be accorded with.—And yet,

"III. Your second advice gives your *ingenuous* man liberty to propound

his own different conceptions; and it may be to brand the contrary opinion with the black mark of 'Divinity taught in hell,' which will take away as much peace as the former advice promised to give us. The *libertas prophetandi*, in most that ever pressed it, did *semper aliquid monstri alere*; and when I discern whose footsteps appear in these two advices, I am very sorry to see Dr. Whichcote, whom I so much love and honour, to tread in them. Of both these advices what ground there was from the text, I leave indifferent men to judge. Sir, your heart I believe was full of them; and that was the reason of that so *importune* propounding of them.

"IV. Your discourse about reconciliation—that it does not operate on God but on us, 'that *e nobis nascitur*,' &c.—is divinity which my heart riseth against. . . . To say that the ground of God's reconciliation is from anything in us, and not from His free grace, freely justifying the ungodly, is to deny one of the fundamental truths of our Gospel that derives from Heaven, which I bless God lyeth near to my heart. It is dearer to me than my life; and therefore you will pardon me in this my bolder *παρρησία* and freeness, in which if I have exceeded you will easily impute an oversight to the straytes of an hour, which I had to write this letter—and a copy of it. And, Sir, although your speech and answers the last Commencement were in the judgment of abler men than myself against my Commencement Position the former year; and your first yesterday advice directly against my Commencement sermon, and what you delivered yesterday about reconciliation, if I mistake not, flatly against what I have preached for you in Trinity pulpit—yet in holy reverence I call God to witness that all this I have laid aside, nor hath it put any quickness into my pen. But zeal for God's glory and truth, desire that young ones may not be tainted, and that your name and repute may not be blemished, and that myself with your other friends may not be grieved, but comforted and edified by your ministry, and so may have more encouragement to attend upon it, have been the weights upon my spirit that thus set the wheel agoing."

There is something delightful in the whiff of personal feeling that mingles with Tuckney's orthodox zeal. No doubt he was honestly distressed by Whichcote's opinions; the "footsteps" which appear in them are too marked not to have alarmed a less sensitive Calvinistic conscience. But, moreover, it is plain that he was personally aggrieved. Whichcote's utterances had been "flatly" in contradiction of his own, and this was more than the most tolerant orthodoxy could stand. One who had assisted at the Westminster Assembly, and who had probably given his earliest theological instructions to the intrepid preacher, could not be expected to bear such an interference. The human impatience of contradiction beyond question helps wonderfully at all times the divine sense of orthodoxy.

Whichcote's reply is marked by humility, and yet he keeps to his point with dignity and force. He thanks Tuckney for his "plain dealing," but he feels bound to examine the question betwixt them. He has always had his former tutor "in very high esteem. I have borne you reverence beyond what you do or can imagine, having in me a loving and gentle sense of my first relation to you; and of all men alive, *I have least affected to differ from you*, or to call in question either what you have done, or said, or thought; but your judgment I

have regarded with reverence and respect. I do not, I cannot, forget my four first years' education in the University under you, and I think I have principles by me I then received from you." He then acknowledges that lately he had been sensible "of an abatement of former familiarity and openness." He had attempted "to make a discovery of the matter," but he had been met "with reservedness;" and therefore he had been content that time should "lead into a good understanding." But now he was heartily glad that "the *cordolium*" had been discovered, and he was willing to be reproved if he was really in error. "Blessed be the man, whosoever he be, that confutes that error I heartily pray that no man may receive an opinion from me, but only abide in the truth." First he defends the *matter* of his Commencement Speech, as having been in his mind, and duly considered, long before Tuckney delivered his speech. "Seven years before," he says,—that is, at his very first settling at Cambridge,—he had preached the same views "concerning natural light, or the use of reason;" and therefore he had no intention of merely saying anything in opposition to Tuckney. "Indeed," he added, "I took not offence at your question, but was well enough satisfied in your replication and defence of it—thinking, if we differed in some expression, yet we agreed in sense and meaning."

As to his sermon, he enters at some length into the positions he had maintained, as he finds them written in his notes. He is persuaded that truly all good men substantially agree "in all things saying," and that there are indeterminate questions, in reference to which Scripture seems to countenance the different views that may be taken of them. All that is "*ultra et citra Scripturam*," he says, must be pronounced fallible. This is to him "the foundation of Protestantism." All who "agree in Scripture forms of words, acknowledging that the meaning of the Holy Ghost in them is true," should "forbear one another, and not impose their own either sense or phrase." All Protestants hold, he maintains, "that *cuiuslibet Christiano conceditur iudicium discretionis*, against the Pope's usurpation of *Judex Infallibilis, visibilis in rebus fidei*." He admits that his heart was full of these truths, for his head had been possessed with them many years, even so long back as when he had disputed in the college chapel at Emmanuel.

On the subject of reconciliation he enters at length, the effect of his explanation being to show that he had no intention of undervaluing the Free Grace of God, but only sought to bring out the necessity of Christ's work being recognised as not only something *without* us but also *within* us. For reconciliation betwixt God and us is not usually as betwixt parties mutually incensed, where secret enmity may still remain; but real, to the effect of taking away all our enmity and making us god-like. "For God's acts are not false,

overly, imperfect; God cannot make a vain show, God being perfectly under the power of Goodness cannot deny himself—because if he should, he would depart from Goodness, which is impossible to God. Therefore *we* must yield—be subdued to the rules of Goodness, receiving stamps and impressions from God, and God cannot be further pleased than when Goodness takes place. They therefore deceive and flatter themselves extremely, who think of reconciliation with God by means of a Saviour acting upon God in their behalf, and not also working in or upon them to make them god-like.”

In reply, Tuckney sends a learned letter entering at length into all the points betwixt them. Reciprocating the affection expressed towards him by his old pupil, he yet returns to the concern entertained by himself and others as to the general tone of Whichcote’s preaching. They are grieved he says, addressing his old pupil, “by a vein of doctrine which runs up and down in many of your discourses, and in those of some others of very great worth, whom we very much honour *and whom you head*, some think.” Taking up once more the Commencement Speech, he expresses more fully his dislike of the manner in which the speaker, like so many others lately, had “cried up” Reason, and made use of the saying “the spirit of man is the candle of the Lord, &c.,”—a favourite expression of Whichcote’s. This saying, he holds has no relation to the truths of *supernatural* or evangelical theology; nor is the Protestant principle of private judgment, while true against the Pope’s pretended claims, to be held as superior to the rule of Scripture, but in subordination to it. A true believer should have “something above a collier’s faith,”\*—a proverbial phrase which seems to have been current amongst the theological disputants of the time. Yet faith is not to be resolved into reason, but held distinct, directed to its proper object and governed by its proper authority—the divine mind in Scripture.

The question of good men agreeing on fundamentals, in “all things saving,” is rediscussed; but without any further light being thrown upon it. Tuckney could of course urge from his point of view that the value of such an agreement depended entirely upon the questions which it included, and it was easy to add with ironical effect, “I believe those fundamental saving things are in some men’s judgments but very few.” He cannot admit that men “agreeing in Scripture forms of words” really do or can agree to any purpose so long as they hold contradictory assertions. “And for who are good Christians, when every one that is indeed so, is prone to think another so; and when heretiques of old and divers of late times have been sober and temperate, *nec sine larva summe pietatis*,—I think that we should look rather to their doctrines than their persons.”†

\* “Fides carbonaria.”—The phrase is used also both by Whichcote, and Arrowsmith in his “*Tactica Sacra*.”

† P. 27.

In conclusion, Tuckney makes a fuller confession of all the uneasiness he and others have been under as to Whichcote's mode of preaching—the philosophical rational style which he had introduced in contrast to the “spiritual plain, powerful ministry” for which Cambridge had been distinguished.

“Some are readie to think,” he adds, “that your great authors you steer your course by are Dr. Field, Dr. Jackson, Dr. Hammond—all three very learned men; the middle sufficiently obscure, and both he and the last, I must needs think, too *corrupt*. Whilst you were fellow here, you were cast into the company of very learned and ingenious men; who, I fear, at least some of them, studied other authors more than the Scriptures—and Plato and his scholars above others—in whom I must needs acknowledge, from the little insight I have into them, I find many excellent and divine expressions: and as we are wont more to listen to and wonder at a parrot speaking a few words than a man that speaks many more and more plainly, and all intelligibly, so whilst we find such gems in such dunghills, where we less expected them, we have been too much drawn away with admiration of them. And hence in part hath runne a vein of doctrine, which divers very able and worthy men—whom from my heart I much honour—are, I fear, too much known by. The power of Nature in morals too much advanced. Reason hath too much given to it in the mysteries of faith—a *recta ratio* much talked of, which I cannot tell where to find. Mind and understanding is all, heart and will little spoken of. The decrees of God questioned and quarrelled because, according to our reason, we cannot comprehend how they can stand with his goodness which, according to your phrase, *He is under the power of*. Those our philosophers, and other heathens, much fairer candidates for heaven than the Scriptures seem to allow of; and they, in their virtues, preferred before Christians overtaken with weaknesses.—A kind of Moral Divinity minted, only with a little tincture of Christ added. Nay, a Platonic faith unites to God.—Inherent righteousness so preached, as if not with the prejudice of imputed righteousness, which hath sometimes very unseemly language given it; yet much said of the one, and very little or nothing of the other. This was not Paul's manner of preaching.”

We have quoted so far because we could not have, from the Puritan view, a better and in some respects more vivid account of Whichcote's theological position, and the points where it separated from the Westminster standard. We shall afterwards more fully consider this position, but it deserves to be noticed in the meantime how entirely new, or, as would be now said, neological it is considered by Tuckney. It is not merely special differences which he feels to separate him from some of his old friends at Cambridge; but the plane of thought is obviously different in the two cases. The whole view of the nature of religion and of its relation to philosophy and morals is in question betwixt the Platonic party and himself. The Puritan divine sees this, and at the same time is unable to see any good in the forward movement of thought. He feels the theological ground on which he has been long standing failing him, and he has no courage to try the new ground. It offers to him no prospect of security. The old forms of the truth are to

him the only possible "Truth of God." And therefore he says in conclusion, he and his friends "cannot desert it, though we are but little able to maintain it." He mourns over the growth of opinions which he cannot share, and which appear to him to have interrupted the good work to which he looked forward with encouragement when he settled at Cambridge. Great as was his hope of help from "the company and assistance of friends whom he so much honoured and loved," so great, on the contrary, has been his "trouble of spirit in such an unhappy disappointment."

It is unnecessary to dwell minutely upon the further details of the correspondence, save in so far as they bring out any real points of theological or personal significance. The mere course of argument on the several topics betwixt the correspondents has lost much of its interest, and becomes on Whichcote's part here and there very technical. We can see traces in it of that tendency to "school language" of which Tuckney accuses him—far more so than in his Sermons or Aphorisms. With all Tuckney's narrowness of thought and the occasional slovenliness of his style, there is a homely vigour and expressiveness in his language which compare very well with the more elaborate, but less pointed, letter-writing of Whichcote.

In his second letter the latter defends at length his views as to the relation of reason to religion. Reason, he maintains, is not merely the source and instrument of natural theology, but moreover has a true function in regard to sacred and evangelical theology. The contents of revelation transcend reason, but in no respect contradict it. They lie in *amplitudine et plenitudine objecti non in contradictione rationis*. "*Quicquid recipitur, ad modum recipientis recipitur*—the bucket most filled in the sea, yet least contains the ocean."\* Or as he elsewhere puts what seems to have been a favourite thought with him—"The ocean can but fill the vessel, which a much less quantity of water can do." Divine truth, by virtue of its self-illuminating power, satisfies the mind. "It speaks for itself; it recommends itself to its subject; it satisfies the reason of the mind; procures its own entertainment by its own excellency."

"I receive the truth of Christian religion in way of illumination, affection, and choice; I myself am taken with it as understanding and knowing it. I retain it as a welcome guest; it is not forced into me, but I let it in yet so as taught of God. Do I dishonour my faith, or do any wrong to it, to tell the world that my reason and understanding are satisfied in it? I have no reason against it; yea, the highest and purest reason is for it."†

He is somewhat indignant at Tuckney's insinuation that he had been indebted to Arminian sources for his opinions. *Non sum Christianus alicujus nominis*, he exclaims:—

\* P. 46.

† P. 48.

"I may as well be called a Papist or Mahometan, Pagan or Atheist. And, truly, Sir, you are wholly mistaken as to the whole course of my studies. You say you found me largely in their 'Apologia;'\* to my knowledge I never saw or heard of the work before, much less have I read a tittle of it. I should lay open my weakness if I should tell you how little I have read of the books and authors you have mentioned—of ten years past nothing at all. I know not who should have been your informer; but, truly, in a thousand guesses you could not have been further off from the truth of the thing. And for schoolmen, I do not think I have spent four-and-twenty hours in them *divisim* these fourteen years. Dr. Field on the Church I read over eighteen years ago; but have not looked into him I believe these ten years. Jackson and Hammond I have a little looked into here and there a good while since, but have not read the hundredth part of either of them. Truly, I shame myself to tell you how little I have been acquainted with books, but for your satisfaction I do. While fellow at Emmanuel College employment with pupils took my time from me. I have not read many books; but I have studied a few; meditation and invention hath been rather my life than reading; and, truly, I have more read Calvine and Perkins and Beza than all the books, authors, or names you mention. I have always expected reason for what men say, less valuing persons or authority in the stating and resolving of truth; and therefore have read them most where I have found it. I have not looked at anything as more than an opinion which hath not been underpropt by convincing reason or plain or satisfactory Scripture. . . . I rather affect to speak with them who differ from me than those who, I think, agree with me (I speak of matter of opinions, for about fundamentals I am satisfied), that I may be rid of my misapprehensions, wherein I daily suspect myself, and see cause to think that I may be in some errors, as well as I have been, whereof I have had experience.—But this is vanity to use such a *περιαντολογία*. I am ashamed to think what I have done, and could blot it out again; but to satisfy you wherein you have me in suspicion, though it be folly in me to do it, I let it go. You seem in your letter to anatomize my life; but the description does not characterize me; you could hardly have shot further from the mark."

After this significant piece of autobiography, Whichcote returns to criticise Tuckney's denunciation of "Socinians, Arminians, *coluries* of Sectaries, &c." "Do we not agree even with Papists," he argues, "in what they hold as true? . . . Truth is truth, whosoever hath spoken it, or howsoever it hath been abused." "Every Christian must think and believe as he finds cause. If this liberty be not allowed to the University, wherefore do we study? we have nothing to do but to get good memories and to learn by heart." He winds up in conclusion with a further bit of self-portraiture. Tuckney had accused him of affecting "school phrases and learning in preaching," and making use of "philosophy and metaphysics." He resents this imputation as affecting the success of his ministry, of which he was not unreasonably jealous. Preaching was his strong point, and the chief means of his influence.

\* *Apologia pro Confess. Remon.*

"I have to my best," he says, "endeavoured to confirm truth, and convince the understanding of men therein, and to that purpose, as I have been able, have made use of all those principles that derive from God and speak Him in the world. I am sure I have all along been well understood by persons of honest hearts, but of mean place and education; and I have had the blessing of the souls of such at their departure out of the world. I thank God my conscience tells me that I have not herein affected worldly show, but the real service of truth. And I have always found in myself that such preaching of others hath most commanded my heart which hath most illuminated my head. The time I have spent on philosophers I have no cause to repent, and the use I have made of them I dare not disown. I heartily thank God for what I have found in them; neither have I upon this occasion one jot less loved the old Scriptures. I found the philosophers that I have read good so far as they go; and it makes me secretly blush before God when I find either my head, heart, or life challenged by theirs, which I must confess I have often found. I think St. Augustin saith of St. Paul, *Non destruit verum quod invenit in latere Paganorum*; and our Saviour reproves the Jews by Tyre and Sidon. I have thought it profitable to provoke to jealousy lazy and loose Christians by philosophers."\*

Tuckney's third letter is in a milder and less grieved tone. He has evidently been touched by the personal feeling and modesty shown by Whichcote in defence of himself; and he tries to make the most of their points of agreement rather to emphasize further their differences. *Reciprocare serram* would be, he says, but a poor and "unthrifty" business for two old friends. He would be satisfied if Whichcote and his friends would only so far deny themselves "as to forbear the insisting on arguments of the power of nature and reason," in their sermons, "which in Scripture are rather abased than exalted." "It would prevent heat and opposition, which at all times are uncomfortable, and especially in these crazy times may prove of very ill consequence to the University. As to the Westminster standards, heartily as he approved of them, he would be far from imposing them upon others. "In the Assembly I gave my vote with others that the Confession of Faith, put out by authority, should not be required to be either sworn or subscribed to, we having been burnt in the hand in that kind before."† At the same time he cannot go the length of that "liberty of prophesying which some so call for." "Let truth be truth," he says.

"This *libertas prophetandi* I take to be no such truth; and I do not the more like it, but rather the more suspect it because Socinians and Arminians do so much plead for it, and that as it is apparent out of design, that they might not be hindered in diffusing their poison, in their other corrupt tenets, which they are more commonly known by, though the world is not now so ignorant of Socinianism and Arminianism as to confine the one to the denial of Christ's divinity and satisfaction, or the other to the five controverted articles."‡

\* P. 60, 61.

† P. 76.

‡ P. 84.

He apologises in some degree for his alleged anatomy of Whichcote's life.

"God help me," he says, "more to search into my own heart, that I be not so much mistaken in the one as it seemeth I am in the other! God knows I am not wont to look very much into others who have so much to look after in myself. What I did herein I entreat you to think was not from an ill-minded or busy curiosity, but out of love and faithfulness; and if you will please to do as much for me, such 'balm shall not break my head.'"<sup>\*</sup>

He naturally expresses astonishment at Whichcote saying that he had never read the "*Apologia Remonstratum*," "which, when it came out, we so greedily bought and read." And he adds, in a very significant clause, that amongst the English authors which he formerly † named as having influenced his friend, he should have included Chillingworth and Hooker. In the first book of the "*Ecclesiastical Polity*," "though it be many years since I read it," he continues, "and I have it not now by me, if I forget not *there be divers things which divers discourses now-a-days much symbolize with*." This is an interesting guess, the truth and force of which will afterwards more fully appear. Whichcote himself takes no notice of the statement in his next letter. He confines himself mainly to a reiteration of the positions which he has already maintained, and rather seems to warm as Tuckney has cooled. The softness and apparent satisfaction of Tuckney's language kindles him more than his rebukes had done. He had, he says,

"well considered the matter objected to, and when he found it had given offence, re-examined it all over again *et tandem confirmatio evado*; and I am fully settled in my thoughts that the matter is unexceptionable, and that which must be stood to, highly tending to God's honour and worthy the Gospel: and there is nothing of reality against it but mistakes, misapprehensions, jealousies, and misprisions. Sir, this I would not write to you did I not think the honour of God and truth engaged, the interest of souls concerned; and were not I myself so assured as that thereto, if called to it, I must give attestation with my life. Therefore, Sir, though I dearly love you in my relation to you, and highly honour you for your own worth, yet cannot I, out of respect to you, give up so noble, so choice a truth, so antidotal against temptation, so satisfactory, so convictive, so quietive, in so full confirmation to my mind of the truth of the Christian religion"—

the truth, namely, of the rationality of Christian doctrine, and its fitness to fill and satisfy the human mind. It was impossible for him, he argues, to dwell too much on a great truth like this, and all the blessed moral consequences which it involves; "which, if settled in the hearts and lives of men, would make this world resemble heaven, whereas now, the contrary speak hell broken loose." And, warming as he writes, he exclaims somewhat wildly—

<sup>\*</sup> P. 82.

† Field, Jackson, and Hammond.

"*Too much and too often* on these points! The Scripture full of such truths, and I handle them too much and too often! and not discourse of them, rationally! Sir, I oppose not rational to spiritual—for spiritual is most rational. But I contradistinguish rational to conceited, impotent, affected canting, as I may call it, when the ear receives words which offer no matter to the understanding—make no impression on the inward sense." \*

Again, in the same vein,—

"'Exalting the power of Nature'—to me a strange imputation! I have indeed called upon men—supposing, as I ought, God to be with them, to use and employ all gifts, both of grace and nature, the neglect of which I am sure will prove matter of self-conviction." †

Then, as if he felt it necessary to speak his mind frankly, and bring to the light the full differences of thought betwixt himself and his old friends:—

"Permit me *animam liberare*—to deal freely and clearly—and I pray it may be without offence. Let the matter of difference be discovered in order to a removal and a more inward closing. I cannot return to that frame of spirit in the judging and discerning the things of God you here and there, in my apprehension, seem to advise me to. I have had, in the former part of my life, experience thereof, and have freely and fully delivered myself up to God to be taught and led into truth; my mind is so framed and fashioned by him that I can no more look back than St. Paul, after Christ discovered to him, could return into his former strain. . . . If I learn much by the writings of good men in former ages, which you advise me to, by the actings of the Divine Spirit in the minds of good men now alive I may learn more. The times wherein I live are more to me than any else, the works of God in them, which I am to discern, direct in me both principle, affection, and action. And I dare not blaspheme free and noble spirits in religion who search after truth with indifference and ingenuity; lest in so doing, I should degenerate into a spirit of *persecution* in the reality of the thing, though in another guise. For a mistaken spirit may conceit itself to be acted by the zeal of God. . . . I pray God our zeal in these times may be so kindled with pure fire from God's altar that it may rather warm than burn, enliven rather than inflame, and that the spirits of good men may truly be qualified with Gospel principles, true fruits of the Divine spirit. And, truly, I think that the members of the Church, if not the leaders—notwithstanding all the perfections of times before us, so much pictured or applauded, on this point have very much yet to learn. For I am persuaded that Christian love and affection is a point of such importance that it is not to be prejudiced by *supposals* of difference in points of religion in any ways disputable, though thought weighty as determined by the parties on either side; or by particular determinations beyond Scripture, which, as some have observed, have enlarged Divinity, but have lessened charity and multiplied divisions. For the *maintenance of truth is rather God's charge, and the continuance of charity ours.*" ‡

The correspondence winds up with two further brief letters. Both writers felt that they had delivered their souls, and that if they were not nearer to each other as the result, they at least understood each

\* P. 108.

† P. 114.

‡ Pp. 115, 116, 118.

other somewhat more fully, and were not likely to make more progress by further argument. Tuckney professes himself satisfied in the main, though in divers things he remains unsatisfied. In any case, he is convinced from the tone of Whichcote's last letter that it is better for the present to forbear. At some future time he may put down in writing a reply to certain things which still dissatisfy him. Whichcote, in a few words, says, that he is sure of his own honesty as a thinker.

"If I know myself at all, I know that in discovering of truth I do not dally nor have any worldly design, but with all indifferency of mind do receive from God what I have assurance is from him. I cannot practise upon my judgment, nor use any force to command my understanding into other apprehensions. . . . It is not in my power to fall off from mine own persuasions, conceptions, and thoughts so grounded. Wherefore," he concludes, "if in this point of discerning we differ, there is no help for it. We must forbear one another. And nothing is to be done, unless so far mutually to value each other's judgments, as to think that for such difference there is occasion given to each of us to examine our own spirits, whether we retain that indifference and ingenuity in discerning, we ought always to be clothed withal."\*

These details, from the correspondence betwixt Whichcote and Tuckney, serve sufficiently to bring before us the commencement of the new Cambridge movement. So far, it is seen to concern itself with the same questions already discussed so amply by Hales and Chillingworth—questions as to the non-importance of many of the dogmatic differences amongst Christians, and the fundamental basis of Christian Communion in the bonds of common sympathy and charity, rather than in doctrinal agreement. All, in short, that was vital in the liberal thoughtfulness of the earlier movement is taken up and carried forward by the Cambridge school, although there is no evidence of genetic connection betwixt the two. To the charge of being indebted to Chillingworth, as well as to Hooker, Whichcote makes no reply. He probably felt that in what he had formerly said as to the slight degree in which he was indebted to books at all, he had sufficiently answered such a charge. "Meditation and invention" rather than reading, as he says, had been the source of his inspiration, and the nurse of his opinions. He had borrowed nothing, strange as it may seem, from the Dutch Arminians. The truth is, that such thoughts as to the vitality of dogmatic controversies, and the necessity of a new catholic basis of Christian Communion, were a natural growth of the time in many minds. The theological atmosphere had been so vexed, and a polemical spirit had raged with such bitterness and such little good effect, that the more thoughtful of the younger clergy instinctively turned away from dogmatic dis-

\* Pp. 132-3.

cussions, disgusted and wearied, towards some higher and purer atmosphere of Christian truth. They had had, as Whichcote hints,\* in the early part of their life, "experience thereof," and the result was to make them seek a "more excellent way." It is unnecessary, therefore, to try to make out points of connection betwixt the Cambridge Divines, and our earlier series of "liberal Churchmen." Hales and Chillingworth may, or may not, have been studied by them; but the liberal sentiments which they had sown were germinating, more or less, by the middle of the century, in all generous, open, and rational minds.

But it is easy to detect in Whichcote from the first something far more searching in the shape of liberal thought than anything to be found in Chillingworth. Chillingworth's principles, indeed, are sufficiently rational in a definite direction; he emphasizes with great significance the rights of the Christian reason. But he nowhere takes up the general question which evidently pervades Whichcote's mind—the "vein," as Tuckney says, "running up and down" all his discourses and letters—of the relation betwixt natural and revealed truth. In what respects are natural and revealed truth allied? and in what do they differ? or, in other words, what is the essence of the Divine, and how is it brought near to us, alike in philosophy and in religion, in nature and revelation? These are but different forms of the same problem, and the problem is the one plainly which, more than any other, runs through Whichcote's letters, and, as we shall see, still more clearly through his discourses. The only writer who had hitherto touched this problem with a true and bold hand was Hooker, as Tuckney clearly enough surmised. But Hooker strangely founded no school. His great work stands by itself at the very opening of the century, a pillar of light to which neither of the extreme parties had given heed. It was either too much in advance of the time, or the spirit of controversy had been already kindled too intensely to permit of conciliation. Certainly it is remarkable how little the immediately succeeding generations were affected by Hooker's magnificent labours. While they have continued a source of inspiration to many thinkers of a later time, there are scarcely any signs of their having affected the thought of his own or the next age, much as the name of the writer seems to have been held in respect. No succession of thinkers sprung up in connection with him.

It was reserved to the later half of the seventeenth century to propagate the seed of religious culture first sown by the Books of Ecclesiastical Polity. Whether or not directly transplanted, undoubtedly the quality of thought is the same. And what is really remarkable is that now, after the lapse of half a century, and in the

\* P. 115.

hands of one who is comparatively unknown in the history of theological opinion, this seed of noble thought is found taking root and springing up into a powerful influence—a school of opinion which was to guide and change many minds. Of this there is abundant evidence in these letters, although half the result was not before the mind of Tuckney, nor could he foresee all that was to grow from the views which so alarmed him. He felt, indeed, that there was a party behind Whichcote; his main apprehension from the teaching of his friend was that it was representative. Whichcote spoke not only for himself, but for others, of whom he was reputed the head. His preaching would have been of little account if it had not uttered the thoughts of many as well as his own, or at least revealed their thoughts to them. All the enthusiasm of young Cambridge was evidently turned in a liberal direction by the eloquent Provost of King's, and "so young ones in the University tainted."

It is difficult to say what peculiar combination of qualities sometimes gives a man the position of leader of thought in a University. The greatest ability and the most profound learning may fail in securing it; distinction as a writer has often no effect. In the case of Whichcote there were none of these qualities prominently present. But there was that, no doubt, which is more than all—a certain attractiveness and glow of feeling, a persuasive enthusiasm, an "aptness to teach," which goes right to the hearts of the young, and constitutes a power far more effective than any mere literary or intellectual capacity. The Puritan doctors, who settled at Cambridge in 1644, were all men of mark. Tuckney's letters, in mere literary and argumentative force, are certainly not inferior to those of Whichcote. Hill was distinguished as a preacher, and Arrowsmith known and loved for his personal amiability. Yet it is evident that the young thought of the University had gone after Whichcote and his friends. The men who had sat at Westminster and assisted in the composition of the "Confession of Faith" were left comparatively without followers. The very name of "Orthodox," Tuckney complains, was "stomached;" while a species of "moral divinity," which sought to ally natural and revealed truth, and bring them to a unity, carried all before it.

The great instrument of Whichcote's influence, as we have already said, was the pulpit. He possessed great powers as a preacher, and his regular Sunday afternoon lecture in Trinity Church drew crowds, Tillotson tells us, "not only of the young scholars, but of those of greater standing and best repute for learning in the University."\* He contributed thus, according to the same authority, "more to the forming of the students of that University in a sober

\* Funeral Sermon.

sense of religion than any man in that age." Evidently he was the great University preacher of the Commonwealth; and to his afternoon sermons, probably more than to any single means of influence, is the progress of the new movement to be attributed. Both from his own language, and the language of his opponents, it is clear that he aimed by his sermons to give a new tone to contemporary thought, and to turn men's minds away from polemical argumentation to the great moral and spiritual realities lying at the basis of all religion, from the "forms of words," as he himself says, to the "inwards of things," and the "reason of them."\*

We will consider immediately what appears most striking and original in the substance of Whichcote's discourses. They are all, or nearly all, that remains to attest his power as a preacher, and the novelty and force of the truth which he preached. But, in trying to estimate the value of his living eloquence, we must remember the very imperfect form in which these discourses have been preserved to us. Like Frederick Robertson's sermons, in our own day, they seem to have been printed merely from notes, his own or others'. We are told that in the pulpit he used "no other than very short notes, not very legible,"—specimens of which he has himself presented in his letters to Dr. Tuckney, and which are evidently the mere bones which he clothed with a living shape in the course of delivery. He had the temperament of the orator, which yields, like a flexible, glowing medium, to the inspiration of the moment. For when Tuckney accuses him of using in one of his sermons, in reference to certain views, the very strong expression, "Divinity taught in hell," he answers, "The phrase 'Divinity minted or taught in hell' I find not in my notes; but it was suddenly spoken." It can be easily imagined, therefore, that, animated and vigorous as many of Whichcote's sermons are in comparison with most of the sermons of his age, they give us only an imperfect idea of the life and impulse of thought which moved him in the pulpit, and which made him such a power as afternoon lecturer in Trinity Church. All the more was he likely to be such a power that his whole activity seems to have been given to his University work. He had evidently no worldly ambition; no schemes of authorship, like More and Cudworth. He was a born teacher—one whose highest qualities were stimulated by contact with young minds, and that play of speech which seems to be necessary to the finest development of certain intellectual natures, from Socrates downwards. Such men are teachers divinely called. Their proper place is in the academic chair or the pulpit. Surrounded by questioning spirits and eager looks, there they are great, as the life of thought grows warm within them and over-

\* Letters, p. 108.

flows in copious and impressive utterance. It by no means follows that they will be equally great as writers. Often they are not. Oftener still they want the impulse to authorship. Their thoughts only rise freely, their words only come fitly in the face of a listening audience. Whichcote appears to have been a man of this stamp. And hence his peculiar position and fate. He stood at the head of the Cambridge thought of his time; he moved the University youth with a force which Tuckney and Hill and others failed to imitate; he inspired and formed the highest intellect which it was destined to produce for thirty years. Men like Smith and Cudworth, and More and Tillotson, looked back to him as their intellectual master. Yet he himself never appeared as an author. His sermons were only published some time after his death. They have been prized by all who have fallen in with them; they cannot be prized too highly; but they have not served, as they scarcely could, to preserve his name from partial oblivion. He was infinitely greater in life than he appears in history. One of the powers of his age, his name may be sought for in vain in a biographical dictionary.

His life may be said to be summed up in his academic career, which he continued till the Restoration. So far as can be gathered from scanty hints, he was a warm admirer of the great Protector, whose death, in 1658, he lamented in a copy of Latin verses, commemorative of his government and congratulatory of Richard's succession. This may be supposed to indicate his political position and sympathies. But he was not a partizan in politics or anything else. He was "of too great and noble a spirit," his biographer says, "to follow a party servilely, and was never so attached to any as not to see and own, and seek to serve, real merit wherever it was to be found." And in evidence of this is mentioned his anxiety to assist Isaac Barrow in his application for the Greek professorship (about 1654), which was refused to him on account of his Royalist and supposed Arminian leanings. Barrow is almost the only great name in Cambridge at this time that remained uninfluenced, or nearly so, by the new movement. Comparatively young (having only taken his degree in 1648), his genius was of that bold, original, self-concentrated type which strikes out its own orbit. It is pleasant to note Whichcote's appreciation of him, and to be told that Barrow "ever acknowledged his good offices and readiness to serve him,"\* unsuccessful as they then were. All testimonies unite in attributing to Whichcote, as Provost of King's, a happy breadth and equity of temper, and a genuine love of fair play. He was no bigot for his own opinions, deeply as he valued and resolutely as he maintained the characteristic principles which lay at their root. We have seen

\* Salter's Preface, p. xxv.

how widely he differed from Dr. Tuckney, and what reason he might have had to be offended by the latter's freedom ; yet some years afterwards he was one of the six electors who raised Tuckney to the chair of divinity. He felt, no doubt, according to his views, that they agreed in far more than they differed, and that they were more at one, even when they differed, than their modes of language would allow them to seem to be.

It might have been supposed that such a man would have been spared in his post at the Restoration ; but separated as he was in thought from the Puritan leaders who had been sent with him to Cambridge in 1644, he shared their fate when the time came for the king and the king's friends to have their own again. He was "removed from the provostship by especial order of the king, and Dr. James Fleetwood was put into it." This is the statement of his biographer. He adds : "But though removed, he was not disgraced nor frowned upon." When the Act of Uniformity was passed, he adhered, as might have been expected, to the Church ; and in the end of 1662 (November) he was appointed to the cure of St. Anne's, Blackfriars, London. When this church was burned down in the Great Fire of 1666, he retired for a while to Milton, in Cambridgeshire, a country rectory *sine cura*, his biographer says—a piece of preferment to which he had succeeded by the favour of his college on the death of Dr. Collins, whom he had displaced in the provostship. He had taken the precaution after the Restoration to have his presentation to this living renewed, and he continued to keep it as long as he lived. Here he spent some years in comparative retirement, till the promotion of his friend, Dr. John Wilkins, to the bishopric of Chester in 1668, by whose interest and recommendation he was presented to the vicarage of St. Laurence Jewry, which Wilkins had vacated.

"This was his last stage." Here he continued in high and general esteem, preaching twice every week to "a very considerable and judicious auditory, but not very numerous, by reason of the weakness of his voice in his declining age." He was about sixty when thus finally settled in London. The days of his activity were passed ; he had done his work, or nearly so ; and although he survived about fifteen years, we hear no more of him beyond what we have now quoted. He had his own circle, no doubt, his "auditory judicious, but not very numerous," who delighted in his preaching, and who loved and respected his person. He kept up his old Cambridge friendships, although he had been severed from all official connection with the University. We find Worthington writing to him there, at Dr. Cudworth's, in Christ's College. He may, through his friends there, have continued to exercise something of his old influence ; but, upon

the whole, he was content to live in the background during those unhappy times. He died on one of his visits to Cambridge, in the house of "his ancient and learned friend, Dr. Cudworth." Having gone down there a little before Easter, in 1683, "he caught a cold and fell into a distemper, which in a few days terminated his life." It is added that "he died with uncommon sentiments of piety and devotion. He expressed great doubts of the principles of separation"—(this is extremely natural, and consistent with all his principles)—"and said that he was the more desirous to receive the sacrament, that he might declare his full communion with the Church all the world over. He disclaimed Popery and, as things of near affinity with it, or rather parts of it, all superstition and usurpation upon the consciences of men."

Tillotson preached his funeral sermon, and draws his character after the manner of the time—adding trait after trait, without much subtilty of insight or of combination, without much glow or enthusiasm of feeling, but so that we can read in his cautious sentences many indications of a high and fine nature.

"A godlike temper and disposition (as he was wont to call it) was," Tillotson says, "what he chiefly valued and aspired after,—That universal charity and goodness which he did continually preach and practise. His conversation was exceeding kind and affable, grave and winning, prudent and profitable. He was slow to declare his judgment, and modest in delivering it. Never passionate, never peremptory—so far from imposing upon others that he was rather apt to yield. And although he had a most profound and well-poised judgment, yet he was of all men I ever knew the most patient to hear others differ from him, and the most easy to be convinced when good reason was offered; and, which is seldom seen, more apt to be favourable to another man's reason than his own. Studious and inquisitive men," he adds, "at such an age (at forty or fifty, at the utmost) have fixed and settled their judgments on most points, and, as it were, made their last understanding—supposing that they have thought, or read, or heard what can be said on all sides of things; and after that they grow positive and impatient of contradiction. But our deceased friend was so wise as to be willing to learn to the last, knowing that no man can grow wise without some change of his mind—without gaining some knowledge which he had not, or correcting some error which he had before. He had attained so perfect a mastery of his passions that for the latter and greater part of his life he was hardly ever seen to be transported with anger, and, as he was extremely careful not to provoke any man, so not to be provoked by any; using to say, 'If I provoke a man, he is the worse for my company; and if I suffer myself to be provoked by him, I shall be the worse for his.' He was a great encourager and kind director of young divines, and one of the most candid hearers of sermons, I think, that ever was; so that though all men did mightily reverence his judgment, yet no man had reason to fear his censure. He never spake well of himself nor ill of others, making good that saying of Pansa or Tully, *neminem alterius, qui suæ consideret virtuti, invidere*, that no man is apt to envy the worth and virtues of another that hath any of his own to trust to. In a word, he had all those virtues, and in a high degree, which an excellent

temper, great condescension, long care and watchfulness over himself, together with the assistance of God's grace (which he continually implored and mightily relied upon) are apt to produce. Particularly he excelled in the virtues of conversation, humanity and gentleness and humility, a prudent and peaceable and reconciling temper."

The portrait is an engaging one, and leaves a pleasant impression upon the mind. It is easy to see the elements at once of intellectual strength and moral beauty which made Whichcote a leader of minds, and gave him so much influence at Cambridge. As he was well-born he appears to have been wealthy throughout his life, and this, no doubt, helped his influence. He was "frugal in expense upon himself," but very liberal and charitable towards the necessities of others; more than "was well known to many," says Tillotson, "because in the disposal of his charity he very much affected secrecy." He bequeathed valuable legacies to the University of Cambridge and King's College and Emmanuel College, with which he had been connected, and also to the poor of the several places "where his estate lay, and where he had been minister." "He was married, but I cannot learn to whom," says the author of the preface to his correspondence with Tuckney.\* This event in his life is supposed to have taken place when he left the University for a brief period in 1643, and went to reside at his living of North Cadbury in Somersetshire. He is believed not to have had any children, and he certainly left none—his nephews, sons of Sir Jeremy Whichcote, of the Inner Temple, and Deputy-Lieutenant of Middlesex, being appointed his executors.

It will now be our aim to exhibit somewhat more fully the subject of Whichcote's teaching. Its main tendencies have already appeared in the correspondence with Tuckney; but it is necessary to draw them out in greater fulness and detail as presented in his Discourses and Aphorisms. Four volumes of "Discourses" and a series of Moral and Religious Aphorisms collected from his MSS., and forming the first portion of one volume containing the correspondence from which we have quoted so largely, comprise all his works. They give probably but an inadequate picture of his intellectual and religious activity; he appears, as we have already remarked, to have been so much more as a living teacher than as an author; but they are all that survive from his pen or that help us to understand the character of his influence. Unhappily they are imperfect in some degree, both

\* Dr. Salter, from whom we have already so often quoted. We have learned nowhere else anything of Whichcote's marriage. But there is a pleasant and characteristic allusion to his wife in his first letter to Tuckney, where, in excusing himself for not having been able to hear one of Tuckney's sermons at Trinity, preached for him, he says that all he knew of it was, that "my wife told me how much she was moved by your excellent pains, as I think, upon, 'We as ambassadors beseech you to be reconciled.'"

in substance and in form. None of them were published during his lifetime, nor even left by him in a state for publication. Their history is, in fact, a curious one, and of itself deserves attention.

Two years after his death appeared a small 8vo. of eight sheets, under the title "*Θεοφοροῦμένα Δόγματα* : or, some Select Notions of that learned and reverend Divine, Dr. B. Whichcote. Faithfully collected by a pupil and particular friend of his." The volume consists of notes on a few texts of Scripture, and a series of what the editor calls "Apostolical Apothegms." Of the editor nothing is known, and the volume itself seems to have gone out of sight entirely. Then in 1697 there was published a "Treatise of Devotion, with Morning and Evening Prayer for all the Days of the Week," attributed to our author, and which has also disappeared. In the following year his "Select Sermons" were printed in two parts, with a preface which has been universally ascribed to the Earl of Shaftesbury, author of "The Characteristics." The preface bears internal evidence of its authorship, and is a very interesting and characteristic document both in relation to Whichcote and Shaftesbury. It contains no indication, however, of the manner in which either the publisher or the writer of the preface became possessed of the sermons. They are held forth as the genuine productions of the author beyond question, in contrast to "some things" which had been lately "set out in his name, which his best friends disowned to be his"—in allusion, it is supposed, to the "Treatise of Devotion," printed in the preceding year, or possibly to the imperfect Notes collected by a pupil shortly after his death. A very unnecessary apology is made for the unpolished style and phrase of the author, as "being more used to school learning and the language of an University than to the conversation of the fashionable world." It is further stated that none of the Discourses were ever designed for publication, and that the publisher has sometimes "supplied" the author "out of himself," by transferring to a defective place that which he found in some other discourse, where the same subject was treated; yet it is added, "so great a regard was had to the very text and letter of the author that he (the editor) would not alter the least word; and wheresoever he had added anything he has taken care to mark it in different characters." This edition was reprinted at Edinburgh about the middle of last century (in 1742) by Dr. Wishart, Principal of the University, with a dedication to young ministers and students in divinity. Wishart was himself a remarkable man, of great learning and liberality of spirit. He also edited and prefixed a recommendatory preface to "Scougal's Life of God in the Soul of Man," a well-known work of the small school of Scottish meditative divines, who have some analogy to the great

Cambridge School in the seventeenth century.\* Wishart was prosecuted for heresy by the Presbytery of Edinburgh in 1738, among other things for wishing to "remove confessions and freeing persons from subscription thereto," and for "licentiously extending the liberty of Christian subjects." But the prosecution was unsuccessful. Both the Synod and the General Assembly acquitted him, and he afterwards rose to great influence in the Church, and became Moderator in the year of the Rebellion, 1745. Principal Wishart, no doubt, appreciated the full significance of Whichcote's sermons, and sought to extend their influence in Scotland. It is difficult to say how far he may have succeeded in this, or what traces may be found of them in the religious literature of the time, which was then assuming, in the northern part of the island, that somewhat extreme phase of rationality which has been stigmatized under the name of *Moderatism*. One curious testimony to their widespread circulation is to be found in the fact that an edition, not only of the sermons edited by Shaftesbury, but of the others subsequently published by Whichcote's own friends, appeared at Aberdeen from the press of "J. Chalmers" in 1751. To this day this edition is the most common and easily accessible to the ordinary student.

It may have been Shaftesbury's edition in 1698, and the language of his preface, which seems in some respects to have been displeasing to Whichcote's friends, or the mere knowledge that there were many unauthorized copies of his sermons in circulation, which led them in the beginning of the eighteenth century to entertain the idea of issuing an edition, as far as possible, from his own MSS. His nephew entrusted his papers to Dr. Jeffery, "who had the highest veneration for the deceased author, and every talent beside that could qualify him to be a diligent, faithful, and judicious editor." The result of Dr. Jeffery's labours was the publication, in the three first years of the eighteenth century, of three octavo volumes of Whichcote's sermons, to which a fourth volume was afterwards added under the care of Dr. Samuel Clarke. To the same editor we owe the original publication of the "Moral and Religious Aphorisms," which were revised and re-edited in 1753 by Dr. Salter, Jeffery's grandson, who "felicitates himself most unaffectedly that he lives in an age (a happiness which his reverend grandfather Jeffery could not boast!) in which such a generous freedom of thinking, chastened and tempered by the genuine spirit of true piety, and a most exalted devotion, and by the most sound and exact judgment in religion and all learning 'cleared from froth and grounds,' as the

\* Scougal was born in 1650, and died in 1678, only twenty-eight years of age. He was one year minister of a country parish, and four years Divinity Professor in King's College, Aberdeen.

ever memorable Mr. John Hales, of Eton, expresseth it, meets with the esteem and applause it so well deserves."

"Such men as Whichcote," the same complacent and somewhat indiscriminating admirer adds, "do indeed recommend religion by their lives and by their writings, proving its influence on themselves, and show well-grounded persuasion of its truth by the whole tenor of their conduct, and making such and only such representations of it in their works as demonstrate its entire agreeableness to the best improved reason of man, as show it to be worthy of God to institute and of man to believe and to obey—placing it in its fairest and truest light as the highest perfection of the human nature, and greatest improvement of the human powers; while the narrow systematical pretenders to religion, before and since his time, do all they can to expose and disgrace what they cannot extinguish and destroy. These men (to anticipate the masculine sense and words of the 'Aphorisms') fancy 'they advance religion, while they but draw it down to bodily acts, or carry it up into I know not what of mystical, symbolical, emblematical; whereas the Christian religion is not mystical, symbolical, enigmatical, but unclothed, unbodied, intellectual, rational, spiritual.'"<sup>\*</sup>

It is somewhat difficult to group Whichcote's views and opinions scattered throughout his Sermons and Aphorisms, and yet it would be of little use to present to the reader an unclassified series of extracts. We will make the best attempt we can to bring together the main points of his teaching under several heads. We begin with that which may be said to be the centre and most distinctive principle of all his thought—

### I. THE USE OF REASON IN RELIGION.

The following are some of his most characteristic sayings on this subject:—

"I find that some men take offence to have reason spoken of out of a pulpit, or to hear those great words of *natural light* or *principles of reason and conscience*. They are doubtless in a mighty mistake. . . . There is no inconsistency between the grace of God and the calling upon men carefully to use, improve, and employ the principles of God's creation. . . . Indeed, this is a very profitable work to call upon men to answer the principles of their creation, to fulfil natural light, to answer natural conscience, to be throughout rational in what they do; for these things have a divine foundation. *The spirit in man is the candle of the Lord, lighted by God, and lighting man to God.* . . . Therefore, to speak of natural light, of the use of reason in religion, is to do no disservice at all to *grace*; for God is acknowledged in both, in the former as laying the ground-work of his creation, in the latter as reviving and restoring it."<sup>†</sup>

"A man has as much right to use his own understanding in judging of truth as he has a right to use his own eyes to see his way."<sup>‡</sup>

"The *written word* of God is not the first or only discovery of the duty of man. It doth gather, and repeat, and reinforce, and charge upon us

<sup>\*</sup> Dr. Salter's Preface.

<sup>†</sup> "Sermon on the Exercise and Progress of a Christian," vol. i. (Ab. ed.) p. 370—1.

<sup>‡</sup> 40, cent. i. The aphorisms are arranged in centuries.

the scattered and neglected principles of God's creation that has suffered prejudice and damnation by the defection and apostacy of man."\*

"Those that differ upon reason may come together by reason."†

"He that gives reason for what he saith has done what is fit to be done, and the most that can be done. He that gives no reason speaks nothing, though he saith never so much."‡

"There is nothing proper and *peculiar* to man but the use of reason and the exercise of virtue."§

"To go against *reason* is to go against God; it is the self-same to do that which the reason of the case doth require, and that which God Himself doth appoint. Reason is the Divine Governor of man's life; it is the very voice of God."||

"Religion consists in things that are good in themselves or that are for the *recovery* in us of what are good in themselves."¶

"Nothing in religion is a burthen, but a remedy or a pleasure. When the doctrine of the Gospel becomes the reason of our mind, it will be the principle of our life."\*\*

"Reason discovers what is natural, and reason receives what is supernatural."††

## II. DIFFERENCES OF OPINION AMONG CHRISTIANS.

"By the way I will observe how little there is in many controversies, if wise and temperate men had the managing of them; but when once there is suspicion and jealousy these make and increase differences."‡‡

"All artists differ in their notions; there are different opinions on several points of philosophy; what is one man's meat is another's medicine, and another's poison. We differ in age, in stature, in feature, in gait, in complexion, in constitution of life, in profession. These varieties and differences, as well as harmonies and proportions, explain the infinite wisdom of the Creator. Yet all agreeing in human nature are fit companions one for another, can take delight in each other's company. Why should not they who meet in the regenerate nature, who agree on the great articles of faith and principles of good life, overlook subordinate differences? If there be love and goodwill we come to be more rational, better grounded in our resolution from our different apprehensions. Discourse is as soon ended as begun where all say the same. Whereas he that speaks after, and says a new thing, searcheth the former (Pro. xviii. 17.), so no truth will be lost for want of being offered to consideration." . . .

"We may meet in the rule of truth though we differ in the particular application. If there were no contradiction in the several apprehensions of men, we might never be awakened to search into things, and so if we were once in a mistake we should never come out of it."§§

"The points of Christian faith are as clearly intelligible to all capacities, as they are clearly necessary to be believed by all men. God accepts alike the faith that results from the dark mists of the ignorant, and from the clearest intelligence of the learned. The Holy Scriptures are so written that they are sooner understood by an unlearned man that is pious and modest than by a philosopher who is arrogant and proud."|||

"Why should not consent in the main be more available to concord and union than difference when powerful matters prevail to distance and separation?"¶¶

"Every man hath a right of judging, if he be capable; yea, can a man, ought a man to believe otherwise than he sees cause? Is it in a man's power to believe as he would, or only as the reason of the thing appears to

\* 46. † 58. ‡ 60. § 71. || 76. ¶ 89. \*\* 91-2. †† 99.

‡‡ Vol. i. 372.

§§ Vol. ii. 27.

||| Ib., p. 28.

¶¶ Ib., p. 29.

him? \* He that is *light of faith*, by the same reason will be light of unbelief. He will as easily disbelieve truth as believe error." †

"By discourse men accommodate things; in conference they render a reason. There is *gratia vultus*, the light of one's countenance, presence is winning; the presence of men conciliates favour and acceptance. When persons at difference talk together, they often find that they stand not at that distance they did imagine. Distance gives tale-bearers opportunity and advantage." ‡

"'Tis neither of our fault that our understandings are not cast in the same mould; or that our organs or bodily constitutions which occasion variety, are not alike. It may be also our apprehensions are nearer than our expressions. Two who think they say not the same may think the same as to God." §

"Nothing is *desperate in the condition of good men*; they will not live and die in any dangerous error." ||

"God, who will not lose anything that is good, will finally save what is capable of salvation, will not reject malign dispositions which will not be altered and subdued to the temper of heaven. Jerome and Rufinus charged each other with heresy. Chrysostom and Epiphanius refused to join in prayers, the former wishing the latter might not return alive, the latter that the former might not die a bishop; both which came to pass. 'Tis a great mistake in quest for truth to let it run out on some smaller matters which have scarce been thought of by the whole series of Christians of all ages, but only of late." ¶

"They who have rashly augmented the materials of faith, have thereby weakened and diminished charity." \*\*

"Two things a man may easily perceive, whether he be a hypocrite, whether an heretic. Not the former if he means well; not the latter if he be not wilful, but patient to be informed." ††

"It becomes the modesty of particular persons when their sentiments are singular to ask themselves this sober question, How went the Spirit of God from the generality of his worshippers, and determined itself to me?" ‡‡

All these passages are taken from two sermons in the beginning of the second volume on the "Traits of the Church Maintained by Sincere Christians." I might add to them indefinitely. I should have liked also to set before the reader in a larger shape some of his noble descriptions of the essence and character of true religion, as well as his opinions on many other topics, but space [forbids our giving further extracts than we have added below.

### III. THE CHARACTER OF TRUE RELIGION.

"A true Gospel spirit doth excel in meekness, gentleness, modesty, humility, patience, forbearance; and these are eminent endowments, and mightily qualify men to live in the world. This is that which makes men bear universal love and goodwill, and overcomes evil with good, teacheth men to return courtesies for injuries. This I daresay had we a man among us that we could produce, that did live an exact Gospel life; had we a man that was really gospelized; were the Gospel a life, a soul, and a spirit to him, as principles upon moral considerations are—he would be the most lovely, useful person under heaven. This man, for everything that is excellent, and worthy, and useful, would be miraculous and extraordinary in the eyes of all men in the world: Christianity would be recommended to

\* Vol. ii. 29. † Ib., 3. ‡ Ib., 30. § Ib., 32. || Ib., 20.  
¶ Ib., 34. \*\* Ib., 35. †† Ib., 36. ‡‡ Ib., 37.

the world by his spirit and conversation. For the life of the heavenly state, so far as it can be expressed to us, is delivered in the Gospel law and rule, and is put into an act in a Gospel spirit and life. The fruit of the Spirit in us is in all goodness, righteousness, and truth. Were a man sincere, honest, and true in the way of his religion, he would not be grievous, intolerable, or unsufferable to anybody; but he would command due honour, and draw unto himself love and esteem. For the true Gospel spirit is transcendently and eminently remarkable every way for those things that are lovely in the eyes of men—for ingenuity, modesty, humility, gravity, patience, meekness, charity, kindness, &c.; and so far as any one is Christian in spirit and power, so far he is refined and reformed by these graces. . . . Such is the nature of religion, that it keeps the mind in a good frame and temper; it establishes a healthful complexion and constitution of soul, and makes it to discharge itself duly in all its offices towards God, with itself, and with men; whereas the mind of a wicked and profane man is a very wilderness, where lust and exorbitant passions bear down all before them, and are more fierce and cruel than wolves, bears, and tigers. The heavenly state consists in the mind's freedom from these kind of things. It doth clear the mind from all impotent and unsatiable desires, which do abuse and toss a man's soul, and make it restless and unquiet. It sets a man free from eager and impetuous loves, and by these men are torn in pieces; from vain and disappointing hopes, which sink men into melancholy; from lawless and exorbitant appetites; from frothy and empty joys; from dismal, presaging fears and anxious, self-devouring cares; from inward heartburnings; from self-eating envy; from swelling pride and ambition; from dull and black melancholy; from boiling anger and raging fury; from a gnawing, aching conscience; from an arbitrary presumption; from rigid sourness and severity of spirit;—for these make the man that is not biassed and principled with religion to seethe like a pot, inwardly to boil with the fire and pitchy fumes of hell, and as outrageous as when the great leviathan doth cause the waves of the sea to cast out mire and dirt.”\*

“The first thing in religion is to refine a man's temper; and the second, to govern his practice. If a man's religion do not this, his religion is a poor slender thing, and of little consideration: 'tis then, only a naked profession, and fit to give him a denomination. I say, such a man's religion is but of little value: for it hath no efficacy, but falls short of the very *principles* of nature.”†

“Religion is intelligible, rational, and accountable; it is not our burthen, but our privilege. The moral part of religion never alters. Moral laws are laws *of themselves*, without sanction by will; and the necessity of them arises from the things themselves. All *other* things in religion are *in order to* these. The moral part of religion does sanctify the soul; and is final both to what is instrumental and instituted.”‡

“There is nothing so intrinsically rational as religion is; nothing that can so justify itself; nothing that hath so pure reason to recommend itself, as religion hath.”§

“The more false any one is in his religion; the more fierce and furious in maintaining it; the more mistaken, the more imposing.”||

“There are but two things in religion: morals and institutions. Morals may be known by the reason of the thing. Morals are owned as soon as spoken, and they are nineteen parts in twenty of all religion. Institutions depend upon Scripture; and no one institution depends upon one text of Scripture only; that institution which has but one text for it, has *never a one*.”¶

\* Vol. iii. pp. 45—47.

§ Ib., 457.

† Vol. iv. p. 243.

|| Ib., 499.

‡ Aphorisms, 220, 221.

¶ Ib., 586.

"All the differences in Christendom are about institutions, not about morals. He that produceth the best reason in morals, and he that produceth the best Scripture in institutions, is to be closed with. Protestants follow the law of God's creation according to the law of God's institution. Theirs is reasonable service."\*

"Religion is τὸς ὁμοίωσις θεοῦ, κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν ἀνθρώπου, the being as much like God as man can be like him."†

"Religion, which is a bond of union, ought not to be a ground of division; but it is in an unnatural use when it doth disunite. Men cannot differ by true religion, because it is true religion to agree. The spirit of religion is a reconciling spirit."‡

"The state of religion lies in a good mind, and a good life; all else is about religion; and men must not put the instrumental part of religion for the state of religion."§

"Religion doth possess and affect the whole man; in the understanding it is knowledge; in the life it is obedience; in the affections it is delight in God; in our carriage and behaviour it is modesty, calmness, gentleness, quietness, candour, ingenuity; in our dealings it is uprightness, integrity, correspondence with the rule of righteousness: religion makes men virtuous in all instances.

"Religion has different denominations and names, from different actions and circumstances, but it is one thing, viz., universal righteousness: accordingly it had place at all times, before the law of Moses, under it, and since."||

"Religion is not a hearsay, a presumption, a supposition; is not a customary pretension and profession; is not an affectation of any mode; is not a piety of particular fancy, consisting of some pathetic devotions, vehement expressions, bodily severities, affected anomalies and aversions from the innocent usages of others; but consisteth in a profound humility, and an universal charity.

"Truth lies in a little compass, and narrow room. Vitals in religion are few."¶

"The moral part of religion consists of things good in themselves, necessary and indispensable; the instituted part of religion consists of things made necessary only by the determinations of the divine will. He that denies the former is atheistical; he that denies the latter is infidel."\*\*

#### IV. PRAYER, AND FORMS OF PRAYER.

"In the Reformed Church there is both use of forms of prayer and allowance for conceived prayer; and they are both justified. As to forms of prayer, they are great helps to our wandering mind, and then they are proper and succinct; whereas prayers suddenly conceived are not so, are not always purely prayer matter, which is of four sorts: matter of confession of sin; thankfulness to God for his goodness; acknowledging him in his greatness, and our dependence upon him, and petitioning him for grace. That that refers not to these four, is extravagance in prayer. I do observe a great deal in conceived prayer is very good, but may do better in the sermon. Now this advantage a form of prayer hath, that things are proper and succinct. The true excellency of prayer is a sincere intention of mind in presenting our thoughts to God."††

\* Aphorisms, 588, 589.

† Ib., 591.

‡ Ib., 712.

§ Ib., 835.

|| Ib., 956, 957.

¶ Ib., 1007, 1008.

\*\* Ib., 1084.

†† Discourses, vol. ii., p. 327.

## V. POPERY.

"An implicit faith in men, or in the Church, this is Popery.

"There are three great designs in Popery : 1. To keep the civil magistrate in awe. 2. To maintain the clergy in state and honour. 3. To keep the people in ignorance, and so to enslave them."\*

"The Romanists *adulterate* what is true in religion, and *superadd* what is false."†

## VI. MISCELLANEOUS APHORISMS.

"He that is light of belief will be as light of unbelief if he has a mind to it; by the same reason, he will as easily believe an error as a truth, and as easily disbelieve a truth as an error."‡

"I have always found that such preaching of others hath most commanded my heart, which hath most illuminated my head."§

"The reason of our mind is the best instrument we have to work withal.

"Reason is not a shallow thing: it is the first participation from God; therefore, he that observes reason, observes God."||

"Heaven is *first* a temper, and *then* a place."¶

"The longest sword, the strongest lungs, the most voices, [are false measures of truth.]"\*\*

"No man is to *make* religion for himself, but to receive it from God; and the teachers of the Church are not to make religion for their hearers, but to *show* it only, as received from God.

"Curious determinations beyond Scripture are thought to be the improvement of faith; and inconsiderate dulness, to be the denial of our religion; fierceness in a sect, to be zeal for religion; and speaking without sense, to be the simplicity of the spirit."††

"Determinations beyond Scripture have indeed enlarged faith, but lessened charity, and multiplied divisions."†††

"It is better for us that there should be difference of judgment, if we keep charity: but it is most unmanly to quarrel because we differ.

"Let him that is assured he errs in nothing, take upon him to condemn every man that errs in anything."§§

"In doctrines of supernatural revelation we shall do well to direct our apprehensions, and to regulate our expressions by words of Scripture."|||

"It is not necessary, to the satisfaction of him who is offended, that a perfect recompense should be made by the offender, but the offended is master of his own right, and may accept of ingenuous acknowledgment only from the offender, as satisfaction, if he pleases; and expiation is then made, when that which is displeasing is taken away by something which is pleasing."¶¶

"Lord Verulam.—Every one almost worships *Idolum Fori*, the idol of general imagination: fools and conceited persons worship *Idolum Specūs*, the idol of particular fancy. It is less to worship *Idolum Fori* than *Idolum Specūs*, though best to worship neither."\*\*\*

"If I have not a friend, God send me an enemy, that I may hear of my faults. To be admonished of an enemy is next to having a friend.

"There is nothing more unnatural to religion than contentions about it."†††

"Nothing is more specific to man than capacity of religion, and sense of God."††††

\* Aphorisms, 502.

† Ib., 698.

‡ Ib., 292.

§ Ib., 393.

|| Ib., 459, 460.

¶ Ib., 464.

\*\* Ib., 500.

†† Ib., 504, 505.

††† Ib., 981.

§§ Ib., 569, 570.

||| Ib., 578.

¶¶ Ib., 580.

\*\*\* Ib., 607.

††† Ibid., 755, 756.

†††† Ib., 791.

"Among politicians the esteem of religion is profitable: the principles of it are troublesome."\*

"Platonists' principle of creation, *Επος* and *Πενία*, the activity of divine love; the nonentity of all creatures. The grossest errors are but abuses of some noble truths."†

"We are all of us at times in a fool's paradise, more or less, as if all were our own, all as we would have it."‡

"Enthusiastic doctrines—good things strained out of their wits. Among Christians those that pretend to be inspired seem to be mad: among the Turks those that are mad are thought to be inspired."§

"It is inconsistent with any kind of honesty and virtue to neglect and despise all kind of religion."||

"It is not good to live in *jest*, since we must die in *earnest*."¶

It is unnecessary to add to our quotations, much as we feel that they give only an imperfect idea of the substance of Whichcote's thought. Enough has been exhibited to show its temper or quality in contrast either with the High Church or the Puritan thought of his time. He stands obviously on an entirely different platform. His conceptions of human nature, of religion, and of the Church, all differ from theirs. A new, broader, and more philosophical element enters into them. It may be difficult to sum up in definite detail the distinctive points of difference; but there is no difficulty in catching everywhere the breath of a new spirit, and in recognising that he looks at the same subjects in a more comprehensive and intellectual manner. Traditionalism, whether of dogma or institution, affects him little. He moves in an ideal and open atmosphere, unfamiliar to the school theologian. Truth is not embodied to him in this or that form of Divine assumption, standing apart from the ordinary cycle of human knowledge and experience. Religious truth does not displace, or supersede, or make an extraneous addition to other forms of truth. But it is apprehended as the summit and ideal of all others. Man's knowledge does not lie in incommunicable spheres—the secular and the spiritual; but in different planes of elevation, the lower tending towards the higher, and the higher sending down its light to the lower levels of intellectual aspiration.

"I cannot," he says, "distinguish truth in itself; but in way of descent to us; truth either of first inscription (in reason) or of after-revelation from God."\*\* "God hath set up two lights to enlighten us in our way: the light of reason, which is the light of his creation, and the light of Scripture, which is after-revelation from him. Let us make use of these two lights; and suffer neither to be put out."††

This is a higher range of thought than that hitherto reached by any Protestant theologian in England, with the exception of Hooker, who, as we have already said, struck into the same vein in a special

\* Aphorisms, 1081.

|| *Ib.*, 1185.

† *Ib.*, 1131.

¶ *Ib.*, 1185, 1186.

†† Aphorisms, cent. ii. 109.

‡ *Ib.*, 1170.

§ *Ib.*, 1182.


\*\* Sermons, iii. 20.

direction. He saw distinctly in connection with his subject of Ecclesiastical Polity how the lines of spiritual truth in reason and revelation converge; but he did not see with equal clearness, or at least he did not interpret with equally consistent comprehension, their intermingling and co-ordination in all directions, so as to irradiate the whole theological sphere with the light of rational inquiry. Hales and Chillingworth boldly ventured in the same path, but under limitations arising out of the nature of their subjects and the special religious controversies of their time. The necessities of controversy still embarrass Whichcote; but it takes with him from the first a wider sweep and elevation. A higher philosophic manner marks even his correspondence with Tuckney, which is directly polemical in form. And in his sermons there is scarcely a trace of the theological polemic. He is by turns the religious philosopher, the moralist, the evangelical expositor, but scarcely ever the dogmatist or controversialist. In passing to these sermons from either the High Church or the Puritan literature of the time, we feel ourselves surrounded with "an ampler ether—a diviner air." Points of doctrine and duty are discussed in their broadest rational relations, and not merely as parts or data of an inherited system. Human nature is conceived and depicted not as set forth in the creeds, but in the totality of its spiritual powers and functions as a rational constitution in a rational universe. Religion is not a mere section of knowledge supernaturally communicated, nor a side of life supernaturally imparted, but a culture and discipline of the whole man—an education and consecration of all his higher activities. And so religion is not only not independent of morality, but its necessary complement—not only not an enemy of philosophy, but its highest fulfilment. Christianity binds the broken lines of human aspiration into a well-ordered power, which embraces and completes them all. The simplicity and grandeur of religious truth, and its independence of the special dogmas which divide Christians, had been well exhibited in the "Liberty of Prophesying;" but Taylor was himself—as some of his subsequent writings show—only partially emancipated from the crudities and formalities of scholastic tradition. He could not maintain, and indeed he probably never realised, in relation to thought and life as a whole, the same rational and enlightened elevation which necessity compelled him to occupy on the subject of the Church. It remained to Whichcote as a preacher to take up the idea of religion in its full breadth,—moral and philosophical,—and, like the Alexandrine teachers of old, and the Platonic temper always, to bring it into affinity with all the varied energies of humanity. True thought and true power everywhere; all pure and high ideas, all pure and healthy activities, all genuine expressions of reason and aspirations of nature are so far forth religion. Christianity is

distinct and supreme—not in rejecting and casting aside, but in interpreting and completing what is otherwise good and true in man. Morality, even in its most obscure forms, is its shadow ; Philosophy its summit. Reason is not only not opposed to faith, but there can be no faith without reason ; nor yet any higher reason without faith. In other words, the spiritual life of our race is a unity ; all our aspirations are alike divine, whether they are kindled within us by the “ candle of the Lord ” set up in our hearts, or by the light of the Divine Word communicated to us from without.

To initiate once more such a phase of thought as this—to penetrate to the deeper relations and harmonies of spiritual truth, and so to the unity of all the moral forces which govern civilization—was a great gain for the seventeenth century. It was something more than merely to expand and moralise the conception of the Church. It was to expand, elevate, and universalise the whole conception of religion, and of the moral rights of human nature ; and so to prepare the way for the triumph of those principles of civil and religious liberty which we derive—although not directly—from the conflicts of the century.

J. TULLOCH.



## THE FLESHLY SCHOOL OF POETRY : MR. D. G. ROSSETTI.

*Poems.* By DANTE GABRIEL ROSSETTI. Fifth Edition. London : F. S. Ellis.

**I**F, on the occasion of any public performance of Shakspeare's great tragedy, the actors who perform the parts of Rosencranz and Guildenstern were, by a preconcerted arrangement and by means of what is technically known as "gagging," to make themselves fully as prominent as the leading character, and to indulge in soliloquies and business strictly belonging to Hamlet himself, the result would be, to say the least of it, astonishing ; yet a very similar effect is produced on the unprejudiced mind when the "walking gentlemen" of the fleshly school of poetry, who bear precisely the same relation to Mr. Tennyson as Rosencranz and Guildenstern do to the Prince of Denmark in the play, obtrude their lesser identities and parade their smaller idiosyncrasies in the front rank of leading performers. In their own place, the gentlemen are interesting and useful. Pursuing still the theatrical analogy, the present drama of poetry might be cast as follows : Mr. Tennyson supporting the part of Hamlet, Mr. Matthew Arnold that of Horatio, Mr. Bailey that of Voltimand, Mr. Buchanan that of Cornelius, Messrs. Swinburne and Morris the parts of Rosencranz and Guildenstern, Mr. Rossetti that of Osric, and Mr. Robert Lytton that of "A Gentleman." It will be seen that we have left no place for Mr. Browning, who may be said, however, to play the leading character in his own peculiar fashion on alternate nights.

This may seem a frivolous and inadequate way of opening our

remarks on a school of verse-writers which some people regard as possessing great merits; but in good truth, it is scarcely possible to discuss with any seriousness the pretensions with which foolish friends and small critics have surrounded the fleshly school, which, in spite of its spasmodic ramifications in the erotic direction, is merely one of the many sub-Tennysonian schools expanded to supernatural dimensions, and endeavouring by affectations all its own to overshadow its connection with the great original. In the sweep of one single poem, the weird and doubtful "Vivien," Mr. Tennyson has concentrated all the epicene force which, wearisomely expanded, constitutes the characteristic of the writers at present under consideration; and if in "Vivien" he has indicated for them the bounds of sensualism in art, he has in "Maud," in the dramatic person of the hero, afforded distinct precedent for the hysteric tone and overloaded style which is now so familiar to readers of Mr. Swinburne. The fleshliness of "Vivien" may indeed be described as the distinct quality held in common by all the members of the last sub-Tennysonian school, and it is a quality which becomes unwholesome when there is no moral or intellectual quality to temper and control it. Fully conscious of this themselves, the fleshly gentlemen have bound themselves by solemn league and covenant to extol fleshliness as the distinct and supreme end of poetic and pictorial art; to aver that poetic expression is greater than poetic thought, and by inference that the body is greater than the soul, and sound superior to sense; and that the poet, properly to develop his poetic faculty, must be an intellectual hermaphrodite, to whom the very facts of day and night are lost in a whirl of æsthetic terminology. After Mr. Tennyson has probed the depths of modern speculation in a series of commanding moods, all right and interesting in him as the reigning personage, the walking gentlemen, knowing that something of the sort is expected from all leading performers, bare their roseate bosoms and aver that *they* are creedless; the only possible question here being, if any disinterested person cares twopence whether Rosencranz, Guildenstern, and Osric are creedless or not—their self-revelation on that score being so perfectly gratuitous? But having gone so far, it was and is too late to retreat. Rosencranz, Guildenstern, and Osric, finding it impossible to risk an individual bid for the leading business, have arranged all to play leading business together, and mutually to praise, extol, and imitate each other; and although by these measures they have fairly earned for themselves the title of the Mutual Admiration School, they have in a great measure succeeded in their object—to the general stupefaction of a British audience. It is time, therefore, to ascertain whether any of these gentlemen has actually in himself the making

of a leading performer. When the *Athenæum*—once more cautious in such matters—advertised nearly every week some interesting particular about Mr. Swinburne's health, Mr. Morris's holiday-making, or Mr. Rossetti's genealogy, varied with such startling statements as "We are informed that Mr. Swinburne dashed off his noble ode *at a sitting*," or "Mr. Swinburne's songs have already reached a second edition," or "Good poetry seems to be in demand; the first edition of Mr. O'Shaughnessy's poems is exhausted;" when the *Academy* informed us that "During the past year or two Mr. Swinburne has written several novels" (!), and that some review or other is to be praised for giving Mr. Rossetti's poems "the attentive study which they demand"—when we read these things we might or might not know pretty well how and where they originated; but to a provincial eye, perhaps, the whole thing really looked like leading business. It would be scarcely worth while, however, to inquire into the pretensions of the writers on merely literary grounds, because sooner or later all literature finds its own level, whatever criticism may say or do in the matter; but it unfortunately happens in the present case that the fleshly school of verse-writers are, so to speak, public offenders, because they are diligently spreading the seeds of disease broadcast wherever they are read and understood. Their complaint too is catching, and carries off many young persons. What the complaint is, and how it works, may be seen on a very slight examination of the works of Mr. Dante Gabriel Rossetti, to whom we shall confine our attention in the present article.

Mr. Rossetti has been known for many years as a painter of exceptional powers, who, for reasons best known to himself, has shrunk from publicly exhibiting his pictures, and from allowing anything like a popular estimate to be formed of their qualities. He belongs, or is said to belong, to the so-called Pre-Raphaelite school, a school which is generally considered to exhibit much genius for colour, and great indifference to perspective. It would be unfair to judge the painter by the glimpses we have had of his works, or by the photographs which are sold of the principal paintings. Judged by the photographs, he is an artist who conceives unpleasantly, and draws ill. Like Mr. Simeon Solomon, however, with whom he seems to have many points in common, he is distinctively a colourist, and of his capabilities in colour we cannot speak, though we should guess that they are great; for if there is any good quality by which his poems are specially marked, it is a great sensitiveness to hues and tints as conveyed in poetic epithet. These qualities, which impress the casual spectator of the photographs from his pictures, are to be found abundantly among his verses. There is the same thinness and transparency of design, the same combination of the

simple and the grotesque, the same morbid deviation from healthy forms of life, the same sense of weary, wasting, yet exquisite sensuality; nothing virile, nothing tender, nothing completely sane; a superfluity of extreme sensibility, of delight in beautiful forms, hues, and tints, and a deep-seated indifference to all agitating forces and agencies, all tumultuous griefs and sorrows, all the thunderous stress of life, and all the straining storm of speculation. Mr. Morris is often pure, fresh, and wholesome as his own great model; Mr. Swinburne startles us more than once by some fine flash of insight; but the mind of Mr. Rossetti is like a glassy mere, broken only by the dive of some water-bird or the hum of winged insects, and brooded over by an atmosphere of insufferable closeness, with a light blue sky above it, sultry depths mirrored within it, and a surface so thickly sown with water-lilies that it retains its glassy smoothness even in the strongest wind. Judged relatively to his poetic associates, Mr. Rossetti must be pronounced inferior to either. He cannot tell a pleasant story like Mr. Morris, nor forge alliterative thunderbolts like Mr. Swinburne. It must be conceded, nevertheless, that he is neither so glibly imitative as the one, nor so transcendently superficial as the other.

Although he has been known for many years as a poet as well as a painter—as a painter and poet idolized by his own family and personal associates—and although he has once or twice appeared in print as a contributor to magazines, Mr. Rossetti did not formally appeal to the public until rather more than a year ago, when he published a copious volume of poems, with the announcement that the book, although it contained pieces composed at intervals during a period of many years, “included nothing which the author believes to be immature.” This work was inscribed to his brother, Mr. William Rossetti, who, having written much both in poetry and criticism, will perhaps be known to bibliographers as the editor of the worst edition of Shelley which has yet seen the light. No sooner had the work appeared than the chorus of eulogy began. “The book is satisfactory from end to end,” wrote Mr. Morris in the *Academy*; “I think these lyrics, with all their other merits, the most complete of their time; nor do I know what lyrics of any time are to be called *great*, if we are to deny the title to these.” On the same subject Mr. Swinburne went into a hysteria of admiration: “golden affluence,” “jewel-coloured words,” “chastity of form,” “harmonious nakedness,” “consummate fleshly sculpture,” and so on in Mr. Swinburne’s well-known manner when reviewing his friends. Other critics, with a singular similarity of phrase, followed suit. Strange to say, moreover, no one accused Mr. Rossetti of naughtiness. What had been heinous in Mr. Swinburne was

majestic exquisiteness in Mr. Rossetti. Yet we question if there is anything in the unfortunate "Poems and Ballads" quite so questionable on the score of thorough nastiness as many pieces in Mr. Rossetti's collection. Mr. Swinburne was wilder, more outrageous, more blasphemous, and his subjects were more atrocious in themselves; yet the hysterical tone slew the animalism, the furiousness of epithet lowered the sensation; and the first feeling of disgust at such themes as "Laus Veneris" and "Anactoria," faded away into comic amazement. It was only a little mad boy letting off squibs; not a great strong man, who might be really dangerous to society. "I *will* be naughty!" screamed the little boy; but, after all, what did it matter? It is quite different, however, when a grown man, with the self-control and easy audacity of actual experience, comes forward to chronicle his amorous sensations, and, first proclaiming in a loud voice his literary maturity, and consequent responsibility, shamelessly prints and publishes such a piece of writing as this sonnet on "Nuptial Sleep":—

*At length their long kiss severed, with sweet smart :  
And as the last slow sudden drops are shed  
From sparkling caves when all the storm has fled,  
So singly flagged the pulses of each heart.  
Their bosoms sundered, with the opening start  
Of married flowers to either side outspread  
From the knit stem ; yet still their mouths, burnt red,  
Favoured on each other where they lay apart.*

Sleep sank them lower than the tide of dreams,  
And their dreams watched them sink, and slid away.  
Slowly their souls swam up again, through gleams  
Of watered light and dull drowned waifs of day ;  
Till from some wonder of new woods and streams  
He woke, and wondered more : for there she lay.

This, then, is "the golden affluence of words, the firm outline, the justice and chastity of form." Here is a full-grown man, presumably intelligent and cultivated, putting on record for other full-grown men to read, the most secret mysteries of sexual connection, and that with so sickening a desire to reproduce the sensual mood, so careful a choice of epithet to convey mere animal sensations, that we merely shudder at the shameless nakedness. We are no purists in such matters. We hold the sensual part of our nature to be as holy as the spiritual or intellectual part, and we believe that such things must find their equivalent in all; but it is neither poetic, nor manly, nor even human, to obtrude such things as the themes of whole poems. It is simply nasty. Nasty as it is, we are very mistaken if many readers do not think it nice. English society of one kind purchases the *Day's Doings*. English society of another kind goes

into ecstasy over Mr. Solomon's pictures—pretty pieces of morality, such as "Love dying by the breath of Lust." There is not much to choose between the two objects of admiration, except that painters like Mr. Solomon lend actual genius to worthless subjects, and thereby produce veritable monsters—like the lovely devils that danced round Saint Anthony. Mr. Rossetti owes his so-called success to the same causes. In poems like "Nuptial Sleep," the man who is too sensitive to exhibit his pictures, and so modest that it takes him years to make up his mind to publish his poems, parades his private sensations before a coarse public, and is gratified by their applause.

It must not be supposed that all Mr. Rossetti's poems are made up of trash like this. Some of them are as noteworthy for delicacy of touch as others are for shamelessness of exposition. They contain some exquisite pictures of nature, occasional passages of real meaning, much beautiful phraseology, lines of peculiar sweetness, and epithets chosen with true literary cunning. But the fleshly feeling is everywhere. Sometimes, as in "The Stream's Secret," it is deliciously modulated, and adds greatly to our emotion of pleasure at perusing a finely-wrought poem; at other times, as in the "Last Confession," it is fiercely held in check by the exigencies of a powerful situation and the strength of a dramatic speaker; but it is generally in the foreground, flushing the whole poem with unhealthy rose-colour, stifling the senses with overpowering sickliness, as of too much civet. Mr. Rossetti is never dramatic, never impersonal—always attitudinizing, posturing, and describing his own exquisite emotions. He is the "Blessed Damsel," leaning over the "gold bar of heaven," and seeing

"Time like a pulse shake fierce  
Thro' all the worlds;"

he is "heaven-born Helon, Sparta's queen," whose "each twin breast is an apple sweet;" he is Lilith the first wife of Adam; he is the rosy Virgin of the poem called "Ave," and the Queen in the "Staff and Scrip;" he is "Sister Helen" melting her waxen man; he is all these, just as surely as he is Mr. Rossetti soliloquizing over Jenny in her London lodging, or the very nuptial person writing erotic sonnets to his wife. In petticoats or pantaloons, in modern times or in the middle ages, he is just Mr. Rossetti, a fleshly person, with nothing particular to tell us or teach us, with extreme self-control, a strong sense of colour, and a careful choice of diction. Amid all his "affluence of jewel-coloured words," he has not given us one rounded and noteworthy piece of art, though his verses are all art; not one poem which is memorable for its own sake, and

quite separable from the displeasing identity of the composer. The nearest approach to a perfect whole is the "Blessed Damsel," a peculiar poem, placed first in the book, perhaps by accident, perhaps because it is a key to the poems which follow. This poem appeared in a rough shape many years ago in the *Germ*, an unwholesome periodical started by the Pre-Raphaelites, and suffered, after gasping through a few feeble numbers, to die the death of all such publications. In spite of its affected title, and of numberless affectations throughout the text, the "Blessed Damsel" has great merits of its own, and a few lines of real genius. We have heard it described as the record of actual grief and love, or, in simple words, the apotheosis of one actually lost by the writer; but, without having any private knowledge of the circumstance of its composition, we feel that such an account of the poem is inadmissible. It does not contain one single note of sorrow. It is a "composition," and a clever one. Read the opening stanzas:—

"The blessed damozel leaned out  
From the gold bar of Heaven;  
Her eyes were deeper than the depth  
Of water stilled at even;  
She had three lilies in her hand,  
And the stars in her hair were seven.

"Her robe, ungirt from clasp to hem,  
No wrought flowers did adorn,  
But a white rose of Mary's gift,  
For service meetly worn;  
Her hair that lay along her back  
Was yellow like ripe corn."

This is a careful sketch for a picture, which, worked into actual colour by a master, might have been worth seeing. The steadiness of hand lessens as the poem proceeds, and although there are several passages of considerable power,—such as that where, far down the void,

"this earth  
Spins like a fretful midge,"

or that other, describing how

"the curled moon  
Was like a little feather  
Fluttering far down the gulf,"—

the general effect is that of a queer old painting in a missal, very affected and very odd. What moved the British critic to ecstasy in this poem seems to us very sad nonsense indeed, or, if not sad nonsense, very meretricious affectation. Thus, we have seen the following verses quoted with enthusiasm, as italicised—

"And still she bowed herself and stooped  
Out of the circling charm;

*Until her bosom must have made  
The bar she leaned on warm,  
And the lilies lay as if asleep  
Along her bended arm.*

"From the fixed place of Heaven she saw  
*Time like a pulse shake fierce*  
*Thro' all the worlds.* Her gaze still strove  
Within the gulf to pierce  
Its path; and now she spoke as when  
The stars sang in their spheres."

It seems to us that all these lines are very bad, with the exception of the two admirable lines ending the first verse, and that the italicised portions are quite without merit, and almost without meaning. On the whole, one feels disheartened and amazed at the poet who, in the nineteenth century, talks about "damozels," "citherns," and "citoles," and addresses the mother of Christ as the "Lady Mary,"—

"With her five handmaidens, whose names  
Are five sweet symphonies,  
Cecily, Gertrude, Magdalen,  
Margaret and Rosalye."

A suspicion is awakened that the writer is laughing at us. We hover uncertainly between picturesqueness and namby-pamby, and the effect, as Artemus Ward would express it, is "weakening to the intellect." The thing would have been almost too much in the shape of a picture, though the workmanship might have made amends. The truth is that literature, and more particularly poetry, is in a very bad way when one art gets hold of another, and imposes upon it its conditions and limitations. In the first few verses of the "Damozel" we have the subject, or part of the subject, of a picture, and the inventor should either have painted it or left it alone altogether; and, had he done the latter, the world would have lost nothing. Poetry is something more than painting; and an idea will not become a poem because it is too smudgy for a picture.

In a short notice from a well-known pen, giving the best estimate we have seen of Mr. Rossetti's powers as a poet, the *North American Review* offers a certain explanation for affectation such as that of Mr. Rossetti. The writer suggests that "it may probably be the expression of genuine moods of mind in natures too little comprehensive." We would rather believe that Mr. Rossetti lacks comprehension than that he is deficient in sincerity; yet really, to paraphrase the words which Johnson applied to Thomas Sheridan, Mr. Rossetti is affected, naturally affected, but it must have taken him a great deal of trouble to become what we now see him—such an excess of affectation is not in nature.\* There is very little writing in the

\* "Why, sir, Sherry is dull, *naturally* dull; but it must have taken him a *great deal* of trouble to become what we now see him—such an excess of stupidity is not in nature."  
—*Boswell's Life*.

volume spontaneous in the sense that some of Swinburne's verses are spontaneous; the poems all look as if they had taken a great deal of trouble. The grotesque mediævalism of "Stratton Water" and "Sister Helen," the mediæval classicism of "Troy Town," the false and shallow mysticism of "Eden Bower," are one and all essentially imitative, and must have cost the writer much pains. It is time, indeed, to point out that Mr. Rossetti is a poet possessing great powers of assimilation and some faculty for concealing the nutriment on which he feeds. Setting aside the "Vita Nuova" and the early Italian poems, which are familiar to many readers by his own excellent translations, Mr. Rossetti may be described as a writer who has yielded to an unusual extent to the complex influences of the literature surrounding him at the present moment. He has the painter's imitative power developed in proportion to his lack of the poet's conceiving imagination. He reproduces to a nicety the manner of an old ballad, a trick in which Mr. Swinburne is also an adept. Cultivated readers, moreover, will recognise in every one of these poems the tone of Mr. Tennyson broken up by the style of Mr. and Mrs. Browning, and disguised here and there by the eccentricities of the Pre-Raphaelites. The "Burden of Nineveh" is a philosophical edition of "Recollections of the Arabian Nights;" "A Last Confession" and "Dante at Verona" are, in the minutest trick and form of thought, suggestive of Mr. Browning; and that the sonnets have been largely moulded and inspired by Mrs. Browning can be ascertained by any critic who will compare them with the "Sonnets from the Portuguese." Much remains, nevertheless, that is Mr. Rossetti's own. We at once recognise as his own property such passages as this:—

"I looked up"  
And saw where a brown-shouldered harlot leaned  
Half through a tavern window thick with vine.  
Some man had come behind her in the room  
And caught her by her arms, and she had turned  
With that coarse empty laugh on him, as now  
He munched her neck with kisses, while the vine  
Crawled in her back.

Or this:—

"As I stooped, her own lips rising there  
Bubbled with brimming kisses at my mouth."

Or this:—

"Have seen your lifted silken skirt  
Advertise dainties through the dirt!"

Or this:—

"What more prize than love to impel thee,  
Grip and lip my limbs as I tell thee!"

Passages like these are the common stock of the walking gentlemen of the fleshly school. We cannot forbear expressing our wonder, by the way, at the kind of women whom it seems the unhappy lot of these gentlemen to encounter. We have lived as long in the world as they have, but never yet came across persons of the other sex who conduct themselves in the manner described. Females who bite, scratch, scream, bubble, munch, sweat, writhe, twist, wriggle, foam, and in a general way slaver over their lovers, must surely possess some extraordinary qualities to counteract their otherwise most offensive mode of conducting themselves. It appears, however, on examination, that their poet-lovers conduct themselves in a similar manner. They, too, bite, scratch, scream, bubble, munch, sweat, writhe, twist, wriggle, foam, and slaver, in a style frightful to hear of. Let us hope that it is only their fun, and that they don't mean half they say. At times, in reading such books as this, one cannot help wishing that things had remained for ever in the asexual state described in Mr. Darwin's great chapter on Palingenesis. We get very weary of this protracted hankering after a person of the other sex; it seems meat, drink, thought, sinew, religion for the fleshly school. There is no limit to the fleshliness, and Mr. Rossetti finds in its own religious justification much in the same way as Holy Willie :—

"Maybe thou let'st this fleshly thorn  
Perplex thy servant night and morn,  
                  'Cause he's so gifted.  
If so, thy hand must o'en be borne,  
                  Until thou lift it."

Whether he is writing of the holy Damozel, or of the Virgin herself, or of Lilith, or Helen, or of Dante, or of Jenny the street-walker, he is fleshly all over, from the roots of his hair to the tip of his toes; never a true lover merging his identity into that of the beloved one; never spiritual, never tender; always self-conscious and æsthetic. "Nothing," says a modern writer, "in human life is so utterly remorseless—not love, not hate, not ambition, not vanity—as the artistic or æsthetic instinct morbidly developed to the suppression of conscience and feeling;" and at no time do we feel more fully impressed with this truth than after the perusal of "Jenny," in some respects the finest poem in the volume, and in all respects the poem best indicative of the true quality of the writer's humanity. It is a production which bears signs of having been suggested by Mr. Buchanan's quasi-lyrical poems, which it copies in the style of title, and particularly by "Artist and Model;" but certainly Mr. Rossetti cannot be accused, as the Scottish writer has been accused, of maudlin sentiment and affected tenderness. The two first lines are perfect :—

"Lazy laughing languid Jenny,  
Fond of a kiss and fond of a guinea;"

And the poem is a soliloquy of the poet—who has been spending the evening in dancing at a casino—over his partner, whom he has accompanied home to the usual style of lodgings occupied by such ladies, and who has fallen asleep with her head upon his knee, while he wonders, in a wretched pun—

"Whose person or whose purse may be  
The lodestar of your reverie?"

The soliloquy is long, and in some parts beautiful, despite a very constant suspicion that we are listening to an emasculated Mr. Browning, whose whole tone and gesture, so to speak, is occasionally introduced with startling fidelity; and there are here and there glimpses of actual thought and insight, over and above the picturesque touches which belong to the writer's true profession, such as that where, at daybreak—

"lights creep in  
Past the gauze curtains half drawn-to,  
And the lamp's doubled shade grows blue."

What we object to in this poem is not the subject, which any writer may be fairly left to choose for himself; nor anything particularly vicious in the poetic treatment of it; nor any bad blood bursting through in special passages. But the whole tone, without being more than usually coarse, seems heartless. There is not a drop of piteousness in Mr. Rossetti. He is just to the outcast, even generous; severe to the seducer; sad even at the spectacle of lust in dimity and fine ribbons. Notwithstanding all this, and a certain delicacy and refinement of treatment unusual with this poet, the poem repels and revolts us, and we like Mr. Rossetti least after its perusal. We are angry with the fleshly person at last. The "Blessed Damsel" puzzled us, the "Song of the Bower" amused us, the love-sonnet depressed and sickened us, but "Jenny," though distinguished by less special viciousness of thought and style than any of these, fairly makes us lose patience. We detect its fleshliness at a glance; we perceive that the scene was fascinating less through its human tenderness than because it, like all the others, possessed an inherent quality of animalism. "The whole work" ("Jenny,") writes Mr. Swinburne, "is worthy to fill its place for ever as one of the most perfect poems of an age or generation. There is just the same life-blood and breadth of poetic interest in this episode of a London street and lodging as in the song of 'Troy Town' and the song of 'Eden Bower'; just as much, and no jot more,"—to which last statement we cordially assent; for there is bad blood in all, and breadth

of poetic interest in none. "Vengeance of Jenny's case," indeed!—when such a poet as this comes fawning over her, with tender compassion in one eye and æsthetic enjoyment in the other!

It is time that we permitted Mr. Rossetti to speak for himself, which we will do by quoting a fairly representative poem entire:—

LOVE-LILY.

"Between the hands, between the brows,  
Between the lips of Love-Lily,  
*A spirit is born whose birth endows*  
*My blood with fire to burn through me ;*  
Who breathes upon my gazing eyes,  
Who laughs and murmurs in mine ear,  
At whose least touch my colour flies,  
And whom my life grows faint to hear.

"Within the voice, within the heart,  
Within the mind of Love-Lily,  
A spirit is born who lifts apart  
His tremulous wings and looks at me ;  
Who on my mouth his finger lays,  
And shows, while whispering lutes confer,  
That Eden of Love's watered ways  
Whose winds and spirits worship her.

"Brows, hands, and lips, heart, mind, and voice,  
Kisses and words of Love-Lily,—  
Oh! bid me with your joy rejoice  
*Till riotous longing rest in me !*  
Ah! let not hope be still distraught,  
But find in her its gracious goal,  
Whose speech Truth knows not from her thought,  
Nor Love her body from her soul."

With the exception of the usual "riotous longing," which seems to make Mr. Rossetti a burthen to himself, there is nothing to find fault with in the extreme fleshliness of these verses, and to many people who live in the country they may even appear beautiful. Without pausing to criticise a thing so trifling—as well might we dissect a cobweb or anatomize a medusa—let us ask the reader's attention to a peculiarity to which all the students of the fleshly school must sooner or later give their attention—we mean the habit of accenting the last syllable in words which in ordinary speech are accented on the penultimate:—

"Between the hands, between the brows,  
Between the lips of Love-Lilee!"

which may be said to give to the speaker's voice a sort of cooing tenderness just bordering on a loving whistle. Still better as an illustration are the lines:—

"Saturday night is market night  
Everywhere, be it dry or wet,  
And market night in the Haymarket!"

which the reader may advantageously compare with Mr. Morris's

"Then said the king  
Thanked be thou; *neither for nothing*  
Shalt thou this good deed do to me;"

or Mr. Swinburne's

"In either of the twain  
Red roses full of rain;  
She hath for bondwomen  
All kinds of flowers."

It is unnecessary to multiply examples of an affectation which disfigures all these writers—Guildestern, Rosencranz, and Osric; who, in the same spirit which prompts the ambitious nobodies that rent London theatres in the "empty" season to make up for their dullness by fearfully original "new readings," distinguish their attempt at leading business by affecting the construction of their grandfathers and great-grandfathers, and the accentuation of the poets of the court of James I. It is in all respects a sign of remarkable genius, from this point of view, to rhyme "was" with "grass," "death" with "lieth," "love" with "of," "once" with "suns," and so on *ad nauseam*. We are far from disputing the value of bad rhymes used occasionally to break up the monotony of verse, but the case is hard when such blunders become the rule and not the exception, when writers deliberately lay themselves out to be as archaic and affected as possible. Poetry is perfect human speech, and these archaisms are the mere fiddlededeeing of empty heads and hollow hearts. Bad as they are, they are the true indication of falser tricks and affectations which lie far deeper. They are trifles, light as air, showing how the wind blows. The soul's speech and the heart's speech are clear, simple, natural, and beautiful, and reject the meretricious tricks to which we have drawn attention.

It is on the score that these tricks and affectations have procured the professors a number of imitators, that the fleshly school deliver their formula that great poets are always to be known because their manner is immediately reproduced by small poets, and that a poet who finds few imitators is probably of inferior rank—by which they mean to infer that they themselves are very great poets indeed. It is quite true that they are imitated. On the stage, twenty provincial "stars" copy Charles Kean, while not one copies his father; there are dozens of actors who reproduce Mr. Charles Dillon, and not one who attempts to reproduce Macready. When we take up the poems of Mr. O'Shaughnessy,\* we are face to face with a second-

\* "An Epic of Women." By Arthur W. E. O'Shaughnessy. (Hotten.)

hand Mr. Swinburne; when we read Mr. Payne's queer allegories,\* we remember Mr. Morris's early stage; and every poem of Mr. Marston's† reminds us of Mr. Rossetti. But what is really most droll and puzzling in the matter is, that these imitators seem to have no difficulty whatever in writing nearly, if not quite, as well as their masters. It is not bad imitations they offer us, but poems which read just like the originals; the fact being that it is easy to reproduce sound when it has no strict connection with sense, and simple enough to cull phraseology not hopelessly interwoven with thought and spirit. The fact that these gentlemen are so easily imitated is the most damning proof of their inferiority. What merits they have lie with their faults on the surface, and can be caught by any young gentleman as easily as the measles, only they are rather more difficult to get rid of. All young gentlemen have animal faculties, though few have brains; and if animal faculties without brains will make poems, nothing is easier in the world. A great and good poet, however, is great and good irrespective of manner, and often in spite of manner; he is great because he brings great ideas and new light, because his thought is a revelation; and, although it is true that a great manner generally accompanies great matter, the manner of great matter is almost inimitable. The great poet is not Cowley, imitated and idolized and reproduced by every scribbler of his time; nor Pope, whose trick of style was so easily copied that to this day we cannot trace his own hand with any certainty in the *Iliad*; nor Donne, nor Sylvester, nor the Della Cruscans. Shakspeare's blank verse is the most difficult and Jonson's the most easy to imitate, of all the Elizabethan stock; and Shakspeare's verse is the best verse, because it combines the great qualities of all contemporary verse, with no individual affectations; and so perfectly does this verse, with all its splendour, intersect with the style of contemporaries *at their best*, that we would undertake to select passage after passage which would puzzle a good judge to tell which of the Elizabethans was the author—Marlowe, Beaumont, Dekkar, Marston, Webster, or Shakspeare himself. The great poet is Dante, full of the thunder of a great Idea; and Milton, unapproachable in the serene white light of thought and sumptuous wealth of style; and Shakspeare, all poets by turns, and all men in succession; and Goethe, always innovating, and ever indifferent to innovation for its own sake; and Wordsworth, clear as crystal and deep as the sea; and Tennyson, with his vivid range, far-piercing sight, and perfect speech; and Browning, great, not by virtue of his eccentricities, but because of his close intellectual grasp. Tell "Paradise Lost," the "Divine

\* "The Masque of Shadows." By John Payne. (Pickering.)

† "Songtide, and other Poems." By Philip Bourke Marston. (Ellis.)

Comedy," in naked prose; do the same by *Hamlet*, *Macbeth*, and *Lear*; read Mr. Hayward's translation of "*Faust*;" take up the "*Excursion*," a great poem, though its speech is nearly prose already; turn the "*Guinevere*" into a mere story; reproduce *Pompilia*'s last dying speech without a line of rhythm. Reduced to bald English, all these poems, and all great poems, lose much; but how much do they not retain? They are poems to the very roots and depths of being, poems born and delivered from the soul, and treat them as cruelly as you may, poems they will remain. So it is with all good and thorough creations, however low in their rank; so it is with the "*Ballad in a Wedding*" and "*Clever Tom Clinch*," just as much as with the "*Epistle of Karsheesh*," or Goethe's torso of "*Prometheus*;" with Shelley's "*Skylark*," or Alfred de Musset's "*A la Lune*," as well as Racine's "*Athalie*," Victor Hugo's "*Parricide*," or Hood's "*Last Man*." A poem is a poem, first as to the soul, next as to the form. The fleshly persons who wish to create form for its own sake are merely pronouncing their own doom. But *such* form! If the Pre-Raphaelite fervour gains ground, we shall soon have popular songs like this:—

"When winds do rear, and rains do pour,  
Hard is the life of the sailor;  
He scarcely as he reels can tell  
The side-lights from the binnacle;  
He looketh on the wild water," &c.,

and so on, till the English speech seems the speech of raving madmen. Of a piece with other affectations is the device of a burthen, of which the fleshly persons are very fond for its own sake, quite apart from its relevancy. Thus Mr. Rossetti sings:—

"Why did you melt your waxen man,  
Sister Helen?  
To-day is the third since you began.  
The time was long, yet the time ran,  
Little brother.  
(O mother, Mary mother,  
Three days to-day between Heaven and Hell.)

This burthen is repeated, with little or no alteration, through thirty-four verses, and might with as much music, and far more point, run as follows:—

Why did you melt your waxen man,  
Sister Helen?  
To-day is the third since you began.  
The time was long, yet the time ran,  
Little brother.  
(O Mr. Dante Rossetti,  
What stuff is this about Heaven and Hell?)

About as much to the point is a burthen of Mr. Swinburne's, something to the following effect :—

“ We were three maidens in the green corn,  
*Hey chickaleerie, the red cock and gray,*  
 Fairer maidens were never born,  
*One o'clock, two o'clock, off and away.”*

We are not quite certain of the words, as we quote from memory, but we are sure our version fairly represents the original, and is quite as expressive. Productions of this sort are “silly sooth” in good earnest, though they delight some newspaper critics of the day, and are copied by young gentlemen with animal faculties morbidly developed by too much tobacco and too little exercise. Such indulgence, however, would ruin the strongest poetical constitution ; and it unfortunately happens that neither masters nor pupils were naturally very healthy. In such a poem as “Eden Bower” there is not one scrap of imagination, properly so-called. It is a clever grotesque in the worst manner of Callot, unredeemed by a gleam of true poetry or humour. No good poet would have wrought into a poem the absurd tradition about Lilith ; Goethe was content to glance at it merely, with a grim smile, in the great scene in the Brocken. We may remark here that poems of this unnatural and morbid kind are only tolerable when they embody a profound meaning, as do Coleridge's “Ancient Mariner” and “Cristabel.” Not that we would insult the memory of Coleridge by comparing his exquisitely conscientious work with this affected rubbish about “Eden Bower” and “Sister Helen,” though his influence in their composition is unmistakable. Still more unmistakable is the influence of that most unwholesome poet, Beddoes, who, with all his great powers, treated his subjects in a thoroughly insincere manner, and is now justly forgotten.

The great strong current of English poetry rolls on, ever mirroring in its bosom new prospects of fair and wholesome thought. Morbid deviations are endless and inevitable ; there must be marsh and stagnant mere as well as mountain and wood. Glancing backward into the shady places of the obscure, we see the once prosperous nonsense-writers each now consigned to his own little limbo—Skelton and Gower still playing fantastic tricks with the mother-tongue ; Gascoigne outlasting the applause of all, and living to see his own works buried before him ; Silvester doomed to oblivion by his own fame as a translator ; Carew the idol of courts, and Donne the beloved of schoolmen, both buried in the same oblivion ; the fantastic Fletchers winning the wonder of collegians, and fading out through sheer poetic impotence ; Cowley shaking all England with his pindarics, and perishing with them ; Waller, the famous, saved from oblivion by the natural note of one single song—and so on, through league after league of a

flat and desolate country which once was prosperous, till we come again to these fantastic figures of the fleshly school, with their droll mediæval garments, their funny archaic speech, and the fatal marks of literary consumption in every pale and delicate visage. Our judgment on Mr. Rossetti, to whom we in the meantime confine our judgment, is substantially that of the *North American Reviewer*, who believes that "we have in him another poetical man, and a man markedly poetical, and of a kind apparently, though not radically, different from any of our secondary writers of poetry, but that we have not in him a new poet of any weight;" and that he is "so affected, sentimental, and painfully self-conscious, that the best to be done in his case is to hope that this book of his, having unpacked his bosom of so much that is unhealthy, may have done him more good than it has given others pleasure." Such, we say, is our opinion, which might very well be wrong, and have to undergo modification, if Mr. Rossetti was younger and less self-possessed. His "maturity" is fatal.

THOMAS MAITLAND.



## THE PEOPLE IN RELATION TO POLITICAL POWER AND OPINION.

FROM the frequency, and still more from the *tone*, with which the name of "The People"—the phrase being used as a synonym for the working classes—is brought into the discussion of all kinds of political questions, it might readily be supposed that they are politically powerful; but those who know them best are aware that such is not the case. As they come before the rest of the world politically, they are chiefly represented by about a dozen men of the agitator species, and two or three associations professing political creeds that are generally held to be extreme, if not altogether impracticable or Utopian. These men, in their public speeches, and the societies in their resolutions, allege that they *do* represent the working classes, and by many who have no personal knowledge of those classes they are taken at their word. They speak with all the confidence of assured knowledge of the desires of "the great heart of the people," the measures for which and against which the voice of the people is cast, and the statesmen or political parties upon which its eyes are watchfully, approvingly, or threateningly fixed.

Now, that these men mean well to the people, that the opinions they expound are sometimes those held by the people, and at other times such as perhaps ought to be held by them, may be admitted;

but they are not, in any legitimate or reliable sense, the representatives of the people. They are not infallible indicators of the beatings of "the great heart of the people," are not the tongue of their voice, or the eyes of their vision. Some of them, and especially the associations, represent themselves alone, others themselves and a small personal following. They are not elected or accredited by those in whose name they profess to speak, and even if they were, could not represent their political power for the all-sufficient reason that, practically, there is no such power to be represented. The much-talked-of political power of the people, though not an absolute myth, is as yet in embryo, and at best must be counted in the category of desirable things, which ought to be, but are not.

The whole subject of the relation of the working classes to political power, or, to speak by the letter, the lack of political power, is scarcely less curious than important. That these classes labour under social disadvantages which an equitable system of politics, equitably administered, would remove, is a position which we think most people, even in other grades of society, will admit. That such is the case is, at any rate, the first and firmest article of their own political belief, and, as a consequence, the thinkers among them have always looked forward to the possession by their class of political power, as a panacea for most of the social ills to which they found themselves heirs. After years of struggling, and hoping, and waiting, they at last appeared to grasp this long-coveted power. With the carrying of the Household Suffrage Bill, it seemingly passed into their hands in a proportion as preponderating as their numbers. And yet, what do we see? That, though they are potentially "the new masters" of the political situation, the situation is practically master of them. That though notoriously the most clubbable section of society, having vital interests in common, and being supreme in numbers where numbers should be supreme, they are still politically powerless. What a picture! A giant, with all a giant's strength, and the will to use it like a giant, and yet impotent, defeated on all hands by comparative pigmies. A picture so strange as to seem unnatural, and yet a perfectly true one. In a general election under household suffrage, the working classes were unable to return a single special representative; and unless their present attitude is speedily and materially altered, they will, in all probability, fail as utterly in the next election, and undoubtedly fail to make any appreciable modification in the present constitution of the House of Commons—a constitution in which theirs alone of all considerable special interests has not some more or less adequate representation. But whence, it may be asked, this difference between the possible, the desired and desirable, and the actual? To

account for it there are a variety of reasons, the chief of which are political ignorance, political inexperience, political apathy, and the want of a great political leader. A large percentage of the people are so utterly destitute of a knowledge of politics as to be unable to take any intelligent part in them. If they know that there is such a thing as political economy, that is the utmost they do know about it. They have no conception that it may be actually affecting their possession or want of employment, or the rate of wages they are receiving; or that it is a science a general knowledge of which might be of material service to them. And such ignorance breeds an inertness that forms one of the several bars to the full development and effective application of the (potential) political power of the working classes.

Those of the people who have a knowledge of and respect for politics, and a belief that much may be done for the elevation of their class by political means, have, as a rule, little knowledge, and less experience of the mechanism of politics—of getting up, supporting, and “inspiring” press organs; organizing a compact, disciplined party, and carrying out party movements and compromises. From a high standpoint such things may seem out of place in connection with the assertion of great principles; but certain it is, that in the existing condition of the political world principles are not to be gained without both knowledge and practice of the tactics of political warfare—especially where the principles, though palpably just in themselves, are opposed to class interests, as is the case with those by which the people believe that the national policy should be governed.

The indifference of the politically apathetic section of the people though leading to the same ultimate result as the inertia arising from ignorance, already spoken of, is distinct from it. It is found chiefly—and very largely—among the two extremes of the working classes, the *best* and *worst* off portions of them. The first are apathetic in a selfish kind of “rest and be thankful” spirit. They are the fortunate of their class. They have had constancy of health and employment, fare comfortably every day, have generally saved a little money, and in some instances are even men of property to the extent of a house or two got through building societies. They have done well themselves, and are given to “wonder” that others of their degree have not done the same: to wonder in a manner implying that the others might have done so, and that blame must lie with the individuals rather than with any fault in our political or social system. They are comfortable enough under the system, are not predisposed to see blots in it, and do not need to seek for them as a probable cause of personal hardships. They do not care to

"bother themselves" about politics, and, indeed, many of them are imbued with an idea that to bother oneself about them is scarcely respectable. They may have heard in a general way that the labour market is greatly overstocked, and subjected to violent fluctuations, but they do not trouble themselves about it sufficiently to bring the fact home to their "business and bosom;" to understand from it that some *must* suffer. They do not see that in not being among those who do suffer, they may be rather specially fortunate than specially meritorious, and they decline to mix themselves up with matters in which, in their short-sighted selfishness, they believe they have no direct self-interest.

The other division of the apathetics is more to be pitied than condemned. It consists of those who are constantly doing battle with abject poverty, whose whole lives are a from hand-to-mouth struggle to live—a struggle that exhausts energy, breaks the spirits, and crushes even hope, causing men to say in bitterness of heart, that such things as politics are nothing to them; that no matter what party or minister is in power, there comes no gleam of light into their dark lives, no improvement in their miserable condition.

Seeing how many so-called "Leaders of the People" there are before the public, it may seem to many outside the working classes, a somewhat startling thing to say that the people have no leader; nevertheless those inside those classes will know that the assertion is strictly true. Let any person who has taken it for granted that the so-called leaders of the people have been really such, look at the matter questioningly. Let them remember what a vast aggregate the working classes form, and then ask themselves by whom, and when, and in what manner the political leadership of this great body was conferred by itself upon any man, or being assumed was ratified. Let them again, when, under the heading of the Working Classes and this or that political question, they read an account of some meeting, ask themselves how far the meeting *was* the Working Classes. Let them, if they are in a position to do so, attend a few such meetings, and critically note their composition and proceedings. The so-called people's leaders are the speakers at them. A deal of what they say is true, sensible, and to the point, but a deal of it also consists of mere truisms, platitudes, bombastic oratory, and stock flatteries, of the Working Man. Many of the audience are working men. Some of them are there from strong personal political convictions—convictions fully in accordance with the avowed object of the meeting, and generally arrived at after more or less of political study and individual suffering under existing social conditions. These are mostly to be seen on or near the platform listening with a satis-

fied expression of face, and a general air of taking an active part in the proceedings. They *are* represented by the meeting, but then they do not in their turn represent the working classes at large, or even any considerable section of them. So far as they are a class, they are, though few in numbers, substantially the class itself. Their faces are as familiar at such meetings as are those of the leaders; and, in fact, they are a sort of *aides-de-camp* to the leaders, taking up their points and fugling the applause.

The other working men at these meetings—and they form the bulk of the working class element in the audience—it is easy to see from their manner attend simply from curiosity, or the hope of excitement or amusement. They are only roused to anything approaching sympathetic enthusiasm when the praise of the Working Man is sounded. They are greatly given to shouting, and appear best pleased and most interested when an opportunity arises for the display of their capabilities in that line, making a glory of howling down any person who seems disposed to dissent from anything that has been put forward upon the working-class side of the question.

These meetings do *not* represent the working classes. They simply represent as many London workmen as attend them, and—with all due respect and good feeling be it spoken—considered in this connection, London workmen are not the best possible examples of the working classes. Locality has an influence in giving bent to the mind, and the surroundings of a London life tend to make working men superficial, excitable, easy to be pleased, and averse to the trouble of thought. High rentals drive them into squalid neighbourhoods, and cause them to be “cabin’d, cribb’d, confin’d” in the matter of actual house-room and of domestic comforts. This condition of home life has a material influence in causing them to largely avail themselves of the thousand and one amusements which London offers to all classes—amusements which, though perfectly unobjectionable in the abstract, have a tendency to make men thoughtless and mercurial when indulged in habitually. The London workman craves for and indulges in amusements to a greater extent than any other, and more than any other is a man to take part in a showy or exciting demonstration simply *as* a demonstration, and without being imbued with the feeling or understanding the doctrine of which the demonstration is supposed to be an outcome. But while this is the real state of the case, they have a self-complacent belief in the Gospel so often preached to them, that as dwellers in the great metropolis, they are as a matter of course in advance of, and fitted to set an example to, their comparatively benighted provincial brethren. And so the few of them who attend political meetings style themselves

The Working Classes, and assume a *We-the-People-of-England* tone, though, as we have already said, they represent only themselves, and are not even good individual specimens of the politically inclined men of the working classes. The best political element among the people will be found principally in the provincial manufacturing towns, where workmen are more given than in London to spend their evenings at home, and read, and think, and brood. There is, of course, a proportion of this element in London, but those constituting it hold aloof from the demonstrative clique. They do not care about attending meetings which censure governments, and pass momentous resolutions with an amount of "tall talk" and assumption of authority which, when compared with their inability to give any practical effect to their words, makes those in whose name they profess to speak appear ridiculous and contemptible in the eyes of outsiders.

Let the inquirer for fact in these matters examine also for himself the constitution of the various leagues and associations whose proceedings are occasionally chronicled as those of the working classes, and he will find that they consist of from a dozen to a score of members, who are much more bent upon the practice of flowery oratory than the acquisition of political knowledge, or the organization of the political power of the people.

Sometimes the views put forth by those whom it has become a fashion to speak of as leaders of the people, are really those held by the working classes as a body, but that is a matter of chance. Very often, indeed, it happens that not merely do they not express the true feelings of the working classes upon a question, but that the question itself concerning which they allege the mind of the people is chiefly exercised, is by the people—as their mind is to be gathered from their conversation in workshops, workshop dining and reading rooms, trade and benefit club rooms, wherever working men most do congregate and most freely speak their thoughts—regarded with what is mere indifference compared with the unanimity and passionate intensity of their feeling upon some other question. So far from serving the political cause of the working classes, these reputed leaders of the people do it a positive injury. Whenever they set up as working men's candidates, or are very active in advocating the candidature of others who adopt that "platform," they create a division among the class they express themselves wishful to serve. They may be all honourable men, and taking them broadly and as a body it would be ungenerous to question that they are both honourable and well-meaning. But there is an influential section of the working classes which does not think so. They are, on the contrary, of opinion that they are self-seeking, place-seeking, wire-pulling

men, whose object is to promote their own interests—not those of the working classes. A feeling of personal jealousy or envy may have, and in some instances at least most likely *has*, some share in creating such an opinion; but, however that may be, the opinion exists, and tells against that unity which among other things is required to make the political power of the working class a reality. It is among the better-educated portion of the working classes that this opinion principally prevails, and they certainly give considerably ground for their mistrust. They say that in professing to speak in the name of the people, when they do not really represent them, these supposed leaders show an intention to trade upon them for ends of personal ambition. They further say that in persistently “cracking up” the working man, and preaching what substantially amounts to the doctrine that a working man must be a good man simply because he is a working man, these men show either a spirit of bigotry or toadyism that stamps them as unworthy to be entrusted with any authoritative representation of the people’s power—a spirit which, even as matters stand, does injury to the working classes, by tending to make the more ignorant and prejudiced among them intolerant of any suggestion that they too being men may have faults, and may possibly be mistaken in their views upon a political question. Of the men who entertain this adverse opinion concerning the type of people’s leader at present before the public, a little knot will be found in most large workshops, acting as the directing spirits in any movements in which their mates may be called upon to take part. They are in official positions in trade and benefit societies, yard sick-clubs, and co-operative associations. They draw up appeals or remonstrances to employers, the statements which head subscription lists, and other workshop documents of that kind. They preside at workshop meetings, and fellow-workmen seek their advice and look to them for initiatory action. In short, in political and social matters they have material influence with many of their shopmates, and this influence, for the reasons given above, they use against the so-called leaders of the people whenever a parliamentary election, or other practical issue, is to be dealt with. Very often these men are entire believers in the political creed professed by people’s leaders, who are candidates for the people’s votes; but they doubt the men. Another ground on which such candidates cause disunion among the working classes is that which arises from trade prides and jealousies. The majority of them, though they have risen out of the working classes, have only just risen out of them, and are not in any other definite position—unless it be that of professional agitators. So far as social standing goes, they are still regarded as practically on a level with the artisan class, and are identified with the trade at which

they have worked. This being the case, trade feeling steps in. At the election for the Metropolitan School Board, I was canvassing artisan voters for a working class candidate. He was an active politician in the locality, and his views upon the education question were known to be those generally approved of by the working classes; but still many of those classes, while acknowledging that the views he pledged himself to advocate were more in accordance with their own than were those of any other candidate, refused to vote for him because he was a baker. No, they said they were not going to vote for a fellow who carried home twopenny dinners. They were as good, nay better, men than him, and why should they put him in a position to think himself something grand, and to get in with a lot of big people, who would shove him into some snug berth? Such a feeling as this of course shows a discreditable narrow-mindedness; and yet it may be a question whether after all it is not to some extent a natural one. At any rate, it is a feeling that largely exists among the artisan class, and that is likely to be found existing among them whenever they are asked to support, in the practical form of voting, for such people's leaders as we have been speaking of. The printer, the engineer, the carpenter, would in many instances be respectively of opinion that if their trades could not produce a man fit to represent working class interests, it was certain that no baker, shoemaker, or tailor could be fit. While many men of the latter trades would opine that it was "just like the conceit" of any man of the other trades who expected them to help to make him an M.P.

All this is no doubt very petty, but it is a state of things that *does* prevail, and leads to politicians of the people's leader order working injury to the political cause of the working classes.

What the people need in the way of leadership is one really *great* leader, not a score of mediocrities. A leader great even to the point of genius, so exceptionally great that if originally of the working classes, the innate force of the genius within him *must* raise him to such a height above the rank and file of his class as would preclude the idea of their drawing self-comparisons between themselves and him, and secure him against being the object of petty cavillings and suspicions. A born statesman in the higher and not merely red-tape and routine sense of the term. A great organizer, a great debater, a great agitator, and orator. One who, given a just cause, could raise a good battle and rallying cry, and preach such a political crusade as would really stir "the great heart of the people;" and a leader as fearless as great. A leader who would speak evil (when it was also truth) of dignities; nay, who, if the true interests of the people demanded it, would not even hesitate to "rail against the Lord's anointed," to break through "the divinity that doth hedge" royalty—and

say to it in a voice of power, Thus far and no further shalt thou go into the purse of the nation. One who would proclaim against a hereditary legislature, and point out that such a barbarism had no right to be in existence in the present age, and that since its living representatives would not practise what in their case would be the virtue of self-immolation towards the institution, it was the duty of the country on whose freedom its being was a blot to stamp it out. One, too, who would strenuously insist upon the abolition of all sinecurism at the public expense, and argue that "place" should be given only to the most capable workers, pension (under any form) only to those who had done the State some service. A man who, without fear or favour, would cry aloud in the high places in which his position as a veritable leader of the people would place him, that a professedly Christian Church, which puts its offices up to public auction, placed little-working and highly-paid bishops in its pulpits to preach on behalf of charities for the aid of hard-working curates, who are not paid sufficient for a decent maintenance, and did other like things, was a monstrosity that it was the duty of a State to blot out, not foster.

A leader fearless in such things as these, but equally fearless on the other side. Who would not hesitate to tell the working classes that they too have faults, that many among them are drunken, many improvident, many—very many—culpably negligent of the means of self-education fairly and abundantly within their reach; the means of acquiring that knowledge that to them would be truly power. That, in short, of the various reforms required to elevate the working classes self-reform is one.

This is the kind of man that the people stand in need of for a leader, the only kind of man who could be to them what a leader should be. The only kind of man that they would as a body look up to, be proud of, trust, and stand reproof from. A real people's tribune, such a man as John Bright was in the strength of his early prime, and to the full as advanced in opinion for this day as John Bright was for that time.

If there are ever to be "working men's M.P.'s" in anything like adequate numbers, they will have to be of much the same stamp as such a leader. Men of assured position, dignified action, and proved intellectual ability. Men of thought and education and a tolerant spirit, who would only be working men's M.P.'s in the sense that on grounds of high principle they would fearlessly advocate broad measures of general and all-equal justice, by which the working classes, as those who suffer most from the want of such measures, would be the greatest gainers. Men in regard to whom there would be no room for even envious or jealous working men to say that they

were not only no better than themselves, but, in the popular meaning of the phrase, no better than they should be. Men of the like of whom we have one example in Professor Fawcett. Men in the returning of whom to Parliament many of those who oppose the style of working-class candidate hitherto brought forward could join, feeling safe in the conviction that they would not be class representatives in a mere class sense, would not be likely to drive working-class "rights" up to a point at which they would become other class wrongs, or to yield to any clamour urging them to do so against their own better judgment.

In combination with such a leader and such representatives the people would require some of the more machine-like appliances for developing and concentrating political power. They stand in need of an "organ" in the shape of a leading daily paper, a paper that would bear comparison with other leading dailies, and would have *its* opinions quoted in the opinions of the press; that could be thoroughly "slashing" or "scathing" on fit occasion, but that would not after the fashion of some weekly papers calling themselves working-class organs descend to mere blatant abuse, or to the use of arguments or misstatements that show either that editor and writers are grossly ignorant in political matters, or that they desire to trade, and have an unquestioning belief in the possibility of trading, upon the ignorance of their readers.

Again, before the people can make their power felt, fully felt, they must have the ballot. They must have it to protect them, on the one hand from "the screw," and, on the other, from the venality of their own weaker members. Those who look upon a vote as a marketable commodity, who will support the side that gives the largest "consideration," and then by way of apology for such dereliction of duty, plead that their poverty not their will consented, and adduce the same kind of reasons as the Custom-House officer spoken of in Macaulay's England, when he gave thirteen—a wife and twelve children—for changing his political creed to save his place.

Lastly, though anything but leastly, to make their own political power a practical fact instead of a legal fiction, the people need an electoral union constituted on the model of their great trades' unions. The political interests of the people at large are as much in common as are the trade interests of the men of any trade, and the machinery that correctly ascertains the feeling and gives effect to the decisions of the grand majority in the one case, might be advantageously applied in the other. A trade union can obtain the opinion of "the trade" upon any given subject, can, where there is a difference of opinion, take an exact vote upon it, and can at all times be relied upon as an authoritative channel for the expression of the feeling of

the trade. It can circulate all documents requiring general signature, and it is a standing and ever ready means of combined action. All this an electoral union could do for the people in political matters, and such an union would be a very simple affair, and might be easily established. It would have a central office in London as the seat of government, and branches in every town; each branch, of course, electing its own officers. As its members would be numbered by millions, and branch meetings, at any rate, need not be frequent, the expenses of general management would be very trifling, probably not more than a penny a month per member, while for occasional "monster" demonstrations—and such a union could organise demonstrations that would really be "monster" ones—a very small levy per member would be sufficient. By means of such an union the working classes throughout the country could at election times arrange a general "platform," and draw up a sort of candidates' catechism that would serve as a test on great principles, and the leading questions of the time. Through it they could become aware of each other's intentions and position, and act unitedly. And while it would be an invaluable machine for the actively political to work with, it would give the least possible trouble to those who did not wish to be "bothered."

With such a leader, such parliamentary representatives, and such machinery, the political power of the people would become a great reality, would make them truly the "new masters" of the political situation. Without them, with only leaders who are no leaders, and lacking any means of united action, their political power will remain as it is, chaotic and useless: a thing frequently referred to with sound and fury, but signifying nothing.

THOMAS WRIGHT.



## WHAT IS MATTER?

I WISH here to make some attempt to reconcile the scientific and metaphysical conception of Matter with the common-sense conviction that it is something external to ourselves. I think that such an attempt is still a desideratum.

Dr. Reid, whatever his omissions, did invaluable service in asserting the validity of our sense-intuition against the refinements of idealism. For to reject intuitions is to reject consciousness, and logically involves the suicide of all science, which is but the marshalling of these in their order. When astronomy declares the laws of planetary motion, she assumes, not proves, certain complex sense-impressions, of which *externality* is as much an integral element as colour, space, and motion. There can be no ground whatever for such arbitrary election and reprobation as is now usual among the testimonies of consciousness. Let us see what in this respect they are.

Every one believes that yonder chair is a thing external to us who see it; by no means a part of us who see it, but just the opposite. Now come the philosophers, who repudiate this and other effete metaphysics, and tell us we are all wrong. This chair, on the contrary, is a group of sensations in us, whose thinghood and unity are constituted by their inseparability in experience. The unity of it is a unity of consciousness. Thus Mr. Hodgson,\* who has in a

\* In his work on "Space and Time."

very lucid manner reduced the Hume-Mill idealism to a dogmatic form, says—"By reflection I distinguish the I, the feeling from the object, the particular mode of the feeling." "The feeling is the subject, the mode of it the object." Now, is this, as I suppose it claims to be, *par excellence*, really an *experience*-philosophy? An ordinary man will not admit that the chair is in him, not out of him.

In fact, when I reflect about my sensations, thoughts, feelings, I recognise them as *mine*, as different phases of me. Moreover, they have "form," as well as "matter;" they are *special* sensations, thoughts, feelings, and their special character I recognise as mine, as belonging to my state of consciousness. The idealist affirms that I impart, that my consciousness imparts, unity to the chair—(as Mr. Hodgson puts it, "my feelings existing in a continuous time and space")—while the special character of the feeling makes it the special thing it is—the chair. Now, in that case, I ask, since you recognise the special mode of the feeling as part of yourself, why, when you perceive the chair, are you conscious, on reflection, that it is not yourself, but distinct from yourself, and not, observe, distinct from yourself at all in the same sense that *your idea or sensation when you reflect upon that is distinct from yourself as a whole; but distinct from yourself in this sense, as not being yourself, and no part of yourself?*

By analyzing the result of a reflection upon our perceptions, we get a very distinct testimony of consciousness which cannot be explained away. You recognise a given perception as yours, but what you recognise as yours is just this—a *perception of something which is not you, nor part of you*; in philosophical language, a non-ego.

It is not sensation, but perception, we have to allow for or explain; they are quite distinct; Idealism always confounds them.

It is probably in the first experience of resistance to the accomplishment of a desire that we acquire the first consciousness of ourselves as distinguished from existence external to ourselves. And I would ask whether any one is able to conceive of our acquiring *the idea of ourselves at all except as an idea correlative to the opposite idea of something which is not ourselves?* The very notion of oneself distinctly implies and involves the notion of a not-self, of existence *external* to oneself. This negative or objective element enters into that positive or subjective idea, is absolutely necessary to constitute it. It appears to me that when we affirm ourselves to be the only thing we can be really certain of, we do in fact implicitly affirm our certainty of other things—of some existence external to ourselves. Without perception of an external world, self-consciousness were, in

truth, impossible. We do not see our way to grant, with Hamilton and Professor Ferrier, that in all consciousness the two factors Ego and Non-Ego are explicit. There is much consciousness, I believe, in which neither terms are explicit; but, on the other hand, these two laws seem to me clear:—(1) In all consciousness the two factors are *implicit*, and may be discerned on reflection. It has not perhaps been distinctly acknowledged, yet it seems very evident, that into all thought, even the most abstract, external perception of some kind enters as an integral element. You may think of thoughts, but ultimately you come to a percept. (2) In every consciousness where one of the two elements is explicit, the other is explicit also. That you recognise a thing as external, implies a distinct reference to yourself; that you distinguish a thing as belonging to you implies the distinction of yourself from it, and that of yourself from other selves and other things—external to and different from you.

It seems to me that before idealism succeeds in getting rid of an external world, it must get rid also of the consciousness of oneself, which, of course, is its very standing-ground, the one belief it recognises as valid. But I should be glad to hear it argued how the one belief can stand when the other is annihilated. They seem to me correlative, mutually supporting. They must stand or fall together.

But it will be asked how I reconcile with this the certain fact that not only the secondary, but also what have been called the primary qualities of matter have been shown to be mental, subjective, in their character.

Certain impressions are produced on us, on our perceiving faculty, such as green, solid, round. If we analyze these impressions, it is evident that they are effects produced upon us—that they are relative to us; that they are not in anything outside us, as we at first take for granted that they are. Out of perception there is no blueness, solidity, roundness. It is plain that the crude, crass belief of the unphilosophical person needs correction; but this is true of all our first impressions. They are all vague, confused, incorrect, and only gradually become clear, distinct, accurate. One's natural impression is that the sun climbs up and descends the blue sky, but scientific men have taught us differently. However, the question is, whether there be not something radical and essential in men's perceptions, which remains, and which has a right to remain after the necessary corrections have been made.

After all deductions have been made, that which seems to remain as ultimate datum of consciousness in perception is this—that in the case of a blue, round, solid thing, we know that *something is influencing us in the way of blue, round, solid*. We still call a flower blue; we still believe that there is something external producing an

impression on us, which we name blue. We now admit that, in accordance with the general law of reciprocal action and reaction, we are not passive in perception; that this impression is in part the result of the reaction of our perceiving faculty upon the external agent; but this does by no means enable us to dispense with the conviction that there is an external agent. It is not we who are coloured; it is the thing, in this sense, that this thing is the occasion of such a sensation in us. Accurately speaking, it is evident that the actual colour and solidity are neither in us apart, nor in the external thing apart, but arise upon the meeting of certain internal with certain external elements.

It is said that the mind can only perceive its own ideas. But I cannot understand how in that case the mind could ever get any ideas to perceive. How is *resistance*, probably almost the earliest experience, and that in which perception seems to be born, possible on this hypothesis? Once we have perceived something resisting us, *i.e.*, external to us, then we acquire the power of reflecting upon and analyzing such a perception, but consciousness would have no *start* without this. How, moreover, is the conception of Space, one of our most fundamental conceptions, to be accounted for? Space surely involves the idea of Externality. It is curious how Mr. Hodgson, not admitting this essential element of thought, yet making Space and Time the foundation of all, speaks of feelings as themselves existing in space. Now, extension evidently belongs, not to the subject, but to the object, of consciousness. Externality constitutes the specific difference of all perception when it is reflected on; that distinguishes it from thought, ideas of the mind. If we could suppose for a moment that a philosophy which repudiates all metaphysics could be hampered by the mistakes of a defunct metaphysic (which no more make against the science itself than the former mistakes of physical science make against that), we should be tempted to infer that the prevailing idealism still founds itself on curious axioms such as may be found shelved, preserved in spirits, and most learnedly labelled in Sir W. Hamilton's very interesting essay (though his own theory is far from satisfactory); axioms like these—that the mind can only perceive what is present to it—which, if it means anything, is at once to assume that the mind, consciousness, occupies space; or, again, that mind and matter are too diverse to communicate, which involves two pure assumptions—that mind and matter are *two substances radically different, with nothing in common—and that diverse things cannot communicate*; whereas it is this very diversity, such as it is, which makes the fact of perception possible. Hegel has established for ever the law that contraries are necessary to one another, and constitute one another.

His error appears to me to be in trying to bring all things out of one thing, which was scarcely consistent with his other unquestionably valid law. Nothing can be conceived as existing isolated; the infinitude of monads in phenomena are necessary to one another, but no one of them can be brought out of another. Their common source is above phenomena; but their phenomenal existence is essentially successive in time and space.

When it is urged that, after all, material forces are nothing till they come into contact with consciousness, when they first acquire qualities, I urge in reply that, precisely in the same sense, spiritual personal functions are nothing till they are touched by material forces, when they appear first to start into existence and acquire qualities. If matter be nowhere till it comes into contact with mind, in precisely the same way mind is nowhere (so far as experience goes) till it comes into contact with matter. And if the foregoing argument proves the non-existence of matter, it equally proves the non-existence of consciousness. Our complex consciousness certainly has its genesis in sensation and perception of a not-self, of an external, and would be impossible without it. All consciousness involves this element even now, and would be non-existent without it. If the ideality of matter makes matter non-existent, then certainly the materiality of consciousness or personality makes that non-existent. The one has as good a claim to be acknowledged as the other; in fact, they mutually involve and hang upon one another. Each is the product of the interpenetration of both. Suppose thus that neither matter nor personality have any existence until they come into existence together. This, of course, is no sort of disproof of the actual existence of either under these circumstances. Whether matter *can* be supposed to exist independent of consciousness or not, we will in a few minutes shortly discuss. Meanwhile, the Ego, as result of this analysis, would be *ego + non-ego*, stress being laid on the ego; while the non-ego would be *non-ego + ego*, stress being laid on the non-ego. Thus Hegel follows Plato in calling matter the "other," the *το ἕτερον* of thought. Fichte, indeed, maintained that the Ego, in order to attain self-consciousness, by means of two opposing actions, limits itself in the creation of a non-ego, afterwards passing onward and making itself in perception the object of thought. Now, to me, it seems unphilosophical to speak of an agent acting before it exists—before experience affords any evidence of its existence. An ego that has not attained self-consciousness is not an ego at all. It does not certainly go through such a process of self-limitation deliberately, of set purpose, but blindly, of necessity. Some already existing power might thus bring the phenomena of consciousness into existence, but the I, the person,

cannot properly be said suddenly to rise up, and after this fashion bring itself and matter both into existence. Besides, this is a purely arbitrary assumption. Seeing that experience presents us in all perception with the two distinct but correlative elements ego + non-ego, I may quite fairly turn round upon German idealism with the contrary assertion that the non-ego, by limiting itself, creates the ego ; which, indeed, seems far more consonant with the testimony of experience, that testimony, the contempt of which it is which has brought upon metaphysics their present regrettable, yet on this account deserved neglect. But this theory would be that of materialism, and as, I believe, equally incompetent to account for the facts of experience. Personality cannot come out of Protoplasm, because unless we find it elsewhere, and by sleight-of-hand put it in, we shall never find it there ; for to say it may be *potentially* there is, after all, only to say, in finer words, that it *can* come there by itself, which is just what we deny. Since the two elements appear in experience together as correlatives, philosophy has no right to repress either, or to assert that the one must be completely merged in the other.

Another fatal objection to this (as to other current idealism), is that it contradicts experience by leaving the multitude of personalities unaccounted for, and arguing as if there were only one in the world. Yet if anything be certain, the multitude of persons, of egos, is certain. One ego, according to Fichte's system, and, indeed, according to Mr. Mill's, creates all the others (I do not mean avowedly, but I do think by necessary implication) ; other men and minds are but ideas in oneself, which consequence, one would think, would be a *reductio ad absurdum* in the mere statement of it. For whatever be true of matter, it is certainly true of another man's consciousness that it abides, whether I think about it and know it or not, even although it certainly cannot affect me without being modified by my consciousness. And whatever a man may please to affirm in his philosophical system-mongering moods, he is quite equally sure of other men's existence as of his own. German idealism subsequently substituted the *pure or absolute ego* for the *empirical or particular ego*, and to that I have much less objection, only it seems a misnomer, "*pure absolute ego*" appearing to my mind a contradiction in terms.

Kant was perhaps disposed to admit a *something* vague and chaotic external to the mind, which underwent a *categorizing, forming* process in consciousness. Yet the mere subjecting sensation to general forms of space and time does in no possible way account for experience, —for our perception of particular things with special characteristics. Surely Plato's doctrine of their participation in eternal ideas accounted for them much better ; and yet Aristotle very completely showed

that this doctrine even quite failed to account for them. There must be ascribed to the mind, not only a focalizing, unifying faculty, but also an infinitely specializing faculty. *Why* do sensations group themselves in the particular actual combinations which they display? Why are some continuous in space and time, and not others? Such functions must undoubtedly be ascribed to the mind. But consciousness, if it testifies to external existence at all, also testifies, in the same breath, I believe, to an *external thinghood*, an *external unity*. What we discover in the case of a particular perception is that certain powers or forces external to us are producing in us certain sensations. The coherence of certain sensations, the rounding-off of them into a definite group always united in space and time, reveals a definite coherence of external and internal forces or functions, both among themselves respectively and together. Whether, except in connection with consciousness, there can be any such thinghood or unity is another question; but, at any rate, *in connection with it*, there is clearly revealed an external, correlative to an internal, unity. In a percept there is a twofold unity; there is a unity as thing, and a unity as percept of one personality. The two cannot be confounded. That the second displays a higher degree of unity than the other, I freely grant, and that the mind imparts its own unity to constitute the percept, I also grant; but there is implied besides a capacity for and tendency to such unity in the external element. That this thinghood must be conceived as fluctuating with the perceiving faculty seems, however, also evident. The perception of a lower animal, of an infant, of a grown man, of an ordinary man, of a man of science, of a poet, of mankind in different stages of their development, varies immensely. Can we limit the actuality of things as they are to either of such perceptions? Hardly. It has been quite correctly said that the eye sees what it brings with itself the power of seeing. And when things have been classified according to their similarities, their contiguity in place and time, the order of their development, &c., they assume quite a new aspect and significance. This susceptibility of classification, this enlargement of their boundaries both in space and time, must also be founded in the nature of things, in a correspondence of the external with the internal sphere. It will be asked if, in this region, we are not clearly in a thought-region only—concerned with the order and classification of ideas only. I answer—Not only, because that which is thought and idea on one side is a material world on the reverse side, and *vice versa*.

In fact, all ordinary perception implies what has become the almost automatic and instinctive ranging of a thing under many heads or classes, and the labelling of it with a general name proper to a class.

As to the old Heraclitan and revised modern difficulty (which led Plato to his ideal theory), that all is in perpetual flux, I believe it will be found that this has been pushed unduly far. Constant change itself implies permanence, some definite fixed state, which may change more or less soon into another; but fixity and definiteness in consciousness is a fact of experience, and, indeed, is involved in that other fact of change to a different state.

It is one of the many merits of that mighty thinker, Spinoza, that he saw the necessity of ascribing to his eternal Substance the two fundamental co-equal attributes, thought and extension, the internal and external elements of being; although, indeed, he keeps them too much isolated from one another, whereas one cannot exist without impregnation, interpenetration with the other.

And now shortly to consider the question *whether any existence can be predicated of matter apart from consciousness*. What of the planet in its primeval nebulous condition?—and afterwards, long before some pushing anthropomorphous ape had made himself into man? Was the world really confined to the meditations of a Pterodactyl? What of the organs and functions of our complex bodies, in full work, without, alas! most of us knowing anything about it? What of the nooks and corners of this earth no human foot has trod?—of the inside of the Moon and Sirius, especially before the spectroscope? Mr. Mill says, “All possible sensation.” Now, would not this be a more correct description of consciousness before perception, than of matter before perception? However, of course Mr. Mill does not recognise the distinction. Sensation idealists assume *to be* matter. The question is, on any view of it, attended with very great difficulty. But it is almost impossible, even when we make the effort most strenuously, to believe that everything disappears from this room when we leave it. And we can hardly acquiesce in a system that forces us to assume this. The only conclusion that at all satisfies me is somewhat of the following kind:—In the first place, matter—in the full ordinary sense of the term—*cannot* exist out of consciousness, strictly speaking; for (as we have seen) it is partly the product of consciousness. It *must* be regarded as created, as starting into existence, together with the perception of it. But the question is, whether *something* may not be assumed to remain independently of such perception. Must we not believe, in order to satisfy this instinctive conviction of which I speak, that there is some existence external to ourselves, which, as it were, waits in darkness and slumber for the approach of a subjective element to start up into conscious order, beauty, actuality, rationality?—which bides its time to become matter? Just as molar motion might be said to bide its time to become molecular motion—heat or light—or any given force

to be ready to become another force, so do I suppose that these dark forces may wait to take on the forms of intelligence. In these correlative and corresponding forces we should then have to assume correlative and corresponding associabilities, unions, and separations. But further than this it is obviously impossible to go in definition of them; and even this must be taken as indication only of their possible nature. In such a notion we have to allow for the error which our positive inability to abstract completely from the material conceptions now fully formed in our intelligence inevitably involves us in. But I think that we *are* able to imagine, and for the reason given to believe, that there is such an existence. Only let me not be misunderstood. Such an existence ought not (except loosely and in a popular sense) to be conceived as *growing into and becoming* the matter we have cognizance of. It may invariably precede or fill its place, but material things themselves are wholly other, and must be created in perception. The same thing may be said, however, in the case of all correlation of force. It is only loosely that one kind or manifestation of force can be said to become, to be changed into, another. Upon the cessation or loss of one kind of force, another kind or other kinds invariably, in certain definite proportions, succeed. The modes of force, special manifestations of it, are lost, being apparently repressed and destroyed by others. When we say that one mode is changed into another mode, what we really know and mean is that one mode is substituted for another. Granted that force does not perish; special modes of it confessedly do, or there would be no change, no successive manifestation of force. And when one thing becomes another, strictly speaking it perishes, and is replaced by another. However, in this sense we may assume that external existence before consciousness, upon coming into collision with it, takes on the totally new form of matter as we know it. And thus such unperceived external existence may be termed matter, or rather the *Matter* of which, in the Aristotelic sense, known matter is the *Form*.

But I wish to point out that this is *analysis* only—*there is no efficient causality* concerned here, which yet I believe, by the constitution of our nature, we are forced to postulate somewhere. Such elements, mental and material, may be obtained by decomposing the concrete result. But their modification of one another at a particular time so as to produce the given result is not *causatively* explained. Why do they change, why do they at a given time so modify one another?

If the special cause had existed in phenomena before, the effect would have existed also. That which existed antecedent to the effect cannot strictly be taken to be its cause, for the effect is new, and in so

far as it is not new does not require efficient causality to account for it. But since all of it was new once, it does require accounting for in its entirety. We may trace the genesis of it through the phenomena which preceded it, and which invariably precede similar effects. But these are not the cause. The Cause is that which makes the antecedent elements to combine as they do, and educes a new result. If these elements were permanent, no cause would be required except themselves; but they change, they come into existence, they assume special combinations which did not exist before—therefore, we require a cause for these at every moment of their change. In any effect we, *judging from the results*, can describe the several forces (and their relative intensity) which appear to have combined to form and constitute the result. We observe the same or something similar in other cases. But except from experience in similar cases, we could not predict the special result from the antecedent phenomena. Yet (as Hume argued) if these were causative, we ought to be able to do so. A new phase of being has come about. Why? The cause cannot, strictly speaking, be in preceding phases of being, nor in the present phenomenon itself, still less in the future. Therefore, it must be out of phenomena in a transcendental region. Here it is that we must recognise the special principle, origin, and efficient of all phenomenal combinations,—of every special thing, idea, person. Invariable Succession, and efficient Causation, are totally distinct ideas. Yet since all phenomena in their actual order seem to be essential to any actual effect, their causes must concur with its own special cause to produce it; but all causes are alike transcendental, that is, not in phenomena. *Potential matter* is therefore, strictly speaking, in this region, as also is *potential mind or personality*. The Divine Essence manifests itself in Time in certain invariable modes of existence; external and internal, matter and spirit, being the most fundamental of its distinctions. The self-development of the Divine Essence in time must be considered essential to It, even as It is essential to the self-development in time. When it is said that time is an illusion, only relative to us, very little is said; for *Time is, at any rate, true of the facts of our consciousness, and they are, if anything is, real existence*. In all the play of phenomena, the power, the cause, the efficient, the Substance, is beneath them. There are discoverable three cardinal elements in all objects of knowledge—(1) the effect or accomplished fact, (2) the forces producing it, (3) the forces destroying it.

However, it may be urged, and I have heard it ably argued, that what we really believe is that material things AS WE KNOW THEM exist out of human consciousness, and that this belief may be justified by ascribing to God the knowledge of material things which we ourselves possess. To this view there appear to me grave, indeed

insuperable, objections. For *what* perceptions of material things are on this view to be ascribed to God? Those of infants, those of adults, those of uncultivated, or those of cultivated races? Perceptions, and things with them, grow and vary. Are nascent, incomplete perceptions to be ascribed to Him as well as others, and can we affirm that our present perceptions are complete, and not still nascent, relative to a more cultured intelligence, perhaps to the development of new senses, which may yet lie in the future, even to the perfecting of those we have? As it is, what a difference do microscope and telescope make! If only some of these are to be ascribed to God,—which? Or if all, then do we not assimilate the Deity no longer only partially, but completely, to human creatures? A growth from sensation to ever-perfecting perception and conception must be ascribed to Him,—otherwise what *we* mean by the material world is *not* in this intelligence. And our notion is of a varying, growing, progressing, successive, germinating, and dying material world; that is what we know. Does He know just this? It has, indeed, been usual to hold a theory about the Divine ideas quite inconsistent with such a view as this,—to hold that God does not see things and persons in a successive manner, in time, but all at once, the whole of their existence all together. But consider whether this is tenable. Apart from theory, as a matter of fact and experience, the very essence of persons and things is successive existence. They change, while retaining some of their characteristics (and in the case of personal identity consciously claiming past phases of existence as belonging to one unity of consciousness); they have lost some, and have acquired others. What is the significance of this? That if they were viewed as having qualities together which are not together, but successive, such a knowledge of them would not be more correct, but incorrect. (This, of course, is to assume the reality of time, that is, the reality of consciousness, and this I do assume.) To know a successive thing correctly, knowledge of it must follow it from point to point of its existence, and itself be a successive knowledge. It may be said, perhaps, that this Divine way of knowing cannot be gauged by human understanding. Now, I am quite open to appeals *ad verecundiam*. But it is *we* who hold and strenuously maintain that God as Essence is not to be prisoned within any forms of intelligence. Whereas here a dogmatic assertion is made about God as Essence,—that as such He is Personal and knows;—this assertion, therefore, we have a right to criticise. It will hardly do to assert Divine knowledge, which is a word bearing a definite meaning and meant to bear it, and then to assert that what is intended is something totally inconceivable. Wherefore, the only knowledge that can be predicated of the Divine Cause, if any can, seems to be what

we mean by knowledge; and this might explain material things out of human knowledge, if on other accounts such a view were tenable. Indeed, to speak of any thought at all whereinto the material element does not enter is surely to use words with little meaning. Thought, consciousness, without subject and object, without perception and conception of external existence, *which may enable the thinker to distinguish himself as Person from such external existence, which is not himself*, does seem quite inconceivable. But what is here implied is that such knowledge must necessarily be *successive*. Now, I would ask, in the case of the Divine Cause, how is such successive knowledge supposed to arise? Either from processes without, or from processes within, the Divine intellect. Since theists maintain that all finite existence (except sin) owes its origin to the conception and purpose of the Divine Person, this knowledge cannot arise from any finite existence independent of Himself, as it may in our case. It must therefore originally come from processes *within* the Divine intellect. But how do these successive processes, which represent and are the origin of the actual course of things as it is, arise? Here we have again change, indeed the growth from less to more, which is the actual course of things in the creation of every thing, as of every person; and this, as we have seen, must be originally represented in the Divine intellect in order for it to be purposed and originated. *But this change, this growth of more complex existence from simpler, requires as much accounting for, as much previous efficient causation here as it can possibly do in the actual world.* This is tortoise and elephant, and only repeats the processes of time in a supposed ideal region *ad infinitum*. This is no real cause. The real efficient cause even now must be not in this process at all, but in the depths of the Divine Nature beneath intelligence. That is exactly where I believe it to be. But, then, do you gain anything by interposing such a process of thought—a simple repetition of the human—between the essential Cause and the phenomena of which experience informs us? I think not, and therefore such a provision for matter out of human consciousness seems to me quite out of the question.

In conclusion, I would say a word on other current theories.

I. As to the *Causal* theory of Perception.

(1) Why are we determined, if we merely infer a cause of our own sensations, to infer one *external* to ourselves? (2) In perception we do not perceive our sensations at all: experience teaches that the sensations are merely united in the intuition of a thing which has qualities corresponding to them, *not copying them*. Scientific experience corrects the notion that our sensations *copy* the qualities.

II. With respect to *Representationism*.

If we perceive a *tertium quid*, and not a thing, we ought to find

three factors in perception—(1) the perceiving act; (2) the idea perceived; (3) the external thing represented. Now we only find two—act perceiving, thing perceived. If you say, that must be an idea which our constitution determines us to think as external thing, our consciousness deceives us in a primary intuition. It may then deceive us in all. And Scepticism, to be logical, should annihilate itself, and merge in nirvana, unconsciousness. (Two factors there are, for the perceiving act cannot make itself its own object.) Yet if the thing perceived were an idea, Bishop Berkeley's would be the only reasonable theory. Representationism is arbitrary and absurd.

Now as to Mr. Mill's *permanent possibilities of sensation*. This notion could never have been formed at all without an opposite notion correlate to it. The sense of resistance distinctly refers us to *something not ourselves*;\* whereas, according to Mr. Mill, it refers us only to a possibility of our again having a feeling which has only reference to ourselves. The term "matter" evidently corresponds to the external element in this experience. Mr. Mill's definition makes it correspond to the internal subjective element. Our idea of Substance, he says, "is negative apart from the impressions it makes on our senses." But then our idea of it, of *thing*, is not apart from these impressions; it is of something giving us these impressions, or rather having qualities corresponding to them, which is no more negative than the sensations themselves are.

Mr. Mill, however, concedes that there are many egos, external to one another: "the world of possible sensations is as much in other beings as in me; it is therefore an external world." But it is certain that when we first got the notion of resistance, we had none whatever of other persons like ourselves, which implies a previously-formed notion of ourselves. What says Mr. Mill himself? "I conclude that other human beings have feelings like me, because, first, they have bodies like me, which I know in my own case to be the antecedent condition of feelings." "We know the existence of other beings by generalization from the knowledge of our own." And yet we are supposed to know the existence of matter (*i.e.*, of our own bodies) through our knowledge of the existence of other beings and their possible sensations. This generalization to the existence of other minds is a late thing arrived at through a previous knowledge of an external sphere (our own bodies): yet this knowledge of an external sphere is impossible without such a generalization preceding it! Is not that reasoning in a circle?

But there seems yet another contradiction.

\* Maine de Bizan's theory that we by a natural mistake transfer the causation we are conscious of outward, and other kindred theories, are indirectly disposed of by this and the foregoing reasoning.

Mr. Mill says (throughout I am quoting from his work on Sir W. Hamilton) that the conception of Self is the result of a much wider generalization than that of matter (p. 206). How late therefore must be the conception of other selves ! At first, then, the notion of matter can only be that of *our* possible sensations. But when we do not yet know our own minds, our own selves, how can we know our own sensations and their possibilities ? For though sensation may be before perception, a *general conception of permanent possibilities* of sensation must involve consciousness of *myself*, and of these sensations as *possible for me*. Even if this general notion were obtainable before that of self ; it could not be that of *matter*, for matter involves explicit reference to *mind* : matter is substance viewed as different from mind, and *vice versâ*.

I need only observe further, that Mr. Mill gives up his cardinal doctrine of the merely relative validity of our knowledge when he adopts the foregoing explanation of an external world. His inconsistency in admitting the real existence of minds external to one another is fully equal to that which he charges on Hamilton for admitting the external reality of matter. But, in fact, since we are said by Mr. Mill to infer the minds of others from their bodies, if their bodies are not known as outside ourselves, their minds cannot be so known. These other minds and bodies, then, are general notions of our own. Yet (as Mr. Masson has put it) we must conceive these minds, since they are like our own, as conceiving our minds to be general notions of theirs. So that I conceive a consciousness, which is mine, conceiving my consciousness as not mine. Talk of bewildering *German* metaphysics after this !

RODEN NOEL.



## PROSPECTS OF THE NEW GERMAN REFORMATION.

CONSIDERING the radical differences which distinguish the Roman from the Protestant modes of thought, it is not surprising that the agitations now disturbing the theological atmosphere of Germany should be inadequately appreciated by English writers in general. On the whole, indeed, I am disposed to think that Protestant journalists have displayed a very creditable amount of caution in their speculations as to the final results of the conflict already begun. It is satisfactory to read so little in the way of repetition of the old commonplaces about the scarlet lady, the idolatries of benighted Papists, and the contrast between Protestant orthodoxy and Romish Paganism. It is pleasant to see that among the most anti-Roman theologians and politicians there are many who candidly aim at a comprehension of the true facts of the case, and decline to adopt the old-fashioned divisions of parties, according to which everybody on one side was an honest man, and everybody on the other either a knave or a fool.

Still, there are few signs that the English public really understands the nature of the principles which are arrayed against one another in Bavaria, in Prussia, and elsewhere, both in Northern and Southern Germany. Every little fresh incident that occurs, in which Rome and her former obedient children seem to be in conflict, is magnified to an unreal importance. If the secular government upholds a

recalcitrant priest against his bishop, or a knot of lay professors repudiate all thought of bowing the knee to Rome, or it is whispered that many of the priesthood have subscribed with unconvinced minds to the Vatican decree, it is augured that these are tokens of some tremendous religious revolution, and are the first mutterings of a storm which may shake the whole Roman Church to its foundations.

With all my heart I wish that I could share these interpretations of the phenomena of the hour. With all my knowledge of the personal merits of not a few of the Roman laity and clergy, my conviction of the fatal influences of the intellectual and moral despotism, which is the vital essence of the Roman system, is so strong, that I hail every fresh defection from her communion as so far a gain to the ultimate triumph of what I believe to be the truth. But it is in vain to allow "the wish to be father to the thought," in this, as in all other matters of doubt and difficulty. Sincerely and cordially as I venerate the great leader of the new movement, I cannot think that he and his friends, some of whom are my own friends also, will be able to make good their position, or that any permanently extensive religious organization is about to be established, either in Bavaria, or in any other part of Germany. That great good will come from the resistance which Dr. Döllinger is offering to the Papal autocracy I do not for a moment question. That this resistance is also a real step towards the final overthrow of the Roman power, which is destined some day to be accomplished, I do not in the least degree doubt or deny. On the contrary, I am satisfied that it has a distinct tendency in this direction. But, in the meantime, I am satisfied that the attitude taken up by the "Old Catholic" party cannot possibly be maintained; and that the attempt to set up a new Catholicism, minus the Papal autocracy, must utterly and rapidly collapse and vanish away.

I will attempt to explain my reasons for thus thinking, so briefly as not to exceed the limits to which I must confine myself. In the first place, here are none of the elements which have invariably been present in every previous case of vast religious revolution with which we are acquainted. In order that a theological movement may spread widely among the masses of the people, and overthrow existing ecclesiastical organizations, it is necessary that it should be directed against certain moral abuses or manifest religious impostures, such as the popular understanding can comprehend and the popular feeling can detest. The world will never rise in anger against abstruse questions of history, or philosophy, or theological criticism. If the people are to be roused, they must be touched to the quick of themselves. The scandals against which reformers preach must be open, intelligible,

and outraging such notions of right and wrong as the multitude holds dear. And the dogmas which it is proposed to substitute for the dogmas denounced must be simple, and must rest upon some basis which the most ignorant can comprehend, and about which there is no dispute whatsoever.

Such were the elements of the revolution accomplished by Moses, when he brought the Jews out of Egypt, and finally established the Hebrew race as an independent people, organized upon the basis of a pure monotheism. Such were the conditions of the new creed preached some hundreds of years afterwards by Buddha in India. Such, looking at the propagation of Christianity itself under its more human aspect, was the reform accomplished by Christ and his Apostles after Him. Such was the extensive revival of practical religion which was wrought by Dominick and Francis of Assisi in the Middle Ages. Such, again, was the Reformation itself, when Rome presented certain frightful abuses as the mark for the blows of the reformers, and one or two special and simple doctrines served as the shibboleth of the party of revolt. It was the same, still later, in England, when Wesley and Whitefield took the field against the absolute paganism and debasement of the lowest and lower middle classes of English society, and preached their easily intelligible dogmas of regeneration and justification. In all these cases the reformers had some monster of ignorance or corruption to strike at, and some practical substitute for existing belief which all men could understand and personally adopt as their own.

But what is this that the "Old Catholic" party in Germany are fighting for? A highly subtle theological distinction, resting upon recondite historical inquiries, and pre-supposing an acquaintance with remote facts, of which the world in general knows little, and for which it cares nothing. Monstrous as is the Papal claim to infallibility when tested by the old maxim of Vincent of Lerins, that nothing is to be regarded Catholic which has not been believed *semper, ubique, et ab omnibus*, how is it possible that the vast mass of the Roman Catholic world, both clergy and laity, and even in learned Germany itself, should enter with heartiness into any such dispute? The world was never yet revolutionized on a question of history. No saying was ever more true than that of Thucydides, when he wrote that the multitude are indisposed to the search after truth, and that they love convictions which come ready to their hand. When Dr. Döllinger and his supporters and sympathisers imagine that mankind are to be moved to enthusiasm for the *quod semper, quod ubique, quod omnibus*, they are imputing to ordinary men and women that passionate love for truth, and especially historical truth, which they themselves feel, but about which the

enormous majority of religious people are supremely indifferent. To argue with sincerely devoted adherents to the Pope that he cannot be infallible, because the dogma originated in forgeries several hundred years ago, and because Popes have taught flagrantly inconsistent doctrines, is only a fresh example of that passion for trying to cut blocks with a razor, which is so far from uncommon with acute and learned minds.

Whatever, again, may be thought on the matter by English Protestants, the Roman Church does not exhibit, as a rule, those flagrant scandals which are of a nature to arouse popular indignation, and which give life to the arguments of controversial assailants. In Germany especially, as in England, Ireland, France, and America, the Roman clergy are, as a body, men of respectability; the members of religious orders live quiet lives in their convents and monasteries, or if they are known in the world, it is as zealous teachers or as self-sacrificing sisters of charity. Where their abuses are more marked, as in Italy or in Spain, the priests, monks, and nuns are remarkable rather for laziness and incompetence, than for those outrageous violations of their own principles of morals which the eye of the multitude detects, and which awaken the storms of popular indignation. There is little in the existing condition of Roman Catholicism which is at all parallel to its features in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. If it fails to make any deep impression upon the masses of the people, and its doctrines are repellent to the more educated of the higher classes in Catholic countries, it does not awaken any very fierce bitterness or angry contempt, unless where, as in France, it comes into conflict with an energetic party like that of the Communist and Socialist schools.

Nor is it any answer to this view to reply that the pretensions of the priesthood are regarded with contempt by large sections of the people in all nominally Catholic countries. Contempt is an emotion of which active reformers can make little use in their efforts at revolutionising with a view to reconstruction. People who treat the theological system of Rome and the ways of her clergy with scorn, are not likely to trouble themselves very much with any schemes for her violent overthrow. We are all, I think, rather apt to forget this, when we are told of the contempt with which the creed of Rome is regarded by influential men abroad, and to the alienation of the working classes from her practical system. When we notice the striking contrast between the ways of men and of women in France, Germany, or Italy, and see that the fathers of families so frequently despise the practices which their wives and daughters devoutly cherish, we argue most illogically upon their probable future personal conduct. In reality, this philosophic disdain has little or nothing in

it that is akin to the spirit of active reform. If only the Pope and the priesthood will not meddle too far, your scornful sceptic will not lift his finger to substitute some other active religious body in their place. Contempt is not the stuff out of which theological reformers are made. The kings, and princes, and nobles, and burghers, who banded together for the destruction of the Roman system in the sixteenth century, were roused by passions more fiery than any quiet philosophic aversion.

The calmness with which the abolition of the convents and the alienation of Church property in Italy has been received by the influential classes of Italians, of various ranks, is a proof of the possibility of uniting a readiness to strip the clergy of their goods, with a marked disinclination for setting up a distinctly anti-Papal religious society. Three centuries ago, such a thing would have been impossible. Men did not seize the revenues of the Church, or demolish convents, and appropriate them to their own benefit, without openly breaking with Rome altogether. They never abolished Romanism without at the same time setting up a doctrinal Protestantism; and they never quarrelled with the Pope in secular things, without quarrelling also with him in spiritual things. But so vast a change has come over the mind of Europe since the Reformation period—a change which in itself is purely Protestant in its tendencies—that whole nations will now make free with the revenues of the Pope, and at the same time hold themselves his thoroughly loyal spiritual subjects. And this is because his spiritual pretensions are now regarded with a supercilious contempt by the more influential minds of professedly Catholic countries. When men do not trouble themselves to hate the religious creed of Rome, they help themselves to the Papal property for the benefit of the State, and never exert themselves to interfere with the faith of the populace.

This same fact, again, that kings and nobles do not now appropriate Church lands and palaces for their personal benefit, is surely, if read aright, a significant token of the feebleness of the purely religious element now involved in disputes with Rome. When men in power openly enriched themselves at the expense of the Roman clergy, their whole nature, with all its worst passions, was involved in the conflict. If Rome were not anti-Christian, or infamously vile, where was the justification of all these spoliations? And how could Rome be reduced to the position of an impotent anathematiser, except by the erection of some fundamentally anti-Roman Church, which should give the Pope back his curses in kind, and enlist the enthusiasm of the plebeian horde in defence of patrician and royal robbers? Nowadays the procedure is quite different. This new idea of the secular State, as an institution, existing for the benefit of

the people, and ultimately having a right to the control of all property whatsoever, has silently modified the entire cast of modern thought. There can be no sacrilegious robbery, it is felt, when monasteries and bishoprics have to yield up the revenues which they waste or misuse, for the benefit of the whole people, for the diminution of taxation, and the education of all classes. This is not plunder, but a resumption of rights long since in abeyance, and may be effected by an orthodox Catholic with a perfectly good conscience. If the Pope chooses to anathematise governments which take this view, that is his affair. We are superior to him in enlightenment, say the secular powers. There must be two parties to a quarrel, and we have not the remotest intention either of giving him back the property that he pretends to claim, or of setting up an opposition church in his face.

Viewed, in the next place, as a theological dogma, the Vatican decree on Papal infallibility does not really offer any more difficulties, from the non-historical point of view, than does the doctrine which assigns infallibility to the entire Church, on which the German "Old Catholics" take their stand. There is nothing in it which runs counter to the feelings, instincts, and practical habits of the Roman Catholic world in general, and, consequently, nothing on which the "Old Catholic" can appeal to the people. I would venture to remind the English reader that the doctrine of infallibility, in itself, whether in its Papal or non-Papal form, does not present itself to the Roman Catholic mind in that repellent guise which it wears in Protestant eyes. It is no more repellent to the Catholic, whether learned or unlearned, devout or worldly, than was the doctrine of verbal Biblical inspiration in the eyes of all Anglicans and Protestants up to a very recent period. To the unbiassed Protestant critic the belief in the infallibility of a living Pope appears simply ludicrous. It is impossible for the imagination to divest itself of those associations of common-place humanity which stand in startling contrast with a claim to divine inspiration. We see the absolute logical impossibility of drawing a distinction between the utterances in which Pius IX. speaks like one of ourselves, and those in which he is the channel through which the voice of God himself is to be heard. The moment we can look facts in the face, and bring our idol into the light of day, out of the haze of golden mist in which our fancy had enshrouded him, we detect the imposture, unconscious as is that imposture on the part of the idol himself. We see at once that the theory of Papal infallibility is not only impossible; it is absurd.

But this is not so with the vast majority of Roman Catholic believers. With them the living Pope is habitually invested with

the attributes of "the divinity which doth hedge a king," and their imagination never attempts to realize the phenomena of his personality as a sinful and erring mortal. Take the common idea which the most loyal and most ignorant English women entertain respecting the Queen and her family, or concerning royal and imperial potentates in general. See how they invest their characters and lives with a sort of superhuman beauty, and glory, and freedom from human infirmities; how, in a word, they "worship" them in the secret penetralia of their beatified career; and then apply all these bright illusions to the case of the Pope. The actually existing Pope, as he is in reality, with all his intensely human nature, his blunders, his faults, his virtues, his rash talk, his billiard-playing, his mingled Italian craft and impulsiveness, his cleverness, his imperviousness to reason, his love of political liberty and his passion for ecclesiastical despotism, his subservience to the Jesuits and his personal distaste for them, such as he is in the eyes of those among whom he lives,—such a personage, I say, is an unknown being to the millions whom he governs. In their eyes he sits apart from all sublunary affairs, like a grand Llama of Thibet or a spiritual king in Japan, in the midst of that sacred and eternal Rome, which is the seat of everything that is pious, venerable, learned, just, loving, and ascetic. To the foreign ecclesiastics, indeed, who visit Rome, and become acquainted with its realities, it is the city of disenchantment, and they feel renewed difficulties in believing that the dogma of Papal infallibility is anything better than a barren theological proposition, to be maintained at all hazards against all comers. But it is not the habit of disenchanted ecclesiastics to reveal ugly facts to their flocks, or to do anything that may tend to what they call "disedification." The imagination of the ordinary Roman Catholic is therefore left free to feed itself upon its dreams, and to cultivate the pleasant worship with which it venerates the living Pope as a being not very far from an incarnate God. Against such a disposition of mind, the elaborate historical disquisition of the "Old Catholic" German theologians are directed in vain. They are like the offering of a translation of Plato's "Republic" to a mob shouting in frenzied delight at the condescension of an emperor or empress in the streets of Berlin or St. Petersburg. Rome and the Pope are living, splendid, powerful realities; and what, in comparison, does the multitude care for the difficulties of antiquarians, who, after all, are no more infallible than the rest of the world?

Contrasting, too, the ultramontane theory of the infallibility of the Pope with the "Old Catholic" theory of the infallibility of the whole church, speaking through the voice of Œcumenical Councils, so far as theological and philosophical difficulties are concerned, there is not

the shadow of a difference between the two. And this identity is instinctively felt by the entire body of Roman Catholics, lay and clerical, who, with so few exceptions, have practically accepted the Vatican decree. In the nature of things, there is no more difficulty in attributing infallibility to a single living Pope, than in attributing it to an assembly of several hundred dead bishops. In the case of the latter, it is true that "distance lends enchantment to the view," and the miracle seems no longer a thing utterly incongruous with its surroundings. The fancy paints a gathering of devout, learned, and reverend fathers, the fitting instruments for the enunciation of supernatural doctrine. Everything that might indicate the presence of human infirmities, human passions, and human ignorance, is forgotten, and the whole scene suffused with a celestial glow, from the midst of which eternal truths proceed in harmonious numbers, to become from henceforth the symbolic hymns of the faithful in all ages. But in reality there was nothing more supernatural about the fathers of the great councils than there is about Pius IX. He is one, and they were many; and theologically, philosophically, and historically, it is just as impossible to believe that the voice of God spoke by their lips as to believe that it now speaks in a Papal brief or bull. To the vulgar, unthinking Roman Catholic I suspect that there is even less difficulty in accepting the infallibility of a single Pope than that of some hundreds of bishops. The average believer is so completely possessed with anthropomorphic notions of the Divinity, that he will suspect that it is easier for God to make one man infallible than to compel the discordant thoughts of an episcopal multitude into one single inspired unanimity. But, be this as it may, it is unquestionable that when the "Old Catholic" school would fall back upon the ancient anti-ultramontane view, they have no practical ground on which to appeal to the miscellaneous multitude, whether lay or clerical. It is just as easy to believe in the decree of the Vatican Council as in the decrees of Nice, or Ephesus, or Chalcedon. What "the faithful" ask for, is to be told now what they are to believe, and as to whether or not this creed has been believed, *semper, ubique, et ab omnibus*, they are as supremely indifferent as they are to the authenticity of a Vatican manuscript of the New Testament, or the history of the Rosetta stone.

If, further, we look at home, we shall be enabled easily to realise this indifference, and to understand the eagerness with which the Roman Catholic world accepts, rather than repudiates, the dogma of the infallibility of the Pope. Judged by all laws of right reason, what can be more ludicrous than the implicit confidence which thousands and thousands of Protestants, of all schools, place in the teaching of some individual clergyman or minister? They see him

in all his human personality, just as the prelates and cardinals, and other privileged Catholics, see the Pope in the familiarity of private life. They know that the object of their worship is a fallible and sinful man, and that there is not one single token about him that suggests the presence of a supernatural power which may give his judgment a claim to be listened to and received. They are aware that he has often changed his opinions, and been just as dogmatically positive in favour of some assertion as he is now dogmatically positive against it. They are conscious that numerous other persons, as good, as learned, as able as he is, entertain views in direct contradiction to those which he announces to be the teaching of the Holy Ghost. But for all this, they believe in him with all the abject fervour of the most extreme Ultramontane. Their intellect prostrates itself before his definitions and his anathemas, and congratulates itself on being blest with such a guide. How, then, can we be surprised at the quiet acquiescence with which the Roman communion has adopted the late Vatican decree? It is not more preposterous than the claims to deference which are put forward by hundreds of Protestant teachers, and which their devotees find peace in believing. The Roman theory of infallibility is but the systematised and avowed form of the pretension which the clergy of all churches are too apt to claim for themselves, and to which mankind is only too happy to submit. The looker-on detects the absurdity of the pretensions, and smiles at the devotion of those who accept them, but he argues and smiles in vain. So it is when Archbishop Manning puts forward his pretensions and those of the Roman Pontiff. His assertions are shown to be untrue, his arguments fallacious, and his whole theory self-destructive. But what then? He goes on asserting as positively as ever, and those who feel inclined to believe in him go on still believing. What they want is not truth, but a freedom from troublesome facts, and the opiate of a loudly proclaimed dogmatic creed, sweetened with an elaborate ceremonial and the incessant guidance of the confessional.

In such a condition of Christendom, what hope has the dawning Reformation, now shedding its first rays of light in Bavaria? If it is to make its way, and establish itself by founding a new branch of the Church, which shall retain the characteristic dogmas of the Council of Trent, purified from later Ultramontane corruptions, where, further, we must ask, are the leaders to direct it? Even supposing that the existing moral and doctrinal condition of the Roman communion is generally such as to present marks for the blows of popular controversialists, and that such controversialists are prepared with a living substitute for the system they would uproot, where, I say, are the men to effect the revolution? Wide-spread

revolutions of opinion, leading to organic religious changes, must necessarily be the work of one or two men, possessing gifts of an extraordinary kind, and combining in themselves not merely force of character, but rare popular eloquence accompanied with the practical organising faculty. Such men have been the vital forces which have wrought out every vast religious change in the world's history. Every religious revolution has borne the impress of the individuality of some one single leader, or of some one or two of his immediate associates or followers. It is true that such men are as much the creation of their age as they are its leaders; but they must exist. Without Moses, where would have been the deliverance of the Jews from Egypt, and what would have been the character stamped upon the legislation of the newly-established Hebrew nation? Doubtless, Moses was himself the natural and characteristic product of the race whom he led to freedom and victory. If he had not been so, he never could have become their leader, their master, and their legislator. But he ruled them, not simply because his personal nature was essentially one with their own, but because he enforced the fundamental ideas of the monotheism which he taught with an energy, a fierceness, a fire, and a strength before which their passions quailed, and to which all that was good and strong within them did willing homage. And, accordingly, what we call the Mosaic system is pre-eminently a reflex of the faith and character of its wonderful founder.

Some five or six hundred years afterwards—for we are in the dark as to the exact date—a far more extensive religious revolution was brought about in the farther East by the extraordinary man whom Asia and Europe have agreed to describe as Buddha the sage. Of his personality we know but little; and we can only frame conjectures, more or less justifiable, as to the precise nature of the creed he taught. There is reason to believe that in some respects it presented a more exact anticipation of the Christian morality than was known to the Jews. But one fact is certain. That gigantic reformation which shook the populations of Asia, and which has issued in the establishment of a religion, which in its corrupted forms still numbers far more adherents than does Christianity itself, was due to the character and the teaching of one individual man.

When Christianity at length appeared, as soon as its Divine Founder had left the world, the modelling of the faith he had left to his disciples fell, to a large extent, under the dominion of one masterful mind. The religion of Christendom for eighteen hundred years has borne the indelible impress of the mind of St. Paul. I am not now discussing the question as to the nature of that modification of the teachings of Christ which resulted from the influence of St. Paul's nature upon the original and simpler faith. According to

one school, the Gospel, as taught by the great apostle, merely passed through his mind, as a ray of white light passes through a prism and re-appears, not indeed changed, but resolved into elements of exquisite hue. According to another, the Pauline religion is really a modification of pure Christianity, resulting from the introduction of elements essentially foreign, or from modes of presentation to the intelligence which injure its purity, and interfere with its steady influence upon mankind. But be this as it may, it is undeniable that to this hour the peculiarities of the temperament of St. Paul are dominant throughout Christendom. Sacerdotalism, from which he would have shrunk, has been engrafted upon his system in the Roman, the Greek, and the High Anglican creeds; but taken as a whole, the Christianity of eighteen centuries has reflected the theology of that great and enthusiastic nature, which bowed itself prostrate on the road to Damascus before the name of Jesus of Nazareth.

In the middle ages, two conquering men came forward and reformed the inner, practical life of the Roman Church, and stamped upon its devotion and its ideas of God a character which it has not yet shaken off. In Dominick and Francis of Assisi we recognise once more the astonishing powers of individualism in vivifying the dormant elements of religious feeling, and moulding generation after generation to one personal pattern. It was the same in after times with the founder of the Jesuits. That wonderful society to this hour bears the impress of the individuality of Ignatius Loyola. The intensity and the profoundly military character of his temperament are reflected in the whole Jesuit body, and amidst all the varieties of national peculiarities which are exhibited by individual Jesuits.

At the Reformation period it is a mere commonplace to point to the part played by a few vehement natures, and to the helplessness of all efforts at reform, where the leadership did not fall into the hands of characters formed to arouse and guide the storms of popular feeling. Without Luther in Germany, without Calvin in France and Switzerland, without Knox in Scotland, where would have been the German, the French, the Swiss, and the Scotch Reformations? Granting all that may be said of the prevalence of suicidal Roman scandals, and of the preparation of the popular mind for radical religious changes, it is still true that the leadership fell into the hands of a small number of men of rare personal capacities for the practical ruling of their fellow-creatures.

In England the Reformation was the work of a combination of influences, among which a purely religious and popular feeling was one of the least powerful. We have known but one really religious revolution, and that was the revolution of Methodism. Here was a true conflict between religious and non-religious ideas, between con-

servatism and radicalism in theology, between quiet piety in helpless alliance with worldliness, and fiery fanaticism in alliance with a passionate desire for a knowledge of God and for salvation. And here, as in all similar cases, the work was due to one or two men. Without the personal influences resulting from the personal characters of Wesley and Whitefield, Methodism would never have been. And their influence is all the more pregnant as an illustration of what I am saying, because neither Wesley nor Whitfield was the inventor of the peculiarities of Methodism. They found its essential elements already existing in the Moravian communities and the teaching of Zinzendorf, and in the small societies which in the eighteenth century were struggling against the irreligion of the times in English life. It was only when the existing systems of reform were taken in hand by men possessing the capacities for popular leadership that Methodism became a real power in the country, and the revolution began.

But where are the leaders of German or English or Italian "Old Catholic" thought now? The school consists of scholars and theologians and professors, and the few laymen who may be influenced by their writings. Of course I do not for a moment deny that some new leader may appear, destined to popularise the recondite labours of the present guides of the movement. But until the victorious nature does appear, I fear that the Roman authorities will remain masters of the field, so far as the purely religious aspects of the new reformation are involved. The priesthood will remain, as now, all but unanimous in their submission to the anathemas of Rome; and the adherents of the few courageous theologians who dare to think for themselves, will be for the most part drawn from the body of the laity who are more influenced by dislike of Roman political pretensions than by an ardent love for Christianity in its ancient purity.

From this point of view, indeed, it is quite possible that the new anti-Papal movement may be productive of most momentous consequences. To a certain extent, we may witness a reproduction of the conflict between the secular power and the Papacy, which made the Reformation in England a possible thing. No one who is acquainted with the real facts of the English Reformation can please himself with the fiction that it was in any sense, in its origin, a popular or theological movement. It was brought about by the conflicting interests of kings and popes. And so it may be now in Bavaria, and in other parts of Germany, where Roman Catholicism is powerful. Changes, which Dr. Döllinger and his supporters will never effect, will in all probability be brought about by the Pope and his advisers themselves. Bavarian Catholics may be supremely

indifferent to the claims of Church history, but Bavarian governments will be resolutely determined to uphold their rights against bishops, popes, and cardinals. It is in the consecration of the monstrous assertions of the famous Syllabus, and their conjunction with the assertion of Papal Infallibility, that the Court of Rome is playing the losing game. German sovereigns will remain unmoved when the priesthood merely transfer the ground for believing in transubstantiation from the Council of Trent to the Theologians of the Vatican and the Pope, their mouthpiece. It will affect them no more than the popular belief in any alleged modern miracle. States are not shaken by Addoloratas, or appearances at Salette, or by processions in honour of relics at Treves. On the contrary, the Gallies of European Courts are somewhat gratified at such manifestations of the non-inquiring, non-critical spirit in these restless days. But the moment it comes to the flinging in their faces of such flagrant revolutionisms as are embodied in the Papal syllabus, we have the stories of Henry VIII. and Elizabeth over again. When kings and emperors and chancellors are assured, by a *soi-disant* infallible pope, that the groundwork on which their authority rests is a delusion, and that the only power which has a claim upon men's consciences for obedience is that of the Pope himself, we may, I think, be satisfied that affairs cannot possibly remain as they are, and that a revolution of some sort is at hand.

But, unless I am utterly mistaken in the religious phenomena of the times, that revolution will not take the shape of the establishment of a reformed Catholic community, on the model put forth by the "Old Catholic" party of Munich. Their sympathisers in this country seem to look forward to the setting up of some Church, very much after the style of the Established Church of England. Roman Catholicism, without the Papal despotism and stripped of its ultramontane corruptions, will, they think, assume a shape not unlike that which the High Church school attributes to the Anglican Church, as they interpret the Anglican idea.

To myself, this expectation seems purely visionary. When Germans, or any other foreign Catholics, separate themselves from Rome, it will not be to set up a continental Anglicanism in her place. Anglicanism is a phenomenon unique in the history of mankind. The Church of England can no more be reproduced elsewhere than among the offshoots of the English people, than can our Queen, Lords and Commons, and all the other minglings of virtues and vices which are characteristic of Englishmen. What we shall probably witness in Germany will be that dissociation between the Church and the State, which is one of the most general effects of modern political and religious ideas throughout the world. The

German governments will sever their connection with the Pope, and leave him to anathematise their ideas on science and society at his will. He thus anathematises them in England and North America, his followers now recognising these anathemas as the utterances of an infallible authority, but nobody is affected by it. The curses are *vox et præterea nihil*. It is Jupiter thundering, and that is all.

And that such a separation between the German states and the Papal authority will tell powerfully upon the advance of religious enlightenment seems certain. The upholding of Roman influence to any extent by the governments of Germany, is so far a crushing of that freedom of thought which lies at the root of the Roman system. And for this reason, while upholding the present union between Church and State in England, I should rejoice to see all such union annihilated when the State allies itself with Rome. The establishment of Anglicanism in England is the establishment of comprehensiveness; the establishment of Catholicism abroad is the establishment of intolerance. As I honestly believe that the cause of religious freedom gains, on the whole, by the maintenance of our existing system, anomalous as it is, so I am equally satisfied that every species of alliance between the secular power and Rome is a gain to the cause of spiritual slavery. Thus, therefore, with all my heart, I rejoice to watch the growing support which Dr. Döllinger and the "Old Catholics" are every day gaining. I do not despair because they count but few adherents among the priesthood or the devout laity, for I see no elements at work which can give birth to a wide-spread popular religious movement. But I am thankful to see the old story again renewed, and to behold the grasping secular ambition of the Roman Court coming into conflict with the ideas of national sovereignty and independence. Since the struggle cannot be fought out upon theological and spiritual issues, I rejoice that it should be transferred to collateral grounds, and I am happy in believing that in assailing nations and sovereigns, the Papacy is once more making a gigantic mistake.

J. M. CAPES.



## THE BURLESQUE AND THE BEAUTIFUL.

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“*As in a glass!*” saith the favourite stage motto. I cry you merey, my lord manager! As for the folks who pay, would ye see your faces like grinning masks in yonder mirror, or like those that are hopeful and believe in angels? Resolve me that now, my masters.”—*Old Play.*

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IT is remarkable what pleasure the British nation takes in ugliness, with regard to general amusements both in private and public. Perhaps there is no nation among which female beauty or prettiness is more universally admired and courted; but in most other respects, and especially in subjects and objects of amusement and general taste, the love of the grotesque, the comic, the exaggerative and caricature, the broadly farcical, and even the downright ugly, have for a long time been a very marked peculiarity. The late Richard Duppa, the art-critic, used to say that such was the effect of female beauty, even upon the unromantic imagination of the British, with whom a respectable “position” in society was all-important, that he was convinced that the humblest servant maid or peasant girl, of more than average personal attraction, could make sure of settling well in life, and above her station, if she took due care of herself. How is it, then, that the same race of men have a perverted eye as to form and expression, and in so many other respects, and particularly in matters of amusement—graphic, literary, scenic, dresses, dances, and gesticulations? The comic, the broad-farcical, and all the phases of

the ludicrous, predominate over everything else, with a few marked exceptions, in the struggle for extensive popularity, and what is regarded as "success" of late years, and supremely at the present day; this false light of fame, this *parhelion*, has culminated in the popular literature of fiction; in the extraordinary number of caricatures, and caricature illustrations of periodicals; in female dresses, often presenting monstrous heads and Hottentot forms; in dances, as rife with distortions as licentiousness; and in the desecration of the fine arts, generally by means of costly and demented burlesques.

Probably the extremes of nearly every kind and degree of ugliness among the popular amusements of the British nation were attained in the modern as well as old English Fairs. We say "English" advisedly, because this peculiarity, if not confined to, is certainly most predominant in, the Anglo-Saxon race, the Celtic and other races being far more poetical, and with a far greater tendency to the love of beauty. Such grotesque monstrosities as the great English Fairs were never popular in Scotland or Ireland, and only represented, in some sort, by itinerant showmen from England. These periodical assemblages in the two former countries were, and are, almost exclusively cattle-fairs and markets, with the single exception of "Donnybrook," and even there the shows, stalls, and gambols were by no means so conspicuous as the dancing-booths, drinking-booths, and the number of broken heads. Having had the "luck" to see Donnybrook Fair, and, in my schoolboy days, all the great English Fairs, I unhesitatingly declare that, excepting in the Hibernian characteristics just specified, the fair so celebrated in song, was not to be compared even to one of the triple fair-fields of Edmonton Statute Fair; and still less with those of Greenwich and Fairlop, not to mention the head and front of all those offendings which used to be held annually in Smithfield, viz., "Bart'l'my Fair." This preposterous outrage upon civilization, together with all its provincial and far less reprehensible sisters within twenty miles of London, have been abolished by Act of Parliament during the last quarter of a century, so that a few passing remarks upon them may have all the effect of novelty upon the majority of readers.

The love of ugliness, the popular delight in the grotesque and the absolutely hideous—not as an eccentric variety, and from the force of contrast, but exclusively and for itself as the greatest pleasure in life—may be said to have fully obtained the coarse objects of its vulgar desire in an English Fair. Let the reader try to imagine the following medley: Long rows and lines—in fact, long, narrow, and crooked streets—of canvas stalls and booths, all selling gingerbread nuts, or huge gingerbread kings and queens, all gilt; and barn-door cocks in

hunting-breeches, also covered with gold-leaf; and painted toys, and dolls of all sizes, shapes, and colours; and booths, narrow at the entrance, but running back to forty or fifty yards in depth, for drinking, smoking, eating, and dancing; and these streets of stalls, constructed very often in confusing labyrinths, so that amidst the densely-moving throng it is difficult to find your way out; but when you have accomplished that task, you come upon openings into the spacious arena of the great shows of the fair, dazzling, gaudy colours of draperies, and spangled dresses of figures gesticulating, dancing, or promenading upon their several stages; with bands of discordant instruments, among which trombones, bugles, screaming clarionets, big drums, clashing cymbals, and bashing and booming gongs predominate, while inarticulate, stentorian voices shout through huge speaking-trumpets the special wonders of each unrivalled show! The different bands are all playing different airs, in different keys, all at the same time, and as loud as possible; and this, with the addition of the voices of the struggling crowds of people, produces a solid roar of a kind unique and indescribable in its deafening brutality. Below, there is a dark, surging mass of conflicting human beings, each eddy and vortex struggling in opposite directions; above, and as if moving upon agglomerated heads, melodramas and pantomimes, combats and dances, giants, tumblers, ghosts, and spangled men and women on horses, are visible; while slack-rope performers whirl to and fro between white or scarlet curtains at the very top-ridges of the largest shows, and high-flyer boat-swings, full of half-drunken men and half-mad, screaming girls, swing up to perilous heights, and all but whirl over, as if to shoot out the whole of their frantic cargoes! The spectator's vision has now become confused by the complex and disordered motions of the barbarous, colossal, and uproarious living kaleidoscope. If this is the scene by day, what must it be by night, with all the flashing and fuming torches, the coloured lamps, the rockets and roman-candles hissing or gleaming upwards in the dark sky, while huge lights flame and flap from iron or earthenware pans and crocks on the stages of the shows? Amidst these lights and clouds of foul smoke, harlequin becomes a demon, the dancing-girls fiends, the clowns are hobgoblins, and the richly-spangled figures standing upon horses are so many sentinels of the outposts of Pandemonium! This is "Bart'emy Fair," a quarter of a century ago. Here, and in the surrounding localities, are assembled at night some hundred thousand of the very scum and ruffianism of all London and its lowest suburbs. It is in Smithfield, the whole of the cattle-enclosures, sheep-pens, and pig-stalls having been cleared away. This harvest-home and grand gala night of burglars, highwaymen,

pickpockets, dog-fighters—with suitable women and girls of course—the “idle apprentices,” with not a few of the better sort, and hundreds of small shopkeepers, the “swell mob,” and many swells of a higher mob;—this wonderfully “mixed” assemblage lasted during three days and nights. It now and then happened that a bull, shut up in some butcher’s yard in one of the back streets, found the exciting uproar intolerable to his lordly brain, and having indignantly burst his bonds, rushed headlong into the thick of the fair. Many people were almost killed by the crushing and trampling, not of the bull, but of each other, in their desperate efforts to escape from the foaming and bellowing charges of his lordship; and there is a tradition that, on one of these occasions, the weight and pressure of the terrified crowd burst and broke down the barriers and boarding of one side of Polito’s menagerie (the precursor of Wombwell) and let out a number of the wild beasts, to take the side of the bull, or to attack on their own responsibility. I see no reason for disbelieving the legend; but, whether it be regarded as authentic or apocryphal, I am quite sure (as it is not our cue in this matter to be complimentary) that the wild beasts who escaped from the menagerie could not easily surpass the brutality of the rest of the company.

But during the period of these hideous scenes—not to revert beyond the memories of living play-goers—there were popular entertainments of a totally opposite character. Shakespeare and the high drama of tragedy and comedy were constantly played, and on the same nights, to crowded houses at Old Drury, at Covent Garden, and at the Haymarket, by such actors as John Kemble and Mrs. Siddons, immediately succeeded by Edmund Kean and Miss O’Neil, as these were immediately succeeded by Macready and Helen Faucit, with Madame Pasta, “the Siddons of the Italian stage,” and by Phelps, G. V. Brooke, Charles Kean with Mrs. C. Kean, Barry Sullivan, and several actresses of very great talent. Many other names, justly celebrated in high comedy, and several in tragedy, will long be remembered. How does it occur that the advances of science during the last five-and-twenty years should be as wonderfully marked and unquestionable as the decay, downfall, and almost the dissolution of the British drama? Why does the love of ugliness and folly, or balderdash and burlesque, which used to be conspicuous only among the most coarse and uneducated classes at fairs, low minor theatres, and other appropriate bear-gardens, now assume the appearance of especial, and till very lately nearly exclusive, favour among both lower and middle classes, and, we fear, among a large proportion of the upper classes? In some very important respects the tastes and mental pleasures of even the lowest classes have obviously deterio-

rated. Tragedies and comedies at three theatres on the same night continually brought, not merely good audiences, but crowds, the pit and the two-shilling and one-shilling galleries being packed almost to suffocation. If the better sort of the lower classes would seek delight three or four times a year in beholding brutish ugliness grinning through a horse-collar at a fair, the same people would far more frequently spend their last shilling for a tragedy, or indeed any play by Shakespeare, or a comedy by Sheridan, Goldsmith, and other true representatives of our national drama. A new five-act piece by a living author was sure to attract a crowded house, and during many succeeding nights, if the first two or three were genuine successes.

During the admirable management of Covent Garden by Macready, some of Shakespeare's plays were produced in a manner which, if it did not justify the term of "revivals," was at any rate a stage-revival. Every piece was put upon the stage with a studious view to the effect of the whole, and without any prodigal display of costly superfluities, such as had characterized the gross management of the pampered mountebank, Mr. Alfred Bunn. The same principle was adopted by Mr. Phelps, and successfully carried out, as far as possible, with the inferior means possessed at Sadler's Wells. When Macready or Phelps produced any plays that admitted and properly required a more poetically pictorial treatment of the scenery and scenic effects, this was always given with a special attention to "the beautiful," and to a subdued and appropriate beauty, eschewing all gorgeous, glaring, and startling effects. On a certain occasion, when Macready brought out the *Tempest*, I remember Leigh Hunt standing up in the box involuntarily, and murmuring, with tears of rapture glimmering in his eyes, "Oh, it's too beautiful!" at the moment the curtain drew up and presented the sea-shore of the enchanted island, with the long waves of the tide slowly moving down towards the spectators, and then bursting into sparkling foam, and running onwards in broad silver ridges and ripples over the "yellow sands." Here we had none of the stupid and blundering vulgarity of "real water," clumsily and mechanically running over fuller's-earth and sawdust by way of presenting actual sands and a flowing tide,—the kind of thing the reality-mongers of the present day substitute for the charming illusions of Art. Here we saw no glaring lights and staring violations of harmony in colours; heard no noisy orchestra, where all the violins, horns, drums, and the accursed piccolos are played as loud as possible; saw no impertinent, conspicuous, and provocative intrusion upon the central line of vision, of the black, full-dressed Antic, with kid glove on one side and a doll's truncheon on the other, ruling all the variations of sound with his front-gesticulations, and informing the

audience of the same by a ridiculous back-view. Here, on this seashore I have described, there was an exquisite harmony of colours, the lights were of a subdued loveliness, a rich, deep, murmurous voice of the sea alternately excited and soothed the ear; when the orchestra played, it was in harmony with the waves, and when it did not play, and the silence was only broken by the hushing gushes of the tide, you heard in the distance that this isle was "full of noises" sweet, strange, magical, with now and then soft snatches of enchanted quires, that sang—and paused—and sang, and died away to finest air. "Oh, it's too beautiful!" ejaculated Leigh Hunt: "these things should often be done for the good of us all. But they are so seldom done that they are almost too much to bear. We're not prepared for so much." These are the things for which Macready's management deserves to be most highly commemorated. For modern, and especially for contemporary dramatic literature, he did as much as he could not well help doing; and he did no more. His real feeling and appreciation, like that of most, perhaps all, great actors, was only in the glories of the past, and the old stage-traditions. The *Tempest* was also produced by Mr. Phelps with similar feeling, taste, and skill, and with all the poetical effect, so far as the limited means of his stage permitted. As for modern dramatic literature of the highest class, whether we go back to the great Mrs. Siddons and the great John Kemble—thence, to Young, and to the great Edmund Kean, and Miss O'Neil—and thence, down to the present hour, the same concentrated, and almost exclusive interest has been manifested with regard to the old traditions. There has always been one excellent and unanswerable reason at hand as to why no living man has been considered by the above authorities competent to write a fine tragedy suitable for the stage—and that one was simply that he was not a second Shakespeare. It could also be smartly and easily added "nor anything of the sort." The living dramatist has always been, directly or indirectly, overwhelmed, and, if of soft materials, rapidly crushed in the bud or blossom by the very name of "Shakespeare." Yet the same histrionics and managers who have successively done this, can but know perfectly well that not a single play of the greatest of the world's dramatists ever has been, is, or could be acted as he first wrote it; and not one of them could be acted as now printed. Every kind of study, labour, and care has been devoted to the requisite omissions, condensations, changes of construction, division of scenes, arrangement of accessories, &c.; while the play of the living dramatist, being almost certain to display various practical imperfections in the first instance, he has commonly been at once pronounced unequal to so "high an argument."

But these successive blows at the existence of modern dramatists, this determination not to "keep up the breed," and to leave them to become extinct by prolonged exclusion from the pastoral domains,—this is considered no reason for the decline and dissolution of the British drama. For have we not got Shakespeare? With that mightiest of all, we want no new-born man. Let us stop at the sign of the "Swan." Precisely so. But it *is* a reason for the decline and fall in question; by which we mean the frequent scantiness of audiences when the higher class of plays is given, unless they be given by very great or quite new actors of ability, and in a suitable locality. I have known a ship's crew on the verge of mutiny in the tropics because they were fed every day upon turtle. They would naturally have become equally tired of venison and champagne, even if served by the varied talents of new cooks and vintners. Human nature in all things, and in all periods, requires a change for the benefit of the health, and there is no irreverence to God or man in saying so. But great actors, one after the other, steadily refusing to look this fact in the face, and the managers having long since come to the conclusion that they must bring the public taste down to the level of their own, or that of their misleading patrons, both author and actor of high-class dramas have been actually driven from the stage. The great actors little thought they themselves would be dragged down among the ruined authors. Macready left the stage in the maturity of his powers, many years ago, because the stage was leaving *him*, and dropped his mantle upon Mr. Phelps (we heard him say as much in his farewell address), who ought from that day to have been manager or chief actor at Covent Garden or "old Drury," instead of moving "hither and thither." The late G. V. Brooke had to seek Australia, where he had great and constant success; so did Barry Sullivan (losing in London the fortune he made at the Antipodes, playing legitimate drama at each place!); Anderson had to migrate there; so did Walter Montgomery,\* and he made a fortune by Shakespeare and the high drama. Charles Kean and Mrs. Kean had to migrate, and were well remunerated. It is by no means clear that Miss Helen Faucit wished or wishes to leave the stage—but what field in London is there now for her, or for Miss Glyn, or Miss Cleveland (a very fine actress), or Miss Neilson, or for any other actor or actress of the high drama? Managers of late years have concentrated their capital and energies either upon extravagant emotional effects in action

\* Since the above was written, the melancholy and abnormal close of a career, so brilliant in foreign lands, so ill-fated at home, has suddenly occurred, and "narrows"—as a morning contemporary too truly remarks—"the arena for a revival of the poetical drama," already reduced to one or two first-class tragedians. But Walter Montgomery is not the only martyr to this cause.

and scenic display, or else upon burlesques, generally of a plotless and unmeaning kind, or chiefly meaning an idolatry of the *φιλοίφες* rather than *φιλόκαλον*—burlesques and balderdash, compared with which the old fairy-tale of "Beauty and the Beast" becomes quite a charming poem—in brief, we are now presented with that piece *minus* "Beauty."

At the period we have previously touched upon, Macready produced several stage-revivals of Shakespeare's plays with marked attention to poetical rendering, and an aggregate effect, the *ensemble* never being broken or disturbed. He was the first manager—and there has been none since—who made a chorus, mob, or crowded mass all *act*, either in groups or in unison as a whole, and the effect was prodigious, giving a fair idea, so far as it was attempted, of what an ancient Greek Chorus must have been. This was more especially done when he produced Milton's *Comus*, with Purcell's music. On another occasion, when Macready brought out *As You Like It*, the forest of Arden, where the romantic duke had taken up his abode, was represented at this rustic palace with an entire covering of tangled boughs and foliage high over head, among the leaves of which, with their delicate tints, peeps of sky, and glancing green lights, there was a constant movement and fluttering, as of soft winds and small birds, whose sweet warbling fitfully blended with the subdued strains of the orchestra below. It was about, or soon after, the same period that Mr. Phelps, at Sadler's Wells, gave an occasional stage-revival of Shakespeare, as also my reconstruction of Beaumont and Fletcher's *Honest Man's Fortune*, and Webster's *Duchess of Malfi*, neither of which had been acted since the days of Elizabeth. So anxious was he to present the plays of Shakespeare as closely as practicable to the early texts, that he sacrificed his own last scene (as an actor) by allowing Macbeth to be thrust and hacked off the stage by his adversary's claymore; and presently afterwards the head of Macbeth was brought in "upon a pole," in accordance with the earliest stage-directions. But this was effected in an artist-like manner. He in no respect gratified stupid realistic anticipations by sending a gore-dripping horror down to the footlights. A rout of gesticulating, shouting, victorious soldiers rushed upon the stage, in the centre of which a tall pole was held aslant, on which "what seemed the tyrant's head, the semblance of" recent severance might be imagined; but the whole scene was skillfully confused with the din of wild surroundings, and the ghastly trophy was borne off before the means or time were allowed for any one to fix upon offensive realities. The effect, *therefore*, was more truthful by its broad aggregations, as in nature on tumultuous and passionate occasions. Mr. Phelps produced, among other plays, the *Tempest* with various new poetical effects. The first appearance

of the "tricksy" spirit of Ariel was that of an aërial sprite darting across the back of the scene to obey the call, before alighting in a substantial form at the feet of the romantic Necromancer. We have also seen the same gentleman, behind the scenes, direct the slow rising of a moon, and watch the proper movement of fleecy silver mists and fragments of clouds, with the calculating care and patience of an astronomer.

At the period we are now reviewing Mr. Planché was continually bringing out those elegant and fascinating versions of fairy-tales, for which the management of Madame Vestris became celebrated. This lady had a great sense of beauty in art, and great taste and skill in presenting objects of scenic as well as personal loveliness. The stage-version she gave of Milton's *Comus* was almost worthy of comparison with the *Acis and Galatea* at Covent Garden, though it was rather too meretricious, as might have been expected. Her "Olympic Revels" were, however, represented with great taste, delicacy, and skill, nothing coarse or vulgar being permitted in word or act, while the female costumes, whether of nymph, naiad, or bacchante were as those of vestal virgins, if compared with the unblushing public scandals of the present day. Nevertheless, the fatal tendency of Madame Vestris, and in opposition to all the remonstrances of Mr. Planché, to have comic speeches and repartees put in the mouths of gods and goddesses, led the way to desecrations and burlesques, as her carpeting the stage in comedy with real Brussels and Turkey carpets introduced that false system of costly realities in dresses, furniture, and other accessories, which have since pampered and materialised the public taste, and deservedly ruined many a management. The stage-revivals of Shakespeare by the late Mr. Charles Kean were founded upon this mistaken principle, and under the sounding and delusive terms of various sciences he successfully overlaid and smothered the text of the author with expensive upholsteries, costumes finically accurate, and often uncouth, and all sorts of costly "properties," till the attention of the audience became confused and distracted, so that it could never be said "the play's the thing," because it was made quite a secondary consideration. Yet, with all this, Charles Kean had good artistic aims and intentions. He desired to present the beautiful with the true, but lost sight of both by over-attention to material actualities and minute details, ignoring the "so potent" art of stage-illusion and an elevating and refining influence upon the imagination.

"The connection of scenic exhibitions," writes Shelley, "with the improvement or corruption of the manners of men, has been universally recognised; in other words, the presence or absence of poetry in its most perfect and universal form, has been found to be connected with good and evil, in conduct or habit. The corruption which has been imputed to the

drama, as an effect, begins when the poetry employed in its constitution ends. The drama of Athens—or wheresoever else it may have approached to its perfection—ever co-existed with the moral and intellectual greatness of the age. The tragedies of the Athenian poets are as mirrors, in which the spectator beholds himself, under a thin disguise of circumstance, stripped of all but that ideal perfection and energy which everyone feels to be the internal type of all that he loves, admires, and would become.”\*

How widely and how deeply the foregoing speculations are applicable to the present day, when science and general knowledge have assumed a breadth unattained in the previous history of our race, may not be easy to determine; but that there is much truth in it is proved by the numbers of the middle, as well as the lower, classes that take an exclusive delight in the most vulgar, meretricious, and unmeaning stage-productions. Moreover, the pleasure of a large proportion is of a maudlin kind, associated with the fumes of alcohol and tobacco; and this by no means inconsiderable part of the public is more besotted and less impressible than it was twenty or thirty years ago. At that time beauty and power were to be seen in dramatic art on the stage. People crowded to witness a tragedy, fine comedy, or sterling play, prepared to be moved, and to enjoy the full flow and influence of ideal passion, of imagination, of home affections, and many-coloured glancing thoughts. Now they smoke their way to a “burlesque,” prepared to find all sincere emotions and thoughts turned into absurdities, the human heart reduced to a vacuum, and the brain made ridiculous. The Fine Arts, instead of working in harmony to some beautiful and ennobling results, are purposely thrown into conflict with each other, so that they may defeat themselves by general antagonism. It is like a circular duel, or a drunken fight at a fair. Comical and contemptible verses are adapted to pleasing music, often to pathetic music, and, at times, to very fine music—the greater the desecration the greater the success; the most lovely, and in all cases the most costly, costumes are appropriated to those whose characters and actions in the piece defeat all the effect of this prodigal outlay. So with scenery, often most excellent and charming, and always “regardless of expense;” for the action, whether with dialogue or dances, all that occurs amidst these brilliant and lovely scenic effects, is farcical, contemptible, too obviously forced to be “funny,” and as stupidly vulgar as the combined abilities of playwright and stage-manager can render it. The Smithfield showmen of five-and-twenty years ago have returned to life with fresh sack-fulls of spangles, gauze, and tinsel, and now present themselves in the Strand, parading all their treasures, and naming a long list of photographed dolls; assisted by the prostitution of painting and music, and yet deeper degradations. The bodily substance of Art is forced into a fight against its own soul.

\* Shelley's “Defence of Poetry,” Part I.

Capital strives to outbid itself; and the theatrical treasury does its greedy utmost to produce a blundering insolvency. One manager follows another, and nobody becomes a degree the wiser by experience. When the costly balderdash ceases to attract its fitting audience, the fatuous autocrat of public taste, instead of casting about for some rare change, some variety, some striking contrast, instantly goes to work sedulously to cut his own throat by rivalling and out-doing himself with another burlesque or foolery, yet more gaudy, licentious, stupid, and expensive than the previous one, and generally with inadequate rehearsals, so that its first night has a narrow escape, and requires a prodigality of falsehoods and advertisements to be retrieved. When he again suffers the almost inevitable consequences of all this monomania, he wonders at the fickleness and perversity of public taste, and accuses the "press" of writing down his pieces and destroying his enterprising efforts.

The series of Shakespearian stage-revivals last alluded to (those by the late Charles Kean) are of some years ago, since which the London public, and the whole theatrical English-speaking world that follows the London taste, descended lower and lower until it reached a condition in which burlesque and its kindred desecrations and sensational vulgarities monopolized at least three-fourths of all the theatres where the English language is spoken. The arch-fiend of all this perversion is LONDON. We have seen the whole of the provincial theatres of the United Kingdom constantly reproducing the burlesques or sensational balderdash of our great metropolis,—speedily and sedulously followed by all the theatres in all our colonies, near and remote, and by all the theatres in America and California. In his speech at the "Theatrical Fund Dinner" last year, the treasurer alluded with sadness and indignation to the injury done to dramatic art by the "mania for burlesque;" but on the recent occasion of the dinner for the present year, the treasurer, apparently carried away by the handsome donations to the Fund, rather demurred to the "decline of the drama" because there were at this day no less than forty-one theatres open in London. Now, so far from this fact being a proof of the flourishing condition, or even the existence of the British drama, it is a glaring proof to the contrary—for what sort of things have three-fourths of these forty-one theatres been producing? A morning journal has recently given us a graphically shocking but too true picture:—

"A stage full of of idiotic figurantes, hired for a shilling a night to 'outstrip' each other in breakdown dances, or to stand staring in a row before the stalls, like so many prize joints after the Smithfield Cattle Show, is, we readily admit, a spectacle that can only rob the romance of life and the imagination of the heart of their natural freshness and sensibility, as burlesque destroys the last illusions upon which dramatic art depends."\*

\* The *Daily News*, May 25, 1871.

One of the most wealthy, and certainly by far the most enterprising of all the foreign possessions of Great Britain—need we say “Australia”—has long since fallen a victim to the “great plague of London.” But this was preceded, and indeed accompanied, by many highly meritorious struggles after better things in Sydney and Melbourne. The Shakespearian and other high-class dramas were presented, and worthily presented, in both those cities during the period of the late G. V. Brooke; under the enterprising management of Mr. Coppin; also when G. F. Rowe and Harry Edwards were lessees of the Theatre Royal, Melbourne; and yet more successfully during the admirable management of Barry Sullivan, who made some £18,000 in Bourke Street, Melbourne, Australia, and lost it not long since, as previously stated, by similar good performances in Holborn, London. Nor ought we to omit the excellent effect of the visit of Mr. and Mrs. Kean, and of the deservedly-admired Walter Montgomery. First-class Italian Operas were also well given some years ago by Miss Catherine Hayes; also by Madame Anna Bishop, by the Bianchi, the Carandini, and of late by the Lister Company. But the “great plague of London”—burlesque—too soon winged its pestilent flight over all the South Sea sisters, and Melbourne, Sydney, with the chief towns of New Zealand and Tasmania, and even of Tahiti, drop into the abnormal arms of this *Lusus Naturæ*—this alternately alluring and mocking siren—the anomalous seducer who, amidst all her nude, bespangled charms, equally ridicules herself and her besotted victims. In those dazzling abortions, Melbourne, as usual in all things, good or bad, “topped the climax.” There I once saw the beautiful and no less exciting Arabian story of *Aladdin* debased to perfection as “the wonderful scamp,” and in the course of this, a truly beautiful young girl of eighteen, exquisitely dressed and undressed, as the Spirit of the Lamp, was induced—perhaps compelled—to wear a flame of pure fire in a secret cup on the top of her head, at the imminent risk of any accidental jerk in the crowded scene causing her diaphanous gauze to take fire, or scalding her to death. Almost the only words she uttered were a *slangy* retort to one of the principal characters, turning the whole affair into contempt, as usual, and the self-vulgarised Spirit then twirled round upon her mortal heel, and made a flippant exit. As specimens of the wit and humour of the more original of these apes and imps of the London brood that have flourished at the antipodes, take the following. A child, personating a pigmy image of the poet Milton, in flowing white locks, enters, and advances. A pantomime personage receives him, and passing his fingers through the white locks, exclaims, “Ah, Milton, whose head seems to say ‘Comb us!’” (*Comus*). This was not very well understood. Then came a miniature Lord Bacon, who was met with

"Bacon, my boy, 'ow *ham* you?" There was some laughter at this. Next we had Sir Walter Raleigh. "This is Sir Walter Raleigh. He lost his head!" Loud laughter; the "joke" being still more relished after a special reference to tobacco. If instead of the block some pointed allusion to the gallows could have been introduced, the delight would no doubt have been still more general. These things are worthy offshoots of the "great plague of London,"—have occasionally been quite equal to the very best of the latter, and were always put upon the stage with every prodigality that the prostitution of Art could suggest.

With what expression of countenance does the reader imagine a manager of the ordinary type of the day would listen (supposing you could get him to listen) to the following passage on "the beautiful," from Shelley's exquisite translation from Plato!—

"Attempt, I entreat you, to mark what I say with as keen an observation as you can. He who has been disciplined to this point of love by contemplating beautiful objects gradually, and in their order, now arriving at the end of all that concerns love, on a sudden beholds a beauty wonderful in its nature. . . . It is not, like other things, partly beautiful and partly deformed; not at one time beautiful, and at another time not; . . . nor can this supreme beauty be figured to the imagination, like a beautiful face or beautiful hands, or any portion of the body, nor like any discourse, nor any science. All other things are beautiful through a participation of it. . . . When any one, ascending from a correct system of love, begins to contemplate this supreme beauty, he already touches the consummation of his labour. For such as discipline themselves to ascend through these transitory objects which are beautiful, towards that which is beauty itself, proceeding as on steps from the love of one form to that of two, and from that of two to that of all forms which are beautiful; and from beautiful forms to beautiful habits and institutions, and from institutions to beautiful doctrines; until, from the meditation of many doctrines, they arrive at that which is nothing else than the doctrine of the supreme beauty itself, in the knowledge and contemplation of which at length they repose."—*The Banquet of Plato*.

Passing over the managerial expression of countenance, we conceive the reader will be of opinion that the average manager of the day would not, any more than the "girl of the period," very readily apprehend the true meaning and purport of the foregoing passage, albeit he might "liven up" with some misleading rays of erroneous perception at the part referring to the love of one form, and thence to the love of two, or three, &c., and thence to beautiful "habits," in all of which they might hope to "repose at length," in a Fool's Paradise.

But the theatrical atmosphere of London has begun to show some gleams of brightness at last. Though fitful, and often seeming to retire again behind the old muggy clouds, a few unmistakable signs of good have latterly appeared, and after very many years, a peep of clear blue sky has been, and still is, visible in several quarters, here

and there expanding for a time, and even shedding old familiar rays of glory. We of course allude to the stage revivals of high comedy by Mr. Phelps, and more especially to his production of the *Midsummer Night's Dream*, which, for beauty and appropriateness of scenery, scenic effects, action, grouping, and poetical unity of purpose and feeling throughout, was one of the most lovely, dream-like productions ever put upon the stage. The general sentiment and emotion were not a little aided by the soft, half-melancholy, half-entrancing music of Mendelssohn, the exquisite sounds seeming to deepen and dissolve the colours of the gliding scenery, as the misty woodlands and forests floated onwards in slumbrous obedience to the poet's visionary creation.

Of the lighter class of comedy and drama, we have witnessed the unexampled success of the productions of the late T. W. Robertson, the very same pieces running for hundreds of nights in succession, with no "star system" to aid them, but always with the same fair and sufficient cast. They contain no great scenes of passion, wit, or humour, and scarcely any dramatic writing; but the characters are good and well marked, the subjects pleasing, the construction, in many cases, perfect, and they possess the unfailing charm of graceful ease, truthful and kindly nature, and the absence of all the vulgarities that are elsewhere so abundant. Very much the same may be said of some of the productions of the author of *The Two Roses*. Nor should we omit the pleasing pieces of Blanchard Jerrold, of H. J. Byron, or the excellent adaptations from Dickens by G. F. Rowe and others. They deserve to rank as small comedies, or plays, and have no sort of alliance with burlesque and balderdash. Of a yet higher class are the comedies and dramas of Westland Marston, of Mr. Planché, and Mr. Tom Taylor. The continuous successes of dramas of the class produced by these authors, the latter more especially, prove that there must be a very large portion of the public anxious to enjoy something better than the costly outrages upon common sense and common decency which have so long been the ruling *incubi* of the day. Burlesque is dying out: let the Circus expedite its fall.

Shall we ever again see anything like the dear old Christmas pantomimes of childhood's day?—the true pantomime of fairy land, the grotesque merriment of action and gesture without the constant intrusion of vulgar word-torturing. Shall we ever again see enacted the true story of *Aladdin*, or *Mother Goose, Beauty and the Beast*, or *Jack and the Bean Stalk*? May we ever again hope to witness anything like the *Harlequin Gulliver* of old Covent Garden, when the farmer of Brobdignag who walked across the stage was, or at least looked, some fifteen or eighteen feet high, amidst his stupendous nut-brown stocks of golden corn; when the flying island

of Laputa descended from the clouds to rich ærial music, with its throng of strange geometric inhabitants, who hauled up the harlequinade characters by ropes and baskets; or when a royal army of Lilliputian soldiers, with flying banners and fixed bayonets, marched underneath the legs of the clown (Grimaldi) who had insolently leaped and stood astride upon the two jasper columns of the palace gates, his feet fastened there by the wand of harlequin? His apprehensive contortions as the points of the little bayonets passed close underneath him, caused convulsions of laughter never to be forgotten. *Undine*, too, with *Fortunio*, and his *Gifted Servants*, by Mr. Planché, shall we ever again see these delights of the eyes of children "of all ages?" for all healthy and genial people are children at a beautiful fairy tale and pantomime. Yes; something like these things will be seen again. And it will not be very long before they are seen. It is worthy of special remark and gratulation that last year, instead of all the theatres in London giving burlesques at Christmas, three-fourths of them gave fairy tales, ballads, or romantic legions for the foundation or leading subject of their pantomimes. Mr. E. L. Blanchard led off at Old Drury with the ballad-romance of the *Dragon of Wantley*; while at Covent Garden we were presented with the legend of the *Sleeping Beauty*, treated as a pure beauty of the world of romance; and the Haymarket had a "fairy comedy" by Mr. Gilbert, entitled *The Palace of Truth*. The minor and suburban theatres chose subjects from the novels of Dickens and Le Sage, from Dean Swift, and from the "Arabian Nights." The Prince of Wales continued its unbroken chain of Robertson's charming comedietta of *Ours*; and at the Queen's Mr. Phelps gave his exquisite stage-revival of the beautiful *Midsummer Night's Dream*.

That there are marked and unmistakable signs of a change, nobody can doubt; and this change has already extended to the antipodes. A statement recently appeared in the papers of the losses incurred by the manager of the leading theatre in Melbourne, from all the pieces he had produced during the last six months—including the legitimate drama—the greatest loss being upon the most costly one, viz., a burlesque with "scenery that has never been surpassed." And no doubt he might have added "fine music and the richest costumes," in accordance with the usual prostitution of the Fine Arts to these fooleries. Is it not clear that after so many years of depraving the public taste, people are at last tired of the gaudy sameness and insincerity, and care less than ever about theatres, disbelieving in the value of any superior class of drama? Like those who have been continuously intoxicated for many days by unwholesome liquors, it requires some time to relish or even endure good wine and sub-

stantial food. But recover they will, and as London led the way to this vice, so London is about to inaugurate a better state. Action comes first, the moral sense will next awake. The first has been, and is, gradual; the latter will be a sudden revulsion as we have often seen. The very same families which, during the whole of the last twelvemonth have presented themselves—wives, daughters, and little ones—to see public nudities beyond precedent, and found nothing particularly objectionable, certainly nothing wrong, or such respectable people would never have been there—all on the sudden will open new eyes, and denounce such gross improprieties. From this moment, Mr. and Mrs. John Bull and family will never again enter a theatre “while these abominable exhibitions are suffered to continue!” Behold, then, the waste of money that has been expended on several new efforts and so-called novelties in flash dialogues, licentious and graceless dances, pink silk, padded fleshings, and bedizened costumes, all reduced at once to a *caput mortuum*. “To this complexion they must come at last.” And the end is near.

“Teach your children to love the Beautiful,” has been said by thoughtful and wise writers, and it has recently been repeated in a pleasing form.

“Children are susceptible creatures,” says a weekly contemporary, “and circumstances, and scenes, and actions, always impress. If you are able, give them a corner in the garden for flowers; allow them to have their favourite trees; teach them to wander in the prettiest woodlets; show them where they can best view the sunset; rouse them in the morning, not with the stern ‘Time to work,’ but with the enthusiastic, ‘See the beautiful sunrise!’”

Yes, this is the best early education. Never allow horrid or ugly nursery tales, with their yet greater horrors and ugliness in illustrations, to be placed in their hands or within their reach. Never let the eyes, the imagination, or the hearts of children, or young people, be contaminated and injured in other ways by the sight of stage burlesque, with all its desecrating words and actions, insidiously and fatally presented amidst the *irresistible seductions* of lovely scenery, dazzling costumes, and delightful music. The best of these things are not worthy to wipe the dust from the glass slipper of the charming “Cinderella” and other tales of fairy land.

Mr. Godwin, and several well-known dramatists, together with influential organs of the public press, have already called aloud for a National Theatre on the principle of the Théâtre Française, which should receive annually an adequate State aid, and thus be rendered independent of all need for catering and pandering to the assumed low taste of the public—a taste which is but too often precisely that of the manager. Such a National Theatre would thus be enabled, and in fact compelled, by the terms of its foundation, to produce the

masterpieces of the British drama of all times—not excluding dramatic authors who happen to be living. Mr. Planché is no doubt quite right in his opinion of the taste of a large and superior class—a taste for “the beautiful,” a taste for the impassioned, the imaginative, the poetic drama—and, we may as certainly add, for the natural union of painting and music with dramatic genius, all working in harmony together, instead of counteracting each other amidst scoffs and levities which all true lovers of Art have grieved over during the last quarter of a century.

Without trenching upon psychological depths, or those equally subtle movements within our being, which, for want of a better name, we may venture to call æsthetic emotions, it will be at once conceded that the habitual contemplation of beautiful objects must gradually exercise upon the great majority of natures, in every class of society, a corresponding influence of refinement, elevation, and enlarged sympathies, varying in degree with the different characters, education, habits, and faculties of the recipients. Two or three fine engravings upon the household walls are of more value as beautiful influences than a visit, now and then, to a gallery of miscellaneous pictures, even if without the usual evil of low, ugly, or gross objects; in like manner, but of far more potent influence, the continual representation on the stage of beautiful compositions, in which poetry, action, painting, music, should all tend to a homogeneous effect, would be of more importance towards the culture and improvement of a people than the occasional presentation of a drama of the highest class at rare intervals, between all sorts of incongruous exhibitions of the gaudy and grotesque, interspersed with jargon, rigmarole, and heartless ironies upon all high principles and feelings, and the self-mockeries of licentious dolls and ornate prodigies of foolery. A regular, a systematic stage influence upon national character of the kind we advocate, must eventually exercise its due, its inevitable power of softening, purifying, and elevating, and thus render the aid of a National Theatre well worthy the consideration of a wise and economic Government, were it only from the saving it would effect in the cost of the various departments of our penal legislature and reformatory institutions, by its harmonious coincidence with the movements of national education, and the gradual elevation of our species in accordance with the divine ordinance of universal progression.

R. H. HORNE.



## “FRATERNITY.”

*Zur Geschichte der Englischen Gewerkvereine, Von LUJO BRENTANO, Doctor der Rechts und Philosophie. Leipzig: verlag von Doncken und Humboldt.*

*La Roma del Popolo, 12th and 19th Aprile, 1871.*

*La Classe Artigiana, I. II.*

THE immediate economical gain or loss produced by trades' unions and the policy of which they are supposed to be the chief champions, has been lately discussed in these pages with a knowledge and experience of the facts to which I can lay no claim. The story told in the book which I have placed at the head of this article suggests, however, to an outsider like myself, rather different considerations than those so forcibly urged by Mr. Potter or Mr. Fothergill. The writer, English as he may be in many of his sympathies and feelings, is characteristically German in his preference of principles to details, and through the careful and patient investigation of facts which this volume discloses we see a keen insight into the principles which underlie those facts which we are sometimes apt to fear is rather lacking in Englishmen, who may be the equals of the writer in ability and conscientiousness, and possibly his superiors in the power of practically applying these principles. The very idea and plan of the book is unlike the attempts hitherto made to investigate the work of trades' unions. The theory that these institutions are somehow or other connected with the old guilds has been, as Dr. Brentano himself reminds us, eagerly caught at both by friend and foe—by the one that they may justify them as honoured and

respectable in their derivation, by the other that they may condemn them as reactionary and antiquated. But the origin, intention, and history of the guilds themselves, the combatants have been content to leave to antiquarians, and it was as a contribution to the series of the Early English Tract Society that Dr. Brentano first published the essay which in a somewhat enlarged form composes the introduction to the first chapter of the present volume.

We are I think greatly indebted to him that he has now resolved on connecting the early rise of the principles of these institutions with the study of their modern anti-types; and first of all we must call attention to this statement in the preface to this work, that when he began his investigations his feeling

"Was rather that of dislike and mistrust than of good-will. I had," he continues, "only just completed a severe course of theoretical political learning, and who could have helped being enthusiastic for a science, according to which all difficulties of economical and social life dissolve as by a magic mechanism into universal contentment by the mere striking off the fetters from individual interests, and letting them take their own courses; \* while, on the other hand, what I had learnt from the newspapers was of such a kind that I expected to be able to find nothing in them but an anachronism united to brutality, and incapable of any profitable effect on the solution of the Labour Question. Nay, even on the strength of this information, I had, before my journey to England, written a short pamphlet, in which I had introduced a decidedly unfavourable contrast between the trades' unions and the co-operative movement."

Thus inclined by training, and committed by *amour propre* to the side of opposition, Dr. Brentano began his inquiry, with what result this volume partially tells us.

From first to last, then, we find an idea running through these institutions which is best expressed by the word which I have placed at the head of this article. Like all English popular movements, they were characterized in the beginning by a strongly theological tendency. These two ideas of worship and brotherhood were connected in the following way, in the first instance which Dr. Brentano mentions: †—

"It was founded by Orey, a friend of Canute the Great, to the honour of God and St. Peter, at Abbotsbury, and richly endowed with lands. Thus its object appears to have been above all the support and care of any sick guild-brother, the burial of the dead, and the support of services and offering of prayers for his soul. Every year the society met at the Feast of St. Peter for a common worship of God in honour of their patron. To this was joined a common store, and that the poor might have their share in the joy of the feast, they received alms on the feast-day, and the guild-brothers were obliged to make for this object contributions of bread on the previous evening, well 'sifted' and thoroughly baked. . . .

\* This loses much of the epigrammatic force of the original, "bei dem blossen Walten-lassen der Entfesselten individuellen Interessen;" but I doubt whether a literal translation could avoid clumsiness.

† P. 1.

"Quite a different object than those just mentioned, is pointed to by the statutes of the Cambridge guilds. Even in the oath which every member was obliged to swear on the relics of the patron of the guild, they swore to each other true brotherhood, not only in religious, but in worldly matters; and though the statutes secured to the guild-brother the same support in cases of sickness and death as did the statutes of Exeter and Abbotsbury, and like them contained arrangements relating to alms, worship, and stores, yet are all these points unimportant in comparison with the rules for the protection of guild-companions against criminals—nay, even against the evil results of their own wrong-doing. The most important rule was, 'All shall bear the punishment when one goes wrong, and all shall suffer alike.' "

Nor when the religious or strictly family feeling gave way to the citizen feeling, was this idea of brotherhood lost sight of, though it must be owned that it lost something of its universality. This indeed was unavoidable since these new leagues were formed for protection against the lawlessness of a certain part of the nation.

"Like their fellows in the country, they " (the towns) "saw their freedom, property, and trade exposed to the violence of neighbouring great men, to the arbitrary attacks of the bishop or the castle-lord, to bold adventures of robbers, or—as in the towns which arose from settlements of merchants in foreign countries—to attacks from the natives who were in many cases still barbarous. To that was frequently added a feeling of uncertainty in internal matters, and thus a union of the petty freemen into protecting guilds became all-important. For, apart from the dangers which threatened their freedom and their well-being, these free townsmen had a special inducement to enter into such brotherhoods.

"These were old free landholders—owners chiefly of land in towns, if also partially of surrounding lands; most of them carried on trades, and many also handicrafts; but the possession of land in the towns is the chief mark of these oldest citizens, and with it we see connected in the first movements of town-life the full rights of citizenship. Whilst, then, the protection against those dangers made common measures of protection necessary, the amount of possessions limited to a small area was increasing even within the town walls, while the similarity of trade, the community of interests, and the living together in a small compass, facilitated the formation of alliances. Naturally, the collective body of full citizens—that is, of owners of lands in the town of a certain worth—the *civitas*, united itself into one guild the *convivium conjuratum*. Town-communities and guilds became identical, and that which had been guild-right became also town-right."

The power to which these town-guilds sometimes rose is illustrated very startlingly by a story given (on p. 19) of their vengeance on the King of Denmark; but the remarkable point about their growth, especially in England, seems the strange union of the ideas of exclusiveness and of brotherhood. Thus in the rules of a guild at Berwick-on-Tweed,\* the first one was that "no other guild shall be permitted in the town, while as to the guild all guilds should give the property to which they were lawfully entitled to the one guild, and all should be as limbs under one head and with one will—a body

† P. 22.

strong and true." Also on p. 25, Dr. Brentano notices the same provisions for help and support of needy brothers in these guilds as had been granted in the religious guilds. But on p. 31 we have a hint of the new phase into which the guilds were passing. "The growing possessions brought an ever-widening gulf between the feelings and interests of classes." . . . Even the laws make "a contrast between the patrician and the man without hearth or honour who lives from work, and the former could box the ears of the latter with impunity if the latter did not show him reverence."

But it was in the third stage of the development, the growth of the distinctively handicraft-guilds, that these evils came to their full height. Many of the workmen had been in many cases serfs or slaves, and the entrance into the guild offered them an escape from their slavery. Between these emancipated slaves and the older members of the guild there soon arose a sort of class contest. The older guild members drove out the new workmen-members, and on the other hand new workmen hurried into the privileged towns to enforce the claims of themselves and their fellows.

"These former members\* of the burgher-guilds, as well as those free workmen who had lately been brought in, found themselves in the same relation to the burghers as the old-freemen had done when they combined themselves in guilds in opposition to the attacks of the great men. On the one side the burgherhood tried to reduce the workmen into a kind of subject relation; on the other hand they had, after they had driven out the ruling officials, in their own hands the control of the handicraft and trade, and it was in their power to relax the rules which pressed heavily on the workmen."\*

Yet in spite of the bitterness of the struggle which caused this formation within themselves, these new guilds showed the same principles as their earlier prototypes.

"Just like those first guilds, they could create relationships like those between brothers, and, above all, could give to those who belonged to them that help which the member of a family could expect from his family. Since the need had become different in kind, this help had no longer anything to do with protection of body and life against theft; for the magistracy which had grown out of those protective guilds took care of that now. It was rather concerned specially with the security of the independent, undisturbed, regular earning of daily bread by handwork."†

The rest of the introduction is concerned with the further development of these handicraft guilds. The introduction closes with these words:—

"But in England there grew up successors to the old guilds in the trade unions, in which the workmen, like the old freemen in the first guilds, gradually combined against the capitalist, who, as the strong ever do, had united against the weak."‡

The first chapter of this work is taken up with the rise of the English trade union.

\* P. 37—8.

† P. 47.

‡ P. 88.

Originally, as Dr. Brentano shows, there had been in many cases an almost paternal relation between the master and workman. The former had trained and boarded the latter; the wife and children of the master helped in the work. "The workman and master," says a master, "were in all cases so much bound together, if I may be allowed the expression, in love, that they did not wish to be separated from each other even when they could be so."

But by the side of this paternal life grew up one of a different kind. Rich master clothmakers\* in the west of England employed workmen whom they did not keep in their homes. The merchants started factories over which they set overseers. Workmen were taken into these factories who had not gone through the ordinary course of training, and who were taken at a cheaper rate than that for which skilled workmen could be obtained. At last the employment to a large extent of women and children, as well as of the unskilled workmen, irritated the under-sold men, and a trades' union was formed in 1796 in Halifax to oppose the introduction of the new cheap work. They did not know at the time that the then existing statute was on their side against the masters. Thus began the bitter struggle which has lasted into our own time.

A law of 1799 suppressed this and similar unions. The clothmakers increased the bitterness of the men by engaging more men than they could find work for, and then leaving a great part workless. Then followed new combinations of workmen, made, of course, more reckless and bitter by the opposition of the law; yet even here the English trust in law did not desert them.

"In spite of this great bitterness, and in spite of the dependence of the workmen on their trade union, which was at that time so great that a master found that if it were forbidden the workman would sooner obey it than the law of the land,—yet the trade union ceased when on Christmas, in 1805, the representatives of the cloth-halls again took petitions to Parliament, and at once the workmen gave up all their money to these representatives. This is a clear proof that the institution aimed only at the support of the existing legal economical regulation of the work. As soon as the State ceased to support order the trade union came forward in its place. As soon as it saw that a more lawful Board than itself would carry out these laws it broke up."

The rest of the chapter is taken up with the struggle for the laws regulating wages and the gradual defeat of the workmen. Of the misery which came upon the latter during the struggle Dr. Brentano speaks in the strongest terms:—

"By the repeal of the law of Elizabeth this condition of disorganization in industry was declared the only right one. And while the boundless development of individual freedom produced, economically speaking, the greatest success, in social matters the unlimited exercise of individual caprice led to the deepest misery. Disorder and inequality rose to the highest

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\* P. 98.

pitch. The rule of power and accident grew up. Every one who was not strong was oppressed, suffered, and went to the ground. Force was the ruling principle in this condition of society. And only too soon after the repeal of the Act did these changes make themselves clear in every trade. Parliamentary reports about the condition of the ribbon and silk industries at Coventry, Nuneaton, Macclesfield, show us the immediate result of the repeal—such a spread of the system of middlemen and half-pay pupils that the workmen came near to starvation, and the workwomen were driven to prostitution. ‘As long as the statute of Elizabeth was in force,’ says the Report, ‘the sad circumstances which we now lament were never heard of.’”\*

Such, then, was the state of things under which the modern trade unions rose into life. The second chapter is chiefly devoted to the present form of those unions and their strictly modern history. It may seem a bold thing to say, but I cannot help believing that the idea which I have alluded to as embodied in the earlier guilds at every stage, appears *more* nobly and perfectly in the trade union. The first guilds were attracted by the natural ties of kinship, which all must to some degree recognise. Those who formed the burgher-guilds were forced to combine for life and safety; to shrink from joining them would have been a sign rather of folly and short-sightedness than of selfishness. Hardly less forcibly does the same remark apply to the handicraft-guilds of the fourteenth century. They were indeed not absolutely forced to keep to their original trade, and so far as they refused *that* chance they sacrificed themselves; but unless they gave up their ordinary means of livelihood they were forced to combine against exclusion and tyranny. The modern trade unionist was, and often still is, called on for a severer sacrifice. The chances now are open to any man of industry and intelligence of rising out of his class by following his work, without caring for his neighbours. It is, therefore, a deliberate self-renunciation which makes the trade unionist determine to stand or fall with his class. Of course, to a proposition so broadly stated there are plenty of limitations in special cases, but the two ordinary objections, I believe, are not in the main well-founded—not, that is, to such an extent as materially to weaken my main proposition. The idea that the leaders of the movement are mainly clever talkers who have failed in their work, is, I believe, false. The late able secretary of the Amalgamated Carpenters has certainly had no difficulty in getting work since he resigned his place; I am personally acquainted with one unionist who was at one time on the trades’ council, and who was very highly thought of as a skilled engineer; for the goodness of the boots made by another prominent unionist I can also answer; and of a still more influential one Dr. Brentano speaks in the following terms †:—“Had not Allan,‡ with singular faithfulness and

\* P. 128.

† P. 205.

‡ The Secretary of the Amalgamated Engineers.

unselfishness been unwilling to separate himself from his companions and their class, with his abilities, energy, and power of endurance he could long since have raised himself like so many others into a successful employer." It is no answer to such instances as these to say that these secretaries are *now* well paid, when we think of the certainty of a much more lasting success which they must have sacrificed on their first joining the union.

Nor is the other charge of mere terrorism, as a means of recruiting, true, when applied to some of the largest and most influential trade unions, such, for instance, as the Amalgamated Engineers, one of the oldest; and the Amalgamated Carpenters, one of the youngest (both of them among the most successful) of the unions.

Of the actual constitution of the union, the question of whether its government should be considered a democracy or a despotism, Dr. Brentano speaks as follows:—

"The 84,000 members limit themselves to the laying down of principles and ideas of management which they wish to see carried out. For the working out and bringing into practice of these ideas, in a word, for government, they choose trusted men as members of their committee and as secretaries. In many ways one may call this government democratic. But if one understands by a democratic government that kind of government in which every man takes part in the direction of the business, then this society is certainly not democratically governed. A government of that kind is very often only a government by incapacity and chatter. *Also it answers* much more to the inclinations and needs of the English middle-classes than to those of the English working-class. The English workman suffers much less from that instinctive feverish hunger for carrying out his individual wishes. Individuals are already accustomed from their work in the factory to subject themselves to the community, and to act in masses."

This sentence should be well studied, for there is much in it that goes to the very roots of the whole question of modern democracy. Under the *régime* of the middle-classes and the Manchester school we have been accustomed to look upon liberty merely as "being let alone." The idea which that school worked out had, of course, an important truth in it, though a terribly limited truth. Under its guidance we have gained free trade and greater development of municipal liberty. Under it we have got rid of the tinsel nonsense in which men used to praise as "spirited" every minister who would plunge the country into a war, and have learnt rather to reverence those who study internal reform, and look upon the people as composed of individual men with distinct wants, and not as mere food either for powder or glory. But, nevertheless, under it we are terribly in danger of losing the idea of fraternity and of accepting the terrible gospel, "Each man for his own interests, and Mammon for us all." Under it we are apt to suppose that individual convenience, if of a kind that seems to be within the reach of any one, must not be sacrificed for the common good.

In our wish to allow free play for individual strength, we are in danger of forgetting the weak. In our wish to do justice to individual members of the nation, we are inclined to forget that they are members of a nation, and that they have duties both to the whole, and as a whole. The same men who carried free trade opposed the Factory Acts. The same men who cured us of the lust for war have also brought in the selfish and godless doctrine of non-intervention.

Against this spirit we need all the help which we can find, and I think trades' unions and their supporters will give us some. The inconsistencies of their position are no doubt painfully evident, but are, as I trust, changing and modifying.

"In Manchester and Glasgow," says Dr. Brentano, "there exist, on account of the great number of members in those districts, special bureaux with special officials. It is very common now for employers of labour who need workmen to send direct to these bureaux for workmen. Where this is not the case they give information in every work-place to the working members of every vacancy, so that a workman can at once be sent there to ask for work. Also, non-unionists are sometimes supplied with work in this way from the Society, but of course only in cases when there is absolutely no member out of work."\*

I may incidentally mention that I have heard that a well-known unionist recently expressed his belief that the London trade unions would do the same thing if necessary. But it may still be urged with some force that this is at best a class movement, and that under present circumstances it must to a great extent be, however moderately carried out, the movement of one class against another, and so far a selfish movement. It is on this account partly that I have placed at the head of my article the names of two articles from the Roman *Di Popolo*, by Signor Mazzini, which a friend has kindly translated for me.

After answering some charges against the general movement of the working classes, he proceeds to speak of the Italian workmen. In Italy, he says, "the socialist systems of France have found no visible followers. The agitations, if there were agitations, among the working classes were always caused by the sense of Italian honour violated, of the greatness of the country betrayed—never by the desire of ameliorating their economical condition."

This is certainly a bright picture, and no doubt a far more attractive one than that presented by our own trades' unions. But Signor Mazzini would be the last to ignore the differences between Italy and England. Nay, I will boldly say that he seems to have understood these differences far more clearly than most English writers, far more truly than some of the most highly-lauded Italian statesmen.

Indeed, he has stated in a recently printed letter that the special

\* P. 216.

work of England for many years to come must be in the direction of internal reform of the relations between classes. Nor would he deny that the especial impulses which the Italian revolution has given to such feelings as he describes must be wanting to some extent in a country where, thank God! we have no need of armed revolutions. Yet, nevertheless, the leaders of our movement for social and economical reform may learn from the teacher I have quoted to take a higher standard, and to set before them nobler aims than the mere aggrandizement of a class. The principles of fraternity once admitted, liberty must be seen to be not the mere being let alone, but the right and ability to develop to the utmost one's faculties for the good of others; then we must go on to connect it logically with the larger whole to which we all feel related. Amongst the many changes which Signor Mazzini puts forward in the second of these articles, as the result of the Republican movement in Italy, are not only "the constitution of a legislative power, in which labour may be largely represented—of an executive power entirely responsible and removable, called to an office defined by name, and of an administration left as much as possible to the election of the locality;" but also "*of a system of defence which may substitute an armed nation for the standing army.*" It may seem to some that this is a long way from the subject of trade unions; but it is not so to those who look upon them rather as representing a principle than as means to the immediate ends which they may have before them. It is not far from it when the movement of which they are the leaders (to borrow the words of the same article) "represents itself as part of a movement of emancipation connected with the life of humanity"—and, we may add, still more literally of the English nation. And whatever we may learn from other countries in their special times of trial, we cannot forget that at any rate we have here in England an embodiment of the great principles for which they are struggling there as well as here—that whatever new lights we may have from other countries, we have here a chance such as they have hardly ever had, of realizing the true idea of Fraternity.\*

C. E. MAURICE.

\* I am sure my friend, Mr. Odger, will forgive me if I say that I think that the ignoring of national differences was his mistake in founding the International Society. I do not mean, of course, that he could have foreseen that a president would have been chosen by that society unscrupulous enough to put to an address the names of those who had not even seen it; but I do mean that the difference between the political condition of the workmen in Germany and France and those of England, and the difference of the doctrines of their respective leaders, might have warned him and others that they might be sooner or later betrayed into a false position by their rashly-chosen friends.



## THE IDEA OF GOD: ITS GENESIS AND DEVELOPMENT.

MODERN Science, on the one hand, and modern Philosophy, on the other, have raised in the most distinct and precise form the question as to the Genesis of the Idea of God. Religion is practically co-extensive with man; its presence, even among savage tribes, is the rule, its absence the exception. Peoples the most distant, and indeed opposite, in genius and culture and geographical position, with languages, institutions, and civilization in every shade and degree of difference, have yet a religion as their common characteristic, have never as peoples outgrown it; and though they may have changed its form, have only done so to find in a reformed religion renewed life. A nation's genius rises as its consciousness of God deepens, and the one is highest when the other is most intense.\* The point where the genius and culture of Greece culminated was the very point where it had come to realize most vividly the being and government of God. The two eras in our English history most distinguished for genius and heroism, were also the most distinguished for intensity and sincerity of religious life.

Religion thus seems so necessary to the nature of man, so pervades

\* M. Renan finds the characteristic which mainly distinguishes the Aryan and Semitic from the other races of mankind to be their moral and religious superiority (*Histoire des Langues Sémitiques*, p. 472).

and determines his individual and social life, that Science, in its inquiries into the origin, constitution, and original condition of man, has come face to face with the questions, How did man become religious? What was the earliest form of his religious faith? How can the practical universality and apparent necessity of his belief in one God, or in many gods, be explained? The answers have, on the whole, been growingly adverse to belief in a primitive Theism. The extreme antiquity of man which Geology is inclined to affirm, the aboriginal barbarism Archæology claims to have proved, the primitive Nature-worship Comparative Mythology is said to reveal, the savage condition which Ethnology exhibits as the point from which civilization starts, and, lastly, Mr. Darwin's attempt to trace the "Descent of Man" from a "hairy" ancestor, require a natural descent of Theism from Atheism, of our religious ideas from the rude fears and frightful dreams of anthropomorphous animals.

The question has also been raised, quite as sharply too, in the proposition which Positivism has enunciated as the law of historical progression. Comte's law of mental evolution is too well known to require statement here. The "theological or fictitious" is the first stage of our knowledge, "the necessary starting-point of the human mind."\* Here individual and race must alike begin. In this first stage there are three progressive sub-stages—Fetichism, Polytheism, Monotheism, each transitional, each fictitious. To Positivism the primitive faith of the world is a Fetichism common to infant and savage, dog and monkey,† and the English disciples who most differ on other points from their master are yet at one with him here.‡

Of course, the agreement on this point of Science and Positivism is superficial, and should not be allowed to hide the fundamental difference of their principles and aims. Science does not, but Positivism, as Comte understood it,§ does, pronounce against the truth of theology. Mr. Darwin thinks his speculations in no way hostile to belief in the being of God,|| but M. Comte could not allow the fictions of the theological stage any place among the facts of the positive. The difference between Science and Positivism is thus fundamental. It is the accident of the one to ignore, but the essence of the other to contradict, theological belief. Their accidental agreement on the point in question only helps to sharpen their essential antithesis. Science does not seek by its theories to supersede or abolish religion; but Positivism dogmatically promulgates its fundamental

\* "Cours de Philosophie Positive," vol. i. p. 3.

† *Ib.*, vol. v. pp. 30 ff.

‡ J. S. Mill, "Auguste Comte and Positivism," p. 12, pp. 18 ff.; "System of Logic," vol. ii. p. 524. G. H. Lewes, "Hist. of Philos.," vol. iv. pp. 248 ff. (ed. 1852). Herbert Spencer, *Fortnightly Review*, vol. vii. (N.S.) pp. 536—550.

§ "Cours de Philos. Posit.," vol. i. pp. 4—10; Mill, "Comte and Positivism," p. 14.

|| "Descent of Man," vol. i. p. 65.

law that it may evolve the Atheism which claims to be the new religion of humanity.

The question to be here discussed is the question which modern Science and Positivism have thus combined to raise—How did the idea of God arise? What was its earliest form? What the law or what the process of its development? The questions are certainly in some respects grave enough, touch not only a point at which Christian thought and scientific inquiry come into the sharpest collision, but also the speculative tendencies most threatening to religious truth. Neither religion in general, nor Christianity in particular, depends on the answer to any question in physical science, and our faith has nothing to fear from the most searching investigations into the origin and primitive condition of man. But the tendency, on the one hand, to erect a law of evolution, enacted and administered without any conscious moral law-giver, into the grand principle of human progress, and the tendency, on the other hand, to resolve religion into the expression of subjective states, the externalization in forms and acts of the religious consciousness, are much more dangerous; because they contain, in so far as the one seeks order and progress in the history of humanity, and the other the explanation of the various ethnical religions in the nature and faculties of man, elements of neglected truths. Our essay, which is meant to deal, more or less directly, with each of these phases of modern thought, falls into two parts. The first will discuss the genesis of the idea of God, therefore the question raised by Science. The second will discuss the development of the idea, therefore the question raised by every theory of evolution, whether coming from the transcendental or positivist side.

I. "Natural Histories of Religion" are as old as scepticism. Doubt has always been forced, all the more because exceptional, to justify itself against belief. Coarse or shallow minds have snatched at the readiest and least creditable explanation. Religion is an invention of priests, or poets, or rulers. This explanation was not unknown to the ancient world, figured largely in the anti-religious French and English literature of last century, and still plays a part in the lower infidel discussions of to-day. But the explanation is so manifestly superficial and unsatisfactory, that it falls to pieces the moment the inquiry becomes earnest and searching. Subtler minds saw that a phenomenon so universal as religion must have its roots in the nature of man, and his relation to the world around him. Hence the Epicurean, who hated a *curiosum et plenum negotii deum*,\* held that fear had created the gods. The terrible forms seen in dreams, the system of the heavens, the seasons, tempests, meteors,

\* Cicero, "De Nat. Deor.," lib. i. 20.

and lightnings, created the notion of invisible or spiritual beings, of gods, and the terror which they inspired gave birth to religion.\* Hume, with a rare subtlety of analysis and felicity of illustration, tried to evolve the idea of gods out of the ignorance and fear that personified the "unknown causes" of the accidents and eccentricities of Nature, the idea of one God or Monotheism out of the gradual concentration of flattery and offerings on one of these personifications.† Hence Polytheism was the deification of many unknown causes of natural phenomena; Monotheism, the deification of one unknown cause. Dupuis held that all religions had their origin in a worship of nature pure and simple, and that "*les Dieux sont enfans des hommes*."‡ But he did not explain the one thing needing explanation—how and why man had begun to worship at all. Comte supposed the primitive Fetichism to rise from infant or savage, by a tendency which they had in common with dog or monkey, ascribing to natural objects, organic or inorganic, a life analogous to their own.§ Sir John Lubbock thinks that the rudest savages, representatives of aboriginal man, are actual Atheists,|| and describes the transition to Fetichism¶ somewhat as Lucretius did,—the explanation of the Roman Epicurean, however, being on the whole the more philosophic and elevated. Herbert Spencer considers that the rudimentary form of all religion is the propitiation of dead ancestors, who are supposed to be still existing, and to be capable of working good or ill to their descendants.\*\* Mr. Darwin's theory is eclectic, and seems to combine the various elements of an ascription of life to natural objects, dreams and fears.††

An analytic and categorical criticism of these Natural Histories of Religion cannot be attempted here and now. But it may be observed that, amid minor differences, they agree in their three main propositions—(1) that man was originally destitute of religious belief; (2) that delusions due to ignorance, fear, or dreams were the causes of his earliest faith; and (3) that the primitive religion was one of terror, a series of rude attempts to propitiate supposed unfriendly beings. Religion is thus derived from the lower faculties

\* Sext. Empir. Adv. Math., ix. 25; Lucretius, v. 1161—1240. The notion, that fear is the mother of religion runs through the whole poem of Lucretius and crops out everywhere. Yet the fine invocation of *Alma Venus*, with which his poem opens, shows what a fascination the idea of the divine had for him. It was the actual religion he saw around him which he hated, for "*Sæpius illa Religio peperit scelerosa atque impia facta*," (i. 82).

† "Natural History of Religion," sections i.—viii.

‡ "*Origine de Cultes*," vol. i. p. viii. and pp. 3—42.

§ "*Cours de Philos. Posit.*," vol. v. p. 37.

|| "*Origin of Civilization*," p. 119.

¶ The main factors in the change are dreams (p. 126), disease (p. 131), divination, and sorcery (p. 141); see also p. 221.

\*\* *Fortnightly Review*, vol. vii. (N.S.) p. 536.

†† "*Descent of Man*," vol. i. pp. 65—68.

and passions of man, and, as a necessary result, its form is low—lower, one would think, than the aboriginal Atheism. It is, too, in its nature false and delusive, without objective reality, the creation of miserable ignorance and trembling fear, a very torment to the minds that had created it. It is hard to see how a religion so produced, and of such a nature, could be otherwise than injurious to man, its terrors fatal to his incipient moral nature, its delusions bewildering and oppressive to his intellect, its entire influence tending to throw the savage back into the animalism from which he had lately emerged. Such a religion could only increase the difficulties in the way of progress, make civilization less possible. Then, how can the virtues and graces of religion be evolved from this barbarous faith? *Ex nihilo nihil fit*. The highest moral qualities do not spring from the lowest. This "Natural History of Religion" would require an inverted actual history of religion, the reversal of its historical place in society and the State. It is not without significance that, while M. Comte was introducing his law of evolution to the world, finding the roots of religion in Fetichism and the final and perfect system in a Positivism without God, the two profoundest thinkers then living were formulating very different doctrines—the one the doctrine that a nation and its religion rose together, that, apart from religion, a nation, with its institutions and laws, was impossible;\* the other, that "the religion and foundation of a State are one and the same, in and for themselves identical," and that "the people who has a bad conception of God has also a bad State, bad government, and bad laws."†

Before finally dismissing these theories, it may be well to notice a few of their assumptions. They assume the truth of an empirical philosophy. They resolve religious ideas into impressions of sense. Man's faculty or tendency to believe in invisible beings is unexplained. If infant and dog, savage and monkey, alike think natural objects alive, the man does, the animal does not, formulate his thoughts into a religion. Why? If man can get out of the Fetich stage, he can also get into it. Why? Faith is not the result of

\* Schelling, "Philosophie der Mythologie," i. 63.

† Hegel, "Religions-philosophie," i. p. 241. A sketch of the German philosophies of religion, in so far as they touch the genesis of the idea of God, although a very tempting subject, is not one that can be touched within the limits of a short essay. It would have to start with Lessing, Herder, and Kant, and come down to the younger Fichte, Feuerbach, and Pfleiderer, and would lead us into the very heart of the questions that have agitated the German philosophic schools for now almost a century. German thought on this matter forms, on the whole, an admirable counteractive to English and French. The elements the one ignores are, as a rule, the elements the other emphasizes, though English empirical and scientific thought is beginning to tell at the close of this century in Germany, very much as English rationalistic thought told at the beginning of last.

sensations. Mind is not passive, but active, in the formation of beliefs. The constitutive element is what mind brings to nature, not what nature brings to mind, otherwise no spiritual and invisible could be conceived. Our theorists assume, too, that the aboriginal state of our cultured peoples was similar to that of the lowest living savages. But surely the difference of their conditions, the one savage, the other civilized, hardly warrants such an assumption—implies rather original differences, physical and mental, fatal to it.\* Then they assume a theory of development which has not a single historical instance to verify it. Examples are wanted of peoples who have grown without foreign influence from Atheism into Fetichism, and from it through the intermediate stages into Monotheism; and until such examples be given, hypotheses claiming to be “Natural Histories of Religion” must be judged hypotheses still. “Spontaneous generation” is as little an established fact in mental as in physical science, and its truth need not be assumed until it be proved.

We cannot, therefore, accept any hypothesis which would evolve the idea of God from delusions, or dreams, or fears. Shall we trace it, then, to a supernatural source, to a primitive revelation? But a primitive revelation were a mere assumption, incapable of proof—capable of most positive disproof. Although often advanced in the supposed interests of religion, the principle it assumes is most irreligious. If man is dependent on an outer revelation for his idea of God, then he must have what Schelling happily termed “an original Atheism of consciousness.”† Religion cannot be rooted in the nature of man—must be implanted from without. The theory that would derive man’s religion from a revelation is as bad as the theory that would derive it from distempered dreams. Revelation may satisfy or rectify, but cannot create, a religious capacity or instinct, and we have the highest authority for thinking that man was created “to seek the Lord, if haply he might feel after and find Him”—the finding being by no means dependent on a written or traditional word. If there was a primitive revelation, it must have been — unless the word is used in an unusual and misleading sense — either written or oral. If written, it could hardly be primitive, for writing is an art, a not very early acquired art, and one which does not allow documents of exceptional value to be easily lost. If it was oral, then either the language for it was created or it was no more primitive than the written. Then an oral revelation becomes a tradition, and a tradition requires either a special caste for its transmission, becomes

\* Renan’s “*Histoire des Langues Sémitiques*,” p. 468.

† “*Philos. der Mythol.*,” i. pp. 141—142.

therefore its property, or must be subjected to multitudinous changes and additions from the popular imagination—becomes, therefore, a wild commingling of broken and bewildering lights. But neither as documentary nor traditional can any traces of a primitive revelation be discovered, and to assume it is only to burden the question with a thesis which renders a critical and philosophic discussion alike impossible.

The natural and supernatural theories, as they may be termed, may here be dismissed. Let us now attempt to approach the question in what may be termed the historical method. This method is, indeed, of limited application. The history of no people reaches back to a very remote antiquity. Then, the religions of the ancient world are, with one exception, polytheistic in their earliest historical form, and their Polytheism so developed as to indicate ages of growth. They seem like an ancient forest in which the underwood has become so dense as to render any attempt to pass through it, or discover the order and time of growth, alike hopeless. But, happily, many labourers, long engaged in clearing the underwood, have met with such success, that diligent search, such as is now possible, among the roots of the old mythologies, may bring us near the discovery of the thing we seek.

In this inquiry we must confine ourselves as much as possible to the limits within which the method is applicable. Adopting, as meanwhile the most convenient, the familiar division of the race into the Aryan, Semitic, and Turanian families, we shall confine ourselves to the first, leaving aside, though for opposite reasons, the second and the third. This limitation has a double advantage. It connects the discussion with ourselves. The religious ideas whose origin and evolution are to be examined were the ideas of our forefathers. There is no proof that the lake-dwellers of Switzerland, the flint-hatchet makers of Abbeville, or the aborigines of Scotland, were either our ancestors or their kindred; but there is the most positive proof that we are the lineal descendants of the Aryans who emigrated from North-Western Asia. The other advantage is, that the Aryan family seems to offer decisive disproof of a primitive Theism. If the religious instinct of the Semitic family has impelled it to Monotheism, the religious instinct of the Aryan has carried it into the most extravagant and multitudinous Polytheisms. No Aryan people has had a Jehovah like the Hebrews, or an Allah like the Mohammedans;\* nor has any one had a prophet, save the partly exceptional Zoroaster, authoritative like Moses, or exclusive like

\* Lassen, "*Indische Alterthumskunde*," vol. i. p. 496. Lassen's beautiful analysis and portraiture of the Aryan and Semitic characters contains almost everything that can be said on the subject—Pp. 494—497 (2nd. ed.).

Mohammed.\* The Aryan has been tolerant of the different gods of different nations; the Semite intolerant of all gods except his own. The tolerance, in the one case, has increased the tendency to multiply gods; the intolerance, in the other case, has intensified the passion for unity. But under this difference there lies what at first seems similarity, but becomes on deeper examination a sharp antithesis. Aryan man has had his passion for unity, but his unity has been abstract, impersonal. Unity of person has been the goal of Semitic thought, but unity of conception the goal of Aryan.† The highest being of the first was personal, masculine, Jehovah, Allah; but the highest being of the second was impersonal, neuter, Brahma,‡ το ὄντως ὄν. We must therefore distinguish between the religious and philosophic forms of the idea of God. The Aryan tendency was to religious multiplicities, but to philosophic unities. The unity or monism, which was the product in the historic period of the speculative reason, was by no means a Monotheism; while the multitude of mythological persons which sprang up in the pre-historic period certainly formed a Polytheism.

It is the more necessary to emphasize this distinction as so much has been written about the development of Monotheism among the Greeks. It is not time yet to discuss that part of our question. And here we can only note the contrast between the Deity of a philosophy, and the God of a religion. The one is an object of worship, the other a product of speculation. In the one case, God must be conceived as a person or power standing in a certain relation to the worshipper; in the other, Deity is the first or final proposition forming the base or the summit of a system of reasoned truth. Religion may exist without philosophy, has always existed before it, and may, when it has passed from the instinctive and imaginative stages into the reflective, attempt to represent in system, or justify to thought, its idea of God; but while the two may thus become allies, they can never, save in the mind of some transcendentalist, be identical. Religion has often given the idea of God to philosophy, but philosophy has never given a God to religion. The speculative God of the Brahmans remained an object of speculation.§ And not

\* Renan, "Histoire des Langues Sémitiques," p. 8, compares, not very happily, I think, the Semitic prophet to the Indian *Avatar*. The two are, save in one or two superficial points, essential contrasts. The Indian *Avatar* doctrine rests on the communicableness of the divine nature, but Hebrew prophecy on its incommunicableness.

† This is only another side of the contrast Renan points out between the capacity of the Aryan race to produce original philosophies, and the incapacity of the Semitic to do so ("Histoire des Langues Sémitiques," pp. 9 ff).

‡ Brahmā (mas.) is the first god in the Hindu Trimurti, but Brahmā (neut.) is the universal soul or substance of Hindu philosophy.

§ Nor does the worship of Brahmā (mas.) seem to have been general (Lassen, "Indis. Alterthums," i. p. 776, 1st edition). He was too much a product of the reflective priestly consciousness to be a people's god.

one of the Greek schools gave a God to Greek worship. The development of abstract conceptions—space, time, the infinite, the absolute, the supreme good—is not the development of Monotheism, just as a system of thought is not a religion.

We return to our problem. What was the genesis of the religious idea of God? Our first step must be to determine the primitive form of that idea among the Aryan peoples. Here we assume (1) the original unity of the Aryan family of nations; (2) that the rudimentary form of their civilization was in existence prior to their separation;\* and (3) that the Aryan mythologies send their roots into that distant time, are branches whose parent stem is the faith of the still united family. Discussion of mythological theories is here unnecessary. Our own view, and the reasons for it, will appear in the sequel.†

Let us start, then, from the well-known fact that, while the Aryan mythologies in their earliest literary forms reveal developed and multitudinous Polytheisms, their elements become simpler and fewer the farther they are traced back.‡ The more cultured Greeks believed that the religion of the ancients had been much simpler than that of their own age, and that the mythical elements had been added either for poetical or political purposes.§ While each philosophic school had, according to its own fundamental principles, a different—either allegorical, physical, or historical—method of interpreting the national mythology, each agreed with the others in repudiating the literal and popular sense.|| In the Homeric and Hesiodic poems fragments can be found which seem like the survivors of an earlier faith, and look, even in the old epics, like the curiously carved stones of an ancient Gothic cathedral built into the walls of a modern church, or, to use Welcker's figure, like the fauna and flora of a lost world preserved in the successive strata of the earth's crust.¶ The simpler Polytheism standing behind the

\* These questions are discussed at considerable length in Pictet's "*Les Origines des Indo-Européennes*." With less fulness of detail, but quite as conclusively, in Max Müller's essay on Comparative Mythology in the second volume of his "*Chips from a German Workshop*."

† A most exhaustive and philosophic discussion of mythological theories, combined with a triumphant assertion of the origin of mythology in the religious conceptions of a people, will be found in Schelling's "*Philos. der Mythol.*," vol. i. *Erstes Buch*.

‡ Welcker, "*Griechische Götterlehre*," vol. i. p. 129; Blackie, "*Homer and the Iliad*," vol. i. p. 23.

§ Herodotus, lib. ii. 53; Plato, "*De Repub.*," lib. ii. §§ 18 ff, vol. vi. pp. 380 ff. (Bekker); Aristotle, "*Metaphys.*," lib. xi. 8; Creuzer, "*Symbolik und Mythol. der Alten Völker*," i. pp. 3 ff.

|| Zeller, "*Philosophie der Griechen*," ii. 305 ff., 554 ff. (ed. 1846), iii. 299 (ed. 1865); Max Müller, "*Lectures on the Science of Language*," ii. lect. ix.

¶ Creuzer, "*Symbolik und Mythol.*," iii. pp. 64—67; Welcker, "*Griechis. Götterlehre*," i. pp. 5—8.

Greek epics can, in great part, be deciphered, and the several streams whose confluence form it traced to their respective Aryan, Pelasgic, Hellenic, Oriental, and Egyptian fountain-heads. The process is thus one of increasing simplification. Diversity and multiplicity alike tend to disappear as historical analysis dissolves the tribal and temporal accretions, and resolves the faith of the early Greek settlers into its primal elements.

What is true of the Greek branch of the Aryan mythology is also true of the Indian. The Vedic hymns represent a much earlier phase of mythological development than the Homeric poems.\* If we may use Schelling's terms,† changing somewhat their sense, we would say, the Homeric Polytheism is successive, *i.e.*, its gods have each a history and a place in a definite system; but the Vedic Polytheism is simultaneous, *i.e.*, has no developed system—now one god, now another, is supreme.§ The simultaneous is much more primitive than the successive stage. There has been time to create, not to systematize. But behind the Vedas lies a still earlier faith, or rather a series of earlier faiths, which can be determined partly from the hymns themselves, and partly from a comparison of Vedic deities with those of other Aryan peoples. Indra is the supreme Vedic god,|| but his origin cannot be placed earlier than the immigration into India,¶ where he soon thrust the older and, morally, higher Varuna into the background,\*\* as Varuna seems at a still earlier period to have superseded Dyaus. Then, many gods known to the Indian are unknown to the other Aryans, and can only be regarded as additions to the primitive faith held by the undivided family. But centuries behind the Vedas we find a point where a still earlier phase of Aryan mythology can be studied—the point where the two branches that had grown longest together parted, to form the Indian and Iranian peoples, and to develop religions almost the exact antitheses of each other.†† Here literary documents fail us, but comparative philology sheds a light that can hardly be called

\* Muir's "Sanskrit Texts," v. pp. 3—4; Müller, "Chips from a German Workshop," i. p. 26.

† "Philosophie der Mythologie," i. p. 120.

‡ Lassen, "Indis. Alterthumskunde," i. 768 (1st ed.).

§ Müller's "Hist. of Ancient Sans. Lit.," p. 546. Since the above was written I have read the first of a series of papers entitled, "Vedenstudiën," in *De Gids* for June, by Mr. P. A. S. van Limburg Brouwer. The writer gives a fresh and interesting, but I think, in some respects, incorrect interpretation of Vedic Polytheism. The several gods are personalized natural phenomena, but God the power in nature which produces them. There is apparent plurality, but actual unity.—*De Gids*, June, pp. 395 ff.

|| Of course only comparatively supreme. See former reference to Müller, and also Lassen, "Indis. Alterthums." i. pp. 756—758; Muir's "Sanskrit Texts," v. sec. v.

¶ Benfey, "Orient und Occident," i. pp. 48, 49, note 275; Muir's "Sanskrit Texts," v. 118.

\*\* Muir's "Sans. Texts," v. p. 116.

†† Lassen, "Indis. Alterthums," p. 516; Spiegel, "Eränische Alterthums," i. 489.

dim. By this light we can perceive that there are fewer gods than in the Vedic age, but more than had existed prior to the departure of the European branches.\* The elaboration and increased importance of the worship, the appearance of a professional priesthood, the rise of new gods like Soma-Haoma, Mitra-Mithra, and other things indicative of growth in religious doctrines and rites, can be discovered from a comparison of the names and words existing at this period with those common to the Aryan family as a whole,† while the absence of gods afterwards well known, of ceremonies and castes raised at a later period to prime importance, can be ascertained from a comparison of the Iranic-Indian deities, religious terms and rites, with those of the Vedas.‡ The process of simplification thus continues; the younger the Polytheism the fewer its gods.

But behind the Homeric poems, and the Vedas, and the separation of the Iranic-Indian branches, lies the period when Celt and Teuton, Anglo-Saxon and Indian, Greek and Roman, Scandinavian and Iranian, lived together, a simple single people. And at this point comparison can be again instituted. The germs of many subsequent developments in arts and institutions can here be discovered; but the one thing sought, meanwhile, is, What can be determined as to the religious faith then held? The points of radical and general agreement are few. Resemblances that may be classed as coincidences evolved in the course of subsequent development, must of course be excluded. Under this head many of the points comparative mythology seizes may be comprehended. The same faculties in men of the same race, working under different conditions indeed, but with kindred materials, could hardly fail to produce similar results. The most of those Myths of the Dawn which Max Müller has so ingeniously analyzed and explained; § gods of the stormful sky, like the German *Wodin* and the Indian *Rudra*; gods of the sea, like the Indian *Varuna* in his later phase, and the Greek *Poseidon*; gods of the sun, like the Indian *Savitri* and *Surya* and the Greek *Helios*—are, whatever their mythical resemblances, developmental coincidences, creations of the Aryan genius, nationalized yet retaining its family features. Excluding, then, the coincidences natural to related peoples developing the same germs, we find two points of radical and general agreement—the proper name of one God, and the term expressive of the idea of God in general. The name is the Sanscrit *Dyaus*, the Greek *Zeus*, the Latin *Ju* in *Jupiter*, the Gothic *Tius*, the Anglo-Saxon *Tiw*, the Scandinavian *Tyr*, the old German *Ziu* or *Zio*. On this point scholars

\* Spiegel, *Eränische "Alterthums,"* pp. 432 ff.

† Spiegel, *ut supra*. Some excellent materials for such a comparison can be found in Fick's "Vergleich. Wörterb. der Indoger. Sprachen," ii. Wortschatz.

‡ Muir's "Sanskrit Texts," i. pp. 289—295, where views of Dr. Martin Haug bearing on this point are stated.

§ "Science of Language," ii. lect. xi.

are agreed. Sanscritists like Dr. Muir\* and Professors Müller, Aufrecht,† and Lassen,‡ Greek scholars like Curtius|| and Welcker,¶ German like Jacob Grimm,\*\* and Celtic like M. Adolphe Pictet,†† unite in tracing the cognates back to a common root, and, therefore, to a primitive name. The name for God had thus been formed before the dispersion. It was the name, too, of the Supreme Deity of the Greeks and Romans. A distinguished Sanscritist supposes Dyaus to have been before the rise of Indra the highest God of the Indian, as well as the other Aryans,‡‡ and his supremacy may have extended into the period of the Indian and Iranian unity.§§ The German scholar most distinguished for research in the mythology of his own land, thought he had discovered traces of the original supremacy of Tius or Zio among the Teutonic tribes;||| and a brilliant philologist and lecturer has generalized these facts and opinions, and argued that Jupiter was the supreme Aryan God.¶¶

Perhaps, it is too much to argue that the general eminence and prevalence of this name proves the supremacy of the God it designated. Two inferences, however, may be meanwhile allowed—(1) that the word in its primitive form was the name of a deity, (2) that the deity it denoted was acknowledged and worshipped by the Aryan family as a whole. Let us turn, before attempting any more definite deduction, to the term expressing the idea of God in general. This term is in Sanscrit *deva*, in Zend *daeva*, in Greek *θεός* (?),\*\*\* in Latin *deus*, in Lithuanian *déva-s*, old Prussian *deiwa-s*, old Irish *dia*. The

\* "Sanskrit Texts," vol. v. p. 33. † "Science of Language," ii. pp. 425 ff.

‡ Bunsen's "Christianity and Mankind," vol. iii. p. 78.

§ "Indis. Alterthums," i. 755.

|| "Grundzüge der Griech. Etymol.," vol. i. pp. 201, 202.

¶ "Griech. Götterlehre," vol. i. pp. 131 f.

\*\* "Deut. Mythol.," vol. i. p. 175.

†† "Les Origines Indo-Européennes," vol. ii. p. 663 ff.

‡‡ Benfey, "Orient und Occident," vol. i. pp. 48, 49, note; Muir's "Sanskrit Texts," v. pp. 118, 119, where the greater part of Benfey's note is translated, and the similar views of M. Michel Bréal stated.

§§ Spiegel, "Fränische Alterthums," p. 436.

{ ||| Grimm, "Deut. Mythol.," vol. i. pp. 77 ff.

¶¶ Müller, "Science of Language," ii. lect. x.

\*\*\* Sct., *deva*, Zend, *daeva*, Pers., *dew*, Lat., *deus*, Lith., *déva-s*, Old Prus., *deiwa-s*, Old Ir., *dia*, Gen., *déi*, Cym., *dev*, Armor., *doué*, Corn., *deu*, Old Nor., *tíva-r*, are certainly cognates, but there is by no means the same certainty as to *θεός*. The current of philological opinion, once strongly in favour of identifying its root with that of *deva* and *deus*, seems now to have set as strongly against it. Bopp ("Compar. Gram.," i. pp. 4 and 15), Lassen ("Indis. Alterthums," i. p. 755), Grimm ("Deut. Mythol.," i. p. 176), Welcker ("Griech. Götterl.," i. p. 131), Pictet ("Les Origines Indo-Europ.," ii. p. 653), Max Müller ("Science of Lang.," ii. pp. 405, 454), make *deva*, *deus*, and *θεός* cognates. But Curtius ("Grundzüge der Griech. Etymol.," vol. i. p. 220, ii. p. 94 ff.), G. Bühler ("Orient und Occident," i. pp. 508 ff.), Mr. Peile ("Introduct. to Greek Etymol."), Fick ("Vergleich. Wörterbuch," pp. 96, 368), hold *θεός* to have no connection with *deva-deus*. Their objections appear to me to be valid. The Greek *θ* and the Latin *d* do not correspond. Curtius is uncertain as to the etymology of *θεός*, but supposes it to be from a root *θεσ*, whence *θεσ-σά-μενοι*, and the Latin *festus*, *festum*,

very existence of such a term is remarkable.\* It indicates that the united Aryans had advanced so far in religious thought as both to form and formulate a conception of God. Names may express perceptions of sense or presentations of imagination, but general terms imply more or less practised powers of comparison and judgment, abstraction and generalization. But why had the general term come into use? In the sphere of theological thought, if the theology be an absolute Monotheism, denominative and appellative will be identical.† The Hebrews, indeed, had a specific name, Jehovah, and a general term, Elohim. But the first, whatever may be said as to its meaning, was introduced because of the growing latitude in the use of the second. In Christian countries, again, where the very idea of God is exclusive, denominative and appellative tend to coalesce. We no longer distinguish between Jehovah and God; to us they are one and the same.

The formation of a term to express God in general seems possible in one of two ways—either by the gradual extension of a name to various objects of the same nature as the one first designated, or by the creation of a new word to express the new conception. Either explanation implies, so far as concerns our present subject, a growing Polytheism, and various things indicate that gods had begun to multiply before the dispersion.

Perhaps, it is perilous to conjecture as to the order Aryan thought and language here followed. But there are some significant facts. The general term, even without the Greek *θεός*, has a wider prevalence than the proper name. The Celts must have been the first, or among the first, to leave the common home, but the several Celtic dialects, Irish, Cymric, Armorican, Cornish, have the cognates of *deva*, but not of *dyaus*.‡ It seems an almost allowable inference that the Aryans had not begun to distinguish between the individual and the general, God and gods, when the earliest departures occurred. Then the Lithuanian has *deva-s*, old Prussian has *deiwa-s*, but neither has preserved the proper name. That *deva* had been undergoing a

*festivus*, &c. Fick derives it from a word *dhaya*, from a root *dhi*, to shine, to look, to be devout ("Vergleich. Wörterb.," pp. 368, 102). If the latter etymology be correct, the word coincides in meaning with *deva-deus*. Then there is a significant and appropriate progress in the meaning of the word. The primary sense is to shine (*scheinen*); then to look at, contemplate (*schauen*) what shines; then finally, what results from the contemplation, to be devout (*andächtig sein*). The difference of root thus only leads back to identity of meaning, while it helps to show how the contemplator became the worshipper.

\* Max Müller, "Hist. Ancient Sans. Lit.," p. 527. "Words like *deva* for 'God' mark more than a secondary stage in the grammar of the Aryan religion."

† The Hebrew prophets knew the power of a single name. Zechariah (xiv. 9) says of the time when the knowledge of the true God shall be universal, "In that day shall there be one Lord and his name one," while nothing was more characteristic of Polytheism than gods like *Διόνυσος πολυώνυμος*, or *Ἰσις μυριώνυμος*.

‡ Pictet, "Les Origines Indo-Europ.," vol. ii. pp. 653, 663.

process of deterioration in very early times is also evident from its complete change of meaning in Zend, where *daeva* is no longer God, but demon. This is all the more significant as the Iranians are representatives of an Aryan monotheistic tendency, and their repudiation of the deity of the *daevas* may be interpreted as their protest against the growing Polytheism. If, then, these facts may be held to indicate the extension of an individual name so as to embrace a genus, the individual must have formed the starting-point. And if the inter-relations of *dyaus* and *deva* be studied, whatever the order of their application to the Divine Being, this aboriginal individualism becomes apparent. They spring from the same root—are branches of a common stem.\* The unity of root indicates unity of thought. If *Dyaus* was first, then a *deva* was a being who had the nature of *Dyaus*, *Dyaus* was *deva*, Ζεὺς ὁ θεός. The qualities perceived in him were the qualities conceived as constitutive and distinctive of a god. If *deva* was first, then *Dyaus* was the *deva par excellence*, the being to whom the qualities held to be divine belonged. Inquiry as to the order in which the words were applied to God may be useless enough, but their common root seems to indicate that the primitive Aryan mind had conceived *Dyaus* and *deva* as ultimately identical; just as the Hebrew—though here the verbal does not indicate the mental connection—identified in his ultimate thinking Jehovah and Elohim.†

The radical connection thus existing between the words may be held as an evidence that a radical connection existed in the Aryan mind between the idea of God and a specific God. However this connection is explained—whether *Dyaus*, or *deva*, or neither, but a thought anterior to both, is made the parent conception—the result is the same, a Theism which we may term individualistic. But now the question rises, What thought lay at the root of both words? The common root, *div*, means, as is well known, to beam, to shine; hence *Dyaus*, resplendent, light-giving Heaven; *Deva*, the bright or shining one. And so the conclusion has often been drawn, the worship of the primitive Aryans was a Nature-worship, ‡ an adoration of the elements, of the phenomena and powers of Nature. Confirmation is found in the Nature-worship so evident in the Vedas, so visible in the background of the Greek mythology. Then, again, Heaven is married to Earth, *Dyaus* to *Prithivi*, *Zeus* to *Hera*; and this mar-

\* The inter-relations of the words and their relation to the common root, *di*, to shine, may be studied as exhibited in Fick, "Vergleich. Wörterbuch," pp. 93—96, and Max Müller, "Science of Language," ii. pp. 449 ff. *Dyaus* seems to have as a word a simpler and more rudimentary structure than *deva*, but simplicity of structure may not always be evidence of priority of use in a given sense.

† Ewald, "Geschichte des Volks Israel," vol. i. p. 138.

‡ Renan, "Hist. des Langues Sémit.," p. 468; Bunsen, "God in History," vol. i. p. 273.

riage, as a French author has told us, "forms the foundation of a hundred mythologies."\* But, beginning with the last, we inquire, Is this marriage a primitive belief, or the creation of a developed mythology? Certainly there is no evidence that Earth is as old a goddess as Heaven is a god—very decided evidence to the contrary. Dyaus was known to almost all the Aryan peoples, but each people, and often the several tribes composing it, had a different name for the Earth-goddess. Prithivi was known to the Indians alone. Zeus, in his several forms, Pelasgian and Hellenic, was one in name and the ultimate elements of his character; but almost every Greek tribe had its own Earth-mother. The place Hera occupies in the Olympian system is given by many of the local worships of Greece to different goddesses; and Homer, in elevating the Hellenic Hera to the throne, has to reduce the old Pelasgic Dione to a mere "lay-figure."† The German Zio, too, has no consort, the Hertha of Tacitus being altogether a local goddess.‡ The separation of the sexes implies an anthropomorphism,§ rudimentary, perhaps, but real; and the marriage of Heaven and Earth, although "the foundation of a hundred mythologies," is built upon the conception that the life in both is akin to, indeed the parent of, the life in man. Since the idea of difference of sex among the gods must precede the idea of marriage, the latter must be a later mythical product than the former, and, as names like Juno and Dione witness, the bright divinity of Heaven may have been sexualized and married to a goddess of Heaven before the mythical faculty in its career of unconscious creation deified Earth and married it to Heaven.|| Developmental coincidence can explain the uniformity of the association, but no theory which assumes it as the common starting-point of the Aryan mythologies can explain the general preservation of the name in the one case and the universal loss of it in the other.

But now we come back to the Nature-worship theory, and ask, What does such a worship mean? The Nature is now limited—excludes Earth. The worshippers turned to Heaven. But it does not follow that because they named God Heaven, they thought Heaven God. It is, perhaps, no longer possible to us to personalize Heaven, but it might have been as impossible to the primitive Aryan to conceive it as impersonal. The belief difficult to the philosophic

\* M. Albert Réville, "Essais de Critique Religieuse," p. 383, quoted in Muir's "Sanskrit Texts," vol. v. p. 24.

† Gladstone, "Juventus Mundi," pp. 198, 238 ff., 261 ff., 264 ff.

‡ "De Germania," 40; Grimm, "Deut. Mythol.," vol. i. 230.

§ Creuzer, "Symbolik und Mythol.," vol. i. p. 24.

|| Even Demeter may have been originally no earth goddess, but Dyāvā Mātā, the Dawn, corresponding to Dyaushpitar, the sky. So M. Müller, "Lectures, Science of Lang.," ii. p. 517. The marriage of Heaven and Earth is too artificial to be a very primitive conception.

man is easy to the imaginative child. The most natural thought to a child-like mind is, as every natural historian of religion witnesses, that Nature is animated—acts by virtue of an immanent life. The Aryan placed the seat of this life in Heaven, worshipped no fetich or idol, but the bright resplendent *Dyaus*. Heaven was to him living—a being capable of feeling and exercising influence, to whom he prayed and offered sacrifices. That primitive man knew what obedience was, strove to shape his life in such a fashion as Heaven might approve, termed the being he worshipped up there *Bhaga*, the Distributor or the Adorable.\* He had not learned to localize the deity upon earth, and hence had no temple—to fear him, and hence had no priest.† The home, or the meadow, or the shadow of a giant oak, like that which stood in old Dodona, or those under whose spreading branches the Germans of Tacitus gathered to worship the invisible Presence,‡ was the temple, and the patriarch of the family was the priest. That worship may be termed a Nature-worship, because the one word was the name of Heaven and of God, but Nature is here only a synonym for God. The Nature was living, and the life in it was to our primitive man divine. Man had not learned to dualize his own being, nor the great being that stood around and above his own. A stranger to the philosophic thought that divides man into body and spirit, and the universe into nature and God, he realized in consciousness the unity of his own personal being, and imagined a like unity in the light- and life-giving *Dyaus*. The glory of the blue and brooding heaven was the glory of the immanent God.

This primitive worship is also sometimes termed a personification of natural forces and objects. It depends very much on what personification means whether the explanation be true or false. Our personification is a conscious act—the investing material things with the character and attributes of living beings. But in no respect whatever was primitive worship personification in this sense. The imagination was not consciously creative. There was no intentional investiture of natural objects with divine powers. That, indeed, would have implied cultured thought and developed belief. Personification involves the idea of person. If man personifies a natural object as a god, he must have the idea of God. A strict Naturalism, without belief in invisible powers, cannot personify—can create a fetich as little as a god. Hence Nature personified can only mean

\* The original meaning of *Bhaga* seems uncertain. Bopp ("Compar. Gram.," p. 1217, note) and Pictet ("Les Origines Indo-Europ.," ii. 654) derive it from a root signifying to worship, to adore, to love; hence *Bhaga*, the adorable being. But Fick ("Vergleich. Wörterbuch," p. 133) derives it from a root signifying to distribute. Hence *Bhaga*, the Distributor ("Zutheiler").

† Pictet, "Les Origines Indo-Europ.," vol. ii. p. 690.

‡ "De Germania," 9; Welcker, "Griech. Götterlehre," vol. 1. p. 202.

Nature conceived as living, as vital with creative and preservative powers. To worship Nature, or natural elements and objects thus conceived, is to worship neither the Nature of material forces and laws known to science, nor the nature of imaginary voices and shapes known to poetry, but the Nature known to the primitive man-child as the body and home of the immanent God.

But there is one element of the Aryan conception of God too characteristic to be overlooked—the element of paternity. He was conceived as Father—father of man. The Indians called him Dyaushpitar. The Greeks invoked Ζεῦ πάτερ—could so little forget this essential attribute of their family deity that they transferred it to the great Olympian, Father of gods and men. The Romans blended name and character in Jupiter. The Germans, though they displaced the ancient Zio, did not forget his fatherhood,\* and so loved the thought of a father-god† as to make the stormful Wodin *Alcater*. This is, perhaps, the characteristic which most distinguishes the Aryan from the Semitic conception of God—the parent, too, of all other differences. Neither as Monotheisms, nor as Polytheisms, do the Semitic religions attribute a fatherly humane character to their gods. Even the Old Testament knows only an abstract ideal fatherhood, which the Hebrews as a nation realize, but the Hebrew as a man almost never does. The Semitic God dwells in inaccessible light—an awful, invisible Presence, before which man must stand uncovered, trembling; but the Aryan God is pre-eminently accessible, loves familiar intercourse, is bound to man by manifold ties of kinship. The majesty of God in an exalted Monotheism, like the Hebrew, is sometimes so conceived as almost to annihilate the free agency and personal being of man; but the Aryan, as a rule, so conceives his Deity as to allow his own freedom of action and personal existence full scope. The explanation may, perhaps, be here found of the Hebrew horror at death, almost hopeless “going down to the grave,” the often-asserted and often-denied silence of the Old Testament as to the immortality of man. So much is certain, whether the Warburtonian or the more orthodox theory be held, the doctrine of a future state occupies a less prominent and less essential place in the religion of the Old Testament than in the Aryan religions in general.‡ The belief in immortality was before Christ more explicit and more general among the Greeks than among the Jews. The conception of God, in the one case, seems to have almost annihilated the conception of man; but in the other, the two conceptions were mutually complementary, God incomplete without man, man without God. Then, while the father in the Aryan religions softens the god, and gives, on the whole, a sunny and cheerful

\* Grimm, “Deut. Mythol.,” vol. i. 178.

† *Ib.*, pp. 20, 149 f.

‡ Ewald, “Geschichte des Volks Israel,” vol. ii. 172 ff.

and sometimes festive character to the worship, the god in the Semitic annihilates the father, and gives to its worship a gloomy, severe, and cruel character, which does not indeed belong to the revealed religion of the Old Testament, but often belongs to the actual religion of the Jews.\* The Aryan loves the gay religious festival, the Semite the frequent and prolonged fast. The Semitic Polytheisms showed very early their fiercer spirit in the place they gave and the necessity they attached to human sacrifices; but the Aryan religions, although perhaps, even in the earliest times not altogether innocent of human sacrifices,† yet entered on their more dreadful phase only after they had fallen under malign influences, home or foreign.‡ The contrast might be pursued to their respective priesthoods, where, indeed, exceptions would be found, but only defining and confirming the rule. These characteristic and fundamental differences in feeling, thought, and worship can be traced to the primary difference in the conception of God. The one class of religions developed themselves from the idea of Divine Fatherhood, but the other class from the idea of Divine Sovereignty severely exercised over a guilty race. The subjective Semite found his God in himself, and offered a worship such as would have been acceptable to him had he been Deity. The objective Aryan found his God without and above him, and rejoiced in a religion as full of light and gladness as the resplendent heaven.

We may now attempt to formulate the primitive Aryan idea of God. We can at once exclude the fancy that it was a fetich or an idol-god, such as the savages of the South-Sea Islands may now worship. The God of our fathers was no ghost of a deceased ancestor seen in feverish dreams. They stood in the primeval home in the highlands of North-Western Asia, looked, as Abraham once did, at the resplendent sun flooding the world with life and light, at the deep, broad, blue heaven, a bosom that enfolded earth, bringing the rain that fertilized their fields and fed their rivers, and the heat that ripened their corn, at the glory its sunlight threw upon the waking, its moonlight upon the sleeping, earth, and at the stars that "globed themselves" in the same boundless Heaven, and went and came and shone so sweetly on man and beast, and they called that far yet near, changing but unchangeable, still but ever-moving, bright yet unconsumed and unconsuming Heaven, *deva*—God. To Aryan man, Heaven and God were one, not a thing but a person, whose *Thou* stood over against his *I*. His life was one, the life above him was

\* Kalisch, "Leviticus," vol. i. pp. 381—416.

† Muir's "Sanskrit Texts," i. p. 355 ff. "Weber Ueber Menschenopfer bei den Indern der Vedischen Zeit. Indis. Streifen," pp. 54 ff.

‡ Pfeiderer, "Die Religion," vol. ii. 128, ascribes the myth of Kronos devouring his own children to Oriental, *i.e.*, Semitic influence. Gladstone, "Address on the Place of Ancient Greece in the Providential Order of the World," pp. 35, 36.

one too. Then, that life was generative, productive, the source of every other life, and so to express his full conception, he called the living Heaven, Diespiter, Dyaushpitar—Heaven-Father.

The primitive form of the Aryan idea of God, so far as it is discoverable, now lies before us. We must now see what light the form can throw upon the genesis of the idea. It certainly shows the theories before examined to be historically untenable. Terror, distempered dreams, fear of the unknown causes of the accidents and destructive phenomena of nature, the desire to propitiate the angry ghosts of ancestors deceased—none of these could have produced the simple, sublime faith of our Aryan man-child. The religion whose earliest form embodies neither terror nor darkness, but a spirit glad and brilliant like the light of Heaven, cannot have risen out of the ignorance and fears of a soul hardly human. The object selected for worship was the sublimest man could perceive, and even the inquirer most inclined to deny spiritual and theistic elements to the first religion, must concede to its Aryan form rare elevation of object and sunniness of aspect, and to the men who held it a force of thought and strength of imagination incompatible with what we know to be the mental and moral condition of savages. The idea formulated in Heaven-Father was no product of the reasoning or reflective consciousness, because the conclusions of the one and the creations of the other are abstract, bodiless, not concrete, embodied, living. There were two real or objective, and two ideal or subjective, factors in the genesis of the idea. The two real were the bright, brooding Heaven and its action in relation to Earth. The two ideal were the conscience and the imagination. The real factors stimulated the action of the ideal. The ideal borrowed the form in which to express themselves from the real. Conscience knew of relation, dependent and obligatory, to Some One. Imagination discovered the Some One on whom the individual and the whole alike depended in the Heaven. Neither faculty could be satisfied with the subjective, each was driven by the law of its own constitution to seek an objective reality. Conscience, so far as it revealed obligation, revealed relation to a being higher than self. Imagination, when it turned its eye to Heaven, beheld there the higher Being, the great soul which directed the varied celestial movements, and created the multitudinous terrestrial lives. Without the conscience, the life the imagination saw would have been simply physical; without the imagination, the relation the conscience revealed would have been purely ideal—the relation of a thinker to his thought, not of one personal being to another. But the being given by the one faculty and the relation given by the other coalesced so as to form that worship of the bright Dyaus, which was our primitive Aryan religion.

These, then, were the two faculties generative of the idea of God,

*i.e.*, from their action and inter-action the primitive religion sprang. Of course, in terming these "the faculties generative of the idea" we do not mean that they acted alone. No faculty can be isolated in action, whatever it may be as an object of thought. We only mean that these, for the time being the governing faculties of the mind, were the two from whose combined instincts and actions the idea of God rose into form. That conscience was a main factor of our Aryan faith is evident, setting aside psychological considerations, from that faith itself. More moral elements can be found, comparatively speaking, in its earlier than in its later forms. The proofs of its Naturalism, as of its Polytheism, are derived from the developed national religions, not from the rudimentary and common faith. But it is certain that some of these grew from a (comparative) Spiritualism into an almost pure Naturalism. It was almost certainly the conflict of the spiritual and sensuous forms that separated the Iranian and Indian branches.\* In the Rig Veda the younger and more physical faith is seen superseding the older and more moral.† Varuna has a "moral elevation and sanctity" of character "far surpassing that attributed to any other Vedic deity."‡ Yet he is seen undergoing a twofold process, one of supersession and another of deterioration, until, in the later Vedic hymns, the God, in his older and nobler character, almost entirely disappears. The God that supersedes him is Indra, a splendid physical figure, no doubt, "borne on a shining golden car with a thousand supports," drawn by "tawny steeds" "with flowing golden manes," hurling his thunder-bolts, drinking the soma-juice, slayer of Vritra, but the moral elements in his character are far fewer and inferior to those in Varuna's.§ Behind the latter the still more ancient *Dyaus* stands, and his character, though shadowy and fragmentary, reveals moral elements transcending the conception of a mere physical deity. In the religion behind the Vedas and Avesta we see the point where mind becomes conscious of a dualism in its faith, and by exclusion of the moral element, the Naturalism of the first is developed, by exclusion of the physical, the Spiritualism of the second. But behind this point stands the ancient and common Aryan faith in which the two elements existed together as matter and form, spirit and letter, not in a consciously apprehended dualism, but in a realized unity. In this oldest religion worship,|| sacrifice,¶ prayer,\*\* and such rudimentary ideas as faith, piety,†† holiness,‡‡ can be discovered, and their

\* Professor Roth, "Zeitschrift der Deut. Morgenl. Gesellschaft," vol. v. ; pp. 76 ff.

† *Ib.* Also Muir, "Sanskrit Texts," vol. v. pp. 116—118, where an epitome is given of Roth's views. ‡ Muir, "Sans. Texts," v. p. 66.

§ See the admirable and exhaustive exhibition of Indra in the fifth volume of Dr. Muir's "Sanskrit Texts," sec. v.

|| Pictet, "Les Origines Indo-Europ.," vol. ii. 690.

¶ *Ib.*, p. 702.

\*\* *Ib.*, p. 699.

†† *Ib.*, p. 696.

‡‡ *Ib.*, p. 694.

existence implies, as the creative faculty, a moral sense. The acquired conscience of Utilitarianism cannot explain these acts and ideas, because they rise with the Aryan people, create, are not created by, its religious experience, are deteriorated rather than improved by certain later developments. The oldest is here the highest. The physical eclipses the moral, the moral does not rise by hardly perceptible gradations from the physical. We require, therefore, a faculty generative of these primary religious acts and ideas, and we have it in conscience. Consciousness and conscience rose together. Mind conscious of self was also mind conscious of obligation. The "I am" and the "I ought" were twins, born at the same moment. But to be conscious of obligation was to be conscious of relation, and so in one and the same act mind was conscious of a self who owed obedience, and a Not-Self to whom the obedience was due.

The idea of God was thus given in the very same act as the idea of self; neither could be said to precede the other. Mind could be mind as little without the consciousness of God as without the consciousness of self. Certain philosophies may have dissolved the first idea as certain others may have dissolved the second, but each idea is alike instinctive, rises by nature, can be suppressed only by art. But we must try now to define the nature of this *πρώτη θεοῦ ἐννοία*. Our ordinary terms are so associated with modern ideas as to be inapplicable to this aboriginal idea. We cannot call it a Monotheism, for as Preller rightly remarks, "Monotheism rests essentially on abstraction and negation,"\* while here the very idea of other gods has not as yet been formed. Schelling terms the primitive faith *relativer monotheismus*,† but this phrase is hardly descriptive and definite enough, is also, perhaps, properly denotive of a Monotheism which admits a number of divine beings as intermediate between God and the world, as contrasted with an absolute Monotheism, which draws the line of a sharp and rigid dualism. Max Müller uses the term *Henotheism*.‡ This is better; but we would prefer, as more intelligible, the terms, individual Theism, or simply Individualism. It is a Theism, as opposed to Naturalism, in so far as it makes Dyaus conscious, creative, moral. It is an individual Theism, as opposed to an abstract and exclusive Monotheism, on the one hand, and a Polytheism, on the other, in so far as it affirms God is, but neither that there are or are not other gods. These, indeed, were questions the primitive mind could neither raise nor answer. Centuries of unconscious creation were needed to raise the one—centuries of conscious reflection to raise the other.

II. We come now to the development of the idea. It was in its earliest form essentially capable of evolution. A pure Monotheism or

\* Quoted in Welcker, "Griech. Götterlehre," iii. p. xiv.

† "Philos. der Mythol.," i. 126.

‡ "Chips from a German Workshop," vol. i. p. 355.

an actual Polytheism is, each in its own way, an ultimate form, which may be developed as to its accidents, but not as to its essence. Revolution must precede further evolution. But the primitive idea was germinal, held in it many evolutionary possibilities, was a point from which the human mind could start, but at which it could not permanently stand. Had reason been cultivated, or had an instinct anticipated its action, the evolution might have been to an abstract and exclusive Monotheism; but the primitive Aryan had neither a cultured reason nor a monotheistic instinct. Of the faculties generative of the idea, conscience was unifying, demanded an individual deity, demanded no more; but the imagination was multiplicative. Then, the very conception of a life immanent in the luminous and impregnating Heaven strengthened the multiplying as opposed to the unifying tendency. The variety and contrasts of Nature helped the imagination to individualize the parts. A different spirit seems to animate the calm, smiling Heaven from what animates a heaven tempestuous and thundering. Night seems distinct from day—the brilliant, beneficent spirit of the one from the revealing yet enfolding, distant yet near, spirit of the other. So the imagination, which had discerned and localized the God conscience demanded, pursued its creative career, not now in obedience to the moral faculty, but only to its own impulses. And so its creations graduated to Naturalism, became more physical, less moral—simple transcripts of the phenomena and aspects of Nature. The Indian Varuna, the Greek Uranos, marks the first step of the evolution to Naturalism. The conceptions so agree as to warrant the inference that the deification had begun before the Greeks left for Europe, but so differ as to imply that the creation was recent, the character of the new deity was still fluid, unfixed.\* He represented the covering, enfolding Night-Heaven, as opposed to the luminous Dyaus. The two had seemed so different as to suggest distinct individuality; two aspects of the same object were apprehended as two beings. When next comparison can be instituted, a new deity stands beside Varuna—Mitra, the God of Light.† The creation of the one had necessitated the creation of the other; deified Night was incomplete without deified Day. But though the conceptions graduate to Naturalism, they are not yet purely natural—creations, indeed, of the imagination, but of it as still influenced by the moral faculty.

But the conscience also acted indirectly on what we may term, after Schelling, the theogonic process.‡ In prompting to worship, it furnished objects that could be personalized. The earliest worship was, indeed, simple, but its tendency was to multiply acts and

\* Muir, "Sanskrit Texts," vol. v. p. 76.

† Spiegel, "Eränische Alterthumsk.," p. 434.

‡ "Philos. der Mythol.," vol. i. pp. 193, 204.

ceremonies. The first priests were the fathers of the family ; but as life became more toilsome and occupied, the father was fain to delegate his priestly office to another. The sense of faults and sins, too, began to affect the worshipper, to force him to distinguish between secular and sacred, until he came to think that the man acceptable to God must be a man divorced from secular and devoted to sacred things. Hence, a professional priesthood was formed, and, as a matter of course, forms of worship increased. Each reacted on the other. The worship became more elaborate as the priesthood became more professional, and the ritual the priest developed the imagination idealized—the form became to it the matter of religion. What could reveal deity was deified. What made the worshipper accepted, forgiven, was idealized into the acceptor, the forgiver ; and hence, sacerdotal deities were evolved alongside the natural. The same period that witnessed the creation of Varuna-Mitra witnessed also the creation of Soma. The juice of the plant used in sacrifice to God became itself a god, just as to a certain section of Christians the symbol of Christ's sacrifice has become the sacrifice itself.

The theogonic process thus operates at the beginning in two distinct spheres—the natural and the sacerdotal. Its action is influenced in the one by geographical conditions, in the other by social and political. The natural objects deified are borrowed from the Nature presented to the imagination. It was only after the Indians had descended into the hot plains of India, lived under its bright, burning sky, wearied and prayed for softening and cooling rain, that Indra was created. It was up among the mountains of Kashmir, where frequent tempests rage, that the blustering and furious Rudra took his rise.\* The Germans, wandering under the cloudy and tempestuous skies of the north, forgot the bright face of Zio, and worshipped the stormful Wodin and the thundering Thor ; but the Greeks, under their sunny sky, and in their land of many mountains, and rivers, and islands, washed by the waves of the sparkling *Ægean*, remembered Zeus, and called around him innumerable bright deities of mountain, and river, and sea. Geographical conditions thus very much determined the character and number of the natural deities. A land of severe climate and uniform scenery could not have the wealth of mythical gods and legends natural to a beautiful and varied land like Greece. The Vedic natural deities but embody the splendour of Indian nature ; but the rough, yet kindly, German gods reproduce the boisterous, yet warm-hearted, Fatherland.

Political and social conditions in India favoured the growth there of a sacerdotal caste, and that was the Aryan land pre-eminent in sacerdotal deities. The struggles, conquests, and changes that issued in the rise of the Brahmans do not concern us meanwhile, but their

\* Weber, quoted in Muir's "Sanskrit Texts," vol. iv. p. 335.

rise indicates profound religious convictions. It dates from the Iranian and Indian unity, and many things prove that to have been a period of extraordinary spiritual fervour and growth. The inner and moral forces then active the Iranians carried away, but the Indians the outer and formal. The genius of each people took thus a different direction—the one tended to develop the spiritual, the other the external, side of religion. The most extreme sacerdotalism is the least spiritual. It changes the form into the matter of religion—augments and emphasizes it. Hence from the separation, when its moral spirit departed with the Iranians, the sacerdotalism of India increases. The very natural deities have more or less a sacerdotal character. Indra loves the soma-juice, which he “drinks like a thirsty stag,” is thereby exhilarated and propitiated.\* Agni is the sacrificial fire deified, and so is the mediator between gods and men, “the priest of the gods,” “commissioned by gods and men to maintain their mutual communications.”† Brahmanaspati is an “impersonation of the power of devotion,” “a deity in whom the action of the worshipper upon the gods is personified.”‡ He is sometimes the representative of Indra, sometimes of Agni, the idealizing faculty halting uncertain as it were between a new creation or the sublimation of an old.§ The imagination which found so much to deify in the sacerdotalism of India, was less successful in the same sphere in other Aryan countries. Greeks and Germans, Latins and Celts, held the instruments of worship to be sacred but not divine. Oaks and groves were believed to be the haunts of deities, sacrifices were thought to persuade the gods, certain ceremonies and symbols to have peculiar sanctity, but without the necessary social conditions the act of deification was impossible.

The mythical faculty pursued in each sphere a different course—descended in the one, ascended in the other. Thus in the Rig Veda, where Naturalism stands in its purest form, we have as the background and starting-points two conceptions—Heaven as luminous, Dyaus; then as immense, boundless, Aditi.|| The dissolution of Aditi into the Adityas yields a number of deities, each partly natural, partly spiritual—as the first associated with the greater phenomena of Nature, as the second representatives of functions like government, or virtues like the mercy that forgives. Then single objects are deified, like the sun as Surya or Savitri, or the dawn like Ushas, or the storm as the Maruts. The process goes on descending till rivers like the Sarasvati and Yamuna, and mountains like the Himalaya, are deified. But the theogonic process in the sacerdotal sphere begins with the

\* Muir's “Sanskrit Texts,” vol. v. pp. 88 ff.

† *Ib.*, pp. 199 ff.; Lassen, “*Indis. Alterthumsk.*,” vol. i. p. 760.

‡ Professor Roth, quoted in Muir's “*Sans. Texts.*,” vol. v. pp. 272 ff.

§ Muir, *ib.*, p. 281.

|| Professor Roth, “*Zeitschrift der Morgenländ Gesells.*,” vol. vi. pp. 68 ff.

Soma-juice, ascends through Agni and Brahmanaspati, till it culminates in Brahma, the supreme deity. This difference in the order of evolution is instructive. The first shows how an exalted idea has been materialized and depraved, the second how a low idea can be, by abstraction and negation, raised and rarified till it becomes the highest deity of speculation, but not a god to be worshipped. The living god which the process of degradation ruins the process of elevation cannot restore.

But now, while this double theogonic process goes on, exhausting the natural and sacerdotal objects it has to deify, the necessary evolution of the human mind leads to another theogonic process, also double, and starting from two opposite sides. This process, as it affects the gods, is anthropomorphism; as it affects man, apotheosis. The first, by ascribing human forms and relations to the gods, prepares the way for the second, the deification of man. The one springs from the worship, the other from the unconscious poetry, of a people. Every god who is the object of worship is conceived more or less under human forms. The feelings, relations, and acts attributed to him, the influences brought to bear upon him in prayer and sacrifice, are the results or expressions of an anthropomorphic conception. Thus, as worship becomes more elaborate and important, the gods become more manlike. Sacrifices persuade them as gifts persuade men. The soma-juice, or the wine of the libation, exhilarates gods as well as men. They are pleased with those who worship them, displeased with those who do not. So essential is this anthropomorphic conception to worship, that the pure Monotheism of the Hebrews could not, when made the basis of an actual religion, dispense with it. It forms the foundation of every successive Polytheism, changes the character, modifies the history and relations, of every deity, natural or sacerdotal. When the anthropomorphic process is well advanced, apotheosis begins. Gods have been changed into the similitude of men, men can now be changed into the similitude of gods. The tendency to apotheosize was always strong in Aryan man. Love of the fathers has ever been one of his characteristics. The heroic age lay behind, and the fathers were the heroes. Indian and Teuton, Greek and Latin, alike revered their ancestors, and the unconscious poetry of the popular mind transformed the splendid figures of the past into minor deities. The primitive Aryan faith, which attributed paternity to God, favoured the apotheosis of the fathers. The first men were the sons of Dyaushpitar—partook of his divine nature—were divine. The anthropomorphic process introduced human elements into the idea of God; apotheosis introduced divine elements into the idea of man. Each widened the circle of Polytheism, allowed the imagination to deify men as easily as it had once deified natural and sacerdotal

objects. The idea had ceased to be exclusive and become comprehensive. The difficulty was now to determine not what was, but what was not, divine. And at this very point the mythical faculty became exhausted. It was crushed beneath the multitude of its own creations, died because it had driven the idea with which it started into regions where it could no longer live.


But at the point where creation ends combination begins. The gods of different tribes and nations become blended together. Foreign worships are naturalized, and their legends adapted to their new homes. The religion of the Indian aborigines affected, modified, that of the Aryans—certain gods of the soil conquered the conquerors. Simple as was the German mythology, it was an amalgam of elements derived from various sources. And every one knows how many mythologies and worships coalesced in those of Greece and Rome. The age of combination culminates in the epics. They are a conscious effort to weave into historical harmony and form the mythical creations of the past. The poet finds the myths of conquering and conquered peoples, aborigines and immigrants, legends native and foreign, floating side by side, and these he shapes into the story he sings. The epic is thus a real, though perhaps unintentional, attempt to systematize mythology, so to combine and co-ordinate the conflicting positions and claims of the gods as to produce a credible and organized Polytheism.

But since the epic is a product of the reflective consciousness, since it attempts to combine heterogeneous elements into a homogeneous system, it marks the beginning of a new stage in the development of the idea of God—the reflective. The mythical faculty has exhausted its resources, ended its career, and further multiplication is now impossible. The reflective faculty now comes forward to develop the idea in another direction—that of unity. It does not begin by denying, but by assuming, the truth of the mythical creations. The gods are all true, have each their place and work in the universe. But it seeks behind and above the gods an abstract unifying principle, ascribing to it supreme power even over the gods. Characteristically the Indians developed their sacerdotal deity Brahmanaspati into Brahṃā, the Supreme God, then into Brahṃā, the Universal Soul; and quite as characteristically Greek thought started on its unifying course from *Moîpa*, the Fate that controlled gods as well as men. The same dread power stands behind the German gods, Ragnarökr \* and works their destruction. These are the first steps of the reflective consciousness towards unity, more or less rude, more or less successful, according to the people's degree of culture and faculty of abstraction.

This touches a subject which cannot be even glanced at here and

\* Pfeleiderer, "Die Religion," ii. p. 101; Grimm, "Deut. Mythol.," p. 774.





## MR. DARWIN'S CRITICS.

1. *Contributions to the Theory of Natural Selection.* By A. R. WALLACE. 1870.
2. *The Genesis of Species.* By ST. G. MIVART, F.R.S. Second Edition. 1871.
3. *Darwin's Descent of Man.* *Quarterly Review.* July, 1871.

THE gradual lapse of time has now separated us by more than a decade from the date of the publication of the "Origin of Species"—and whatever may be thought or said about Mr. Darwin's doctrines, or the manner in which he has propounded them, this much is certain, that, in a dozen years, the "Origin of Species" has worked as complete a revolution in biological science as the "Principia" did in astronomy—and it has done so, because, in the words of Helmholtz, it contains "an essentially new creative thought."\*

And as time has slipped by, a happy change has come over Mr. Darwin's critics. The mixture of ignorance and insolence which, at first, characterised a large proportion of the attacks with which he was assailed, is no longer the sad distinction of anti-Darwinian criticism. Instead of abusive nonsense, which merely discredited its writers, we read essays, which are, at worst, more or less intelligent and appreciative; while, sometimes, like that which appeared in the *North British Review* for 1867, they have a real and permanent value.

The several publications of Mr. Wallace and Mr. Mivart contain discussions of some of Mr. Darwin's views, which are worthy of particular attention, not only on account of the acknowledged scientific competence of these writers, but because they exhibit an attention to

\* Helmholtz: Ueber das Ziel und die Fortschritte der Naturwissenschaft. Eröffnungsrede für die Naturforscherversammlung zu Innsbruck. 1869.

those philosophical questions which underlie all physical science, which is as rare as it is needful. And the same may be said of an article in the *Quarterly Review* for July 1871, the comparison of which with an article in the same Review for July, 1860, is perhaps the best evidence which can be brought forward of the change which has taken place in public opinion on "Darwinism."

The *Quarterly Reviewer* admits "the certainty of the action of natural selection" (p. 49); and further allows that there is an *a priori* probability in favour of the evolution of man from some lower animal form, if these lower animal forms themselves have arisen by evolution.

Mr. Wallace and Mr. Mivart go much further than this. They are as stout believers in evolution as Mr. Darwin himself; but Mr. Wallace denies that man can have been evolved from a lower animal by that process of natural selection which he, with Mr. Darwin, holds to have been sufficient for the evolution of all animals below man; while Mr. Mivart, admitting that natural selection has been one of the conditions of the evolution of the animals below man, maintains that natural selection must, even in their case, have been supplemented by "some other cause"—of the nature of which, unfortunately, he does not give us any idea. Thus Mr. Mivart is less of a Darwinian than Mr. Wallace, for he has less faith in the power of natural selection. But he is more of an evolutionist than Mr. Wallace, because Mr. Wallace thinks it necessary to call in an intelligent agent—a sort of supernatural Sir John Sebright—to produce even the animal frame of man; while Mr. Mivart requires no Divine assistance till he comes to man's soul.

Thus there is a considerable divergence between Mr. Wallace and Mr. Mivart. On the other hand, there are some curious similarities between Mr. Mivart and the *Quarterly Reviewer*, and these are sometimes so close, that, if Mr. Mivart thought it worth while, I think he might make out a good case of plagiarism against the Reviewer, who studiously abstains from quoting him.

Both the Reviewer and Mr. Mivart reproach Mr. Darwin with being, "like so many other physicists," entangled in a radically false metaphysical system, and with setting at naught the first principles of both philosophy and religion. Both enlarge upon the necessity of a sound philosophical basis, and both, I venture to add, make a conspicuous exhibition of its absence. The *Quarterly Reviewer* believes that man "differs more from an elephant or a gorilla than do these from the dust of the earth on which they tread," and Mr. Mivart has expressed the opinion that there is more difference between man and an ape than there is between an ape and a piece of granite.\*

\* See the *Tablet* for March 11, 1871.

And even when Mr. Mivart trips in a matter of anatomy, and creates a difficulty for Mr. Darwin out of a supposed close similarity between the eyes of fishes and cephalopods, which (as Gegenbaur and others have clearly shown) does not exist (p. 86), the Quarterly Reviewer adopts the argument without hesitation (p. 66).

There is another important point, however, in which it is hard to say whether Mr. Mivart diverges from the Quarterly Reviewer or not.

The Reviewer declares that Mr. Darwin has, "with needless opposition, set at nought the first principles of both philosophy and religion" (p. 90).

It looks, at first, as if this meant, that Mr. Darwin's views being false, the opposition to "religion" which flows from them must be needless. But I suspect this is not the right view of the meaning of the passage, as Mr. Mivart, from whom the Quarterly Reviewer plainly draws so much inspiration, tells us that "the consequences which have been drawn from evolution, whether exclusively Darwinian or not, to the prejudice of religion, by no means follow from it, and are in fact illegitimate" (p. 5).

I may assume, then, that the Quarterly Reviewer and Mr. Mivart admit that there is no necessary opposition between "evolution, whether exclusively Darwinian or not," and religion. But then, what do they mean by this last much-abused term? On this point the Quarterly Reviewer is silent. Mr. Mivart, on the contrary, is perfectly explicit, and the whole tenor of his remarks leaves no doubt that by "religion" he means theology; and by theology, that particular variety of the great Proteus, which is expounded by the doctors of the Roman Catholic Church, and held by the members of that religious community to be the sole form of absolute truth and of saving faith.

According to Mr. Mivart, the greatest and most orthodox authorities upon matters of Catholic doctrine agree in distinctly asserting "derivative creation" or evolution; "and thus their teachings harmonize with all that modern science can possibly require" (p. 305).

I confess that this bold assertion interested me more than anything else in Mr. Mivart's book. What little knowledge I possessed of Catholic doctrine, and of the influence exerted by Catholic authority in former times, had not led me to expect that modern science was likely to find a warm welcome within the pale of the greatest and most consistent of theological organizations.

And my astonishment reached its climax when I found Mr. Mivart citing Father Suarez as his chief witness in favour of the scientific freedom enjoyed by Catholics—the popular repute of that learned theologian and subtle casuist not being such as make his works a likely place of refuge for liberality of thought. But in

these days, when Judas Iscariot and Robespierre, Henry VIII., and Catiline, have all been shown to be men of admirable virtue, far in advance of their age, and consequently the victims of vulgar prejudice, it was obviously possible that Jesuit Suarez might be in like case. And, spurred by Mr. Mivart's unhesitating declaration, I hastened to acquaint myself with such of the works of the great Catholic divine as bore upon the question, hoping, not merely to acquaint myself with the true teachings of the infallible Church, and free myself of an unjust prejudice; but, haply, to enable myself, at a pinch, to put some Protestant bibliolater to shame, by the bright example of Catholic freedom from the trammels of verbal inspiration.

I regret to say that my anticipations have been cruelly disappointed. But the extent to which my hopes have been crushed can only be fully appreciated by citing, in the first place, those passages of Mr. Mivart's work by which they were excited. In his introductory chapter I find the following passages:—

"The prevalence of this theory [of evolution] need alarm no one, for it is, without any doubt, perfectly consistent with the strictest and most orthodox Christian\* theology" (p. 5).

"Mr. Darwin and others may perhaps be excused if they have not devoted much time to the study of Christian philosophy; but they have no right to assume or accept, without careful examination, as an unquestioned fact, that in that philosophy there is a necessary antagonism between the two ideas 'creation' and 'evolution,' as applied to organic forms.

"It is notorious and patent to all who choose to seek, that many distinguished Christian thinkers have accepted, and do accept, both ideas, *i.e.*, both 'creation' and 'evolution.'

"As much as ten years ago an eminently Christian writer observed: 'The creationist theory does not necessitate the perpetual search after manifestations of miraculous power and perpetual "catastrophes." Creation is not a miraculous interference with the laws of nature, but the very institution of those laws. Law and regularity, not arbitrary intervention, was the patristic ideal of creation. With this notion they admitted, without difficulty, the most surprising origin of living creatures, provided it took place by *law*. They held that when God said, "Let the waters produce," "Let the earth produce," He conferred forces on the elements of earth and water, which enabled them naturally to produce the various species of organic beings. This power, they thought, remains attached to the elements throughout all time.' The same writer quotes St.

\* It should be observed that Mr. Mivart employs the term "Christian" as if it were the equivalent of "Catholic."

Augustin and St. Thomas Aquinas, to the effect that, 'in the institution of nature, we do not look for miracles, but for the laws of nature.' And, again, St. Basil speaks of the continued operation of natural laws in the production of all organisms.

"So much for the writers of early and mediæval times. As to the present day, the author can confidently affirm that there are many as well versed in theology as Mr. Darwin is in his own department of natural knowledge, who would not be disturbed by the thorough demonstration of his theory. Nay, they would not even be in the least painfully affected at witnessing the generation of animals of complex organization by the skilful artificial arrangement of natural forces, and the production, in the future, of a fish by means analogous to those by which we now produce urea.

"And this because they know that the possibility of such phenomena, though by no means actually foreseen, has yet been fully provided for in the old philosophy centuries before Darwin, or even centuries before Bacon, and that their place in the system can be at once assigned them without even disturbing its order or marring its harmony.

"Moreover, the old tradition in this respect has never been abandoned, however much it may have been ignored or neglected by some modern writers. In proof of this, it may be observed that perhaps no post-mediæval theologian has a wider reception amongst Christians throughout the world than Suarez, who has a separate section \* in opposition to those who maintain the distinct creation of the various kinds—or substantial forms—of organic life" (pp. 19—21).

Still more distinctly does Mr. Mivart express himself, in the same sense, in his last chapter, entitled "Theology and Evolution" (pp. 302—5).

"It appears, then, that Christian thinkers are perfectly free to accept the general evolution theory. But are there any theological authorities to justify this view of the matter?

"Now, considering how extremely recent are these biological speculations, it might hardly be expected *a priori* that writers of earlier ages should have given expression to doctrines harmonizing in any degree with such very modern views; nevertheless, this is certainly the case, and it would be easy to give numerous examples. It will be better, however, to cite one or two authorities of weight. Perhaps no writer of the earlier Christian ages could be quoted whose authority is more generally recognised than that of St. Augustin. The same may be said of the mediæval period for St. Thomas Aquinas: and since the movement of Luther, Suarez may

\* Suarez, *Metaphysica*. Edition Vivés. Paris, 1868, vol. i. Disputat, xv. § 2.

be taken as an authority, widely venerated, and one whose orthodoxy has never been questioned.

"It must be borne in mind that for a considerable time even after the last of these writers no one had disputed the generally received belief as to the small age of the world, or at least of the kinds of animals and plants inhabiting it. It becomes, therefore, much more striking if views formed under such a condition of opinion are found to harmonize with modern ideas concerning 'Creation' and organic Life.

"Now St. Augustin insists in a very remarkable manner on the merely derivative sense in which God's creation of organic forms is to be understood; that is, that God created them by conferring on the material world the power to evolve them under suitable conditions."

Mr. Mivart then cites certain passages from St. Augustin, St. Thomas Aquinas, and Cornelius à Lapide, and finally adds;—

"As to Suarez, it will be enough to refer to Disp. xv. sec. 2, No. 9, p. 508, t. i. edition Vivés, Paris; also No. 13—15. Many other references to the same effect could easily be given, but these may suffice.

"It is then evident that ancient and most venerable theological authorities distinctly assert *derivative* creation, and thus their teachings harmonize with all that modern science can possibly require."

It will be observed that Mr. Mivart refers solely to Suarez's fifteenth Disputation, though he adds, "Many other references to the same effect could easily be given." I shall look anxiously for these references in the third edition of the "*Genesis of Species*." For the present, all I can say is, that I have sought in vain, either in the fifteenth Disputation, or elsewhere, for any passage in Suarez's writings which, in the slightest degree, bears out Mr. Mivart's views as to his opinions.\*

The title of this fifteenth Disputation is "*De causa formali substantiali*," and the second section of that Disputation (to which Mr. Mivart refers) is headed, "*Quomodo possit forma substantialis fieri in materia et ex materia?*"

The problem which Suarez discusses in this place may be popularly stated thus: According to the scholastic philosophy every natural body has two components—the one its "*matter*" (*materia prima*), the other its "*substantial form*" (*forma substantialis*). Of these the matter is everywhere the same, the matter of one body being indistinguishable from the matter of any other body. That which differentiates any one natural body from all others is its substantial form, which inheres in the matter of that body, as the

\* The edition of Suarez's "*Disputationes*" from which the following citations are given, is Bireckmann's, in two volumes folio, and is dated 1630.

human soul inheres in the matter of the frame of man, and is the source of all the activities and other properties of the body.

Thus, says Suarez, if water is heated, and the source of heat is then removed, it cools again. The reason of this is that there is a certain "*intimius principium*" in the water, which brings it back to the cool condition when the external impediment to the existence of that condition is removed. This *intimius principium* is the "substantial form" of the water. And the substantial form of the water is not only the cause (*radix*) of the coolness of the water, but also of its moisture, of its density, and of all its other properties.

It will thus be seen that "substantial forms" play nearly the same part in the scholastic philosophy as "forces" do in modern science; the general tendency of modern thought being to conceive all bodies as resolvable into material particles and forces, in virtue of which last these particles assume those dispositions and exercise those powers which are characteristic of each particular kind of matter.

But the schoolmen distinguished two kinds of substantial forms, the one spiritual and the other material. The former division is represented by the human soul, the *anima rationalis*; and they affirm as a matter, not merely of reason, but of faith, that every human soul is created out of nothing, and by this act of creation is endowed with the power of existing for all eternity, apart from the *materia prima* of which the corporeal frame of man is composed. And the *anima rationalis*, once united with the *materia prima* of the body, becomes its substantial form, and is the source of all the powers and faculties of man—of all the vital and sensitive phenomena which he exhibits—just as the substantial form of water is the source of all its qualities.

The "material substantial forms" are those which inform all other natural bodies except that of man; and the object of Suarez in the present Disputation, is to show that the axiom "*ex nihilo nihil fit*," though not true of the substantial form of man, is true of the substantial forms of all other bodies, the endless mutations of which constitute the ordinary course of nature. The origin of the difficulty which he discusses is easily comprehensible. Suppose a piece of bright iron to be exposed to the air. The existence of the iron depends on the presence within it of a substantial form, which is the cause of its properties, *e.g.*, brightness, hardness, weight. But, by degrees, the iron becomes converted into a mass of rust, which is dull, and soft, and light, and, in all other respects, is quite different from the iron. As, in the scholastic view, this difference is due to the rust being informed by a new substantial form, the grave problem arises, how did this new substantial form come into being? Has it been created? or has it arisen by the power of natural causation? If the former hypothesis is correct, then the axiom, "*ex nihilo nihil fit*," is

false, even in relation to the ordinary course of nature, seeing that such mutations of matter as imply the continual origin of new substantial forms are occurring every moment. But the harmonization of Aristotle with theology was as dear to the schoolmen, as the smoothing down the differences between Moses and science is to our Broad Churchmen, and they were proportionably unwilling to contradict one of Aristotle's fundamental propositions. Nor was their objection to flying in the face of the Stagirite likely to be lessened by the fact that such flight landed them in flat Pantheism.

So Father Suarez fights stoutly for the second hypothesis; and I quote the principal part of his argumentation as an exquisite specimen of that speech which is a "darkening of counsel."

"13. Secundo de omnibus aliis formis substantialibus [sc. materialibus] dicendum est non fieri proprie ex nihilo, sed ex potentia præjacentis materiæ educi: ideoque in effectione harum formarum nil fieri contra illud axioma, *Ex nihilo nihil fit*, si recte intelligatur. Hæc assertio sumitur ex Aristotele 1. Physicorum per totum et libro 7. Metaphys. et ex aliis authoribus, quos statim referam. Et declaratur breviter, nam fieri ex nihilo duo dicit, unum est fieri absolute et simpliciter, aliud est quod talis effectio fit ex nihilo. Primum propriè dicitur de re subsistente, quia ejus est fieri, cujus est esse: id autem propriè quod subsistit et habet esse; nam quod alteri adjacet, potius est quo aliud est. Ex hac ergo parte, formæ substantiales materiales non fiunt ex nihilo, quia propriè non fiunt. Atque hanc rationem reddit Divus Thomas 1. parte, quæstione 45, articulo 8. et quæstione 90. articulo 2. et ex dicendis magis explicabitur. Sumendo ergo ipsum *fieri* in hac proprietate et rigore, sic fieri ex nihilo est fieri secundum se totum, id est nulla sui parte præsupposita, ex qua fiat. Et hac ratione res naturales dum de novo fiunt, non fiunt ex nihilo, quia fiunt ex præsupposita materia, ex qua componuntur, et ita non fiunt, secundum se totæ, sed secundum aliquid sui. Formæ autem harum rerum, quamvis revera totam suam entitatem de novo accipiant, quam antea non habebant, quia vero ipsæ non fiunt, ut dictum est, ideo neque ex nihilo fiunt. Attamen, quia latiori modo sumendo verbum illud *fieri*, negari non potest: quin forma facta sit, eo modo quo nunc est, et antea non erat, ut etiam probat ratio dubitandi posita in principio sectionis, ideo addendum est, sumpto *fieri* in hac amplitudine, fieri ex nihilo non tamen negare habitudinem materialis causæ intrinsece componentis id quod fit, sed etiam habitudinem causæ materialis per se causantis et sustentantis formam quæ fit, seu confit. Diximus enim in superioribus materiam et esse causam compositi et formæ dependentis ab illa: ut res ergo dicatur ex nihilo fieri uterque modus causalitatis negari debet; et eodem sensu accipiendum est illud axioma, ut sit verum: *Ex nihilo nihil fit*, scilicet virtute agentis naturalis et finiti nihil fieri, nisi ex præsupposito subjecto per se concurrente, et ad compositum et ad formam, si utrumque suo modo ab eodem agente fiat. Ex his ergo rectè concluditur, formas substantiales materiales non fieri ex nihilo, quia fiunt ex materia, quæ in suo genere per se concurrat, et influit ad esse, et fieri talium formarum; quia, sicut esse non possunt nisi affixæ materiæ, à qua sustententur in esse: ita nec fieri possunt, nisi earum effectio et penetratio in eadem materia sustentetur. Et hæc est propria et per se differentia inter effectiorem ex nihilo, et ex aliquo, propter quam, ut infra ostendemus, prior modus efficiendi superat vim finitam naturalem agentium, non vero posterior,

"14. Ex his etiam constat, proprie de his formis dici non creari, sed educi de potentia materiæ." \*

If I may venture to interpret these hard sayings, Suarez conceives that the evolution of substantial forms in the ordinary course of nature, is conditioned not only by the existence of the *materia prima*, but also by a certain "concurrence and influence" which that *materia* exerts; and every new substantial form being thus conditioned, and in part, at any rate, caused, by a pre-existing something, cannot be said to be created out of nothing.

But as the whole tenor of the context shows, Suarez applies this argumentation merely to the evolution of material substantial forms in the ordinary course of nature. How the substantial forms of animals and plants primarily originated, is a question to which, so far as I am able to discover, he does not so much as allude in his "Metaphysical Disputations." Nor was there any necessity that he should do so, inasmuch as he has devoted a separate treatise of considerable bulk to the discussion of all the problems which arise out of the account of the creation which is given in the Book of Genesis. And it is a matter of wonderment to me that Mr. Mivart, who somewhat sharply reproves "Mr. Darwin and others" for not acquainting themselves with the true teachings of his Church, should allow himself to be indebted to a heretic like myself for a knowledge of the existence of that "Tractatus de opere sex dierum," † in which the learned Father, of whom he justly speaks, as "an authority widely venerated, and whose orthodoxy has never been questioned," directly opposes all those opinions, for which Mr. Mivart claims the shelter of his authority.

In the tenth and eleventh chapters of the first book of this treatise, Suarez inquires in what sense the word "day," as employed in the first chapter of Genesis, is to be taken. He discusses the views of Philo and of Augustin on this question, and rejects them. He suggests that the approval of their allegorizing interpretations by St. Thomas Aquinas, merely arose out of St. Thomas's modesty, and his desire not to seem openly to controvert St. Augustin—"voluisse Divus Thomas pro sua modestia subterfugere vim argumenti potius quam aperte Augustinum inconstantiae arguere."

Finally, Suarez decides that the writer of Genesis meant that the term "day" should be taken in its natural sense; and he winds up the discussion with the very just and natural remark that "it is not probable that God, in inspiring Moses to write a history of the

\* Suarez, *l. c.* Dispu., xv. § ii.

† Tractatus de opere sex Dierum, seu de Universi Creatione, quatenus sex diebus perfecta esse, in libro Genesis cap. i. refertur, et præsertim de productione hominis in statu innocentie. Ed. Birckmann. 1622.

Creation which was to be believed by ordinary people, would have made him use language, the true meaning of which it is hard to discover, and still harder to believe.\*

And in chapter xii. 3, Suarez further observes:—

“Ratio enim retinendi veram significationem diei naturalis est illa communis, quod verba Scripturæ non sunt ad metaphoras transferenda, nisi vel necessitas cogit, vel ex ipsa scriptura constet, et maxime in historica narratione et ad instructionem fidei pertinente: sed hæc ratio non minus cogit ad intelligendum propriè dierum numerum, quam diei qualitatem, QUIA NON MINUS UNO MODO QUAM ALIO DESTRUITUR SINCERITAS, IMO ET VERITAS HISTORIÆ. Secundo hoc valde confirmant alia Scripturæ loca, in quibus hi sex dies tanquam veri, et inter se distincti commemorantur, ut Exod. 20 dicitur, *Sex diebus operabis et facies omnia opera tua, septimo autem die Sabbatum Domini Dei tui est*. Et infra: *Sex enim diebus fecit Dominus celum et terram et mare et omnia quæ in eis sunt*, et idem repetitur in cap. 31. In quibus locis sermonis proprietas colligi potest tum ex æquiparatione, nam cum dicitur: *sex diebus operabis*, propeissimè intelligitur: tum quia non est verisimile, potuisse populum intelligere verba illa in alio sensu, et è contrario incredibile est, Deum in suis præceptis tradendis illis verbis ad populum fuisse loquutum, quibus deciperetur, falsum sensum concipiendo, si Deus non per sex veros dies opera sua fecisset.”

These passages leave no doubt that this great doctor of the Catholic Church, of unchallenged authority and unspotted orthodoxy, not only declares it to be Catholic doctrine that the work of creation took place in the space of six natural days; but that he warmly repudiates, as inconsistent with our knowledge of the divine attributes, the supposition that the language which Catholic faith requires the believer to hold that God inspired, was used in any other sense than that which He knew it would convey to the minds of those to whom it was addressed.

And I think that in this repudiation Father Suarez will have the sympathy of every man of common uprightness, to whom it is certainly “incredible” that the Almighty should have acted in a manner which he would esteem dishonest and base in a man.

But the belief that the universe was created in six natural days is hopelessly inconsistent with the doctrine of evolution, in so far as it applies to the stars and planetary bodies; and it can be made to agree with a belief in the evolution of living beings only by the supposition that the plants and animals, which are said to have been created on the third, fifth, and six days, were merely the primordial forms, or rudiments, out of which existing plants and animals have been evolved; so that, on these days, plants and animals were not created actually, but only potentially.

\* “Propter hæc ergo sententia illa Augustini et propter nimiam obscuritatem et subtilitatem ejus difficilis creditu est: quia verisimile non est Deum inspirasse Moysi, ut historiam de creatione mundi ad fidem totius populi adeò necessariam per nomina dierum explicaret, quorum significatio vix inveniri et difficillime ab aliquo credi posset.” (*l. c.* Lib. I. cap. xi. 42).

The latter view is that held by Mr. Mivart, who follows St. Augustin, and implies that he has the sanction of Suarez. But, in point of fact, the latter great light of orthodoxy takes no small pains to give the most explicit and direct contradiction to all such imaginations, as the following passages prove. In the first place, as regards plants, Suarez discusses the problem :—

*Quomodo herba virens et cætera vegetabilia hoc [tertio] die fuerint producta.\**

“Præcipua enim difficultas hic est, quam attingit Div. Thomas 1, par. qu. 69, art. 2, an hæc productio plantarum hoc die facta intelligenda sit de productione ipsarum in proprio esse actuali et formali (ut sic rem explicarem) vel de productione tantum in semine et in potentia. Nam Divus Augustinus libro quinto Genes. ad liter. cap. 4 et 5 et libro 8, cap. 3, posteriorem partem tradit, dicens, terram in hoc die accepisse virtutem germinandi omnia vegetabilia quasi concepto omnium illorum illorum semine, non tamen statim vegetabilia omnia produxisse. Quod primo suadet verbis illis capitis secundi. *In die quo fecit Deus cælum et terram et omne virgultum agri priusquam germinaret.* Quomodo enim potuerunt virgulta fieri antequam terra germinaret, nisi quia causaliter prius et quasi in radice, seu in semine facta sunt, et postea in actu producta? Secundò confirmari potest, quia verbum illud *germinet terra* optimè exponitur potestativè ut sic dicam, id est, accipiat terra vim germinandi. Sicut in eodem capite dicitur *crescit et multiplicamini*. Tertio potest confirmari, quia actualis productio vegetabilium non tam ad opus creationis, quam ad opus propagationis pertinet, quod postea factum est. Et hanc sententiam sequitur Eucherius lib. 1, in Gen. cap. 11, et illi faveat Glossa, interli. Hugo. et Lyran. dum verbum *germinet* dicto modo exponunt. NIHILOMINUS CONTRARIA SENTENTIA TENENDA EST: SCILICET, PRODUXISSE DEUM HOC DIE HERBAM, ARBORES, ET ALIA VEGETABILIA ACTU IN PROPRIA SPECIE ET NATURA. Hæc est communis sententia Patrum.—Basil. homil. 5; Exæmer. Ambros. lib. 3; Exæmer. cap. 8, 11 et 16; Chrysost. homil. 5 in Gen. Damascene lib. 2 de Fid., cap. 10.; Theodor. Cyrilli, Bedæ, Glossæ ordinariæ et aliorum in Gen. Et idem sentit Divus Thomas, *supra*, solvens argumenta Augustini, quamvis propter reverentiam ejus quasi problematicè semper procedat. Denique idem sentiunt omnes qui in his operibus veram successionem et temporalem distinctionem agnoscant.”

Secondly, with respect to animals, Suarez is no less decided :—

*“De animalium ratione carentium productione quinto et sexto die facta.\**

“32. Primò ergo nobis certum sit hæc animantia non in virtute tantum aut in semine, sed actu, et in seipsis, facta fuisse his diebus in quibus facta narrantur. Quanquam Augustinus lib. 3, Gen ad liter. cap. 5 in sua persistens sententia contrarium sentire videatur.”

But Suarez proceeds to refute Augustin's opinions at great length, and his final judgment may be gathered from the following passage :—

“35. Tertio dicendum est, hæc animalia omnia his diebus producta esse, IN PERFECTO STATU, IN SINGULIS INDIVIDUIS, SEU SPECIEBUS SUIS, JUXTA UNICUJUSQUE NATURAM. . . . ITAQUE FUERUNT OMNIA CREATA INTEGRA ET OMNIBUS SUIS MEMBRIS PERFECTA.” . . .

\* *l. c.* Lib. II., cap. vii. and viii. 1, 32, 35.

As regards the creation of animals and plants, therefore, it is clear that Suarez, so far from "distinctly asserting derivative creation," denies it as distinctly and positively as he can; that he is at much pains to refute St. Augustin's opinions; that he does not hesitate to regard the faint acquiescence of St. Thomas Aquinas in the views of his brother saint as a kindly subterfuge on the part of Divus Thomas; and that he affirms his own view to be that which is supported by the authority of the Fathers of the Church. So that, when Mr. Mivart tells us that "Catholic theology is in harmony with all that modern science can possibly require;" that "to the general theory of evolution, and to the special Darwinian form of it, no exception . . . need be taken on the ground of orthodoxy;" and that "law and regularity, not arbitrary intervention, was the Patristic ideal of creation," we have to choose between his dictum, as a theologian, and that of a great light of his Church, whom he himself declares to be "widely venerated as an authority, and whose orthodoxy has never been questioned."

But Mr. Mivart does not hesitate to push his attempt to harmonize science with Catholic orthodoxy to its utmost limit; and, while assuming that the soul of man "arises from immediate and direct creation," he supposes that his body was "formed at first (as now in each separate individual) by derivative, or secondary creation, through natural laws" (p. 331).

This means, I presume, that an animal, having the corporeal form and bodily powers of man, may have been developed out of some lower form of life by a process of evolution; and that, after this anthropoid animal had existed for a longer or shorter time, God made a soul by direct creation, and put it into the manlike body, which, heretofore, had been devoid of that *anima rationalis*, which is supposed to be man's distinctive character.

This hypothesis is incapable of either proof or disproof, and therefore may be true; but if Suarez is any authority it is not Catholic doctrine. "*Nulla est in homine forma educta de potentia materiæ*,"\* is a dictum which is absolutely inconsistent with the doctrine of the natural evolution of any vital manifestation of the human body.

Moreover, if man existed as an animal before he was provided with a rational soul, he must, in accordance with the elementary requirements of the philosophy in which Mr. Mivart delights, have possessed a distinct sensitive and vegetative soul, or souls. Hence, when the "breath of life" was breathed into the manlike animal's nostrils, he must have already been a living and feeling creature. But Suarez particularly discusses this point, and not only rejects Mr. Mivart's view, but adopts language of very theological strength regarding it.

\* Disput. xv. § x. No. 27.

"Possent præterea his adjungi argumenta theologica, ut est illud quod sumitur ex illis verbis Genes. 2. *Formavit Deus hominem ex limo terre et inspiravit in faciem ejus spiraculum vitæ et factus est homo in animam viventem*: ille enim spiritus, quem Deus spiravit, anima rationalis fuit, et PER EADEM FACTUS EST HOMO VIVENS, ET CONSEQUENTER, ETIAM SENTIENS.

"Aliud est ex VIII. Synodo Generali quæ est Constantinopolitana IV. can. 11, qui sic habet. *Apparet quosdam in tantum impietatis venisse ut homines duas animas habere dogmatizent: talis igitur impietatis inventores et similes sapientes, cum vetus et novum testamentum omnesque Ecclesiæ patres unam animam rationalem hominem habere asseverent, Sancta et universalis Synodus anathematizat.*" \*

Moreover, if the animal nature of man was the result of evolution, so must that of woman have been. But the Catholic doctrine, according to Suarez, is that woman was, in the strictest and most literal sense of the words, made out of the rib of man.

"Nihilominus sententia Catholica est, verba illa Scripturæ esse ad literam intelligenda. AC PROINDE VERE, AC REALITER, TULISSE DEUM COSTAM ADÆ, ET, EX ILLA, CORPUS EVÆ FORMASSE." †

Nor is there any escape in the supposition that some woman existed before Eve, after the fashion of the Lilith of the rabbis; since Suarez qualifies that notion, along with some other Judaic imaginations, as simply "damnabilis." ‡

After the perusal of the "Tractatus de Opere" it is, in fact, impossible to admit that Suarez held any opinion respecting the origin of species except such as is consistent with the strictest and most literal interpretation of the words of Genesis. For Suarez, it is Catholic doctrine, that the world was made in six natural days. On the first of these days the *materia prima* was made out of nothing, to receive afterwards those "substantial forms" which moulded it into the universe of things; on the third day, the ancestors of all living plants suddenly came into being, full-grown, perfect, and possessed of all the properties which now distinguish them; while, on the fifth and sixth days, the ancestors of all existing animals were similarly caused to exist in their complete and perfect state, by the infusion of their appropriate material substantial forms into the matter which had already been created. Finally, on the sixth day, the *anima rationalis*—that rational and immortal substantial form which is peculiar to man—was created out of nothing, and "breathed into" a mass of matter which, till then, was mere dust of the earth, and so man arose. But the species man was represented by a solitary male individual, until the Creator took out one of his ribs and fashioned it into a female.

This is the view of the "Genesis of Species," held by Suarez to be

\* Disput., xv., "De causa formali substantiali," § x. No. 24.

† "Tractatus de Opere," Lib. III., "De hominis creatione," cap. ii. No. 3.

‡ Ibid. Lib. III. cap. iv., Nos. 8 and 9.

the only one consistent with Catholic faith ; it is because he holds this view to be Catholic that he does not hesitate to declare St. Augustin unsound, and St. Thomas Aquinas guilty of weakness, when the one swerved from this view and the other tolerated the deviation. And, until responsible Catholic authority—say, for example, the Archbishop of Westminster—formally declares that Suarez was wrong, and that Catholic priests are free to teach their flocks that the world was *not* made in six natural days, and that plants and animals were *not* created in their perfect and complete state, but have been evolved by natural processes through long ages from certain germs in which they were potentially contained, I, for one, shall feel bound to believe that the doctrines of Suarez are the only ones which are sanctioned by Infallible Authority, as represented by the Holy Father and the Catholic Church.

I need hardly add that they are as absolutely denied and repudiated by Scientific Authority, as represented by Reason and Fact. The question whether the earth and the immediate progenitors of its present living population were made in six natural days or not, is no longer one upon which two opinions can be held.

The fact that it did not so come into being stands upon as sound a basis as any fact of history whatever. It is not true that existing plants and animals came into being within three days of the creation of the earth out of nothing, for it is certain that innumerable generations of other plants and animals lived upon the earth before its present population. And when, Sunday after Sunday, men who profess to be our instructors in righteousness read out the statement, "In six days the Lord made heaven and earth, the sea, and all that in them is," in innumerable churches, they are either propagating what they may easily know, and, therefore, are bound to know, to be falsities ; or, if they use the words in some non-natural sense, they fall below the moral standard of the much abused Jesuit.

Thus far the contradiction between Catholic verity and Scientific verity is complete and absolute, quite independently of the truth or falsehood of the doctrine of evolution. But, for those who hold the doctrine of evolution, all the Catholic verities about the creation of living beings must be no less false. For them, the assertion that the progenitors of all existing plants were made on the third day, of animals on the fifth and sixth days, in the forms they now present, is simply false. Nor can they admit that man was made suddenly out of the dust of the earth ; while it would be an insult to ask an evolutionist whether he credits the preposterous fable respecting the fabrication of woman to which Suarez pins his faith. If Suarez has rightly stated Catholic doctrine, then is evolution utter heresy. And such I believe it to be. In addition to the truth of the doctrine

of evolution, indeed, one of its greatest merits in my eyes, is the fact that it occupies a position of complete and irreconcilable antagonism to that vigorous and consistent enemy of the highest intellectual, moral, and social life of mankind—the Catholic Church. No doubt, Mr. Mivart, like other putters of new wine into old bottles, is actuated by motives which are worthy of respect, and even of sympathy; but his attempt has met with the fate which the Scripture prophesies for all such.

Catholic theology, like all theologies which are based upon the assumption of the truth of the account of the origin of things given in the book of Genesis, being utterly irreconcilable with the doctrine of evolution, the student of science, who is satisfied that the evidence upon which the doctrine of evolution rests, is incomparably stronger and better than that upon which the supposed authority of the book of Genesis rests, will not trouble himself further with these theologies, but will confine his attention to such arguments against the view he holds as are based upon purely scientific data—and by scientific data I do not merely mean the truths of physical, mathematical, or logical science, but those of moral and metaphysical science. For, by science, I understand all knowledge which rests upon evidence and reasoning of a like character to that which claims our assent to ordinary scientific propositions. And if any one is able to make good the assertion that his theology rests upon valid evidence and sound reasoning, then it appears to me that such theology will take its place as a part of science.

The present antagonism between theology and science does not arise from any assumption by the men of science that all theology must necessarily be excluded from science; but simply because they are unable to allow that reason and morality have two weights and two measures; and that the belief in a proposition, because authority tells you it is true, or because you wish to believe it, which is a high crime and misdemeanour when the subject matter of reason is of one kind, becomes under the *alias* of "faith" the greatest of all virtues, when the subject matter of reason is of another kind.

The Bishop of Brechin said well the other day:—"Liberality in religion—I do not mean tender and generous allowances for the mistakes of others—is only unfaithfulness to truth."\* And, with the same qualification, I venture to paraphrase the bishop's dictum. "Ecclesiasticism in science is only unfaithfulness to truth."

Elijah's great question, "Will you serve God or Baal? Choose ye," is uttered audibly enough in the ears of every one of us as we come to manhood. Let every man who tries to answer it seriously, ask

\* Charge at the Diocesan Synod of Brechin, "*Scotsman*," Sept. 14, 1871.

himself whether he can be satisfied with the Baal of authority, and with all the good things his worshippers are promised in this world and the next. If he can, let him, if he be so inclined, amuse himself with such scientific implements as authority tells him are safe and will not cut his fingers; but let him not imagine he is, or can be, both a true son of the Church and a loyal soldier of Science.

And, on the other hand, if the blind acceptance of authority appears to him in its true colours, as mere private judgment *in excelsis*, and if he have the courage to stand alone, face to face with the abyss of the Eternal and Unknowable, let him be content, once for all, not only to renounce the good things promised by "Infallibility," but even to bear the bad things which it prophesies; content to follow reason and fact in singleness and honesty of purpose, wherever they may lead, in the sure faith that a hell of honest men will, to him, be more endurable than a paradise full of angelic shams.

Mr. Mivart asserts that "without a belief in a personal God, there is no religion worthy of the name." This is a matter of opinion. But it may be asserted, with less reason to fear contradiction, that the worship of a personal God, who, on Mr. Mivart's hypothesis, must have used language studiously calculated to deceive his creatures and worshippers, is "no religion worthy of the name." "*Incredibile est, Deum illis verbis ad populum fuisse locutum quibus deciperetur,*" is a verdict in which, for once, Jesuit casuistry concurs with the healthy moral sense of all mankind.

Having happily got quit of the theological aspect of evolution, the supporter of that great truth who turns to the scientific objections which are brought against it by recent criticism, finds, to his relief, that the work before him is greatly lightened by the spontaneous retreat of the enemy from nine-tenths of the territory which he occupied ten years ago. Even the Quarterly Reviewer not only abstains from venturing to deny that evolution has taken place, but he openly admits that Mr. Darwin has forced on men's minds "a recognition of the probability, if not more, of evolution, and of the certainty of the action of natural selection" (p. 49).

I do not quite see, myself, how, if the action of natural selection is *certain*, the occurrence of evolution is only *probable*; inasmuch as the development of a new species by natural selection is, so far as it goes, evolution. However, it is not worth while to quarrel with the precise terms of a sentence which shows that the high watermark of intelligence among those most respectable of Britons, the readers of the *Quarterly Review*, has now reached such a level, that the next tide may lift them easily and pleasantly on to the once-dreaded shore

of evolution. Nor, having got there, do they seem likely to stop, until they have reached the inmost heart of that great region, and accepted the ape ancestry of, at any rate, the body of man. For the Reviewer admits that Mr. Darwin can be said to have established

"That if the various kinds of lower animals have been evolved one from the other by a process of natural generation or evolution, then, it becomes highly probable, *à priori*, that man's body has been similarly evolved; but this, in such a case, becomes equally probable from the admitted fact that he is an animal at all" (p. 65).

From the principles laid down in the last sentence, it would follow that if man were constructed upon a plan as different from that of any other animal, as that of a sea-urchin is from that of a whale, it would be "equally probable" that he had been developed from some other animal, as it is now, when we know that for every bone, muscle, tooth, and even pattern of tooth, in man, there is a corresponding bone, muscle, tooth, and pattern of tooth, in an ape. And this shows one of two things—either that the Quarterly Reviewer's notions of probability are peculiar to himself; or, that he has such an overpowering faith in the truth of evolution, that no extent of structural break between one animal and another is sufficient to destroy his conviction that evolution has taken place.

But this by the way. The importance of the admission that there is nothing in man's physical structure to interfere with his having been evolved from an ape, is not lessened, because it is grudgingly made and inconsistently qualified. And instead of jubilating over the extent of the enemy's retreat, it will be more worth while to lay siege to his last stronghold—the position that there is a distinction in kind between the mental faculties of man and those of brutes, and that, in consequence of this distinction in kind, no gradual progress from the mental faculties of the one to those of the other can have taken place.

The Quarterly Reviewer entrenches himself within formidable-looking psychological outworks, and there is no getting at him without attacking them one by one.

He begins by laying down the following proposition: "'Sensation' is not 'thought,' and no amount of the former would constitute the most rudimentary condition of the latter, though sensations supply the conditions for the existence of 'thought' or 'knowledge'" (p. 67).

This proposition is true, or not, according to the sense in which the word "thought" is employed. Thought is not uncommonly used in a sense co-extensive with consciousness, and, especially, with those states of consciousness we call memory. If I recall the impression made by a colour or an odour, and distinctly remember blueness or

muskiness, I may say with perfect propriety that I "think of" blue or musk; and, so long as the thought lasts, it is simply a faint reproduction of the state of consciousness to which I gave the name in question, when it first became known to me as a sensation.

Now, if that faint reproduction of a sensation, which we call the memory of it, is properly termed a thought, it seems to me to be a somewhat forced proceeding to draw a hard and fast line of demarcation between thoughts and sensations. If sensations are not rudimentary thoughts, it may be said that some thoughts are rudimentary sensations. No amount of sound constitutes an echo, but for all that no one would pretend that an echo is something of totally different nature from a sound. Again, nothing can be looser, or more inaccurate, than the assertion that "sensations supply the conditions for the existence of thought or knowledge." If this implies that sensations supply the conditions for the existence of our memory of sensations, or of our thoughts about sensations, it is a truism which it is hardly worth while to state so solemnly. If it implies that sensations supply anything else it is obviously erroneous. And, if it means, as the context would seem to show it does, that sensations are the subject-matter of all thought or knowledge, then it is no less contrary to fact, inasmuch as our emotions, which constitute a large part of the subject-matter of thought or of knowledge, are not sensations.

More eccentric still is the Quarterly Reviewer's next piece of psychology.

"Altogether, we may clearly distinguish at least six kinds of action to which the nervous system ministers:—

"I. That in which impressions received result in appropriate movements without the intervention of sensation or thought, as in the cases of injury above given. (This is the reflex action of the nervous system.)

"II. That in which stimuli from without result in sensations through the agency of which their due effects are wrought out. (Sensation.)

"III. That in which impressions received result in sensations which give rise to the observation of sensible objects.—Sensible perception.

"IV. That in which sensations and perceptions continue to coalesce, agglutinate, and combine in more or less complex aggregations, according to the laws of the association of sensible perceptions.—Association.

"The above four groups contain only indeliberate operations, consisting, as they do at the best, but of mere *presentative* sensible ideas in no way implying any reflective or *representative* faculty. Such actions minister to and form *Instinct*. Besides these, we may distinguish two other kinds of mental action, namely:—

"V. That in which sensations and sensible perceptions are reflected on by thought and recognised as our own and we ourselves recognised by ourselves as affected and perceiving.—Self-consciousness.

"VI. That in which we reflect upon our sensations or perceptions, and ask what they are and why they are.—Reason.

"These two latter kinds of action are deliberate operations, performed,

as they are, by means of representative ideas implying the use of a *reflective representative* faculty. Such actions distinguish the *intellect* or rational faculty. Now, we assert that possession in perfection of all the first four (*presentative*) kinds of action by no means implies the possession of the last two (*representative*) kinds. All persons, we think, must admit the truth of the following proposition:—

“Two faculties are distinct, not in degree but *in kind*, if we may possess the one in perfection without that fact implying that we possess the other also. Still more will this be the case if the two faculties tend to increase in an inverse ratio. Yet this is the distinction between the *instinctive* and the *intellectual* parts of man's nature.

“As to animals, we fully admit that they may possess all the first four groups of actions—that they may have, so to speak, mental images of sensible objects combined in all degrees of complexity, as governed by the laws of association. We deny to them, on the other hand, the possession of the last two kinds of mental action. We deny them, that is, the power of reflecting on their own existence or of enquiring into the nature of objects and their causes. We deny that they know that they know or know themselves in knowing. In other words, we deny them *reason*. The possession of the presentative faculty, as above explained, in no way implies that of the reflective faculty; nor does any amount of direct operation imply the power of asking the reflective question before mentioned, as to ‘what’ and ‘why.’” (*l.c.* p. 67-8.)

Sundry points are worthy of notice in this remarkable account of the intellectual powers. In the first place, the Reviewer ignores emotion and volition, though they are no inconsiderable “kinds of action to which the nervous system ministers,” and memory has a place in his classification only by implication. Secondly, we are told that the second “kind of action to which the nervous system ministers” is “that in which stimuli from without result in sensations through the agency of which their due effects are wrought out. (Sensation.)” Does this really mean that, in the writer's opinion, “sensation” is the “agent” by which the “due effect” of the stimulus, which gives rise to sensation, is “wrought out?” Suppose somebody runs a pin into me. The “due effect” of that particular stimulus will probably be threefold; namely, a sensation of pain, a start, and an interjectional expletive. Does the Quarterly Reviewer really think that the “sensation” is the “agent” by which the other two phenomena are wrought out?

But these matters are of little moment to any one but the Reviewer and those persons who may incautiously take their physiology, or psychology, from him. The really interesting point is this, that when he fully admits that animals “may possess all the first four groups of actions,” he grants all that is necessary for the purposes of the evolutionist. For he hereby admits that in animals “impressions received result in sensations which give rise to the observation of sensible objects,” and that they have what he calls “sensible perception.” Nor was it possible to help the admission; for we have as

much reason to ascribe to animals, as we have to attribute to our fellow-men, the power, not only of perceiving external objects, as external, and thus practically recognising the difference between the self and the not-self; but that of distinguishing between like and unlike, and between simultaneous and successive things. When a gamekeeper goes out coursing with a greyhound in leash, and a hare crosses the field of vision, he becomes the subject of those states of consciousness we call visual sensations, and that is all he receives from without. Sensation, as such, tells him nothing whatever about the cause of these states of consciousness; but the thinking faculty instantly goes to work upon the raw material of sensation furnished to it through the eye, and gives rise to a train of thoughts. First comes the thought that there is an object at a certain distance; then arises another thought—the perception of the likeness between the states of consciousness awakened by this object to those presented by memory, as, on some former occasion, called up by a hare; this is succeeded by another thought of the nature of an emotion—namely, the desire to possess a hare; then follows a longer or shorter train of other thoughts, which end in a volition and an act—the loosing of the greyhound from the leash. These several thoughts are the concomitants of a process which goes on in the nervous system of the man. Unless the nerve-elements of the retina, of the optic nerve, of the brain, of the spinal chord, and of the nerves of the arms went through certain physical changes in due order and correlation, the various states of consciousness which have been enumerated would not make their appearance. So that in this, as in all other intellectual operations, we have to distinguish two sets of successive changes—one in the physical basis of consciousness, and the other in consciousness itself; one set which may, and doubtless will, in course of time, be followed through all their complexities by the anatomist and the physicist, and one of which only the man himself can have immediate knowledge.

As it is very necessary to keep up a clear distinction between these two processes, let the one be called *neurosis*, and the other *psychosis*. When the gamekeeper was first trained to his work, every step in the process of neurosis was accompanied by a corresponding step in that of psychosis, or nearly so. He was conscious of seeing something, conscious of making sure it was a hare, conscious of desiring to catch it, and therefore to loose the greyhound at the right time, conscious of the acts by which he let the dog out of the leash. But with practice, though the various steps of the neurosis remain—for otherwise the impression on the retina would not result in the loosing of the dog—the great majority of the steps of the psychosis vanish, and the loosing of the dog follows

unconsciously, or as we say, without thinking about it, upon the sight of the hare. No one will deny that the series of acts which originally intervened between the sensation and the letting go of the dog were, in the strictest sense, intellectual and rational operations. Do they cease to be so when the man ceases to be conscious of them? That depends upon what is the essence and what the accident of those operations, which, taken together, constitute ratiocination.

Now ratiocination is resolvable into predication, and predication consists in marking, in some way, the existence, the coexistence, the succession, the likeness and unlikeness, of things or their ideas. Whatever does this reasons; and if a machine produces the effects of reason, I see no more ground for denying to it the reasoning power, because it is unconscious, than I see for refusing to Mr. Babbage's engine the title of a calculating machine on the same grounds.

Thus it seems to me that a gamekeeper reasons, whether he is conscious or unconscious, whether his reasoning is carried on by neurosis alone, or whether it involves more or less psychosis. And if this is true of the gamekeeper, it is also true of the greyhound. The essential resemblances in all points of structure and function, so far as they can be studied, between the nervous systems of the man and that of the dog, leave no reasonable doubt that the processes which go on in the one are just like those which take place in the other. In the dog, there can be no doubt that the nervous matter which lies between the retina and the muscles undergoes a series of changes, precisely analogous to those which, in the man, give rise to sensation, a train of thought, and volition.

Whether this neurosis is accompanied by such psychosis as ours, it is impossible to say; but those who deny that the nervous changes, which, in the dog, correspond with those which underlie thought in a man, are accompanied by consciousness, are equally bound to maintain that those nervous changes in the dog, which correspond with those which underlie sensation in a man, are also unaccompanied by consciousness. In other words, if there is no ground for believing that a dog thinks, neither is there any for believing that he feels.

As is well known, Descartes boldly faced this dilemma, and maintained that all animals were mere machines and entirely devoid of consciousness. But he did not deny, nor can any one deny, that in this case they are reasoning machines, capable of performing all those operations which are performed by the nervous system of man when he reasons. For even supposing that in man, and in man only, psychosis is superadded to neurosis—the neurosis which is common to both man and animal gives their reasoning processes a fundamental unity. But Descartes's position is open to very serious objections, if

the evidence that animals feel is insufficient to prove that they really do so. What is the value of the evidence which leads one to believe that one's fellow-man feels? The only evidence in this argument of analogy, is the similarity of his structure and of his actions to one's own. And if that is good enough to prove that one's fellow-man feels, surely it is good enough to prove that an ape feels. For the differences of structure and function between men and apes are utterly insufficient to warrant the assumption, that while men have those states of consciousness we call sensations, apes have nothing of the kind. Moreover, we have as good evidence that apes are capable of emotion and volition as we have that men other than ourselves are. But if apes possess three out of the four kinds of states of consciousness which we discover in ourselves, what possible reason is there for denying them the fourth? If they are capable of sensation, emotion, and volition, why are they to be denied thought (in the sense of predication)?

No answer has ever been given to these questions. And as the law of continuity is as much opposed, as is the common sense of mankind, to the notion that all animals are unconscious machines, it may safely be assumed that no sufficient answer ever will be given to them.

There is every reason to believe that consciousness is a function of nervous matter, when that nervous matter has attained a certain degree of organization, just as we know the other "actions to which the nervous system ministers," such as reflex action and the like, to be. As I have ventured to state my view of the matter elsewhere, "our thoughts are the expression of molecular changes in that matter of life which is the source of our other vital phenomena."

Mr. Wallace objects to this statement in the following terms:—

"Not having been able to find any clue in Professor Huxley's writings, to the steps by which he passes from those vital phenomena, which consist only, in their last analysis, of movements by particles of matter, to those other phenomena which we term thought, sensation, or consciousness; but, knowing that so positive an expression of opinion from him will have great weight with many persons, I shall endeavour to show, with as much brevity as is compatible with clearness, that this theory is not only incapable of proof, but is also, as it appears to me, inconsistent with accurate conceptions of molecular physics."

With all respect for Mr. Wallace, it appears to me that his remarks are entirely beside the question. I really know nothing whatever, and never hope to know anything, of the steps by which the passage from molecular movement to states of consciousness is effected; and I entirely agree with the sense of the passage which he quotes from Professor Tyndall, apparently imagining that it is in opposition to the view I hold.

All that I have to say is, that, in my belief, consciousness and molecular action are capable of being expressed by one another, just as heat and mechanical action are capable of being expressed in terms of one another. Whether we shall ever be able to express consciousness in foot-pounds, or not, is more than I will venture to say; but that there is evidence of the existence of some correlation between mechanical motion and consciousness is as plain as anything can be. Suppose the poles of an electric battery to be connected by a platinum wire. A certain intensity of the current gives rise in the mind of a bystander to that state of consciousness we call a "dull red light"—a little greater intensity to another which we call a "bright red light;" increase the intensity, and the light becomes white; and, finally, it dazzles, and a new state of consciousness arises, which we term pain. Given the same wire and the same nervous apparatus, and the amount of electric force required to give rise to these several states of consciousness will be the same, however often the experiment is repeated. And as the electric force, the light-waves, and the nerve-vibrations caused by the impact of the light-waves on the retina, are all expressions of the molecular changes which are taking place in the elements of the battery; so consciousness is, in the same sense, an expression of the molecular changes which take place in that nervous matter, which is the organ of consciousness.

And, since this, and any number of similar examples that may be required, prove that one form of consciousness, at any rate, is, in the strictest sense, the expression of molecular change, it really is not worth while to pursue the inquiry, whether a fact so easily established is consistent with any particular system of molecular physics or not.

Mr. Wallace, in fact, appears to me to have mixed up two very distinct propositions: the one, the indisputable truth that consciousness is correlated with molecular changes in the organ of consciousness; the other, that the nature of that correlation is known, or can be conceived, which is quite another matter. Mr. Wallace presumably believes in that correlation of phenomena which we call cause and effect as firmly as I do. But if he has ever been able to form the faintest notion how a cause gives rise to its effect, all I can say is that I envy him. Take the simplest case imaginable—suppose a ball in motion to impinge upon another ball at rest. I know very well, as a matter of fact, that the ball in motion will communicate some of its motion to the ball at rest, and that the motion of the two balls after collision is precisely correlated with the masses of both balls and the amount of motion of the first. But how does this come about? In what manner can we conceive that the *vis viva* of

the first ball passes into the second? I confess I can no more form any conception of what happens in this case, than I can of what takes place when the motion of particles of my nervous matter, caused by the impact of a similar ball, gives rise to the state of consciousness I call pain. In ultimate analysis everything is incomprehensible, and the whole object of science is simply to reduce the fundamental incomprehensibilities to the smallest possible number.

But to return to the Quarterly Reviewer. He admits that animals have "mental images of sensible objects, combined in all degrees of complexity, as governed by the laws of association." Presumably, by this confused and imperfect statement the Reviewer means to admit more than the words imply. For mental images of sensible objects, even though "combined in all degrees of complexity," are, and can be, nothing more than mental images of sensible objects. But judgments, emotions, and volitions cannot by any possibility be included under the head of "mental images of sensible objects." If the greyhound had no better mental endowment than the Reviewer allows him, he might have the "mental image" of the "sensible object"—the hare—and that might be combined with the mental images of other sensible objects, to any degree of complexity, but he would have no power of judging it to be at a certain distance from him; no power of perceiving its similarity to his memory of a hare; and no desire to get at it. Consequently he would stand stock still, and the noble art of coursing would have no existence. On the other hand, as that art is largely practised, it follows that greyhounds alone possess a number of mental powers, the existence of which, in any animal, is absolutely denied by the Quarterly Reviewer.

Finally, what are the mental powers which he reserves as the especial prerogative of man? They are two. First, the recognition of "ourselves by ourselves as affected and perceiving. Self-consciousness."

Secondly. "The reflection upon our sensations and perceptions, and asking what they are and why they are. Reason."

To the faculty defined in the last sentence, the Reviewer, without assigning the least ground for thus departing from both common usage and technical propriety, applies the name of reason. But if man is not to be considered a reasoning being, unless he asks what his sensations and perceptions are and why they are, what is a Hottentot, an Australian black fellow, or what the "swinked hedger" of an ordinary agricultural district? Nay, what becomes of an average country squire or parson? How many of these worthy persons who, as their wont is, read the *Quarterly Review*, would do other than stand agape, if you asked him whether he had ever

reflected what his sensations and perceptions are, and why they are?

So that if the Reviewer's new definition of reason be correct, the majority of men, even among the most civilised nations, are devoid of that supreme characteristic of manhood. And if it be as absurd as I believe it to be, then, as reason is certainly not self-consciousness, and as it, as certainly, is one of the "actions to which the nervous system ministers," we must, if the Reviewer's classification is to be adopted, seek it among those four faculties which he allows animals to possess. And thus, for the second time, he really surrenders, while seeming to defend, his position.

The Quarterly Reviewer, as we have seen, lectures the evolutionists upon their want of knowledge of philosophy altogether. Mr. Mivart is not less pained at Mr. Darwin's ignorance of moral science. It is grievous to him that Mr. Darwin (and *nous autres*) should not have grasped the elementary distinction between material and formal morality; and he lays down as an axiom, of which no tyro ought to be ignorant, the position that "Acts, unaccompanied by mental acts of conscious will directed towards the fulfilment of duty," are "absolutely destitute of the most incipient degree of real or formal goodness."

Now this may be Mr. Mivart's opinion, but it is a proposition which, really, does not stand on the footing of an undisputed axiom. Mr. Mill denies it in his work on Utilitarianism. The most influential writer of a totally opposed school, Mr. Carlyle, is never weary of denying it, and upholding the merit of that virtue which is unconscious; nay, it is, to my understanding, extremely hard to reconcile Mr. Mivart's dictum with that noble summary of the whole duty of man—"Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy strength: and thou shalt love thy neighbour as thy self." According to Mr. Mivart's definition, the man who loves God and his neighbour, and out of sheer love and affection for both, does all he can to please them, is, nevertheless, destitute of a particle of real goodness.

And it further happens that Mr. Darwin, who is charged by Mr. Mivart with being ignorant of the distinction between material and formal goodness, discusses the very question at issue, in a passage which is well worth reading (vol. i. p. 87), and also comes to a conclusion opposed to Mr. Mivart's axiom. A proposition which has been so much disputed and repudiated, should, under no circumstances, have been thus confidently assumed to be true. For myself, I utterly reject it, inasmuch as the logical consequence of the adoption of any such principle is the denial of all moral value to sympathy and affection. According to Mr. Mivart's axiom, the man who,

seeing another struggling in the water, leaps in at the risk of his own life to save him, does that which is "destitute of the most incipient degree of real goodness," unless, as he strips off his coat, he says to himself, "Now mind, I am going to do this because it is my duty and for no other reason;" and the most beautiful character to which humanity can attain, that of the man who does good without thinking about it, because he loves justice and mercy and is repelled by evil, has no claim on our moral approbation. The denial that a man acts morally because he does not think whether he does so or not, may be put upon the same footing as the denial of the title of an arithmetician to the calculating boy, because he did not know how he worked his sums. If mankind ever generally accept and act upon Mr. Mivart's axiom, they will simply become a set of most unendurable prigs; but they never have accepted it, and I venture to hope that evolution has nothing so terrible in store for the human race.

But, if an action, the motive of which is nothing but affection or sympathy, may be deserving of moral approbation and really good, who that has ever had a dog of his own will deny that animals are capable of such actions? Mr. Mivart indeed says:—"It may be safely affirmed, however, that there is no trace in brutes of any actions simulating morality which are not explicable by the fear of punishment, by the hope of pleasure, or by personal affection" (p. 221). But it may be affirmed, with equal truth, that there is no trace in men of any actions which are not traceable to the same motives. If a man does anything, he does it either because he fears to be punished if he does not do it, or because he hopes to obtain pleasure by doing it, or because he gratifies his affections \* by doing it.

Assuming the position of the absolute moralists, let it be granted that there is a perception of right and wrong innate in every man. This means, simply, that when certain ideas are presented to his mind, the feeling of approbation arises, and when certain others, the feeling of disapprobation. To do your duty is to earn the approbation of your conscience, or moral sense; to fail in your duty is to feel its disapprobation, as we all say. Now, is approbation a pleasure or a pain? Surely a pleasure. And is disapprobation a pleasure or a pain? Surely a pain. Consequently all that is really meant by the absolute moralists is that there is, in the very nature of man, something which enables him to be conscious of these particular pleasures and pains. And when they talk of immutable and eternal principles of morality, the only intelligible sense which I can put upon the words, is that the nature of man being what it is, he always has been

\* In separating pleasure and the gratification of affection, I simply follow Mr. Mivart without admitting the justice of the separation.

and always will be capable of feeling these particular pleasures and pains. *A priori*, I have nothing to say against this proposition. Admitting its truth, I do not see how the moral faculty is on a different footing from any of the other faculties of man. If I choose to say that it is an immutable and eternal law of human nature that "ginger is hot in the mouth" the assertion has as much foundation of truth as the other, though I think it would be expressed in needlessly pompous language. I must confess that I have never been able to understand why there should be such a bitter quarrel between the intuitionists and the utilitarians. The intuitionist is after all only a utilitarian who believes that a particular class of pleasures and pains has an especial importance, by reason of its foundation in the nature of man, and its inseparable connection with his very existence as a thinking being. And as regards the motive of personal affection: Love, as Spinoza profoundly says, is the association of pleasure with that which is loved.\* Or, to put it to the common sense of mankind, is the gratification of affection a pleasure or a pain? Surely a pleasure. So that whether the motive which leads us to perform an action is the love of our neighbour, or the love of God, it is undeniable that pleasure enters into that motive.

Thus much in reply to Mr. Mivart's arguments. I cannot but think that it is to be regretted that he ekes them out by ascribing to the doctrines of the philosophers, with whom he does not agree, logical consequences which have been over and over again proved not to flow from them; and when reason fails him, tries the effect of an injurious nickname. According to the views of Mr. Spencer, Mr. Mill, and Mr. Darwin, Mr. Mivart tells us, "*virtue is a mere kind of retrieving*;" and, that we may not miss the point of the joke, he puts it in italics. But what if it is? Does that make it less virtue? Suppose I say that sculpture is a "mere way" of stone-cutting, and painting a "mere way" of daubing canvas, and music a "mere way" of making a noise, the statements are quite true; but they only show that I see no other method of depreciating some of the noblest aspects of humanity, than that of using language in an inadequate and misleading sense about them. And the peculiar inappropriateness of this particular nickname to the views in question, arises from the circumstance which Mr. Mivart would doubtless have recollected, if his wish to ridicule had not for the moment obscured his judgment—that whether the law of evolution applies to man or not, that of hereditary transmission certainly does. Mr. Mivart will hardly deny that a man owes a large share of the moral tendencies which he exhibits to his ancestors; and the man who inherits a desire to steal from a kleptomaniac, or

\* "Nempe, Amor nihil aliud est, quam Lætitia, concomitante idea causæ externæ."  
—*Ethics*, III. xiii.

a tendency to benevolence from a Howard, is, so far as he illustrates hereditary transmission, comparable to the dog who inherits the desire to fetch a duck out of the water from his retrieving sire. So that, evolution, or no evolution, moral qualities are comparable to a "kind of retrieving;" though the comparison, if meant for the purposes of casting obloquy on evolution, does not say much for the fairness of those who make it.

The Quarterly Reviewer and Mr. Mivart base their objections to the evolution of the mental faculties of man from those of some lower animal form, upon what they maintain to be a difference in kind between the mental and moral faculties of men and brutes; and I have endeavoured to show, by exposing the utter unsoundness of their philosophical basis, that these objections are devoid of importance.

The objections which Mr. Wallace brings forward to the doctrine of the evolution of the mental faculties of man from those of brutes by natural causes, are of a different order, and require separate consideration.

If I understand him rightly, he by no means doubts that both the bodily and the mental faculties of man have been evolved from those of some lower animal; but he is of opinion, that some agency beyond that which has been concerned in the evolution of ordinary animals, has been operative in the case of man. "A superior intelligence has guided the development of man in a definite direction and for a special purpose, just as man guides the development of many animal and vegetable forms."\* I understand this to mean that, just as the rock-pigeon has been produced by natural causes, while the evolution of the tumbler from the blue rock has required the special intervention of the intelligence of man, so some anthropoid form may have been evolved by variation and natural selection, but it could never have given rise to man, unless some superior intelligence had played the part of the pigeon-fancier.

According to Mr. Wallace, "whether we compare the savage with the higher developments of man, or with the brutes around him, we are alike driven to the conclusion, that, in his large and well-developed brain he possesses an organ quite disproportioned to his requirements" (p. 343); and he asks, "What is there in the life of the savage but the satisfying of the cravings of appetite in the simplest and easiest way? What thoughts, ideas, or actions are there that raise him many grades above the elephant or the ape?" (p. 342). I answer Mr. Wallace by citing a remarkable passage which occurs in his instructive paper on "Instinct in Man and Animals."

"Savages make long journeys in many directions, and, their whole

\* "The limits of Natural Selection as applied to Man" (*l. c.* p. 359).

faculties being directed to the subject, they gain a wide and accurate knowledge of the topography, not only of their own district, but of all the regions round about. Every one who has travelled in a new direction communicates his knowledge to those who have travelled less, and descriptions of routes and localities, and minute incidents of travel, form one of the main staples of conversation around the evening fire. Every wanderer or captive from another tribe adds to the store of information, and, as the very existence of individuals and of whole families and tribes depends upon the completeness of this knowledge, all the acute perceptive faculties of the adult savage are directed to acquiring and perfecting it. The good hunter or warrior thus comes to know the bearing of every hill and mountain range, the directions and junctions of all the streams, the situation of each tract characterized by peculiar vegetation, not only within the area he has himself traversed, but perhaps for a hundred miles around it. His acute observation enables him to detect the slightest undulations of the surface, the various changes of subsoil and alterations in the character of the vegetation that would be quite imperceptible to a stranger. His eye is always open to the direction in which he is going; the mossy side of trees, the presence of certain plants under the shade of rocks, the morning and evening flight of birds, are to him indications of direction almost as sure as the sun in the heavens " (pp. 207-8).

I have seen enough of savages to be able to declare that nothing can be more admirable than this description of what a savage has to learn. But it is incomplete. Add to all this the knowledge which a savage is obliged to gain of the properties of plants, of the characters and habits of animals, and of the minute indications by which their course is discoverable; consider that even an Australian can make excellent baskets and nets, and neatly fitted and beautifully balanced spears; that he learns to use these so as to be able to transfix a quartern loaf at sixty yards; and that very often, as in the case of the American Indians, the language of a savage exhibits complexities which a well-trained European finds it difficult to master; consider that every time a savage tracks his game, he employs a minuteness of observation, and an accuracy of inductive and deductive reasoning which, applied to other matters, would assure some reputation to a man of science, and I think we need ask no further why he possesses such a fair supply of brains. In complexity and difficulty, I should say that the intellectual labour of a "good hunter or warrior" considerably exceeds that of an ordinary Englishman. The Civil Service Examiners are held in great terror by young Englishmen; but even their ferocity never tempted them to require a candidate to possess such a knowledge of a parish, as Mr. Wallace justly points out savages may possess of an area a hundred miles, or more, in diameter.

But suppose, for the sake of argument, that a savage has more brains than seems proportioned to his wants, all that can be said is that the objection to natural selection, if it be one, applies quite as strongly to the lower animals. The brain of a porpoise is quite wonder-

ful for its mass, and for the development of the cerebral convolutions. And yet since we have ceased to credit the story of Arion, it is hard to believe that porpoises are much troubled with intellect; and still more difficult is it to imagine that their big brains are only a preparation for the advent of some accomplished cetacean of the future. Surely, again, a wolf must have too much brains, or else how is it that a dog, with only the same quantity and form of brain, is able to develop such singular intelligence? The wolf stands to the dog in the same relation as the savage to the man; and, therefore, if Mr. Wallace's doctrine holds good, some higher power must have superintended the breeding up of wolves from some inferior stock, in order to prepare them to become dogs.

Mr. Wallace further maintains that the origin of some of man's mental faculties by the preservation of useful variations is not possible. Such, for example, are "the capacity to form ideal conceptions of space and time, of eternity and infinity; the capacity for intense artistic feelings of pleasure in form, colour, and composition; and for those abstract notions of form and number which render geometry and arithmetic possible." "How," he asks, "were all or any of these faculties first developed, when they could have been of no possible use to man in his early stages of barbarism?"

Surely the answer is not far to seek. The lowest savages are as devoid of any such conceptions as the brutes themselves. What sort of conceptions of space and time, of form and number, can be possessed by a savage who has not got so far as to be able to count beyond five or six, who does not know how to draw a triangle or a circle, and has not the remotest notion of separating the particular quality we call form, from the other qualities of bodies? None of these capacities are exhibited by men, unless they form part of a tolerably advanced society. And, in such a society, there are abundant conditions by which a selective influence is exerted in favour of those persons who exhibit an approximation towards the possession of these capacities.

The savage who can amuse his fellows by telling a good story over the nightly fire, is held by them in esteem and rewarded, in one way or another, for so doing—in other words, it is an advantage to him to possess this power. He who can carve a paddle, or the figurehead of a canoe better, similarly profits beyond his duller neighbour. He who counts a little better than others, gets most yams when barter is going on, and forms the shrewdest estimate of the numbers of an opposing tribe. The experience of daily life shows that the conditions of our present social existence exercise the most extraordinarily powerful selective influence in favour of novelists, artists, and strong intellects of all kinds; and it seems unquestionable that all forms of

social existence must have had the same tendency, if we consider the indisputable facts that even animals possess the power of distinguishing form and number, and that they are capable of deriving pleasure from particular forms and sounds. If we admit, as Mr. Wallace does, that the lowest savages are not raised "many grades above the elephant and the ape;" and if we further admit, as I contend must be admitted, that the conditions of social life tend, powerfully, to give an advantage to those individuals who vary in the direction of intellectual or æsthetic excellence, what is there to interfere with the belief that these higher faculties, like the rest, owe their development to natural selection?

Finally, with respect to the development of the moral sense out of the simple feelings of pleasure and pain, liking and disliking, with which the lower animals are provided, I can find nothing in Mr. Wallace's reasonings which has not already been met by Mr. Mill, Mr. Spencer, or Mr. Darwin.

I do not propose to follow the Quarterly Reviewer and Mr. Mivart through the long string of objections in matters of detail which they bring against Mr. Darwin's views. Every one who has considered the matter carefully will be able to ferret out as many more "difficulties;" but he will also, I believe, fail as completely as they appear to me to have done, in bringing forward any fact which is really contradictory of Mr. Darwin's views. Occasionally, too, their objections and criticisms are based upon errors of their own. As, for example, when Mr. Mivart and the Quarterly Reviewer insist upon the resemblances between the eyes of *Cephalopoda* and *Vertebrata*, quite forgetting that there are striking and altogether fundamental differences between them; or when the Quarterly Reviewer corrects Mr. Darwin for saying that the gibbons, "without having been taught, can walk or run upright with tolerable quickness, though they move awkwardly, and much less securely than man."

The Quarterly Reviewer says, "This is a little misleading, inasmuch as it is not stated that this upright progression is effected by placing the enormously long arms behind the head, or holding them out backwards as a balance in progression."

Now, before carping at a small statement like this, the Quarterly Reviewer should have made sure that he was quite right. But he happens to be quite wrong. I suspect he got his notion of the manner in which a gibbon walks from a citation in "Man's Place in Nature." But at that time I had not seen a gibbon walk. Since then I have, and I can testify that nothing can be more precise than Mr. Darwin's statement. The gibbon I saw walked without either putting his arms behind his head or holding them out backwards. All he did was to touch the ground with the outstretched fingers of his long arms now and then, just as one sees a man who carries a

stick, but does not need one, touch the ground with it as he walks along.

Again, a large number of the objections brought forward by Mr. Mivart and the Quarterly Reviewer apply to evolution in general, quite as much as to the particular form of that doctrine advocated by Mr. Darwin; or, to their notions of Mr. Darwin's views and not to what they really are. An excellent example of this class of difficulties is to be found in Mr. Mivart's chapter on "Independent similarities of structure." Mr. Mivart says that these cannot be explained by an "absolute and pure Darwinian," but "that an innate power and evolutionary law, aided by the corrective action of natural selection, should have furnished like needs with like aids, is not at all improbable" (p. 82).

I do not exactly know what Mr. Mivart means by an "absolute and pure Darwinian;" indeed Mr. Mivart makes that creature hold so many singular opinions that I doubt if I can ever have seen one alive. But I find nothing in his statement of the view which he imagines to be originated by himself, which is really inconsistent with what I understand to be Mr. Darwin's views.

I apprehend that the foundation of the theory of natural selection is the fact that living bodies tend incessantly to vary. This variation is neither indefinite, nor fortuitous, nor does it take place in all directions, in the strict sense of these words.

Accurately speaking, it is not indefinite, nor does it take place in all directions, because it is limited by the general characters of the type to which the organism exhibiting the variation belongs. A whale does not tend to vary in the direction of producing feathers, nor a bird in the direction of developing whalebone. In popular language there is no harm in saying that the waves which break upon the seashore are indefinite, fortuitous, and break in all directions. In scientific language, on the contrary, such a statement would be a gross error, inasmuch as every particle of foam is the result of perfectly definite forces, operating according to no less definite laws. In like manner, every variation of a living form, however minute, however apparently accidental, is inconceivable except as the expression of the operation of molecular forces or "powers" resident within the organism. And, as these forces certainly operate according to definite laws, their general result is, doubtless, in accordance with some general law which subsumes them all. And there appears to be no objection to call this an "evolutionary law." But nobody is the wiser for doing so, or has thereby contributed, in the least degree, to the advance of the doctrine of evolution, the great need of which is a theory of variation.

When Mr. Mivart tells us that his "aim has been to support the doctrine that these species have been evolved by ordinary

*natural laws* (for the most part unknown) aided by the *subordinate* action of 'natural selection' (p. 332-3), he seems to be of opinion that his enterprise has the merit of novelty. All I can say is that I have never had the slightest notion that Mr. Darwin's aim is in any way different from this. If I affirm that "species have been evolved by variation \* (a natural process, the laws of which are for the most part unknown), aided by the subordinate action of natural selection," it seems to me that I enunciate a proposition which constitutes the very pith and marrow of the first edition of the "Origin of Species." And what the evolutionist stands in need of just now, is not an iteration of the fundamental principle of Darwinism, but some light upon the questions, What are the limits of variation? and, If a variety has arisen, can that variety be perpetuated, or even intensified, when selective conditions are indifferent, or perhaps unfavourable, to its existence? I cannot find that Mr. Darwin has ever been very dogmatic in answering these questions. Formerly, he seems to have inclined to reply to them in the negative, while now his inclination is the other way. Leaving aside those broad questions of theology, philosophy, and ethics, by the discussion of which neither the Quarterly Reviewer nor Mr. Mivart can be said to have damaged Darwinism—whatever else they have injured—this is what their criticisms come to. They confound a struggle for some rifle-pits with an assault on the fortress.

In some respects, finally, I can only characterize the Quarterly Reviewer's treatment of Mr. Darwin as alike unjust and unbecoming. Language of this strength requires justification, and on that ground I add the remarks which follow.

The Quarterly Reviewer opens his essay by a careful enumeration of all these points upon which, during the course of thirteen years of incessant labour, Mr. Darwin has modified his opinions. It has often and justly been remarked, that what strikes a candid student of Mr. Darwin's works is not so much his industry, his knowledge, or even the surprising fertility of his inventive genius; but that unswerving truthfulness and honesty which never permit him to hide a weak place, or gloss over a difficulty, but lead him, on all occasions, to point out the weak places in his own armour, and even sometimes, it appears to me, to make admissions against himself which are quite unnecessary. A critic who desires to attack Mr. Darwin has only to read his works with a desire to observe, not their merits, but their defects, and he will find, ready to hand, more adverse suggestions, than are likely ever to have suggested themselves to his own sharpness without Mr. Darwin's self-denying aid.

Now this quality of scientific candour is not so common that it needs to be discouraged; and it appears to me to deserve other treatment than that adopted by the Quarterly Reviewer, who deals

\* Including under this head hereditary transmission.

with Mr. Darwin as an Old Bailey barrister deals with a man against whom he wishes to obtain a conviction, *per fas aut nefas*, and opens his case by endeavouring to create a prejudice against the prisoner in the mind of the jury. In his eagerness to carry out this laudable design, the Quarterly Reviewer cannot even state the history of the doctrine of natural selection without an oblique and entirely unjustifiable attempt to depreciate Mr. Darwin. "To Mr. Darwin," says he, "and (through Mr. Wallace's reticence) to Mr. Darwin alone, is due the credit of having first brought it prominently forward and demonstrated its truth." No one can less desire than I do, to throw a doubt upon Mr. Wallace's originality, or to question his claim to the honour of being one of the originators of the doctrine of natural selection; but the statement that Mr. Darwin has the sole credit of originating the doctrine because of Mr. Wallace's reticence is simply ridiculous. The proof of this is, in the first place, afforded by Mr. Wallace himself, whose noble freedom from petty jealousy in this matter, smaller folk would do well to imitate; and who writes thus:—"I have felt all my life, and I still feel, the most sincere satisfaction that Mr. Darwin had been at work long before me, and that it was not left for me to attempt to write the 'Origin of Species.' I have long since measured my own strength, and know well that it would be quite unequal to that task." So that if there was any reticence at all in the matter, it was Mr. Darwin's reticence during the long twenty years of study which intervened between the conception and the publication of his theory, which gave Mr. Wallace the chance of being an independent discoverer of the importance of natural selection. And, finally, if it be recollected that Mr. Darwin's and Mr. Wallace's essays were published simultaneously in the *Journal of the Linnean Society* for 1858, it follows that the Reviewer, while obliquely depreciating Mr. Darwin's deserts, has, in reality, awarded to him a priority which, in legal strictness, does not exist.

Mr. Mivart, whose opinions so often concur with those of the Quarterly Reviewer, puts the case in a way, which I much regret to be obliged to say, is, in my judgment, quite as incorrect; though the injustice may be less glaring. He says that the theory of natural selection is, in general, exclusively associated with the name of Mr. Darwin, "on account of the noble self-abnegation of Mr. Wallace." As I have said, no one can honour Mr. Wallace more than I do, both for what he has done and for what he has not done, in his relation to Mr. Darwin. And perhaps nothing is more creditable to him than his frank declaration that he could not have written such a work as the "Origin of Species." But, by this declaration, the person most directly interested in the matter repudiates, by anticipation, Mr. Mivart's suggestion that Mr. Darwin's eminence is more or less due to Mr. Wallace's modesty.

T. H. HUXLEY.



## ON THE USE OF THE WORD PERSON IN LATIN THEOLOGY.

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"In rationali natura esse *aliud* et *aliud* fecit diversitas substantiarum, esse *alium* et esse *alium* facit alietas personarum."—*Richard de S. Victor. De Trinitate*, lib. iv. c. 6.

"Pluralitas substantiarum non facit *alium* et *alium* in humana natura, nec pluralitas personarum facit *aliud* et *aliud* in natura divina."—*Ibid.*, c. 10.

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THE questions that have clustered round the document commonly called the Athanasian Creed are numerous and distinct. Ought it to be retained as an authorized formulary of the Church at all? If so retained, ought it to form part of our public services, or be relegated to a position like that of the Articles? If it is to continue being said or sung in the service, ought it to be retranslated? Is it objectionable, either in itself or as translated, by reason of what are called the damnatory clauses, or the dogmatic statements, or both? Here are several issues, on which contending parties might easily be seen in the most varying relative positions. My concern at present, however, has but little reference to these. I wish merely to vindicate a single word, the use of which has been attacked by a recent distinguished advocate of retranslation. My aim is not confined to the Athanasian Creed; for the word *Person*, which is that in question, is used elsewhere in the Prayer-Book and in the Articles, is doubtless largely employed in catechetical and private explanation, and by our Presbyterian and Dissenting brethren as well as ourselves. In short, its retention or abandonment is a question which concerns the whole Western Church.

There is a prejudice in favour of Greek over Latin terminology, caused by the immeasurably greater wealth, expressiveness, and flexibility of the former tongue, and the finer aptitude for philosophical speculation of those who used it. The poverty of the Latin language for scientific ends has been almost a commonplace from the days of St. Gregory Nazianzen. Cicero, indeed, avows a different estimate (*De Fin.*, i. 3), in doing which Boethius seems to think that he was joking (*De Persona et Natura*, c. 111). Be this for the most part as it may, I am disposed to maintain that in the Trinitarian question the Latin tongue has the advantage over the Greek. Its terminology in the first category seems to me on the whole superior, even before it was enriched by the schoolmen, who indeed made Latin, as the Duke of Wellington did the Peninsular army, "able to go anywhere, and do anything."

Independently, moreover, of any comparison between the languages, we ought to keep in mind that on the Latins devolved the handling of the Trinitarian controversy as a whole, the Greeks being engaged with each successive heresy in its turn, and these for the most part turning on the nature and person of the Redeemer.

Now the probable original of the Athanasian Creed is Latin. Its doctrinal shape is Western, being almost a condensation of St. Augustine's statements in his great Treatise "de Trinitate." And all that we have to go by is the Latin document, for such Greek ones as now exist are of uncertain date and origin. Our other statements of the Trinity—that in the Articles and that in the Litany—are Latin also, and they accordingly bid us confess three Persons and one Substance of Godhead, and two natures, the Godhead and Manhood, to be joined together in the One Person of Christ.

It is obvious, therefore, that the questions involved in our use of this language, go further than that of retaining or discarding the Athanasian Creed. We might dethrone the latter from its position of authority, or we might remove it from our public services, and yet we should still be committed to Latin avowals, still obliged to speak of three Persons and one substance instead of three substances and one *usia*. And no retranslation of a single document would change the habit of speaking thus in private religious instruction, or in exposition of the New Testament.

Let us now see what are the objections made to it. They are mainly directed against the word *Person*, and are to be found in Archbishop Whateley's well-known article "Person," in the appendix to his "Logic," and in Dean Stanley's recent essay on the Athanasian Creed which appeared at first in this Review. The case before the latter writer stands thus. The Greeks eventually settled into speaking of three hypostases and one *usia* of Godhead; and the Latins

expressed the same faith by the words three Persons and one Substance. Now as substance is etymologically the same as hypostasis, it is plain that however identical in purport, the formulæ are in verbal contradiction to each other. Dean Stanley moreover seems to speak as if he thought that the Latins translated hypostasis by Person. Of the latter word he gives the following account:—

“Not only had the word *hypostasis* in Greek changed its meaning between the time of the Nicene Council and the time of the composition of this creed (the Athanasian), but the Latin word *persona*, which was used to translate the Greek word *hypostasis*, meant something different even from the newly acquired meaning of *hypostasis* itself; and yet, further, the English word *person* now means something different both from the Latin word *persona* and from the Greek word *hypostasis*. *Persona* is a mask—a character; just as the Greek word which most nearly corresponds to it (*πρόσωπον*) is a face. As applied therefore to the Deity, it meant the outward manifestation as distinct from the inward essence of the Supreme Being. By slow degrees the word was transformed into its modern but now almost universal meaning of a separate individual. In earlier English, even as late as Shakespeare, the old meaning of *character* still survived (‘I then did use the *person* of your father.’) Even the form in which it first became fixed as the name of a single individual, ‘a parson,’ meant to describe him, not in his individual capacity, but in the character or office which he bore. But Locke’s definition of it is substantially that which has now taken the place of the ancient meaning. ‘A person is a thinking, intelligent being that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself—the same thinking being in different times and places.’ This is the first passage quoted by Johnson in explanation of his own definition of the word: ‘Individual, or particular man or woman.’ How entirely remote this is either from the Greek *hypostasis* or the Latin *persona*, it is needless to point out. Yet it is unquestionably the chief idea formed of the word as used in the Athanasian Creed, not only by the uneducated, but even by many of the well instructed. ‘The term “person,”’ says an able modern advocate of the use of the creed,\* ‘cannot be employed to denote the distinctions in the Godhead without considerable intellectual caution.’” †

I will now endeavour to trace the history of this word *Person*, as used in the Latin Church, premising that there is no evidence of its having been employed to translate *hypostasis*. It was used by the Westerns to denote the distinction between Father and Son as early as Tertullian, before the Greeks, so far as we know, thought of denoting this by the other term, when, indeed, they used for the purpose the equivalent to *Persona*, *πρόσωπον*. The fortunes of these two words were identical, and constitute but one history, which I now propose to sketch. Meanwhile let me observe that whatever the earlier phases of that history, the present acceptance of the word is by no means modern. Boethius defines it thus:—“*Persona est naturæ rationalis individua substantia*,” and he proceeds to trace

\* Liddon’s Bampton Lectures, 49.

† On the Athanasian Creed, &c. By A. P. Stanley, D.D., Dean of Westminster. Pp. 20–22.

both it and *πρόσωπον* from the sense of *mask*, through the phase of the parts in a play, to this final meaning (Boeth., *de Persona et Natura*, c. 3.)

This would be enough to show the force of the term in the Athanasian Creed, as few will be prepared to assign a date to that document much earlier than Boethius; and he speaks of his definition as something fixed and antecedent to himself. That he was fully entitled to do so I proceed to prove.\*

The word *πρόσωπον* is employed in our usual sense of *person* by Polybius.† So in the New Testament 2 Cor. i. 11, by Clem., Rom. i. Ep ad Cor. i. 47, and by Ign. ad Magn. 6. St. Paul *may* have used the word in a sense short of the present meaning, but it seems impossible to give it any but that in Sts. Clement and Ignatius.‡

Sabellianism had to be encountered by anticipation when the heretic Noetus denied the distinctions of Father and Son, and thereby introduced what is called *Patripassianism*. Against this we have a fragment of Hippolytus, which is one of the most valuable remains bequeathed to us by early antiquity. He reiterates the statement that while of Father and Son there is one *δύναμις*, there are two *πρόσωπα*, and the sense in which he uses the latter term is sufficiently apparent from the arguments by which he supports his position. These are that the Father commands, the Son accomplishes, the distinctive function of the Spirit being similarly pointed out; that the Son does not say, "I and the Father *am* one," but "I and the Father *are* one," and that he speaks of coming forth from His Father. Surely the word *πρόσωπον* employed to set forth such distinction from the Father as is defended in these arguments must have been used much in our sense of the word *Person*.

The rise, however, of Sabellianism, and the dangers with which their division of the Church were consequently threatened, probably led the Orientals to prefer words which asserted real distinction with no possible ambiguity; and such they found not only in *Hypostasis*, which ultimately prevailed among them, but also for a time in *usia* and *physis*. It is manifest, therefore, that they would have had no quarrel with what Dean Stanley calls the *modern sense* of the word *Person*, on the ground of it involving too much distinc-

\* Except for the interest of Boethius's account of the word, the argument, and indeed the whole question, seem superfluous. Why discuss what *Persona* meant in Latin theology, when it had become an understood matter between East and West that it was equivalent to *Hypostasis*, and therefore meant more than *mask*, *part*, or *character*?

The genuineness of Boethius's theological works has been questioned. I do not see that this makes much difference as to the value of the evidence given by the passage referred to. The treatise in which it occurs, by whomsoever composed, clearly belongs to an age that makes it suit my purpose in referring to it.

† See Liddell and Scott, *in voc.*

‡ See Wotton's Note on c. xlvii. of St. Clement, 1 Ep. ad Cor., quoted by Jacobson.

tion in Godhead. Their distaste for it in their own day was caused by fear that it involved too little.

What they meant by Hypostasis may be seen from the following definitions.

*Hypostasis* is *usia* with certain properties, numerically different from things of the same species. Ὑπόστασις ἐστὶν οὐσία μετὰ τινῶν ιδιωμάτων, ἀριθμῷ τῶν ὁμοειδῶν διαφέροντα.

"We hold Hypostasis to be denotative of *some person*, such as that of the Father or of the Holy Spirit. For we say that *Hypostasis* and *Person*, and the possession of properties signify the same thing. Τὴν δέ γε ὑπόστασιν προσώπον τινὸς εἶναι δηλωτικὴν, οἷον ἢ τον πατρὸς ἢ του ἁγίου πνεύματος. Τὴν γὰρ ὑπόστασιν, καὶ το προσώπον, καὶ τὴν ιδιότητα, ταυτὸν σημαίνειν φαμέν." Theodoret Dialog. i. t. 4.

Quotations like these might easily be multiplied; but what has been cited is enough to show what the Greek fathers meant when they used the term *Hypostasis* or *Prosopon*. It was precisely what we mean by *Person*, excepting the accident of separation which accompanies *Personality* in us, but leaving the essential notion of *individual subsistence*.

Now there was nothing in the Latin use of *Persona* to make that word mean less than such individual subsistence. When it had passed, as it so naturally did, from designating the actor's mask to denoting the part which he played, and which the mask represented, the transition was easy, I should think unavoidable, to the final sense of individual rational subsistence. And an element took part in the Latin development of the word which must have accelerated the process. The word *Person* came much into legal discussion. It was applied to the parties in a lawsuit, and in criminal cases to the agent as compared with the act. How impossible it was to use it in this way without coming to the sense which it ordinarily bears with us will appear, I think, to any one who refers to a few of the innumerable cases of its employment by Quintilian.

These considerations may suffice to show that there was everything in the existing use of the word to render its employment, as denotative of distinct individual subsistence, natural to the Latin Fathers, familiar as, like all Romans, they must have been with law, and trained, as many of them had been, in legal practice. The theological terminology of the Greeks, even had it been fixed in the first three centuries, was probably unknown to them. Had they meant to translate it, the result would surely have been different. No man with such a purpose would have rendered *Hypostasis* by *Person*, or *usia* by *substance*. The gradual ascendancy of these words in the two languages was an independent process, and it was after the result that they were compared with each other.

How *substantia* came to take its place in Latin, as answering both to the *usia* of theology and the *usia* of the Categories, it may not be possible exactly to determine. Its having won the former may have helped it to the latter.\* In giving it that former, I have already said that there can have been no intention of translating the term *usia*. Such an intention would, of course, have issued in the adoption of *essentia*. But the Latins were not spontaneously led to that word as denoting the very being of God, perhaps from the following cause. The Seventy thus translated the words addressed to Moses from the bush: ἐγώ εἰμι ὁ ὢν. This would recommend to them the word *ὄνεια* as the substantive corresponding to the participle, and the *Homoousion* might have to them the force, not of a classification under the first category, but as meaning "of one *Jehovahhood*."† But the Latins translated the awful words in question, "Ego sum qui sum," and *essentia* would not have had so close a relationship to these, either in ear or mind, as *ὄνεια* to ὁ ὢν.

Whatever the cause, *substantia*, having established itself with the Latins as the term for God's Being (and it did so as early as Tertullian), became unsuitable to denote the distinctions of subsistence in that Being. There are exceptions, such as Hilary, who had, however, the distinct purpose of commending Greek theological terms to the Latins. On the whole, however, it was so, and the word Person presented itself for the purpose. We find it used thus by Tertullian (*advers. Prax.*), and difficult as it often is to be sure of his precise meaning, we may see that his arguments are incompatible with giving the word the mere sense of *character* or *manifestation*. In such sense it would have had no force against Praxeas, and would neither have needed nor had any connection with the considerations that he urges, such as the following—that in our Lord's declaration, "I and the Father are one," which was pressed by his opponent, there are two Persons, Ego and Pater, and that as much is implied by the word *sumus*, and by his position that the unity of the Trinity is one of substance not of number.‡

The most complete treatise on the Trinity bequeathed to us by the Ante-Nicene period is that of Noratian. He, too, employs the word

\* The Latin logicians, when treating of the first category, seem for a good while to have adopted the word *usia* without translating it. On the other hand, it should be remembered that the heathen Greeks, as late as the fifth century, used *Hypostasis* as synonymous with *usia*. (See Theodoret, Dialog. I.)

† This connection of the *ὄνεια* with the ὁ ὢν, is pointed out by Athanasius de Decret. Nic. 22.

‡ *Cæterum de meo sumet, inquit, sicut ipse de Patris. Ita connexus Patris in Filio, et Filii in Paracleto, tres efficit coherentes, alterum ex altero; qui tres unum sunt non unus; quomodo dictum est, ego et Pater unum sumus, ad substantiæ unitatem, non ad numeri singularitatem.* (Tertull. *adv. Prax.* c. 25.)

Person in opposition to Sabellius, and the sense wherein he does so is apparent from the distinctions on which he lays stress, between the Father as unbegotten and the Son as begotten; the Father as commanding and the Son as obeying. Still more clearly does it come out in the following passage:—

“Sed quia frequenter intendunt illum nobis locum, quo dictum sit, Ego et Pater unum sumus, et in hoc illos æque facile vincemus. Si enim erat, ut hæretici putant, pater Christus, oportuit dicere: Ego et Pater unus sum. At cum Ego dicit, deinde Patrem infert dicendo: Ego et Pater, *proprieta-tem personæ suæ, i.e.,* Filii a paterna auctoritate discernit atque distinguit, non tantummodo de sono nominis, sed etiam de ordine dispositæ potestatis. Qui potuisset dicere, Ego Pater, si Patrem se esse meminisset. Et quia dixit unum, intelligant hæretici, quia non dixit unus. Unum enim neutraliter positum *societatis concordiam*, non unitatem personæ sonat. Unum enim, non unus esse dicitur, quoniam nec ad numerum refertur, sed ad societatem alterius expromitur. Denique adjicit dicens: Sumus, non sum, ut ostenderet per hoc quod dixit, sumus, et Pater, duas esse personas.” (C. 22).

The great work of St. Augustine on the Trinity is perhaps the standard one of the Latin Church, and has done more than any other single treatise to fix her language on this subject. It is very difficult, and whilst it protests against Sabellianism, the reader at first feels all but landed in that by the stress laid on the simplicity of the Divine Essence, and the apparent denial that any statement regarding the several Persons of the Trinity belongs to the category of substance. And a phrase twice uttered seems to have led some who cite it into the belief that Augustine regarded *Persona* as a word the meaning of which is unknown when applied to the distinctions in the God-head. “Cum quæritur quid tres, magnâ prorsus inopiâ humanum laborat eloquium. Dictum est tamen tres Personæ, non ut illud diceretur, sed ne taceretur.” The “tres nescio quid” of St. Anselm is pressed to the same purpose. But it is surely submitting the words of these writers to the narrowest and most barren literalism to understand them thus. If this was St. Augustine’s meaning, then follows the very thing which he deprecates, and the Church and her members are *silent* on the great truth. We cannot fancy him holding that silence to be broken by a mere unmeaning *flatus vocis*. His *non ut illud diceretur* plainly expresses a truth on which he elsewhere insists,\* that all language must be inadequate to denote the Divine nature, and the *ne taceretur* what he also holds that such language must be used as an approximate utterance of that whose full utterance is beyond our power. He would have applied the

\* “Qui loquitur, dicit quod potest. Nam dicere ut est, quis potest? Audeo dicere, fratres mei, forsitan nec ipse Johannes dixit ut est, sed ipse ut potuit, quia de Deo homo dixit: et quidem inspiratus a Deo, sed tamen homo. Quia inspiratus, dixit aliquid; si non inspiratus, dixisset nihil; quia vero homo inspiratus, non totum quod est, dixit; sed, quod potuit homo, dixit.” (August. in Johann Evad. Tract I. i.).

same consideration to any term whatever on such a subject, not therefore forbearing its use, but vindicating it if it served the end of approximate, however inadequate, expression. After much careful weighing the matter, he concludes with a preference of "one Substance and three Persons" to the Greek formula of three *Hypostases*.

And St. Anselm must be understood in the same way. He makes some singular avowals, such as that the words *Person* and *Substance* are objectionable, the one as indicating separation, the other subjection to accidents; but still he vindicates their use, their dangers being guarded against (Anselm, *Monolog.*, c. 78).

On the whole, then, it is clear that the word *Persona* was used by Latin Fathers in a sense other than that of mere character or manifestation, and that while it exactly answered to *πρόσωπον* in Greek, it was agreed, when East and West compared their meanings, that by both words was intended the same thing as by *Hypostasis*. Nay, *Hypostasis* was explained as meaning *πρόσωπον*.\*

We have further definitions of both *Persona* and *Hypostasis*, which, whether the work in which they occur be that of Anicius Manlius Boethius or not, seem decisive of the use of the former word in Latin theology. As a definition, indeed, that of *Persona* has been questioned by some schoolmen, and others proposed, but not in such wise as to affect our present inquiry.

I see, then, no reasonable ground of complaint against the Latin use of the word *Persona* in theology, either because of its difference from *Hypostasis*, or from an alleged change in its meaning since its first introduction. But I am inclined to go further, I am inclined with St. Augustine to prefer the Latin terminology to the Greek, and to contend that the word *Person* in particular has done service such as we could not well have dispensed with.

Let it be considered that while its meaning never underwent any arbitrary change, but only a gradual development and elevation, it was otherwise with *Hypostasis*.† That seems used in the Nicene anathema as equivalent to *οὐσία*, and in the sense therefore of the Latin *Substantia*, habitually too by Athanasius, and by the Gentile world a century later. Further, it was but a term of art, and in its obvious meaning might be applied to things unintelligent and even inanimate. It needed an arbitrary limitation before it could of its own force denote intelligence and spiritual subsistence (Boeth., *De Natura et Persona*). This has never been the case with *Persona*. In no stage of its growth would it have been applied to anything but a

\* See passage from Theodoret quoted above, and the following:—*χρὴ δὲ γενώσκειν ὡς οἱ ἅγιοι πατέρες ὑπόστασιν καὶ πρόσωπον καὶ ἄτομον το αὐτο ἐκάλεσαν, το καθ' ἑαυτὸ ἰδιοστάτως ἐξ οὐσίας καὶ συμβεβηκότων ὑφιστάμενον, καὶ ἀριθμῷ διαφέρον, καὶ τὸν τινα δηλοῦν, ὡς Πέτρον καὶ Παῦλον.* Joh. Damasc. *Dialect.* c. 43, p. 46.

† I ought, however, to admit that this has been matter of discussion.

moral and intelligent agent.\* It very soon became the counter term to all but that. The distinction between Person and thing, fundamental in law, has taken its place in morals. The word which first meant mask, and then the character indicated by the mask, next in legal proceedings the agent as distinguished from the act and from any matter which might be involved in the description, which sometimes denoted one of especial dignity, has come to designate each human being in that wherein he is different from all that is inanimate or irrational, that which constitutes him more than animal, that which is the seat in him of moral good or evil, that which makes him responsible. Without trying further to sound "the abysmal depths of Personality" we may content ourselves with Waterland's definition, at least as good as Locke's, and far better than Johnson's, that Person means "an intelligent agent, having the distinctive character of I, Thou, He; and not divided nor distinguished into intelligent agents capable of the same characters."†

In short, Personality is identical with *Ichheit*. This great mystery in each of us in virtue of which he is to be called not a thing but a Person, has made itself increasingly felt in philosophy, in morals, and in legislation. For the two first, our habitual, nay, haunting, recognition of it, makes the great difference between modern and ancient philosophy. For the last, the sense of it demands the position accorded to women in Christendom, the sweeping away of slavery, the imparting of education to hewers of wood and drawers of water. It is now felt to be blasphemy to regard any human being as a chattel, and the treatment of tenants in their exercise of the franchise as "one's own," is viewed with opprobrium. It is obvious that all this is directly or indirectly the result of the Christian faith, and though it would be preposterous to trace it all to the development of the word Person, yet that development is closely connected with it all.

Now I contend that the revealed distinctions in the Godhead teach us, if they teach us anything, to view the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost as three *Persons*, in this the highest and ultimate sense of the word. They are in relations to each which we must call personal. The Father loves and commands, the Son and the Holy Ghost love and obey. The Father sends, the Son and the Holy Ghost are sent. There is a mutual beholding—"The Son can do nothing of Himself, but whatsoever things he sees the Father do, the same does the Son also." The language of the Son to the Father

\* There is an exception, probably accidental,—a passage already quoted in Joh. Damascene, where the words *ὑπόστασις*, *πρόσωπον*, and *ἀρμον*, are represented as denoting an individual, be it man or horse.

† Second Defence of some Queries. Works, vol. iii. p. 339.

is that of distinct Personality, the use of the pronouns I, Thou, and Me—"Lo! I come to do Thy Will," "I know that Thou hearest Me always."

But then we are told that Personality implies division of substance from all besides, so that three Persons must be three separate beings. Undoubtedly it is so with us, and with any created existence whatsoever. But to say that it must, therefore, be so with God, is to confound the *accidents* of Personality in our case and that of other creatures with the idea of Personality itself. The distinct Personality of each of us undoubtedly brings with it not only separation of substance, but of much habit, thought, and feeling, interposing between each man and all his fellows a chasm which cannot be bridged or overleapt.

"Each in his hidden sphere of joy or woe,  
Our hermit spirits dwell and range apart,  
Our eyes see all around in gloom or glow,  
Hues of their own fresh borrowed from the heart."

But this separation between man and man, though it cannot be destroyed, may be greatly diminished. It is the function of love to diminish it. And just in proportion as this is done in men do they become less divided, while the Person in each comes out in greater strength and clearer manifestation. Slavery to the senses and to self involves the weakening of Personality; and therefore Personality is faintest where men are living each for himself. In such case the spirit and the will, wherein the former consists, have little sway and feeble action, and we are, like the animals, necessitated by that lower nature which we have in common with them. But when we rise up into sympathy and love, then the spirit and the will subdue the lower nature, and all that element of our being in virtue of which we are not things but persons, comes out into prominence and ascendancy.

The more, therefore, we are united with others in true, self-abdicating love, the more are we Persons. And were it possible for two or more people to love each other entirely, to possess exactly the same amount of knowledge, to think always exactly the same thoughts, to have the same wishes and purposes, is it not plain that they would be only separate in the accident of their separate bodily organizations? They would be one in mental substance, and yet in each there would be not less but more Personality. The will would in each be more perfectly free and predominant than in ordinary men. Each would be a fountain of love, pouring itself forth on the others.

Now this state, though it is one to which men can approach, is of course of impossible attainment at present. But it is otherwise with God. In his perfect being there are no accidents, like our separated organizations, to hinder entire and absolute unity. God is one, the

consummate unity on which all things rest; and yet this unity is no barren abstract point, but an infinite fulness, in which all life and all love have their seat. The Father is a Person who sees in his eternally-begotten Son his own perfect image, the complete and flawless mirror of his own goodness, and seeing this, pours out on it his unbounded love; and the Son is a Person, who from eternity loves his Father, is the delighted doer of that Father's will, and everlastingly prays to that Father; and both Father and Son have their fulness of joy in the Spirit, who eternally proceeds from both, and is of necessity a Person too, capable of helping our infirmities, and making intercession for us. Are not all these distinctions such as we habitually indicate by the words Person and Personal, and for which we have no other terms precisely equivalent? And why am I to be held to the statement that these notions involve division of substance, when this great truth of revelation teaches me that they do not? It is not the division of substance accompanying it which makes the Personality in us: it is that which, true of each human being, is truer still of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost—interpenetrating each other in that transcendent essence wherein infinite fulness is found together with simple unity, and “distinction exists unaided by division.”

The assertion of Canon Liddon, quoted by the Dean of Westminster, is no doubt incontrovertible, that “the word Person cannot be employed to denote the distinctions in the Godhead without considerable intellectual caution.” But of what other word in human language may and should not the same be said? In whatever way we try to set forth the name and the truth into which we are baptized, our caution cannot be too reverent, our sense of the inadequacy of all mortal language too habitual or too constant.

I may, however, be met by the objection that, be the force of what I have urged what it may, it involves an amount of metaphysical reflection of which the many are incapable, and to which, therefore, they ought not to be urged. Why, it will be said, obtrude a word which can only escape a mischievous meaning by means of subtle and difficult considerations, and which, therefore, must convey that mischievous meaning to the whole world outside the schools?


This objection seems to me to apply to every possible statement, every possible word, on the subject—would justify keeping back John xiv., xv., xvi., and xvii., from the many, and would reduce the Church to that *silence* which Augustine deprecated. If the pastoral duties of teaching, catechising, laboriously explaining, are to be left undone, then no doubt some false or mischievous notions will take possession of any mind that is not a mere blank as to the question. If these duties are discharged, then I do not think we shall find that chasm

between minds on which we of the clergy are too apt to lay stress. It is not in a greater or less capacity for the reception of a metaphysical truth that the difference of classes makes itself manifest: and I should, I own, have more expectation of finding the poor man who has been carefully instructed in Divine things able to keep free at once from "confounding the Persons" and "dividing the Substance," than his richer and more cultivated brother. The latter in England is too generally a stranger to all direct pastoral instruction, and the evil that results affects both laity and clergy, the former in the deprivation of a good, the latter in a forfeiture of power to impart it.\*

This evil will not, however, be remedied, if we rashly fling away the inheritance bequeathed to us by other ages. When terms have become fixed, a great purpose is served by them. The truth which, however inadequately, they express, is consolidated and secured; a succeeding age reaps the result won by the conflicts of a preceding; the task of ever beginning, ever reconstructing is spared; the unity of the Church is asserted in time as well as in space. How far the word Person, as used in Western theology, has served this purpose, I leave my readers to judge. If it has done so, let us gladly and firmly keep possession of it, neither taxing it with the thoughts and notions which accidentally accompany it, nor losing sight of that substantial meaning which it has independently of these.

FRANCIS GARDEN.

\* It is otherwise in Scotland. All ranks there send their children to church to be publicly catechised. So at least it is in the Episcopal Communion; and I believe the custom to be in nowise confined to her members.



## NEUTRALITY FOR NEUTRALS.

“**W**ARS should not be fed by the supply by neutrals of the means of slaughter.” With such specious and sententious phrase the *Times*, not long ago, wound up a vigorous argument in favour of prohibiting the export by neutrals to belligerents of arms and other munitions of war. The thesis undertaken could scarcely have been more effectively put, and would indeed be unimpeachable if, so stated, it enclosed the whole matter in debate. If the question were really nothing more than whether “it is in itself a good thing that the traders of any nation should enrich themselves by furnishing two communities with the means of mutual destruction, while their own government and humane men throughout the world are endeavouring to bring the struggle to an end,” there could be little hesitation as to the reply. “Putting the matter,” as the *Times* says, “on the lowest ground, every one would no doubt admit that the gain which a neutral nation can make by such a trade will be but small, compared with the possible and probable burdens due to animosity against her on the part of the nation which supposes itself injured.” Neither probably are there many who would scruple to go a good deal further, and to call any trade, however profitable, accursed, if by it were kept alive a war in itself so great an evil that any termination of it would be preferable to its continuance.

Plainly, however, two things are here taken for granted, neither

of which is ever strictly consistent with fact. Firstly, it is assumed that, but for neutral supplies, belligerents would be compelled to make peace from sheer want of the material requisites of war; whereas those supplies would be at least as likely to cause comparatively short work to be made of a contest which would otherwise be protracted by reason of the ill-equipment of the parties engaged. Secondly, war is assumed to be always so great an evil that peace at any price is a smaller one; whereas, in the present state of international relations, war is often the sole means of preventing what, by one of the parties to it, is deemed a still greater calamity. To both of these points I may have occasion to advert again hereafter; but I do not propose to insist greatly upon either. A stronger objection to the thesis of the *Times* is, that how much soever may be said in its favour, there is, diametrically opposed to it, another thesis in behalf of which still more may be said. Surely, of neutrals, whose neutrality is not itself a dereliction of duty, it is at once the right and the duty to be neutral. Surely, if it be permissible to a nation to profess neutrality, that nation is not simply at liberty, but bound to practise neutrality as long as she continues to profess it. So much is tolerably clear. Among self-evident propositions there are not many better warranted in challenging contradiction. Yet whoever admits thus much, and is willing to follow it out to its logical conclusion, will find that neutrals have no moral alternative but to persist in the practice which the *Times* so eloquently and earnestly exhorts them to renounce. He will find that it is not only not incumbent on a neutral government to forbid, but that it is incumbent on such a government to permit the export of all munitions of war to belligerents, making no difference in the matter between them and non-belligerents.

If Brown and Robinson choose to fall out for reasons affecting only themselves, their neighbour and mutual friend, Jones, need not, unless he pleases, take a side in the quarrel. Not that it might not be perfectly proper for him to do so if he thought proper. Not that it might not perhaps be even laudable. If he think one of the disputants clearly in the right and the other clearly in the wrong, he cannot be acting otherwise than worthily in doing his best to get wrong righted. But perhaps he may not have leisure to investigate the subject of difference; or, having investigated, he may be unable to decide upon its merits; or, having decided, he may not be able to interfere without neglecting affairs which have nearer claims upon his attention; or he may apprehend that his interference would occasion more harm to himself than good to either of the others, and of course he, no more than the rest of us, supposes it to be part of one's duty to one's neighbour to avail himself of every opportunity

of doing them good, regardless of the expense to himself. Any one of these several reasons might be to Jones a sufficient warrant for declining any part in the quarrel between Brown and Robinson, and for continuing to behave to both of them, in so far as they would permit him, exactly as if they had not quarrelled. Very likely by declining to side with either he may give offence to both, but that is a result for which Mr. Jones is not responsible. Do what he may, it must needs be that offences come. The most that can fairly be required of him is that he furnish no just cause for their coming—and as to that his conscience may be perfectly easy if the heaviest charge that either Brown or Robinson can bring against him is, that though they have become enemies, he is anxious to remain friends with both, and will not allow his demeanour to either to be influenced by their reciprocal misdemeanours. Only, while pretending to such absolute impartiality, he must be careful to be as good as his word. Having been hitherto on nodding terms with both litigants, he must continue to exchange nods and other civilities with both as familiarly as ever whenever he happens to meet them. He must—that is, if they will let him, but it is quite possible that they will not. Robinson is likely enough to complain that he is “cold, very cold,” and Brown to mutter that the only neutrality he has any notion of is a “benevolent neutrality,” which not simply shows that it wishes him well, but also shows that it wishes his antagonist the other thing. Quite possibly, therefore, all that Jones may get for his unwillingness to cut either of them may be to be cut by both; yet even so, in addition to the testimony of his own conscience, Jones will have to comfort him the reflection that he could not have been warmer to Robinson without fanning Brown’s wrath into violent flame, nor have exhibited more benevolence towards Brown without drawing down on himself Robinson’s malevolence. As matters stand, whenever the two make friends with each other again, they will no doubt make friends with him likewise; whereas, if he were to demean himself as either at present would have him, the other would infallibly bear him a long enduring grudge.

From this elementary specimen of neutrality we proceed by single steps to examples considerably more complex. If Jones had been a money-lender, and Brown and Robinson’s quarrel had got to the length of a law-suit, not only would not Jones, by lending on his usual terms of trade to both of them, money enough for the engagement of competent counsel, not have overstepped the rights—he would, by rejecting their applications for loans for that purpose, have fallen short of the duties, of neutrality. He is not in the habit of asking what use his customers purpose making of the money they borrow of him. Provided they give due security for its repayment

with interest, there is no excess of riotous living on which they may not squander it, for aught he cares. Why then should he make any particular inquiries now? How can he say that he is not meddling in a quarrel if, by reason of that very quarrel, he deviates from his ordinary mode of dealing with the parties to it?

And how would the mutual friend's position be altered if, his name being supposed to be, not Jones, but Manton—the celebrated Joe, to wit—and the period being supposed to be that of the good old duelling days, Brown and Robinson, confessedly on internecine cares intent, come to his shop for a brace each of his best hair-triggers? Manton, you are aware, was a pistol-dealer by profession—a profession which, though you perhaps may object to it in the abstract, holding that society ought not to tolerate it, society, you see, nevertheless does tolerate, doubtless perceiving it to be indispensable for the supply of a great and real, though deplorable, social exigence. The profession, therefore, is practically legitimate, and Manton may quite blamelessly sell pistols to applicants in general. But, if so, why not to Brown and Robinson as well as to any one else? What though Brown and Robinson want the pistols to shoot at each other with? For what other purpose are pistols ordinarily purchased? Is it not almost always for the chance of their being some time or other needed to kill or maim a fellow-creature? If Brown or Robinson, only a day or two back, had asked for pistols with a view to only some remote or possible contingency of the kind, there would have been no possible pretext for denying them. But is there any better pretext now, merely because the remote contingency has become a present reality? As well might a publican affect qualms of conscience about pouring you out a dram to be drunk on the premises, while tendering you a bottle to carry off and get drunk with at home. Is not the fact of an article, whether gin or pistol, being wanted for immediate instead of prospective use, a reason not the less, but the more, why a customer should be served with it?

Just, then, as Jones might have supplied Brown and Robinson with money, so with equal propriety may Manton, if he likes, sell them pistols, on application. And not *may* only, but also *must*, if he profess neutrality, and care for consistency, for no otherwise can he exhibit that unchanged demeanour which neutrality implies. Neutrality is not, indeed, incumbent on him. Although he will scarcely have the face to object to duelling in general, he may yet entertain such objections to this duel in particular, as will fully warrant him in offering such negative obstruction to it as may consist in declining to purvey the requisites for its prosecution. Only he must understand that in so declining he is discarding neutrality and

taking an effective *part* in the quarrel, and is only not taking a *side* also because he is assuming an attitude of opposition to both instead of to only one of the parties concerned, and is endeavouring to thwart the objects of both. His opposition, too, however well meant, proceeds from mistaken kindness, and is calculated to be sensibly injurious to those against whom it is directed. For by refusing them the pistols they ask for, he will not prevent them from fighting. He will only, by compelling them to resort to an inferior dealer, cause them to fight with worse pistols than he would have supplied—pistols that, instead of hitting their aim, may perhaps carry askew, and hit a sympathising second instead of a hostile principal, or may burst in the shooter's hand, and, besides maiming him, kill or maim with their circumvolant splinters one of the seconds into the bargain.

And for the same reasons for which a neutral pistol-dealer would be, not simply at liberty, but in duty bound, to sell pistols to both of the intending duellists, if both applied to him, would he be equally bound to sell to either if only one applied. What concern is it of his that it may perhaps be impecuniosity that prevents Brown from coming to him as customer in the same manner as Robinson, or that Brown may perhaps have to take the field, in consequence, worse equipped than his adversary? It is no part of his business as a neutral to see that the duel is fairly fought. The one single obligation which neutrality imposes on him, but imposes imperatively, is that of neither doing or omitting anything which he would not have done or omitted if there had been no idea of a duel. Wherefore, as in that case he would not have sent Robinson empty away whether Brown accompanied him or not, so neither must he now. Besides, how can he tell that Brown has not, with wise forethought, duly provided himself beforehand, or that if he have not already first-rate pistols of his own, some fire-eating acquaintance may not accommodate him for the occasion? On either of these suppositions, Manton's deviation from neutrality would have the direct opposite of the effect intended, and, instead of keeping the two duellists on a par in point of equipment, would prevent one of them from placing himself on an equal footing in that respect with the other.

This exposition will not be deemed too minutely analytical by any one who considers that to ascertain what would—if private war were permitted—be the rights and duties of individual neutrals in respect of individual belligerents, is simultaneously to ascertain the rights and duties of neutral communities in respect of belligerent communities. Whatever—*pace*, my honoured friend, Baron Bramwell—a single individual may or ought to do, two or any greater number

of individuals, similarly situated, likewise may or ought, separately or collectively, to do. If an individual pistol-dealer may or ought, in certain given circumstances, to sell pistols to intending combatants, so, in similar circumstances, may or ought a pistol-manufacturing firm, however numerous its members, and even though numerous enough to constitute a nation. If the English nation, which by the agency of its Government does actually manufacture cannon at Woolwich, rifles at Enfield, and gunpowder at Waltham, were in time of peace in the habit of selling to foreign governments whatever remained of those munitions of war after her own requirements were satisfied, the circumstance of two of those governments going to war would be no reason why she should not, but rather a reason why she should, continue so to sell to both or either of them. Her inherent and independent right of trading with any of her neighbours that are willing to trade with her, cannot have been destroyed by the fact of two of her neighbours having quarrelled. Regardless of their ignoble strife, she remains at liberty to pursue the even tenor of her way along the cool sequestered vale of her accustomed life, and to deal with either belligerent as nearly in the same manner as before as she can without infringing the rights which war has conferred on the other belligerent. Of course she must not attempt to force a blockade, for that would be actively to obstruct the legitimate operations of one of the belligerents; neither could she, in decency, herself charter vessels for the transport of warlike munitions even to unblockaded ports of either belligerent; but she would be not simply at liberty to sell those same munitions to the agents of either belligerent, to be exported at their own risk, but she could not, consistently with her duties as a neutral, refuse so to sell. True, neutrality would no more be incumbent on her than, as we have seen in cases previously adduced, it would be on non-belligerent individuals. To any non-belligerent government it would be open to side with one of the belligerents, breaking off, consequently, commercial intercourse with the other, or to signify her disapproval of both, by breaking off intercourse with both. So, if she thought proper, she might, perhaps even laudably, act. But if neutrality, though not incumbent on her, were, as in most cases it would be, permissible, and were moreover professedly adopted by her, then, inasmuch as neutrality in war means acting as nearly as circumstances will permit as if there were no war, and inasmuch as the non-belligerent, before the war broke out, would have supplied both or either of the belligerents with the munitions of war, so is she, by the conditions of neutrality, still bound to do, irrespectively of consequences. Being, as a neutral, bound not to interfere in the contest otherwise than with good offices; debarred from attempting,

either by active opposition or passive resistance, to thwart the bellicose arrangements of either of the belligerents, it would plainly be the reverse of an excuse to her for suspending her accustomed purveyance, to one or other or both of them, of the appliances of war, that she expected thereby either to prevent the war from being carried on, or to prevent one of the parties from engaging in it with more advantage than the other. Besides, more probably than not, the real effects of such suspension would, as in the parallel case already cited, be the direct opposites of those expected. If both belligerents were equally in a position to purchase from her, her refusal to supply them as of old with arms and ammunition would only cause them to fight with equipments inferior to those which she could have supplied, and thereby prolong instead of shortening the war. If only one had access to her markets, the other being from whatever cause excluded, her refusal might, as likely as not, prevent the first from equipping itself as efficiently as the second had already providently done from the same, or might still be able to do, from some different, quarter. There would not be much room, therefore, for the plea of either fair play or humanity, though the latter at any rate would infallibly be brought forward to reinforce whatever other excuse might be attempted. Although, as long as peace lasted, arms and other munitions were freely exported—not even Quakers disapproving—for the express purpose of their being used in war whenever occasion might arise, still, as soon as war breaks out, prohibition of their export is demanded in most virtuously indignant terms, because, forsooth, the anticipated occasion has arisen for putting the munitions to the use for which they had been exported. How more and more familiar cant every day becomes! How continually now she meets us grinning at the most unlikely turns!

Even then on so extreme a supposition as that of our Government being itself an habitual dealer in military stores—for Germany, when war broke out last year between France and herself, to have gone no farther than to require, in the name of neutrality, that our Government should discontinue its previous practice of furnishing France with such stores, would, according to the foregoing principles, have been in effect to require a breach of neutrality in proof of neutrality. That demand would not have been a particularly modest one, but Germany's actual demand was far less modest still, being not that our Government, on account of Germany's being at war, should simply desist from certain of its own peaceful usages, but that it should assume certain novel and exceedingly onerous functions in order to promote Germany's warlike views. The English Government has no trade of its own to desist from. England's trade in military stores is carried on by a number of private firms; and what the English Government

was called upon to do was not simply to *forbid* but also to *prevent* those firms from continuing an important part of their accustomed trade, on pain of being held responsible for the consequences of any neglect of prevention or of any inadequacy of its preventive measures. True, what our Government was thus called upon by Germany to do was no more than Germany was fully entitled to do for herself in so far as she had the power, or than our Government would have been bound to acquiesce in her doing. Although, on the one hand, genuine neutrality, so far from debarring the traders of a neutral country from continuing to sell munitions of war to belligerent nations, on the contrary insists on their being permitted so to sell, still, on the other hand, either of two belligerent nations is warranted in taking measures for intercepting the passage of those munitions to its antagonist. Although English manufacturers or merchants would have been fully justified last year in selling arms to French agents for export to France, and even in themselves shipping the arms for French ports, still German cruisers would have been, by the necessities, usages, and laws of war, equally justified in capturing, if they could, both the arms and the vessels conveying them. What constituted the unreasonableness of Germany's demand was her seeking to impose on the English Government as an obligation her own undoubted privilege of interception. Because France and Germany had chosen to go to war of their own accord, England's Government was not simply to submit patiently to German obstruction of the ordinary course of English trade, but was itself to assist in enforcing the obstruction. It so happened that while Germany was advancing this pretension, France, in the exercise of her acknowledged right, had declared the blockade of certain German ports. That England should acquiesce in this blockade, and in the consequent confiscation of any English ships or merchandise captured in an attempt to break the blockade, was a matter of course. Such acquiescence was merely loyal obedience to the acknowledged laws of war. But what if, instead of passively assenting to the enforcement against her subjects of these laws of war, she had, at the demand of France, actively assisted in the enforcement? What if she had detached some of her own frigates to co-operate with the French cruisers in preventing English merchantmen from running supplies into the blockaded German ports? Above all, what if she had represented that procedure as imposed on her by the obligation of neutrality? With what fiery and what just indignation would not Germany have inveighed against us for thus adding insult to injury, by edging hostilities with hypocritical casuistry? Yet what we might thus have done against Germany at the instigation of France, is not more than Germany did actually endeavour to instigate

us to do against France. Nay, it was not so much, for compliance would have been much less difficult with the supposed demand of France than with the real demand of Germany. It would have been much easier to prevent English goods from entering certain blockaded German ports than to prevent English exports from being landed on unblockaded French coasts. How difficult this latter task would have been may be inferred from consideration of the mode in which Count Bernstorff was good enough to suggest that it should be effected. In his Excellency's opinion, nothing could be easier; nothing more was necessary than to take security by means of bonds, handed to shipmasters on departure and cancelled on arrival at port of destination, that articles cleared out for neutral ports were really delivered there; nothing could be more reasonable or equitable than that, for the sake of regulating trade with belligerents, trade between neutrals should be subjected to *surveillance*, and that all persons engaged in it should be treated like ticket-of-leave men, or presumptive criminals out on bail. Yet plainly, the simple effect of thus harassing *bonâ fide* transactions would be that much of what would otherwise have been open, would become clandestine trade; and plainly too, as Lord Granville pointed out, clandestine trade could not be prevented without the substitution of an expensive, intricate, and inquisitorial customs' system for our present free and easy method. The shipper's declaration as to the nature of his shipment, and that, too, not ordinarily given until after the ship's departure, would no longer suffice. Every suspected package would have to be opened, to no better end commonly than that of showing that it had been unjustly suspected, or of suggesting that suspicion ought to have extended further. When, on one exceptional occasion, a railway truck, denounced by Count Bernstorff with more than usual particularity and positiveness, was permitted to be unladen, its contents turned out to be, not the expected breech-loaders, but—bacon. Yet his Excellency was not satisfied. True, he had been mistaken about truck No. 3,601; but then, as he justly argued, some one of the other three thousand six hundred might conceal what he was in search of. How was it possible to say, without looking? To afford him the certainty he desired, even innocent bacon must have been denied free egress, lest haply some stray small arms might lurk amongst the flitches. And if any skipper were inconsiderate enough to accept an unequivocal case of rifles, or barrel of gunpowder, for consignment to some neutral port—say Buenos Ayres or Shanghai—he would at once relinquish the right of changing the ship's course in the event of anything occurring during the voyage to render a change desirable. To Buenos Ayres or Shanghai he would have to go, and land his stores, bringing back a cancelled bond as the only

sufficient proof that he had not landed them instead at Havre or Bordeaux.

Now, not to speak of the strangulating effect of restrictions like these on the general commerce wherein England lives and moves and has her being, for which of its sins can the duty of enforcing these restrictions have devolved on the English Government? It was no fault of England or of any other neutral state that France and Germany went to war. The war between them originated, as every war does, in the crime or folly of one or other or both of the belligerents. But how can their own crime or folly entitle criminals or fools, for the furtherance of their own wicked or unwise purposes, to exact from third parties the discharge of unaccustomed functions — of functions, too, attended with enormous trouble and expense? War, indeed, be it sin or be it insanity, being nevertheless an amusement to which all nations are prone, and in which they all occasionally indulge, and being moreover one which cannot be indulged in without a certain amount of interference with the peaceful practices of non-belligerents, is, by universally international consent, allowed to carry with it a qualified right of such interference. No one denies that the cruisers of a belligerent state are warranted in trying to prevent the entry of supplies of any kind into a port which they are blockading. No one disputes their right to seize and confiscate, together with its cargo, any neutral ship caught attempting to elude their vigilance. But on the other hand no one ever pretended that a neutral Government is bound to assist in enforcing that right against its own subjects. The intervention of a belligerent's right of stopping the trade between the neutral country and a country with which the aforesaid belligerent is at war, has not cancelled the pre-existing right of the neutral country to trade with any country with which it is itself at peace. That latter right can indeed be no longer exercised, except under peril of belligerent interference, but provided the interference can be evaded, the exercise of the trade remains as legitimate as before. Belligerent cruisers may legitimately, if they can, intercept neutral merchantmen attempting to enter a blockaded port, but neutral merchantmen may, as legitimately, enter, if they can contrive to get in. Enough, surely, for the neutral Government that it patiently acquiesce in the penalties inflicted by a foreign power on its subjects for no worse offence than that of prosecuting what is to them a lawful traffic. Enough that it permit the confiscation of such of their ships and cargoes as are unlucky enough to be intercepted by a blockading squadron. But it is clearly under no obligation to a foreign power to prohibit its subjects from prosecuting their lawful calling if they are content to run its risks. Still more plainly is it under no obligation to incur trouble

and expense for the purpose of preventing as well as forbidding. For France to have claimed that England should largely augment her navy and commission many additional ships to scour the seas and prevent English merchantmen from approaching German blockaded ports would have been too absurd to be thought of. Yet not a whit less, but rather much more, preposterous was the claim virtually made by Germany, that England should double her custom-house establishments in order to prevent the passage of warlike stores from England to unblockaded French coasts. As well might our old acquaintance Brown, if Robinson and he had been content to fight with fists instead of pistols, have insisted on Jones senior not only not himself acting as Robinson's bottle-holder, but hiring a policeman to mount guard and see that none of the young Joneses officiated in the same capacity. Yet this is how Brown must needs have insisted if he had applied to Jones those principles of "benevolent neutrality" to which Germany desired to hold England. Nay he would have gone much farther in his demands. Whatever blow he happened to receive in his pugilistic encounter, whatever crusher on the nose or stunner between the eyes, would not, he might fairly argue, have been delivered so effectively but for the vigour derived by Robinson from the bottle held to his mouth by Jones junior, who could not have been there if Jones senior had kept proper watch: wherefore, he might continue, Jones senior was the ultimate cause of his bruised features, and was liable to damages accordingly. Not unless Brown's exorbitance rose thus high would it rise to the level of that of Germany's representative. For thus said Count Bernstorff: "England is feeding a war which would have ended sooner and with less slaughter of German soldiers, if France had been left to her own resources. England, therefore, will be held morally responsible for the blood which is being shed." In other words, that a neutral Government shall be not less responsible for repression of the new international offence which German ingenuity has devised than for the protection of its own subjects, will not suffice. We, British tax-payers, do certainly expect that in return for the heavy contributions levied upon us, adequate watch shall be set to secure our persons and property from outrage. But although regarding *quod facit per alium, facit per se*, as a maxim of universal application, we cheerfully admit that its converse implies a strain too severe for any Government to exist under. If, therefore, the watch set neglect its duty and suffer any of us to be robbed or murdered, it does not occur to the sufferers or survivors that the Government should make amends. We are content if the delinquent watchmen are dismissed or otherwise suitably punished, but the despoiled owner never dreams of being compensated, nor the newly-made widow and orphans of being pensioned, at the

public charge. The services which a Government owes to the subjects at whose sole cost it is maintained are, however, it seems, to be no measure of the services which it is to render gratuitously to foreign governments. In respect of these, whatever good offices it volunteers to endeavour to get performed, it thereupon becomes bound at its peril to get performed punctually and completely. It must not attempt to transfer the blame of non-performance to its agents. Their sins, not less of omission than of commission, are to be treated as its own. Nor their sins only, but likewise any which their neglect may have afforded to foreigners facilities for committing within foreign jurisdiction. If the King of Prussia had unluckily got shot in the trenches before Paris by a bullet from a rifle with the Enfield mark upon it, his Majesty's blood would, according to the new high German theory, have been as unequivocally on the head of the British Government, as if Mr. Gladstone himself had pointed and discharged the regicide piece. So Count Bernstorff did not scruple to give us to understand, notwithstanding that the export of arms from a neutral to a belligerent country is strictly in accordance with the universal and immemorial practice which as yet constitutes the sole international law on the subject.

Hitherto we have spoken of warlike munitions as if thereby was to be understood nothing but arms and ammunition technically so called, whereas in reality there are very few articles of any sort or kind that may not with equal propriety be classed under the same head. Weapons can be of no use without soldiers to wield them, and soldiers in order to be of use must be maintained in health and vigour, while their utility will be further augmented in proportion as they are provided with facilities for transport and for correspondence. All necessities of life, therefore, and all superfluities which can on a pinch be made to take the place of necessities; all things whatsoever which directly or indirectly can serve for food, or raiment, or shelter; all medicines likewise and surgical appliances, and sundries innumerable and as diverse in character as coal and copper wire, may become of no less service in war than powder and shot, and may on occasion be equally brought within the same contraband category. In point of fact, one of the earliest of Germany's recent complaints against England was based upon a report that cargoes of coal were being despatched from Newcastle to Heligoland for the supply of French steam transports; and a subsequent one was that an embargo was not placed on a telegraph cable that had been ordered from this country for the purpose of being laid between Bordeaux and Dunkirk. It was an exceptional piece of forbearance on Germany's part not to protest against Colonel Loyd Lindsay and his fellow-administrators of our "Sick and Wounded Fund" for their impartial male-

volence in continually despatching medicaments for the rehabilitation of French and German disabled soldiers, thereby enabling many of them the sooner to recommence the work of mutual destruction. Certainly if she had been in the position of France she would not have forborne to protest most vehemently against such immigration from neutral territory as that of the long droves of Flemish, Dutch, and Danish cattle which, throughout last autumn and winter, were successively wending their way towards beleagured Paris, and conducting as unequivocally to the fall of that capital as if they had been dragging some of Krupp's heavy guns instead of only their own succulent carcases to the aid of the besiegers. So few, indeed, are the articles that may not, as being capable of being used in war, be denounced as munitions of war, that for neutrals to relinquish the right of exporting such munitions to belligerents would be almost the same thing as consenting not to trade with them at all. Thenceforward whenever France and Germany were seized with one of their joint fits of *delirium belligerens* it would be for English consumers and English producers to suffer, the former by having to forego all their accustomed French and German indulgences—Chateau Lafitte and Steinberger-Cabinet among the rest—for want of commodities that could be legally sent in exchange, and for fear lest the calico and broad-cloth and cheese and porter, that would in ordinary times have been sent, might be scraped into lint for stanching soldiers' wounds, or made into soldiers' uniforms, or served out as soldiers' rations; the latter, the myriads, that is, of our workpeople whose ordinary occupation it is to create material for an annual export trade of forty millions sterling, by being thrown out of employment, while upon their own Government, whose natural function it would seem to be to foster their industry, would have devolved the office of enforcing the restrictions whereby that industry was for the time extinguished.

And to what end is all this to be done and suffered? What is the *quid pro quo* suggested by the *Times* as an inducement to England to accept an innovation in international law which would impose upon her burdens and exact from her sacrifices so intolerable? Even, be it remembered, preservation from the animosity of belligerents which her adherence to usages sanctioned by existing international law is calculated to provoke. Now that under a continuance of what has always hitherto been international law and practice, there would be abundant scope for up-growth of the apprehended animosity cannot be denied. If, in the distempered eyes of either party to a quarrel, not to be with is to be against, and to remain on terms with one is to break with the other, profession of equal good-will to both can scarcely be expected to atone for concentration of all active good offices on one alone. Of any two belligerents one will almost always have

either much less need than the other of neutral supplies, or much greater facilities for obtaining them. Of any two between whom England may stand neuter one will almost always, in virtue of her naval superiority, be able to cut off the other from the greater part of her English trade. By that other the spectacle of the first deriving from England resources in which, from whatever cause, she herself does not participate, is not likely to be regarded with equanimity; nor will it be wonderful if she do not very accurately distinguish between positive hostility and the friendship which furnishes hostility with the means of injury. But if, on the one hand, it may as well be owned that no neutral country, and particularly not England, can exercise the same unrestricted rights of trade with belligerents as with non-belligerents, without furnishing one or other of the belligerents with plausible pretext for picking a quarrel with her, it is, on the other hand, certain that by renouncing those rights she would both multiply fifty-fold the occasions of quarrel and afford them to both belligerents instead of to one only. If it had so happened that, before last year's war broke out, provident Germany had taken care to fill up her arsenals with English imports while self-confident France had taken no such precautions, would it not have been palpable favouritism on our part to forbid France to repair her previous omission, and, on the plea of treating both alike, to withhold from her the same facilities for equipment against Germany which we had just before afforded to Germany for equipment against her? Could France desire a better idea about which to go to war with us if thereafter at any time in search of one? Nor meanwhile would our Government be committing itself less seriously with Germany, by whom, in consequence of its having declared trade with France to be temporarily illegal, it would naturally be expected to take proper measures for its prevention. But if by proper are to be understood adequate measures, to take proper measures would be impossible, for what conceivable measures would be adequate? By what system of bonds or other so ingenious custom-house devices could stray barrels or bales of provisions, or gunpowder, or medicines, however formally cleared out for the Antipodes, be prevented from being run ashore somewhere in the Bay of Biscay or Gulf of Lyons? and what conclusive answer could be given to some future Count Bernstorff insisting that those clandestine imports had added extra effectiveness to French file-firing or French bayonet-charges, and that England was justly liable in blood-money for the extra slaughter of German soldiers so occasioned?

From the way in which we have seen pretensions of the sort advanced already, albeit neutral trade with belligerents is as yet as legal as immemorial and universal practice can make it, we may

judge how plentifully they would crop up if the trade were, by international agreement, to be illegalized. No war could then take place without shedding all around the possible seeds of subsequent wars. Any litigiously disposed nation, by merely embroiling herself with any one of her neighbours, would presently obtain in the *laches* of each one of the rest, a *casus belli* to be made use of whenever occasion might suit. The most circumspect neutral could not avoid some *laches* upon which demands against her of indefinitely magnifiable amount might be founded. To be sure, the very excess of the evil might bring about its cure. The family of nations would not perhaps be long without insisting on the repeal of legal innovations that had rendered war a so universally intolerable nuisance; but the law may apparently just as well remain as it is, as be violently changed with no more useful result than that of being immediately restored to its present condition.

Upon all that has gone before a natural comment is, that it will apply quite as much to ships, as to any other munitions, of war. If export of the latter ought to be perfectly free, why not that of the former? Why, while Birmingham was busily manufacturing rifles for France, would engineering firms on Thames and Clyde have been required to refuse orders for ironclads from Germany if any such orders had come? Why, instead of so earnestly pleading its freedom from privity to the evasion of the *Alabama*, did not our Government at once make short work of the matter by proclaiming that it would have been no affair of hers if fifty *Alabamas* had steamed out of the Mersey in broad day with Confederate colours flying and Armstrong guns saluting? Well may these questions be asked. Would that the last of them had been authoritatively asked a good deal sooner. It is entirely by her own act that the right vested in England by international law of selling armed ships to foreign nations has been in any degree impaired. In 1794 the Congress of the United States of America, in compliance with English remonstrances, passed a law forbidding French privateers from being fitted out from American ports against English commerce, and the English Parliament in return passed a law in 1819 interdicting the fitting out from English ports of vessels intended for hostilities against the United States. Here was the fountain-head and original source of mischief, which is still a good way from having run itself out. Thus was created whatever shadow of foundation there was for those extravagant claims which, making a virtue of necessity, we are now trying to persuade ourselves we shall be cheaply rid of even at the expense of the treaty of Washington. That diplomatic counterpart of the surrender-at-discretion of Sedan is now a sufficiently accomplished fact to be quite past praying for, and is only referred to here

for the sake of the instructive moral to be drawn from it. The undetermined number of millions sterling which under its provisions we shall have to pay, will not have been thrown away if they deter us from repeating an indiscretion that will have cost us so dearly, and if they induce us, as Sir Roundell Palmer temperately advises, to be "content with the grave responsibilities which we have already assumed, and by no means to enlarge them."

Briefly now to recapitulate. We have seen that to permit the free export of munitions of war to belligerents, is at once the obvious right and the indispensable duty of neutrality, while for a neutral to undertake to prevent the export is to bind itself under incalculable penalties to impossible performances. About the course to be taken where justice and expediency both so clearly point one way, there ought not to be much doubt. For nations, as for individuals, the first essential is to ascertain their duties, and to do them at whatever cost or consequences; the next, to ascertain their rights, and to exercise them to whatever extent self-interest may recommend, and reasonable consideration for other nations may not forbid. That even by so limited an exercise of rights a nation will give offence, incur odium, provoke animosity, is a thing of course, which may as well be permitted to take its course, for by no self-abnegation on the part of the nation concerned could the same result, or a worse, have been obviated. England's experience of foreign affairs ought by this time to have taught her how hopeless it is to attempt to forestall ill-will by gratuitous concessions, and how sure she is, whenever she undertakes the part of the old man in the fable, to discover presently that she has been playing the part of the ass also. Wherefore, whenever she is again inclined towards self-sacrifice for the benefit of her neighbours, let her at least make sure of the genuineness of her motives, and reconcile herself beforehand to the fact that misrepresentation of them is the smallest ingratitude she will meet with in return. Let her listen with becoming patience to whatever duly authorized voice may assure her, in the time-honoured language of the nursery, that, as she herself behaves, others will behave to her, but let her not by such soft lullaby be soothed into belief that any mere meekness, however exemplary, will ward off from her the perils of a Battle of Dorking. Let her, if not ashamed, be at any rate afraid to depend for safety, not on her own strength, but on foreign forbearance. With her native resources, and the help which heaven proverbially vouchsafes to those who help themselves, she is quite as able, as she has so often proved herself before, to hold her own against all comers, provided only she be equally ready. "Nought shall make her rue" any more now than in Shakespeare's day, if only to herself she "rest as true," but she will not remain as true unless

her children believe both in her and in themselves as heartily as Shakespeare's contemporaries did. We smile contemptuously as we call to mind the old-fashioned enthusiasm of our ancestors about—

“ This accepted isle,  
This earth of majesty, this seat of Mars,  
This other Eden, demi-paradise,  
This happy breed of men, this little world,  
This precious stone set in the silver sea,  
This land of such dear souls, this dear, dear land,  
Dear for her reputation through the world.”

Such passionate patriotism savours to us of foolish fondness. Well for us, nevertheless, if we had retained somewhat more of it, for it was at any rate wiser than the smug indifferentism that has so largely displaced it. “ Let us not despise our forefathers,” says De Tocqueville; “ truly we have no right. Would to God that we could recover, together with some of their prejudices and defects, some little of their greatness; some few of those masculine virtues of theirs which we at once most need and most lack—their genuine spirit of independence, their lofty aspirations, their faith in themselves and in a cause!” (*L'Ancien Regime*, pp. 15 and 205.) Woe to us if the lost faith and fire are clean gone for ever! yet I, for my own part, can see no better chance of their being recovered than may consist in the diffusion amongst us of an education sufficiently thorough and elevating to teach all classes, first, how best to obtain so much of this world's good as can legitimately be brought within their reach, and then, how cheerfully to forego whatever of it is unattainable. Knowledge, content, concord, strength—God grant that the phases of the great social revolution so visibly impending may have no worse order of succession.

W. T. THORNTON.



## DORNER'S HISTORY OF PROTESTANT THEOLOGY.

*History of Protestant Theology, particularly in Germany, viewed according to its fundamental movement, and in connection with the Religious, Moral, and Intellectual Life. By Dr. J. A. DORNER, Oberconsistorialrath and Professor of Theology at Berlin. Translated by Rev. GEORGE ROBERTSON, M.A., Inverness, and SOPHIA TAYLOR. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark.*

THE readers of the *Contemporary Review* do not need to be introduced to Dr. Dörner. They have quite recently had the opportunity of judging for themselves of his power as a writer. His recent contribution was such as to give some evidence of the massive breadth of thought by which he is distinguished; and those who are familiar with his "History of the Development of the Doctrine of the Person of Christ," know how eminent he is as a scholar. The work just named was published by him when he was Professor at Göttingen. He has now for a considerable time been Professor in Berlin, and the work here presented to the English reading public as the result of his more recent labours, is one of great inherent interest, marked by all those qualities which have so honourably distinguished previous writings from the same pen.

The subject of the treatise now before us was not selected by the author himself. Rather, he was selected as the man specially qualified to deal with it. The circumstances in which the selection was made are unusual. The Royal Academy of Sciences in Munich, under the auspices of Maximilian II., King of Bavaria, appointed a historical commission to provide for the issue of a history of the sciences in Germany. The Commission determined to have a history of Protestant theology, and also a history of Catholic theology. The

first was entrusted to Dr. Dorner, the second to Dr. Werner, both men of mark as representatives of their own division of the Church. The work now before us, in two goodly volumes, is the result of Dr. Dorner's labours, undertaken at the desire of the Commission, and it is worthy of the auspices under which it appears.

Before speaking of its merits in detail, we think it well to indicate our opinion of the manner in which the translators have done their work. There is throughout both volumes most satisfactory evidence of conscientious effort to do justice to the meaning of the original, and very rarely indeed has the reader occasion to suggest that a little more might have been done to secure perspicuity and elegance in the English. Dr. Dorner does not always concern himself to avoid complicated sentences, and his translators must at times have felt that it was not exactly an easy thing to maintain clearness of diction. They have, however, succeeded in a very high degree in making their translation readable in accordance with English idiom. Mr. Robson has added to his translation occasional notes, some of them of inherent value, and some others of consequence specially from an English point of view. Miss Taylor has done her part exceedingly well in translating the second volume, and is not least successful in that part which we naturally regard as most testing for a lady, where the author deals with the more abstruse speculations of German philosophers.

To the translation, Dr. Dorner himself prefixes an address to English readers, in which he considers the relation subsisting between German and English Protestantism. From that preface we take the following statement of the aim of the work: "It seeks, under the guidance of Evangelical Catholicity, to furnish the historical evidence that, in spite of the variety of nationalities, as well as the manifold conformations of Evangelical Protestant Christianity amongst those peoples which have appropriated the blessings of the Reformation of the sixteenth century, in spite of the division in languages, usages, and habits, as well as in its destinies, Evangelical Protestant Christendom forms an unity." While, then, the book deals more prominently with German phases of Protestant thought, it takes a wider range, so as to embrace a general view of Protestant theology as a whole. A task such as this cannot be undertaken without some sense of the polemical bearing of the result, in the consciousness of which the writer is continually in danger of having his fairness as a historian severely tried. Such history is difficult to write under sway of the rigidly critical spirit, unbiassed by the strength of personal conviction and feeling. As, however, a perfectly unbiassed historian is not to be looked for, as we cannot expect that a writer will take to such work who has no personal conviction or interest on

either side, we must the more anxiously look for evidence of a generous spirit towards those who differ, and a scrupulous desire to secure accuracy, on the part of those who appear as the historians of opposing divisions of the Christian Church. After perusal of the present work, those who most differ from Dr. Dorner, will not be disposed to launch against him the charge of being a bigoted evangelical, with no range of sympathy for any doctrine or church organization in which he cannot claim a personal share. He is distinguished by scholarly research, genial appreciation of all forms of culture, and a well-balanced judgment, swayed by a spirit of fairness to those who differ from him.

When he has to touch upon Roman Catholic theology, he maintains judicial calmness, and does not awaken in the reader the discomfort often felt in perusing the writing of a passionate polemic. Dr. Dorner accepts his task as one which is scientific in character, and, himself appreciating the Protestant theology, he proceeds to search for historical evidence of its scientific unity. His work is not specifically that of a historian of events, but, admitting that an abundance of histories of the Reformation in the common acceptance already exist, his part is to seek, specially in the literature of Protestantism, for evidence of a consistent unity of theological belief. His stand-point is discovered in these fundamental positions: that Protestantism "has a proper principle of life in itself," that it "possesses an intrinsic right to self-preservation and continuance," and that on these grounds it cannot refuse the task "of justifying its separate existence and its peculiar nature *historically*, i.e., of showing by a historical review that a necessity for its appearance had arisen both in a negative and a positive respect."

In surveying his ground at the outset, he takes his position in relation to the Roman Catholic Church in a guarded and fair manner. The following passage, taken from the introduction, may suffice by way of illustration. He says:—

"We have not here to inquire whether Protestantism and Roman Catholicism differ from one another in kind, or as stages in the apprehension of Christianity. In the former case, their difference would be based upon a difference of the religious individuality, which, whether it appears as a national characteristic or in the individual, possesses an intrinsic right to self-preservation and continuance; in the latter case, the higher stage must conserve perfectly what is good in the lower, just as, on the other hand, a general obligation must rest on the latter to pass over into the higher. Perhaps neither the one nor the other completely expresses the case; perhaps Protestantism, which is conscious of representing a higher stage of the religious spirit, has nevertheless only a partial right to be held as completely realizing it, inasmuch as, while representing what is indeed a higher stage, and therefore one to be entered on by the whole of Christendom, it

represents it in an individual manner, so that possibly on the same stage other forms of the Christian spirit may yet show themselves."

This passage will enable readers to judge of the spirit in which Dr. Dorner enters upon his task, a spirit which is admirably maintained when dealing with the Pre-Reformation Church, both in its Roman Catholic or Western Division, and in its Oriental Division. The result is a work in every way deserving of careful examination now, as it is likely to be afterwards valued as one deserving the highest confidence as a work of reference, on account of its ample research amongst the materials upon which competent judgment must rest.

The main feature of the first volume is the fulness of treatment given to the Lutheran Reformation. To that Dr. Dorner devotes his strength. In accordance with the title of the book, and as was naturally to be expected from one whose whole life has made him familiar with German thought and history, he treats at all times more fully of what concerns his Fatherland. In view of the circumstances in which he was called upon to undertake the work, it may even be admitted that this was laid upon him as a special duty connected with the undertaking. As a natural consequence we have greater thoroughness in treating of Luther, than of Zwingli or Calvin—more fulness of view when German nationality is contemplated, than when attention is turned upon other nationalities, such as the Swiss or British. We could have wished that the historical representation of Calvin's life-work had been brought somewhat more closely up to those grand proportions in which the colossal figure of Luther is presented. Since, however, this was not to be expected in the present case, we must content ourselves with wishing that each nationality concerned in the great Reformation movement may contribute its quota to the history of Protestant theology, after the manner in which Dr. Dorner has executed the part to be done for Germany. In the work before us, Calvin is tested rather by the touchstone which Luther affords, than by detailed examination of the historical stages through which the influence of Calvin told upon the Reformed Church. At the same time the view of Calvin's theology, summarized as it is, bears clear traces of the range of a critical eye whose observations give zest to the perusal of the outline.

Dr. Dorner's view of the theological teaching of Luther is certainly one of the most complete representations of the doctrinal system of the great German reformer to be found in our language. There is not a part of his multifarious writings which does not seem to have been examined, in connection with the historical circumstances of its publication, for the purpose of pronouncing upon its relation to the teaching of Luther as a whole. The entire set of questions raised by the changing utterances of the reformer at

different stages of his career is raised for investigation and candidly dealt with. The development of his theological conviction is traced with critical minuteness and care. Opinions may vary as to the completeness of success in this undertaking, but, we incline to think, most will allow that the work is done with a masterly hand. Luther's boldness has been familiar enough in every picture of him, but we scarcely think there is anywhere else to be found such striking testimony as here to his caution and self-restraint. Often enough the unsystematic character of his writings has been dwelt upon, but here the line of unity is traced throughout with great patience and skill. Traces of uncertainty and immaturity of thought are carefully marked, and the gradual development of a system of belief, especially by the agency of Luther and Melancthon, distinctive of the Reformation movement, is established by an ample array of evidence.

From this our author passes to recount the differences among the adherents of the Reformation, leading to the separation of the Reformed and Lutheran branches of the Church; and traces the history of that severance from the seventeenth to the beginning of the nineteenth century. He examines the condition of the Reformed and Lutheran Churches in the earlier portion of this period, pointing to the existence of a "one-sided objectivity" in both; and he next traces the rise of "subjectivity" both in Britain and on the Continent, under the influence of a reviving philosophy, to which Des Cartes contributed very largely. To this portion of the work we have no space to give extended reference.

We pass on to consider the triumph of subjectivity in the eighteenth century, when the influence of philosophy becomes peculiarly strong. Dr. Dorner has thoroughly studied and appreciated the varying phases of philosophical speculation in his own country, and here treats of them with a breadth of comprehension and a fulness of philosophic sympathy which will make the second volume of this work interesting to all students of philosophy, and specially to those who seek to trace the relations of philosophical thought to theology. Dr. Dorner does not write merely as a theologian, but as a philosophic student of history, who marks with interest the vital energy of original thought in whatever direction it springs up. He not only expects that the philosophic thought of the age must make itself felt as a power within the Church, but by its penetrating action may bring even revived life to the Church. Thus the philosophy of Des Cartes has a special interest to him, and when he comes to deal with British theology in the seventeenth century, he cannot do so without dwelling upon the theories of Hobbes and Cudworth, Locke and Shaftesbury. In similar spirit, he finds one grand part of the explanation

of the state of Protestant theology in Germany throughout the eighteenth century, in the successive stages of philosophical speculation of an intensely subjective order. In this way a large share of attention is given to Leibnitz, Wolff, Kant, Fichte, and Jacobi; when, passing on to a period still closer upon our own times, he treats of Schelling, Hegel, and Schleiermacher, after which, coming to our own days and our own doors, he does not fail to take notice of the *Contemporary Review* itself as representing a phase of progress.

With exceeding felicity of language, well preserved in the translation, he touches off in a few sentences some leading characteristics of the philosophic systems concerning which he speaks. He is happy in this description of the writings of Leibnitz :—

“His philosophy is a seed vessel full of philosophical ideas, which do not however forthwith appear in the form of a system, but monad-wise, as it were, in that of larger or smaller monographs. It is as though he strove by such monographs to exhibit microcosmically, and from ever shifting points of view, that whole which he had in view, but which he never carried out symmetrically and harmoniously.”

Or take by way of example the following description of what Kant achieves by his practical philosophy :—

“He has the merit of having fixed, by means of his categorical imperative, and with a lucidity never before attained, the specific peculiarity of morality in opposition to Eudæmonism, and of having again proclaimed, like a philosophical Moses, the supernatural majesty and holiness of the moral law.”

In keeping with the admirable descriptive power illustrated in these quotations, is the strong critical force with which he subjects to scrutiny the theories of Kant and his great successors, considering first their inherent consistency, and afterwards their bearing on theological systems. In all this he shows himself in every way competent for the task he undertakes, and students of German philosophy in our country will find themselves rewarded, if they turn to the criticism of that philosophy from the pen of one who regards it with the metaphysical acumen of a German, and with the sympathies of a devoted cultivator of theological science. In order to meet the natural desire of philosophical readers for some example of Dr. Dorner's appreciation of the essential features of a philosophic system, and of the manner in which he contemplates the difficulties with which it is beset, we extract the following passage on the Kantian philosophy, bearing upon that moment in the history of German philosophy when the system of Kant gave the starting point for the high idealism of Fichte.

“A crisis, arising from internal causes, was, however, coming upon the Kantian system itself. The distinction of ‘the thing in itself,’ from the

*a priori* pure intuitions of space and time, without which no conception of a given object was possible, and from the forms of thought or categories, the pure notions of the understanding, without which no judgment and no experience could take place, and finally, from the ideas or contemplated aims of the reason, without which there can be no moral action—a distinction which called in question all knowledge of objective reality—was indeed adapted to humble the scientific arrogance of popular philosophy, and to awaken a higher idea of knowledge. At the same time, however, it turned like a two-edged sword against Kantianism itself, and gave it an utterly sceptical tenor, unless some terms were come to with this obscure remnant of ‘the thing in itself.’”

Passing from the analysis of philosophical systems, we shall make only the briefest reference to the view given, towards the close of the work, of the present state of Protestant theology in Scotland and England. Fifteen pages only are devoted to the sketch which the author draws of the present situation of things in Great Britain. Within such limits there cannot be very ample treatment of the subject; but what is written shows accurate recognition of the phases of thought and lines of action traceable amongst us. His references to the philosophical and theological literature of our country are numerous, and those which touch upon the ecclesiastical divisions prevailing amongst us betray none of the inexperience which we are quite prepared to find in the descriptions of a foreigner. Neither in the view of the “Scotch Kirk,” nor in his account of the great divisions of the Anglican Communion, is there to be found anything which is not indicative of a real acquaintance with what has been transpiring amongst us for the last half century. Dr. Dorner has clearly made good use of his visit to our country, and has kept up his reading of our literature to a very considerable degree. The National Church, the Free Church, and the United Presbyterian Church, in the north; the High Church, Low Church, and Broad Church in the south; Irvingism, Tractarianism, and the “Essays and Reviews,” all come in for a share of attention. Scanning our horizon, and speaking in the interests of a common Protestant theology, Dr. Dorner lifts a warning voice to proclaim that “Great Britain is not beyond the danger of a return of deism.” He pleads for the danger being met by treating negative tendencies in a thoroughly scientific spirit. While fulfilling the part of a contributor to the *Contemporary*, in supplying a notice of his own work, we need not pass over the circumstance that he is pleased to note the existence of this Review as one evidence of the activity of an increase of scientific life in the treatment of philosophical and theological questions. He says: “A promising beginning for fresh flights in the realm of science was made by the establishment of the great periodical, the *Contemporary Review*, in 1866.” We trust that the Review may fulfil the

promise given in its start. But passing from this, we conclude by quoting the weighty words of Dorner, as to the desirability of closer relationship between British and German thought.

“When we consider the exalted mission intrusted to Britain with regard to Protestantism and its future in other parts of the world, in Africa, in Asia, and especially in India and China; when, on the other hand, we reflect that the reception given to Bishop Colenso's work on the Pentateuch, the reviving spirit of inquiry, and the progress of natural science give reason to anticipate that the as yet inconsiderable party of the Essayists may expect important accessions in the immediate future: it is much to be wished that the advocates of Christian theology, against adversaries whose attacks are sharpened by German weapons, may cultivate an increasing acquaintance with that German science which is of a positively constructive kind, and derive therefrom that which may turn to their own advantage.”

The work lying before inquirers in all departments of knowledge is certainly one which can be prosecuted with success only if it be carried forward in a scientific spirit, and by a careful use of scientific methods. Reason does not dwell on one side of the mountain, and faith on the other, each suspicious of the other, and jealous of any apparent encroachment on the other's territory. They dwell together in the same region, they cultivate the same soil, and are equally interested in the result of all the labour spent upon it. Severance is weakness to both. We regard, therefore, with satisfaction the appearance of such a work as that which we here introduce to the notice of our readers. The highest interests are promoted by a treatise at once scholarly and eminently suggestive, which deals with theology at once scientifically and historically. We only, in conclusion, express the hope, that we may ere long see in our own country, many examples of such searching enquiry into the relations of philosophy and theology as Dr. Dorner has supplied in the second volume of the present treatise.

H. CALDERWOOD.



## THE COMPOSITION OF THE WORKING CLASSES.

PEOPLE in the upper and middle ranks of society, who from taking an active and friendly interest in the welfare of the working classes, are anxious to understand them, often ask how those who have a practical acquaintance with those classes account for or reconcile a variety of matters in connection with them, which seem to throw doubt upon or are inconsistent with each other. The half-surprised, half-distrustful feeling which gives rise to such questioning is, as things stand, a very natural one. Judged by the contradictory character of some of their actions and opinions—or, to speak strictly, some of the actions and opinions generally attributed to them—the working classes must to others appear not only an unreasonable body, but an incomprehensible one also. For instance, the allegation that republicanism is the political creed of the working classes, may sound, we won't say more strange than true, but at any rate *curious*, to those who weigh the assertion in conjunction with the facts, that while the working classes have in their hands ample means whereby to send members to Parliament to advocate their political views, the House of Commons does not number a single republican member—and yet the assertion *is* true.

This and many other *seeming* contradictions are easily explainable. The reason—and the blame, if there is blame—of them lies rather

with others than the working-classes themselves. Though they *speak* of the working classes, most people in other grades of society *think* only of a working class—a class comprehending species as well as genus, and capable of being generalized by being individualized in the person of that great and well-known character of the day, “the working man.” A more material error than this there could scarcely be, and it would be strange indeed, if to those labouring under it the working classes did not appear in an incomprehensible light. That it is a most prevalent error need not be specially demonstrated here. A glance through newspaper leaders and parliamentary and other speeches bearing upon topics in which the working class are concerned, will give abundant proof that such is the case, even if we put aside such evidence as self-examination upon the part of our readers might afford.

The working classes are not a single-acting, single-idea'd body. They are practically and plurally *classes*, distinct classes, classes between which there are as decisively marked differences as there are between any one of them and the upper or middle classes. And this explains many of the inconsistencies that are laid to the charge of the classes in the aggregate. The proceedings of a section are taken to be those of the whole, and presently when another section does something of an entirely opposite nature puzzled or indignant lookers-on exclaim:—“There, my masters, is inconsistency for you! What can be done with or for a body like this?” Of the various “questions of the day,” those more directly affecting the working classes are admittedly among the most pressing and important, and to the efficient dealing with such questions we think that two essential preliminaries are, firstly, a realization of the fact that “the working classes” are literally classes, and not merely a class; and secondly, a general idea of the distinctive characteristics of at least the chief of those classes. Holding this belief we are naturally of opinion that an article upon the composition of the working classes, founded upon knowledge gathered from within them, by one of themselves, may have an attraction for, and possibly be of some slight use to, the many outside those classes who take an interest in them, and the great social questions in which they are concerned. It is at any rate in the hope that such may be the case, that we come to our subject proper, as indicated in our title.

Taken literally, the phrase “the working classes” would include large numbers of all ranks of society, but in the popular and generally accepted sense—and that is the sense in which we wish to deal with it—it may be taken as broadly meaning the artizan and manual labouring classes, excluding even clerks and shopmen, who, though no better paid, and in other respects less advantageously situated than artizans, are yet ranked apart from and above the latter class,

on the ground that they follow "genteel occupations." With this much premised, "the working man" becomes a partially admissible figure of speech. The working man as in contra-distinction to the man who does not work, or as distinct from the employing, or genteelly-employed man, can be easily understood. In this simple sense the phrase is self-explanatory, but when used, as it generally is, as a synonym for the working classes, it not only loses definiteness, but becomes an altogether misleading generalization. As such a generalizing synonym, it has for years past been in the mouths of all manner of men in connection with the discussion of the social and political problems of the age. Yet if a score of those professing to be the friends, to understand, and speak in the name of this assumedly representative individual were asked to define him, it would be found that each definition attributed to him some qualification in antagonism with one or more of those given to him by the others; while, could the attributes of all the definitions be combined, they would go to produce such a monster as happily for itself the world ne'er saw. As a stock phrase, or a rallying battle or party cry, "the working man" is sufficiently well sounding; but as a matter of fact there is no wholly typical working man. Putting aside mere individual traits as outside the scope of our present purpose, there are characteristics marking considerable sections, which are altogether inapplicable to others. What would be true of the mechanic as "the working man," would not be true of the labourer in the same character. There is an educated and really intelligent section, and an uneducated and ignorant section; a political section (broken up again into several sub-sections) and a non-political section; a trade-unionist, and non-trade-unionist section; a sober, steady, saving section, and a drunken, unsteady, thriftless section; and with the labour market habitually overstocked, there is fast arising a sectional difference of mode of life and feeling between the regularly and irregularly employed classes. Between all these sections there is a difference, and in most instances antagonism of feeling. Between the artizan and the unskilled labourer a gulf is fixed. While the former resents the spirit in which he believes the followers of "genteel occupations" look down upon him, he in his turn looks down upon the labourer. The artizan creed with regard to labourers is, that the latter are an inferior class, and that they should be made to know and kept in their place. In the eyes alike of unionist and non-unionist mechanics, any clever or ambitious labourer who shows a desire to get out of his place, by attempting to pick up or creep into "the trade" to which he is attached as an unskilled assistant is guilty of deadly sin, and deserving of the abhorrence of all right-thinking members of the craft. In the same way artizans'

wives hold the wives of labourers to be of a lower social grade, and very often will either not "neighbour" with them at all, or else only in a patronizing way.

On the other hand the labourer looks upon the mechanic with much the same feeling that mechanics in general look upon many of those above them in the social scale. The mechanic is, as a rule, somewhat of a clever fellow, and he knows that by his daily labour he contributes to the national wealth and well-being, and has a more or less full belief in the doctrine so often preached to him that the working class are practically the sole creators of all national wealth. With this knowledge and belief in his mind he sees others whom he holds to be his inferiors in intelligence, usefulness, and everything else save some accident of birth or fortune, obtaining a far larger share of the substantial advantages of labour-created wealth, than falls to his share. This state of things he holds to be wrong in the abstract and an injustice to him individually; a perversion of what ought to be. As a result he comes to entertain—either consciously or unconsciously—levelling doctrines, but like most other levellers he would only level down. Now the labourer is also a leveller, and as he too would likewise level down, his levelling ideas apply to the mechanic as well as to others; indeed more pointedly to him than to others. Many labourers have brighter natural parts than *some* mechanics; perhaps than the very mechanic at whose command they are. Most of them are of opinion that they have at least equal natural parts to the general run of mechanics, and that with the same opportunities they would have been as good or it may be better men—as skilful as craftsmen, as intelligent as members of society. Their lack of opportunity in regard to the acquisition of education or a trade, they argue, is visited upon them as a fault, while it is really a misfortune. Why, they ask, should they be regarded as the inferior of the mechanic, and be subject to him? Why, to come to more substantial things, should they whose work is harder and more disagreeable than that of the mechanic, be so much worse paid that they must perforce live in less comfortable homes, fare and dress more coarsely, and have less of all money-costing pleasures of life. To them it seems that there is no *necessary* or just Wherefore to these Whys. They see in the existing state of affairs, undeserved wrong to themselves individually and as a class, and a proof that society is ill-constructed and in need of reconstruction. It may be a law of nature that in all societies there shall be a class of hewers of wood and drawers of water to their social brethren. The history of mankind hitherto is in favour of such a supposition, but the hewers and drawers are very decidedly of opinion that the hewing and drawing should be divided among all classes, or that otherwise the hewing and drawing class should be rewarded in a manner that would enable them to command the good

things of life to an extent that would be equitably compensatory to them for the degree in which the hard things of life fell upon them. Coming most in contact with the mechanic class, they, as we have said, apply these ideas pointedly to them. The mechanic knows this; knows that the labourer's notion of a radical reconstruction of the social system would involve the swamping of his comparative social superiority, and to this extreme inclusiveness of the levelling idea he objects. He cannot "see the beauty" of the idea when made operative *upon* him, as he can when made operative for him. In the same way the workman—whether labourer or mechanic—who may have a house of his own, or money in the bank, knows that the idea with regard to the "redistribution of property" of those who have neither house nor money, would include in the total to be redistributed his savings, as well as the millions of a Rothschild, or the lands of a Westminster or a Bute; a view of the question which the better-off workman is inclined to consider as too much of a good thing. Thus though artizans and labourers, well-off and ill-off workmen, may broadly and theoretically hold the same article of political belief, and to out-siders appear to be "all of a bunch," they are really divided, are mutually distrustful, and afraid of acting unitedly; the one fearing that they may be dragged down, the other that they may be made tools of.

That many even of the uneducated among the working classes are endowed with a considerable degree of the quality generally spoken of as "shrewd common sense," is well known, and in comparing them with others it should also be borne in mind that their lack of education is their misfortune not their fault. But with all due allowance made on this score, and speaking in a spirit the reverse of unkindly, it must be confessed that the ignorance, and—if we may be allowed the expression—uninformed-ness characteristic of a large proportion of the uneducated section, is so great and dense, and extends to such simple every-day matters, that to more or less educated men who are habitually brought into contact with it, it becomes irritating and seems contemptible. This is of course a wrong feeling upon the matter, but at present we are not speaking to extenuate but to explain. It may be "pity 'tis true," but it *is* true that no one has so impatient a contempt for the uneducated working man as has the educated working man. This feeling is not concealed, the uneducated men naturally resent it, and so arises another bar to the unity which would be strength to the working classes. The educated workman holds the uneducated one to be responsible for a low general estimate of the working classes being taken by other classes, and he thinks it a matter of right that the other should be ruled by him in all matters of opinion, and indeed that he should scarcely presume to have an opinion at all. This idea the uneducated man regards as a piece

either of self-seeking or "cheek," and in a mere spirit of opposition to it—if there is no other ground of difference—will act in antagonism to the views of his educated fellow.

The political section of the working classes is, as we have already mentioned, broken up into various sub-sections. The views of one sub-section may in comparison with the extremer views of most of the others, be called conservative; but a conservative working man in the generally understood sense of the term, "the conservative working man" who sometimes figures on paper as a member of a "constitutional association," is, if not an absolute myth, a very infinitesimal reality. In the course of a tolerably extensive experience, we have met with very few who would admit that they were even nominally of this type, and none who would admit it save under cross-examination, and in a shame-faced manner, or the purity of whose conservatism did not labour under suspicion; who were not in the employ of, or otherwise dependent upon, or desirous of, the favour of some active and pronounced "gentleman member" of the particular "constitutional association" to which they belonged, or who did not bear the reputation among the fellow-workmen who had the best opportunities of knowing them, of being just the kind of men who would be likely to join *any* association that gave poor and accommodating members tickets for "banquets" at which baronets, colonels, and county members are the speakers, and the number of working-men banqueters bears about the same proportion to county gentry, as did the one halfpenny worth of bread to the "intolerable deal of sack" in Falstaff's tavern bill. In short, though Conservative "organs" parade him as a type of a class, "the conservative working man" is *nil* for all practical purposes of estimating the composition of the working classes. The *creed* of the political section of the working classes is *at present* republicanism, or ultra-liberalism, broadening down towards republicanism. It is on the question of the best means for gaining their end that they divide into sub-sections. One set says:—We must go in for a republic; we shall do no good till we get it. Another—Our fight must be against capital. As things stand, it is practically lord of all, and till it falls we cannot rise. Another—What we want is working men in parliament, and we shall never be able to achieve anything for ourselves till we have got them. And another—It is mere waste and misdirection of energy to make home politics the first consideration; that the one thing really needful is an international combination of the working classes throughout the world. Of course, each sub-section is strongly of opinion that their view alone is *the* correct one, and is intolerant of the views of the others, except as secondary to theirs. But they are unanimous upon one point—to wit, that the non-political section are less true, dutiful,

and deserving members of their general brotherhood than they are, and they are given to expressing this belief in rather hectoring fashion. This assumption of superiority is of course resented, and, moreover, the charge of class apathy is retorted by a counter one, of personal self-seeking. Many of the non-political justify themselves by saying that they do not see that they would gain anything by "bothering" themselves with politics, and they argue as a corollary from this that the others would not interest themselves in politics did they not believe they saw some prospect of special personal gain to be obtained by such means.

Between trade-unionist and non-unionist workmen there is, generally speaking, a certain degree of coolness and suspicious watchfulness which leads to divided ideas and action. The unionists are almost of necessity more or less cliqueish, and this leads to non-unionist cliqueism. There are—to use a paradoxical expression—unions of non-unionists; exclusively non-union, as well as exclusively union workshops. That some trade-unions are seriously faulty, and even the best of them not faultless, is no doubt true, but still so far as regards the larger, better, and more representative ones, it may safely be said that very few men qualified to become members of them refrain from doing so on the ground of conscientious objections to features of their constitution. The great majority of the non-unionist members of trades having well-organised unions, are either men who are not eligible for admission by reason of their not being considered up to the union standard of skill, or men who, being in regular employment, and having good prospects of remaining in it, decline to join the union on the ground that, as they are not likely to stand in need of its out-of-work pay, they do not see why they should subscribe to its funds for the benefit of others. The first kind are regarded—not only by the unionists, but by the more skilful non-unionists also—with somewhat of an evil eye, as being likely to bring down the trade—that is, the rate of wages in it. The others are by the unionists considered ignobly selfish; men without brotherly sympathy, and therefore little deserving of the sympathy of others should evil days come upon them. On the other hand, the non-unionists are of opinion that the unionists are unjustifiably and offensively dictatorial, and too much given to meddling and wire-pulling; and the general result is another and serious bar to that unity and feeling of mutual confidence by which the working classes might achieve so much; for want of which they achieve so little.

That the drunkards, and too liberal drinkers, among the working classes are so numerous as to constitute a considerable section, is unfortunately but too well known a fact. Between them and the sober men there are decided differences of opinion. The sober men,

generally speaking, despise the drunken ones, and in many instances look upon them as enemies on the ground that their proceedings have the effect of giving a degraded aspect to the whole body, and that their sins are often visited upon the whole body, in the shape of workshop regulations, and other things which, though necessary and just as applied to drunkards, become harsh in respect to others. But while this is the opinion of others, the drinkers regard themselves as being simply "jolly good fellows," or at the very worst, "nobody's enemy but their own," and look upon those who censure them as prigs—men so lost to all proper feeling and sense of jolly-good-fellowship as to be capable of lending their aid to measures, the tendency of which would be in the language of jolly-good-fellowship to "rob a poor man of his beer"—men, consequently, against whom it behoves all jolly good fellows to be on their guard.

Between the steady and the unsteady section of the working, and between the saving, forethoughtful section, and that which in a too literal sense takes no heed for the morrow, there is much the same difference of opinion and distrustfulness. And this, of course, serves to further break up the working classes, and to show that "the working man," as an all-typical generalization cannot but be inadequate and misleading.

With the chief of their antagonising sections, together with their respective characteristics, and points of difference thus indicated, the working classes may, we think, for the convenience of a proximate generalization, be broadly divided into three "schools," of which representative members may be bodied forth. First comes the old school—the school in which the largest percentage of the lack of education, prejudice, and feeling of class-antagonism that stand in the way of the self-elevation of the working classes is to be found; a school that was once the predominating one, and, though now a declining, is still a large and influential one. The members of it, like the members of other old schools, are given to speak of it as the *good* old school, and the time of its supremacy as the good old time. Though, seeing that the period in question was anterior to the passing of most of the laws at present in force for the protection of labour, other divisions of the working classes are disposed to look back to it as rather a bad old time. A majority of the old school are middle-aged, or more than middle-aged men, but this is not necessarily the case. Though it may sound somewhat paradoxical, it is a fact that there are many young men in the old school—men who, though young in years, are "old school" in feeling and opinion. The man of this school is pleased to regard himself as "rough and tough," and other working men as, comparatively speaking, effete. He is chary of admitting anything good in things "new-fangled," and still stoutly retains a belief in ideas that are generally looked

upon as exploded. As, for instance, in the self-satisfactory and once almost universally accepted doctrine that an Englishman is as good as three Frenchmen (or any other foreigners); that in fighting he could "lick" them; in the peacefuller contests of labour "work their heads off." He has a considerable contempt for mere "book learning," or perhaps it would be more accurate to say, for what he conceives to be the excessive importance attached to education nowadays. He believes in an elementary knowledge of the three R's, but is inclined to regard any attempt upon the part of a working man to go beyond that as affectation and evidence of a desire to set himself above his class—a sin not lightly forgiven by the old school. His reading is generally limited to the criminal records, and social and political philippics, of his weekly newspaper; which latter, though often sound enough in substance, have nevertheless an injurious effect upon him, as by their violent invective and utter one-sidedness they pander to, and perpetuate, his class prejudices. Moreover, they so flatter him—as "the working man," the "brawny son of toil," the only real creator of wealth, and so forth—that he turns a deaf ear to all would-be advisers, who will not flatter, and all the more readily falls a prey to those who flatter in order to fleece. He is inclined to condemn as idlers all who, in the course of their avocations, do not need to soil their hands or pull their coats off. He regards himself as the Ishmael of modern society—the man upon whom all other classes seek to prey. And, holding this opinion, he deems that it behoves him to be watchful of others, to guard against their too close approach, and be scantily civil to them.

But if the workman of the old school has many faults he has also many good qualities. He has plenty of "bottom" in him. He is of a self-reliant, self-helpful, independent spirit, and has none of those demi-semi genteel ideas and ways that are sometimes to be found among other sections of the working classes, and that make those afflicted by them so contemptible in the eyes of others. He dresses and lives plainly, and sees that his wife and family do the same. In his opinion a few pounds in the bank are better than a lot of fine clothes, and if he is ordinarily fortunate he *will* have money in the bank, and not unfrequently he is the proprietor of the house in which he lives. He is upright in his dealings, will stand by his friend and his class, and even when not individually affected by the matter in hand, is prepared to make the greatest personal sacrifices in support of the view of the working classes upon any principle affecting the welfare of the general body.

Gradually growing from the old school—from the explosion of old ideas ere they had engrained themselves in comparatively young minds, and the influence of new institutions, experiences, and knowledge, has arisen a division of the working classes which may be

styled the school of the day. In point of numbers this is the greatest of the several schools, but still it is not preponderatingly great—not so great as to justify the putting up of its typical man as *the* working man, nor yet so great but that it would be swamped, both in numbers and influence, by a combination of the old school and the other leading school to be presently adverted to. It is not so “pronounced” a school as the old school, for though it has distinguishing traits, it has also important characteristics that are common to other schools. For instance, it is inclined to take the Ishmael view of itself—to believe that the hand of every other class is against it, and that therefore it becomes a self-defensive duty upon its part to have its hand against every other class. It, too, believes that all the best and truest political wisdom, honesty, and courage of the country are centred in those newspapers which profess themselves the “organs” of the working classes; and it has been so vitiated by the persistent flattery of those “organs,” that again, like the old school, it will accept no friendship but that which flatters. And from this cause it lends too ready and credulous an ear to those “friends of the working man” who do flatter them—who would fain persuade them that, like the king, they can do no wrong—who make a trade of their friendship and, flattering to live, live to flatter. On the whole, however, the man of this school is a decided improvement upon the men of the schools that have gone before. His general views are much broader and more cosmopolitan. He has got rid of some of the more offensive phases of what the old school are pleased to consider John Bullism. He does not believe it to be a law of nature that one Englishman is equal to several foreigners, or that the exercise of the manufacturing arts is a right divine of England alone. While he is of opinion that the extent and importance of foreign competition is designedly exaggerated by those whose interests are identified with capital, he concedes that it is a material fact of sufficient magnitude to be taken into account as one of the elements of the relations between capital and labour. In the face of it, he not only admits that the once generally—and by the old school still—despised foreigner is a man and a brother, but is anxious to be on friendly terms with him, and to co-operate with him upon labour and other specially working-class questions. Nay, on one point he is even willing to take pattern by him, to avail himself, would the State afford him the means, of that technical education, the machinery for acquiring which foreign governments have been wise and liberal enough to organise for the benefit of their working populations. Without having any very clear or definite idea of what constitute the much talked of “rights” of labour, he is firmly impressed with the notion that some of them are withheld by those having might upon their side. On the

other hand, he is perfectly willing to grant that capital too may have rights—in the abstract. But he thinks that at present it has all its rights, and more. Though prepared, if need be, to take part in strikes, he regards them with a doubtful eye; looks upon them as a last instead of a first resource, as in any case an undesirable means even to a good end, and things, if possible, to be avoided. He prefers arbitration as a means of settling disputes, and in this regard it is only fair to him to say that he has shown greater earnestness and sincerity in attempting to establish courts of arbitration than has been displayed upon the side of capital.

Though comparatively little educated himself, he does not make light of education. On the contrary, he sets a high value upon it, and while regretting his own deficiencies, strives to give his children better educational opportunities than have fallen to his own lot. He takes a more or less warm and active interest in politics and in questions of social progress, and has an earnest though vague longing for a better state of things than now exists, and is ever willing to support this or that "movement" which he believes or is assured will lead to the desired improvement in the constitution of society. But at the same time he labours under a certain bitterness of spirit at finding how little actual material benefit has accrued to his class from even such of those movements as have been prosecuted to a successful end.

Naturally influenced by the tendencies of the times, he is more given to amusements, holiday-making, and dress, than the man of the old school—more perhaps than is altogether good for him. But with all due allowance of his faults, he is, upon the whole, a favourable style of man. A man meaning well, inclining to improvement, as a husband and father affectionate, as a neighbour and workfellow staunch and kindly.

The third school among the working classes is the one that may be spoken of as the "coming" or rising school. Numerically it is smaller than either of the other two schools, and it is also less demonstrative, and from these reasons is much less well known to the outer public. Still it is a large and influential school, and in the natural progress of events it is daily increasing, and is in all probability destined to become a predominating one in a greater degree than either of the other two have ever been or likely to be. It is a natural development from the other schools. It has reaped the ripper and later benefits of institutions that they have helped to establish, and of the general advances of the age; of increased facilities of home and foreign intercommunication, beneficial legislation, improved political status, and extended education. The man of this school is necessarily a young man—too young as yet, generally speaking, to exhibit that stern persistent interest in the great ques-

tions affecting the working classes that many men of the other schools show. Still he does think of such questions, and time, while making him fitter to deal with them, will also deepen his interest in them. If superficially, he is at any rate tolerably widely educated—widely, that is, in comparison with the other schools. He is the man who has availed himself of the plentiful and diversified means of education now within the reach of all; not only of the elementary and technical means, but also of the—in many respects still more important—supplementary means, the wide-spreading press, public libraries, and cheap standard literature. He knows what the *Times*, the *Saturday*, and the *Pall Mall*, as well as *Reynolds's*, *Lloyd's*, and the *Beehive* have to say upon working-class questions, and he does not take it for granted that in regard to such questions all the right must be upon the working-class side, all the wrong on the side of those who hold different views. Nor does he take it as an understood thing that a working man must of necessity be a good man; a man of aristocratic birth a bad one. He has little class prejudice, his knowledge being more extensive than that of the men of the other working-class schools, his sympathies are as a consequence broader. He admits that there are bad as well as good members among the working, as among other classes, and while he believes that a good deal is yet due from the governing to the working classes, he knows, and has no desire to conceal, that much *self-improvement* is needed among the latter body—improvement that will tend to eradicate the intemperance, ignorance, and bigotry that unhappily still largely prevail among them—improvement, without which improvement coming from the outside will be of but little avail.

He is not led away by Utopian ideas; does not believe in social panaceas. But he does believe in “sweetness and light”—in the elevating effects of culture. Believes that education, abundant and easily accessible literature, and the resources of modern science, have already placed means within the reach of the working classes which, rightly appreciated and used by them, would diffuse a far higher and more general happiness among them than is to be found at present. Believes that a time may—probably will—come, when self-organised, self-supporting “Working Men’s Clubs” will supersede the public-house, intelligent social intercourse the “boozing” and horse-play of the tap-room; a time when a choicely-filled little bookcase will be an ordinary article of furniture in working-class homes, and working men generally acquainted with (through their works)—

“The great of old,  
The dead but sceptred sovereigns who still rule  
Our spirits from their urns;”

a time, in short, when mental culture will give such sweetness and light to the home and social life of the bulk of the working classes

as, combined with the material improvement in their condition that—with education and knowledge thus advancing—may be reasonably expected from national progress in other matters, will make their lot one that to a *cultivated* mind will leave little room for envy.

The man of this school believes in liberty and fraternity, but not in equality. He knows that there is no natural equality, and is inclined to think that—

“Beneath the sun  
The many still must labour for the one,  
’Tis nature’s doom;”

that there must always be a working class, but that there is no necessary reason why they should not be as happy—perhaps happier—than the classes who do not work. And for the bringing about of such possible happiness he looks to general and individual improvement in the working classes even more than to legislative action.

The man of the rising school has of course his faults, and the most prominent of them are unfortunately of such a character that, by their irritating action upon the men of the other schools, they stand as much in the way of the unity of the working classes as does the intolerant spirit of the other schools. Under existing circumstances he is inclined to be too egotistical and self-assured. He is given to drawing comparisons in his own favour between himself and the men of the other schools; to being hard upon their educational shortcomings, and on the strength of his superiority on this point, letting it be seen that he assumes a general superiority.

Though so generally spoken of, thought of, and legislated for as a single and unanimous body, any part of which characteristically represented, and might be taken as speaking for, the whole—though so generally regarded in this light, the working classes really are, as we hope we have shown, divided and subdivided; and not only that, but divided into antagonising sections. They are as a house divided against itself. To use the point of the old fable, they are a *number*, but not a *bundle*, of sticks. Their strength is wasted and made ineffective by want of coherence. Though all schools and sections of them have broad interests in common, they are so divided in feeling as to be incapable of united action even for a common object. That they will in time become more united is tolerably certain; education is spreading, and ideas are enlarging among them, though slowly. In the meantime they stand divided in the manner we have attempted to describe, and those who would understand the working classes, or deal effectively with the great questions affecting them, must not only realise the fact that they are a divided body, but must also study their composition.

THOMAS WRIGHT.



## ERASTUS AND EXCOMMUNICATION.

NOT long ago I saw, in some article treating of the relations of Church and State, an allusion to certain persons who were "not ashamed to be called Erastians." Perhaps not many, either of those who accept the name or of those who brand others with it as a stigma, have any more definite notion of what Erastianism means than that it represents an aversion to ecclesiastical government and a desire that the clergy should be controlled as far as possible by the civil law. It will be found interesting, I hope, to inquire a little more particularly what Erastus himself taught. It may be that, as Wilkes declared he was never a Wilkite, and it has been even said that Calvin was not a Calvinist, so the opinions suggested to some minds by the name Erastianism differ considerably from anything that Erastus advocated. Certainly it is so, if Erastianism denotes a theory that a State has any natural authority to prescribe what its citizens are to believe, or how they are to worship. Erastus taught nothing that struck his most religious contemporaries as extravagant, or that need seem extravagant to any sober Christian now. The only subject connected with Church government upon which Erastus wrote, was that of excommunication; and it is with express reference to this subject that he gives incidentally his opinions on the more general question of the relation of the ecclesiastical to the civil

government. But the feeling he has expressed in this discussion is undoubtedly one which puts him out of harmony with those who chiefly use his name as a term of reproach. Those who desire that the Church should lord it over the State, and those who desire that the Church should consist only of voluntary associations of persons who happen to think alike on theological subjects, equally value the ordinance of excommunication. It is the Church's solemn mode of punishing the refractory, and it is the instrument for securing that the members of a voluntary Church shall continue to be men of one mind. And the Tract that made Erastus famous was an argument against excommunication.

The controversy between Erastus and Beza is referred to very briefly by Hooker in his preface; and Hammond, in his *Treatise of the Power of the Keys*, answers Erastus at some length. But the only easily accessible book, I believe, from which the English reader may obtain any satisfactory knowledge of Erastus and his doctrine is a small volume published in 1844 as a controversial pamphlet by the late Dr. Robert Lee, containing a translation of the *Theses on Excommunication*, with a preface, in which he deals with the charge brought by the Free Church party against the Church of Scotland of being an Erastian Establishment. An English translation of his *Theses* had been previously published in 1659, but this I have not seen.

The reader will be glad to have a little information about Erastus himself, which may be introduced by one of Dr. Hammond's long-winded sentences, from which, however, I omit a long parenthesis:—

"For the view of the person, I shall say no more than that he was a Doctor of Physick, who, having fallen on an age when novelties were in fashion (. . . .), thought it not unreasonable to step out of his profession, and offer to the world his *novelty* too; and having in his own profession expressed in some particulars a *zeal*, which others of his faculty will affirm to have been *without knowledge* (as when he speaks of the preparation of *Stibium*, or *Crocus Metallorum*, and the *Antimonian receipts*, he resolves that no man can *salvâ conscientiâ*, with a *safe conscience*, administer them, which yet every physician knows now by daily experience to be very useful), it will not be matter of wonder, if he committed the like mistake in the business of *Excommunication* (a medicine more out of the proper road of his studies) and conceived that a poisonous noxious *recipe* in the Church (judging, it seems, at a first view, that they which were most wicked needed rather to be united to the Church than driven from it), which the experience of all Christian Churches, and the advice of Christ Himself, as a *Physician of Souls*, have concluded to be very *harmless* and *medicinal*. I shall say no more of his person, but that he does not seem by his book to have considered much of *Divinity*, save only of this one head, and in order to that present controversy." (Of the Power of the Keys, c. iv., § 80.)

This physician, whose name survives through a small theological

work not published in his lifetime, was really distinguished in his profession. His name was originally Thomas Lieber, and was Grecized into Erastus after the pedantic fashion of his age. It was the period of the Reformation, and Lieber, born in 1524 at Baden in Switzerland, grew up in the studies and ways of thinking of the Reforming scholars of his day. He came to Basel as a youthful student some four years after Erasmus had ended his career in that city. He was a child of seven years when Zwingli fell on the field of Cappel, and he became the friend and correspondent of Bullinger, Zwingli's successor at Zürich. He was thus the contemporary of the second generation of German and Swiss Reformers. But having chosen the practice of medicine for his profession, he devoted himself with enthusiasm to medical studies. From Basel he went to the university of Bologna, probably as having the highest reputation at that time for the scientific study of physic, and is said to have spent as much as nine years in Italy, "in the company of the most famous and expert physicians" of that country. During the prime of his life he was at Heidelberg, professor of physic at the University, and principal physician and counsellor to Frederick the Elector, Prince Palatine. In the year 1564, when he was forty years of age, Erastus was added by his prince to a company of divines who were to carry on a controversy at Maulbronn with some Wittenberg theologians concerning Christ's Presence in the Lord's Supper. From Heidelberg he returned to Basel, and gave his labour and affection to the University of his early studies. He died on the last day of the year 1583, and was thus described on his tombstone—"Acutus philosophus, elegans medicus, sincerus theologus, Heidelbergensis Academiae columen, Basiliensis lumen; cui nutritia sua liberaliter rependit; doctis piisque amabilis."

This epitaph appears to do him no more than justice. Not a man of genius or a great discoverer, Erastus was a shrewd and independent inquirer. Melchior Adam, in his book, "*De Vitis Germanorum Medicorum*," thus characterizes him:—

"He was most diligent in making inquest into the virtues of medicines; and most gravely resolved, that those physicians must be deceived that trust without trial." [Dr. Hammond, as quoted above, ought evidently to have spoken of his *caution*, not of his "zeal without knowledge."] "Whence he was happy in his practice, and, by the help of God's grace, cured many that were heavily diseased of dropsies, epilepsies, gouts, and other maladies accounted incurable. Neither had he any man's authority in such esteem, that it could move him to depart from what was evident to sense, or agreeable to reason; but he always judged, that truth was to be taken from the matter itself, and not from authority. He refuted judicial astrology in divers writings yet extant; and refuted Paracelsism in a treatise and other disputations: yet doth not condemn, but commend, lawful chemistry."

To the same effect speaks De Thou in his history :—

"This year was closed with the death of Thomas Erastus, born at Baden in Switzerland, who, constantly walking in the solid truth, and not so much in the principles delivered by ancients of both the sciences, was famous in this age for his knowledge of philosophy and physic."

The spirit and method thus attributed to him may be discerned in the Theses and the *Confirmatio Thesium*. We perceive at once that we have, to do, not with a pedant, but with an original inquirer. As a theologian, Erastus is manifestly independent, but he is also cautious, logical, lucid, modest, and reverent. It is a singular relief to pass from the verbose and pompous disquisitions of the learned theologian, Dr. Hammond, to the pages in which the scientific layman gives so concisely the results of his non-professional inquiry.

Our Anglican divines, Hooker and Hammond, remind us that Erastus was not dealing with the Episcopal system of Church government, and they are willing to admit that he makes out a strong case against excommunication by Presbyterian courts. It is necessary to bear in mind the conditions with reference to which he wrote, although they narrow, perhaps disappointingly, the scope of his argument. He has in his eye the Reformed Churches of the Palatinate and of Switzerland. Writing in the year 1568, he says, in a preface to the reader :—

"About sixteen years ago, some persons were seized with a certain fever of excommunication (which they dignified with the title of ecclesiastical discipline, and affirmed to be holy and enjoined by God upon the Church), and were exceedingly desirous of rubbing the infection of it into the whole Church. The method of it, they said, was that certain Elders should sit in the name of the whole Church, and judge who were worthy and who unworthy to come to the Lord's Supper. I wondered that they should agitate this matter at a time when we had neither persons to be excommunicated nor fit excommunicators. For scarcely a thirtieth part of the people understood and approved our doctrine; all the rest were very hostile to us; so that no one of any understanding could fail to see that a dangerous schism of the multitude would be the consequence of such a scheme. Therefore it did not seem to me the time for inquiring, how some might be expelled from the fellowship of the Church; I thought it on the contrary our business to consider how the greatest numbers might be drawn to the knowledge of the truth and included within the Church. Those, again, who would have had to preside, were neither in age and experience, nor in ability and judgment, nor in character and authority, so superior to the rest, that they seemed likely to perform so grave a task with dignity."

Erastus proceeds to explain that at first his only doubt was as to the right manner and time of putting in force the discipline of excommunication; but being thus led to examine the question, when he had consulted the early Christian writers, the schoolmen, and later authorities, he found more and more reason for doubting about

the whole matter. He determined, therefore, to look carefully for himself into the Holy Scriptures. And the results of his examination he embodied in Theses, which he circulated in manuscript amongst the Protestant divines of the Continent.

The Theses were thus read by many, though they were not published or printed, and amongst others by Beza, who wrote a reply to them, and sent it to Erastus in August, 1569. It was in answer to Beza's tract that Erastus wrote his "*Confirmatio Thesium*," which was finished at the end of the same year. This also was circulated in manuscript; and both it and the Theses remained unpublished until the year 1589, five years after Erastus's death. A volume was then issued, "*Pesclavii, apud Baocium Sultaceterum*," in which the publisher announces that he had bought the MSS. from Erastus's heirs, and which contains, besides the Theses and the *Confirmatio*, several excellent letters from Bullinger, Walther, and others, in which they express a general agreement with the views of Erastus.

The title of the Theses is as follows:—"A Discussion of the very serious Question, whether Excommunication, in so far as it Debars Professing Christians from the Sacraments on account of Ill-doing, rests on a Divine Command, or is a Human Invention." Erastus explains repeatedly that his controversy is with those who desire, in professed obedience to Scripture, to set up a presbyteral court, distinct from the civil courts of the country, which shall exercise a censorship of morals, and shall use exclusion from the Lord's Supper as the penalty for moral offences. The issue, as I have observed, is thus strictly defined by Erastus himself. His appeal is almost exclusively to Holy Scripture, because those whom he was opposing professed to be absolutely bound by its authority. Speaking of a certain agreement between Beza and Peter Lombard, he says to Beza—"Verum Lombardo cæterisque scholasticis absque Scripturis licuit loqui: tibi, qui diversum profiteris, non licet." He excludes the case of heresy, which was not then under consideration. He treats of no kind of excommunication but that which was inflicted formally by the sentence of a court, and which consisted in exclusion from the Lord's Supper.

Like his fellow-Protestants, Erastus held Scripture to be Scripture, in whatever part of the Bible he found it. In days when the principle of gradual revelation was little recognised, the appeal to Scripture was embarrassed by the continual uncertainty whether a particular precept, or institution, or example, were of permanent authority or not. In a dispute in which both parties appeal to the authority of the Bible as absolute, may a text out of Genesis, or Leviticus, or Ezra, or Malachi, or the Apocalypse, be adduced to

settle a controversy, or not? The debatableness of this point has caused a great waste and confusion of argument in Protestant theologians.

Erastus refers at some length to the Old Testament, as he had every right to do in dealing with theologians of the Geneva school. In the principal centres of the Reformation, the change of religion had been carried out by the civil Governments. The rulers of the land, converted and guided by preachers, had reformed religion, as a solemn duty which they owed to God and Christ. Luther at Wittenberg, Zwingli at Zürich, Calvin at Strasburg and Geneva, Ecolampadius and others at Basel, were the advisers of the sovereign prince, or of the magistrates of the Commonwealth. Now, though the Reformers drew their theology from the epistles of the New Testament, the age of those scriptures gave them no example of a Christian or godly government. The Old Testament, on the other hand, which their controversial theory placed on a par with the New, was the book of a holy nation. There they saw judges and kings enforcing the divine commands in matters of faith and worship. It was natural, therefore, that the Reformers should be continually referring to Old Testament rules and precedents. Erastus was himself the counsellor of a Christian prince, who desired to govern according to the will of God. What did Holy Scripture say as to the best constitution for a State thus governed? It affirmed that the Jewish order and laws were the wisest and most salutary in the world.

"Accordingly," Erastus argues, "that is the best constitution of a Church which comes nearest to the Jewish form. But amongst the Jews it was never ordained that there should be two different jurisdictions over morals—the civil and the ecclesiastical. What, then, hinders that now also a Church, to which the merciful God has given a Christian Magistrate, should be content with a single government?"

The double jurisdiction to which Erastus demurs is most completely illustrated by the system introduced by Calvin at Geneva. It was the duty of the civil magistrate, according to Calvin, to put down all immorality, and to exterminate erroneous beliefs; and it was also the duty of the Church power to direct *its* punishments against the same offences. In the Confession drawn up by Calvin, when he was first appointed pastor at Geneva in 1536, he claims for the Church, to be administered by its authority—

"The punishment of excommunication, which we hold to be a sacred and salutary weapon in the hands of believers, so that the wicked by their evil conversation may not corrupt the good and dishonour Christ. We hold that it is expedient and according to the ordinance of God that all open idolaters, blasphemers, murderers, thieves, adulterers, and false witnesses, all seditious and quarrelsome persons, slanderers, pugilists,

drunkards, and spendthrifts, if they do not amend their lives after they have been duly admonished, shall be cut off from communion with believers until they have given satisfactory proof of repentance."

So that the same person, for the same fault, would be liable to be tried by a civil court wielding its penalties of fine or imprisonment or death, and by the Consistory wielding its penalty of excommunication. Erastus contends that one jurisdiction, that of the State, is sufficient, and that the Holy Communion ought not to be used as an engine of punishment.

He has no difficulty in showing that the punishment of excommunication has no place in the Levitical Code or the Jewish institutions. The wicked are not excluded by any ordinance from the Passover or the temple worship. Certain persons are excluded; but they are the ceremonially unclean, not evil livers. And the ceremonial uncleanness cannot be understood to typify sin in such a sense that we are to infer, from the exclusion of the unclean, the duty of excommunicating sinners:

"Moses would have been openly at variance with himself if, while intimating through types that certain persons were to be debarred, he had, in fact, admitted those same persons to the Temple and to worship. For it is undeniable that no one was shut out from the Tabernacle and from the company of others on account of viciousness of conduct, if he had incurred no legal impurity by touching a dead body or otherwise. So that Moses would have punished those wearing the figure of the unclean, and would have left the actually unclean (so far as this punishment is concerned) unpunished. Thus he would at the same time have denied and affirmed the same thing." (Thesis xv.)

It had been argued that the putting out of the synagogue, of which we read in the New Testament, was the Jewish form of excommunication. But Erastus contends (Thesis xxii.) that the proper analogue of exclusion from the Lord's Supper can only be exclusion from the Passover and the temple worship; and we see that even those who were put out of the synagogue were not hindered from coming to the temple or offering sacrifices. He refers also to the scourging in the synagogues; and argues that there was a kind of local administration of justice in these assemblies upon those who made themselves obnoxious to the rulers—a different thing from the debarring of men on account of moral unworthiness from sacraments. He might perhaps have admitted that the excommunicatory impulse, not likely to have been wanting in the Jews of our Lord's time, had found vent in the practice of putting men out of the synagogue, because there was no place for it in the ancient law of worship. He further shows that our Lord nowhere expressed any opinion in favour of shutting out wicked persons from the sacramental worship of the Jews; on the contrary, he allowed Judas Iscariot to partake of the

Passover. And he concludes the appeal to Jewish precedent in these words:—

“As God commanded all the circumcised outwardly to participate in the same sacraments and ceremonies, but appointed that the wicked should be restrained and punished with the sword and other penalties; so amongst us now it is the will of Christ that all baptized persons or Christians, holding right and pure doctrine, should use the same outward ceremonies and sacraments, but that the immoral should be punished by the magistrate with death, exile, imprisonment, and other such penalties.” (Thesis xxxi.)

Coming to what the Apostles taught when the Church had been founded, Erastus is able to make out a strong case in support of his view. On the one hand, in the many rebukes and threatenings of unworthy Christians, there is never any intimation that they ought to be excluded from the Lord's Supper. On the other hand, in the chapters (1 Cor. x., xi.) in which St. Paul specially discusses the Communion of the Lord's Supper, he assumes that persons are present at this sacrament who, under no theory of excommunication, could well have escaped being excommunicated. For example, he complains of Christians who eat openly of sacrifices offered to idols; and these are communicants. In this passage, says Erastus,

“Paul proves that those persons no less declared by that act of theirs that they were partners, *κοινωνοίς*, of devils, than they testified by joining in the Lord's Supper that they were members of the mystical body of Christ.” (Thesis xxxiii.)

Again:—

“In the following chapter, speaking of those who cause divisions, and of those who drink to excess in the very celebration of the Supper, he does not order that they should be debarred from coming to it. There is not a word of such interdiction; whereas he suggests much humbler corrections, as that each should eat at home. How could he have failed in this place to speak of excommunication if he had approved it and thought it necessary to the Church? The Apostle knew that the law bade otherwise, and that the use of Sacraments in the Church was other than to be refused for the punishment of moral faults. Therefore he bids that each man should examine himself; he does not enjoin that some should examine others. He besides exhorts all to study to eat worthily, lest any eat judgment to himself. By no means does he bid that those who eat unworthily should be repelled, but he threatens them with the chastisement of the Lord. He divides them that eat into two classes—those who eat worthily and those who eat unworthily; he does not bid that either should *not* eat, but he desires that all should eat worthily.” (Thesis xxxv.)

The latter and larger portion of the Tract is occupied with a very thorough examination of the difficult passage which is relied upon as their main scriptural support by the advocates of the discipline of excommunication—St. Matthew xviii. 15-18. Here, it is affirmed, excommunication is ordained by our Lord himself. The words are as follows: “Moreover, if thy brother shall trespass against thee, go

and tell him his fault between thee and him alone: if he shall hear thee, thou hast gained thy brother. But if he will not hear thee, then take with thee one or two more, that in the mouth of two or three witnesses every word may be established. And if he shall neglect to hear them, tell it unto the Church; but if he neglect to hear the Church, let him be unto thee as a heathen man and a publican. Verily I say unto you, Whatsoever ye shall bind on earth shall be bound in heaven; and whatsoever ye shall loose on earth shall be loosed in heaven." What do we find here—asks Erastus, keeping to his point—of any ordaining of exclusion from the Lord's Supper as a judicial penalty for moral offences?

He calls attention first to the fact that the question here is not of sins or crimes in general, but of private personal offences. This is obvious on the face of the passage, and it is confirmed by the question of Peter which follows (v. 21), "How oft shall my brother sin against me, and I forgive him?" He proceeds to give an interpretation of what is meant by "the Church," and by treating as a heathen and a publican, which he supports with acuteness and learning, but with which we may not be able altogether to concur. He expounds our Lord's direction thus:—

"When thy brother—that is, a Jew—does thee a wrong, do thou of thyself endeavour to effect a reconciliation with him. If thou dost not succeed by thyself, take two or three others and make the same attempt. If thou canst not even thus free thyself from the wrong, tell it to the congregation—that is, to the magistrate of thy own people or religion. If he refuse to listen to him also, thou mayest without any scandal proceed against him as thou wouldst against a publican or a heathen, who would refuse to be brought before any but a Roman tribunal."

In explaining what *the Church* was, he says,

"I take it for a principle and foundation, which I am confident all will approve, and which I do not know that any one denies—that Christ is speaking of a Church which *then was*. For how could he have commanded his disciples to tell it to a Church which could nowhere be found, and of the constitution of which they had as yet heard nothing? If he had wished to found a new Church or a new form of government unknown to the Apostles, he would have been delivering to them an extremely defective institution. For he neither taught them who were *the Church*, nor from whom or how it was to be gathered, nor its mode of judging nor penalties; nor did he speak of *all* sins, as I have shown, and as even those who build excommunication on this passage are compelled to admit, when they openly state that this passage relates only to private sins. . . . Thus much, I think, all will readily grant us, that Christ spoke concerning a Church then existing in the world or in Judea; but opinions begin to differ when it is asked, What Christ understood here by the name *Church*?"

Erastus argues that it could not mean the whole population, but was used for the Sanhedrim or other judicial authority of the Jews, insisting that our Lord had no plan for altering the form of administration or government then in force.

"Two objections," he says, "may be brought against this view:—(1) How could anyone *refuse* to hear the Church if *the Church* be a magistracy? and (2) How does what is said of binding and loosing agree with this interpretation? To the first question an answer has been already given—that the Jews had not at that time the power of judging about all matters, but almost all disputes that did not concern religion came before Roman courts. In these matters then, if any one disregarded the authority of the Sanhedrim, Christ allows the injured party to prosecute his cause in the Gentile courts, as if the offender were a Gentile or a Publican. . . . The answer to the other objection is equally easy. . . . To bind and to loose signify no other thing than to entreat the brother to desist from the wrong and to act piously, seeing that this is pleasing to God, and that God will punish him if he act against his command. He who dissuades a brother, holding out to him the pleasure and the anger of God, from committing a wrong, if he succeeds, has gained him; that is, looses him; if he does not succeed the wrath of God remains on him. . . . It will never be proved from the sacred writings that *to bind* means to exclude professing Christians from the receiving of the Sacraments, or that *to loose* means to readmit to the Sacraments those who have been excluded on account of immorality, and so to graft them in again, as it were, into the Church."

I add some extracts from the concluding Theses:—

"'The Apostle,' they say, 'requires us to shun the wicked, so far as not even to partake of a common meal with them, much less could he desire that we should unite with the same persons in celebrating the Lord's Supper.' I deny the inference. For there is a very great difference between the prohibition of private familiarity and the refusing of the Sacraments, and the one does not necessarily go with the other. The former is a kind of civil penalty, the latter a religious. The former is enjoined upon us, the latter is not. The end and reason of the former are expounded by St. Paul, the end and reason of the latter we nowhere find described. And that the one might be inflicted without the other, is proved by the conduct of the Pharisees; for they, wishing as they did to appear holier than other men, had no intercourse with the publicans. (Whether all others, as well as the Pharisees, equally shunned them, I do not at present remember to have read.) But no one will ever be able to show that the publicans were excluded from the sacrifices, the temple, the Passover, and other sacraments, supposing that they had been circumcised and had not abandoned the Jewish religion. . . . The Apostle commands the good to shun the company of the wicked, that these may be ashamed and repent. If one who has sinned thinks himself as much in favour with every one as before, not only is he not reformed, but others are the more easily corrupted. Whereas if he sees that he is avoided, he cannot help considering why this is; and in his wish not to be hateful to those who loved him, he may take thought about amending his life. The case is totally different as regards being admitted to sacraments or repelled from them. For the frequent participation of these by no means so nourishes and confirms vices, as private familiarity does. For in the churches, where they are administered, there is no talk of private or frivolous matters, but the word of the Lord is set forth. There when men hear that Christ died for them, and that for that benefit he demands that we should give public thanks, and that he is not a worthy guest who has not examined himself, but that all eat judgment to themselves who intrude themselves unworthily amongst the guests,—they who are proposing to come to the Lord's Table, whatever they may have

been before, are compelled to consider, what is done there, what God desires, and how they must henceforth order their life so as to please God. He who is deprived of this invitation is always made the worse and not the better." (Thesis lxvi.)

"Do you then condemn, some may ask, so many holy Bishops, who began soon after the Apostles' times to excommunicate notorious sinners? I answer, that it is one thing to impugn a doctrine, another to condemn the man that holds it. In our own day many learned and godly men have examined and refuted the Catholic errors—so to call them—of the ancients; such as the *limbus* of the Fathers, the fire of purgatory, intercession of the Saints, exorcism in Baptism, celibacy of the clergy, unction in Baptism and at Death, prayers for the dead, and—pertaining to the present subject—satisfactions; and yet I never heard any of them accused as having therefore condemned the ancients. If they desired this Excommunication to be obtruded upon the Church as a law of God's appointment, I do not commend them; although in the meantime I do very much commend and approve their zeal and intention. For they were anxious by this means, when no more convenient method occurred to them, to restrain the frowardness of evil men. Most of them also, as we see to be done at the present day, followed a general and universally received custom; nor did it ever come into their mind to inquire whether the practice was agreeable to Scripture or not." (Thesis lxix.)

As regards the early history of excommunication, Erastus suggests that it arose naturally, when the government was heathen, through the desire of the Christians to restrain wickedness which was not otherwise punished; and that, after the empire had become Christian (when the judicial authority ought to have been given over to the civil ruler), it was continued by the bishops through a love of power, and through the growth of superstition with regard to the sacraments.

Where the government is Christian, Erastus cannot see why the system of the Jewish commonwealth should not be followed:—

"Wherever the magistrate is godly and Christian, there is no need of any other to govern or punish under another name and title,—as if a godly magistrate differed nothing from a profane. It is a most mischievous error, as Wolfgang Musculus says, to regard the Christian magistrate in the same light as a profane government, whose power is only to be acknowledged in profane matters. Therefore if the godly magistrate has received authority not only to settle religion according to the directions of Holy Scripture and to arrange its ministries and offices—for which reason Moses requires the man chosen for king to transcribe with his own hand the book of the law or writings of Moses, and to exercise himself therein continually,—but also to punish vices in the same manner, it is vain of some amongst us now to think of a new form of judgment, which would reduce the magistrate himself into the rank of subjects. An ecclesiastical tribunal to judge of *morals* (concerning *doctrine* the magistrate ought always to consult those who are more skilled in it) is nowhere to be found ordained in Holy Scripture.

"But in those Churches which live under an ungodly government (for example Popish or Turkish) grave and pious men ought to be chosen, according to the Apostles' precept, to settle differences by arbitration, to compose quarrels, and do other offices of that sort. The same persons,

together with the ministers, ought also to admonish and rebuke men of foul and impure lives; and if they do not succeed, they may, by refusal of private intercourse, or by a public reproof or by some such other mark, punish them, or rather recall them to virtue; from the Sacraments ordained of God, if they desire to come to them, they may not debar them. For who except God can judge of men's hearts? It may happen that by public preaching some spark may be kindled, which it may be not at all useless, but rather most beneficial, to cherish by any means not inconsistent with piety. And how, I pray you, can it be otherwise than absurd and therefore impious to debar from the solemn Thanksgiving and commemoration of the Lord's death any man who feels impelled in his heart to celebrate the same with the Church, who declares that he wishes to be a member of the Church, and who desires to testify publicly that he is dissatisfied with his past life?" (Theses lxxiv., lxxv.)

With these words the Theses conclude. The extracts which I have given from them will serve to convey some impression of the general attitude and position of Erastus as a controversialist. I believe it is no more than justice to him to admit that he was led by his own serious studies and Christian instincts, as well as by his knowledge of mankind, to take up the right ground in an important matter, and that he held it with creditable courage and ability.

He was assailing a belief which, if it was an erroneous one, was certainly entitled to be called, in his own bold phrase, a *Catholicus error*. And it related to a question which in his day was a thoroughly practical one. It faced him in the Palatinate, and required his attention as a counsellor of his sovereign. Ought "the Church" to assume a judicial censorship of morals, or not? The Church of Rome, throughout its whole dominion, claimed that censorship. The same right on behalf of the Church had been claimed with equal peremptory insistence by Calvin at Geneva. In England the old Catholic theory remained, subject in practice to some important new restrictions. The answer of Erastus was a twofold one: When the Government does not profess the same faith as the Church, the Church is bound to assume and administer a provisional censorship; but where the Government is Christian and reformed, the Church ought to have no independent and supreme tribunals, but to leave judicial inquiry and correction to the courts, whether they be called ecclesiastical or civil, over which the magistrate is ultimately supreme. The one instrument of punishment which the Church had at command was excommunication. If the Church was to punish, all religious societies were agreed it must do so by excommunicating; and to excommunicate meant, as its essence or chief part, to debar from the Sacrament of the Lord's Supper. The proper power of the Church was to pronounce, You are adjudged, on this or the other count, to be an offender; your punishment is that you be forbidden to join with the rest of the faithful in partaking of the

Body and Blood of the Lord. Against the exercise of such a function by the Church Erastus firmly and altogether protested.

He felt it to be both logically and practically necessary that in a well-ordered commonwealth there should be but one ultimate court of appeal—that of the sovereign. In the Third Book of the *Confirmatio Thesium*, in which he states most fully, and with the requisite qualifications, his theory of Church and State, he says that men are subject to two governments—the one, invisible and spiritual, that of God; the other, external, that of the commonwealth. He was not the man to suppose that “God” stands for bishop, or synod, or church-meeting, as is assumed by so many interpreters of the answer, “Render to Cæsar the things that are Cæsar’s, and to God the things that are God’s.” He places God and his authority above all men and all courts; but, for sentences and punishments in the visible sphere, he affirms that the head of the State must be supreme. The Papists, he says, saw with equal clearness that there could not be two supreme authorities in a society; and, as they held that the Church had an independent authority, they determined this to be the more worthy, and subjected the State to the Church, the Sovereign to the Pope. Hence the saying, *Petra dedit Petro, Petrus diadema Rodolpho*. If the Church is not to exercise judicial authority over the State, the State must ultimately control the administration of the Church.

“But,” says Erastus, “as in the care of secular matters the magistrate is not free to transgress the bounds and limits of equity, justice, and honesty—that is, the prescription of the laws and statutes of the commonwealth; so in ordering sacred matters, or such as relate to Divine worship, he is still less free to depart in any particular from the prescription of God’s Word, which he ought to follow as a rule in all things, and nowhere to diverge a hair’s breadth from it. The sum is, that in a Christian commonwealth there is one magistrate, to whom God has committed the external government of all things, which belong either to civil life or to godly and Christian life; that the right and authority to rule and to judge has not been granted to ministers or to any other persons. This must be understood to be said of a commonwealth in which the magistrate and the subjects profess the same religion, and that the true one. In this, I say, there ought not to be two distinct jurisdictions. In a commonwealth in which the magistrate holds a false creed, the division of governments may perchance in some sort of way appear endurable.” (Pp. 161, 162.)

Both in estimating Erastus and his doctrine, and in trying to form an opinion, as Churchmen of to-day, whether we are now suffering loss from the disuse of excommunication, it is important that we should recognise distinctly the overwhelming ecclesiastical authority which may be adduced in favour of the practice. From about the close of the second century the system of Church discipline which uses excommunication as its main penalty began to grow with a fertility which it is amazing to contemplate. No one doubted that

Christ had ordained, as a thing necessary to the life and health of the Church, that those who were unfit or unworthy to be partakers of the holy mysteries should be debarred by judicial authority from approaching them. Heretics agreed with Catholics in accepting with readiness the painful obligation of excommunicating. "A certain excommunicatory fever," to use Erastus's phrase, seems to have become a chronic affection of the Church. Indeed, those who have once learnt to regard excommunication as a solemn duty, have started on a line on which it is difficult to stop. If the Communion is only for the worthy, how many are to be thought worthy? I have heard that at the infrequent Communion of the Scottish Kirk, it is a part of the minister's duty to warn the congregation of the danger of communicating unworthily, or to "fence the Table;" and that this duty is sometimes discharged with such vigour and impressiveness, that none at all respond to the subsequent invitation: whereupon the minister is obliged to undo some of his former work, on pain of being without communicants. But if the theory of fencing the Lord's Table or the mysteries be once adopted, can a straightforward mind easily find a limit at which to stop in defining unworthiness? Again, if exclusion from the sacred rites of the Church be a wholesome instrument of castigation against sin, what inducements there must be to make a liberal use of it! It cannot be for want of sin to punish that the ecclesiastical disciplinarian must hold his hand. Accordingly, we seem to see Council emulating Council, and bishop outrunning bishop, in putting this ordinance in force to protect the purity of the Church. Practically, the discipline was mitigated by Christian feeling and humanity and good sense, but the mitigation seemed to be at the cost of some unfaithfulness to sterner duty. There is a sermon of St. Chrysostom against anathematizing, in which he uses some excellent Christian arguments, and concludes, That we ought only to anathematize the impious and heretical opinions of men, but to spare their persons, and to pray for their salvation. But this doctrine has been thought by some so strange in a Father of the Church, that they have made a question, without any other reason for the doubt, whether this be one of St. Chrysostom's genuine discourses; and "Sixtus Senensis and Habertus" try to persuade themselves, with no more reason, that he speaks only against *private men's* using the anathema against heretics.\* Yet Chrysostom was not repudiating excommunication, but only the "execration" into which, in some hands, it was developed.

The account given by Bingham, in the sixteenth book of his well-known work, of the Discipline of the Ancient Church, shows strikingly how large and important a place in the life and in the literature of the Church was occupied by its system of punishment.

\* See Bingham's "Antiquities of the Christian Church," b. xvi. c. ii.

It may be convenient to remind the reader of the different grades of exclusion—

“The lesser excommunication consisted in excluding men from the participation of the Eucharist. Of this there were two degrees—the one excluding them only from the Eucharist, but allowing them to pray with the faithful, and the other excluding them from the prayers of the faithful, and only allowing them to pray with the catechumens; but neither of them expelling such delinquents totally from the communion of the Church. The greater excommunication was when men were totally expelled the Church, and separated from all communion in holy offices with her.”

This was understood and declared to involve absolute social separation as well. “It was the greatest curse that could be laid upon man.” The use of this discipline first grew into system, as Erastus pointed out, when the civil government was heathen and immoral; but it did not decline when the government became Christian. It grew in spite of the difficulties by which the theory and practice of it were embarrassed. It aimed at the purity of the Church; it allied itself with sacerdotal power and ambition; it was believed by every Father and theologian to have been positively enjoined by our Lord Himself. It lived, therefore, over great abuses and anomalies in its administration in the earlier ages; and when men were put under “the greatest curse that could be laid upon man” for omitting to pay the fees of a court, or for not observing some trumpery rule, though wise men felt that mistakes had been made, they were hardly shaken in their belief that *some* sinners ought by *some* Church authority to be judicially excluded from the Communion of the Lord’s Supper.

Reformers, of the type and school of Calvin, made it a point of religious honour to be more strict in their conditions of communion than the Papal Church. They were full of zeal against vice, and they cherished a high standard of religious purity in doctrine and life. Calvin held, as we have seen, “the punishment of excommunication to be a sacred and salutary weapon in the hands of believers, so that the wicked by their evil conversation may not corrupt the good and dishonour Christ.” Having been expelled from Geneva in 1538, in consequence of dissensions arising about this very matter of excommunication, Calvin writes:—

“Whenever I think how wretched I was in Geneva I tremble throughout my whole being: when I had to administer the sacrament I was tortured by anxiety for the state of the souls of those for whom I should one day have to render an account before God; there were many whose faith seemed to me uncertain, nay doubtful, and yet they all thronged to the table of the Lord without distinction. I cannot tell you with what torments my conscience was beset day and night.”

How, we may well ask, with this assumption of responsibility, could he ever escape such torments? But when he was invited back to Geneva, he took the pastorate on his own terms, and the Lord’s table was carefully and rigorously fenced. Beza, succeeding Calvin,

was Erastus's chief opponent. To him, as to Calvin, a Church which did not uncompromisingly exclude the unworthy from Communion, was a dead unfaithful Church. On the other hand, Erastus was cordially supported by the pastors of the Zürich Church, Bullinger, Walther, and Wolf. In the admirable letters written by the two former, both to Erastus and to Beza, they declare themselves as agreeing decidedly with Erastus against Beza. These letters are full of Christian wisdom, and marked especially by reverence for the Sacrament of the Lord's Supper.

The Church of England, true to that compromising policy for which it has been so abundantly commended and reproached, is on both sides in this controversy. In theory, it partly goes with the ecclesiastical tradition and with the Calvinists; in practice, it may be called wholly Erastian. The constitution of Church and State in this country does not allow an independent and irresponsible ecclesiastical jurisdiction over morals; a bishop cannot at his discretion excommunicate a sinner or a heretic. The sovereign is over all causes, ecclesiastical as well as civil, supreme. So far, even as regards theory, the Church of England is Erastian. But in theory that judicial exclusion from the Sacrament of the Lord's Supper, which Erastus deprecated, is still a part of our appointed discipline. The curate is directed by the introductory rubrics of our Communion Service to repel obstinate offenders from the Holy Communion.

"Provided that every minister so repelling any . . . shall be obliged to give an account of the same to the ordinary within fourteen days after at the farthest; and the ordinary shall proceed against the offending person according to the canon."

The thirty-third Article pronounces—

"That person which by open denunciation of the Church is rightly cut off from the unity of the Church and excommunicated, ought to be taken of the whole multitude of the faithful, as an heathen and publican, until he be openly reconciled by penance, and received into the Church by a judge that hath authority thereunto."

The canons of 1603 begin with frightful excommunicatory vigour, cutting off dissentients on the right hand and on the left. After the first canon, the eleven next end with the following formula: "Let him be excommunicated *ipso facto* and restored by the archbishop, after his repentance and revocation of his wicked errors." Ministers are required by canons l., xxviii., to be very strict in refusing Communion to persons; and churchwardens, by the eighth canon, to see that no person excommunicated by the church is received. But, practically, the excommunicatory process of procedure in the realm has killed the excommunicatory process. Erastianism has benefited the Church.

practice. No one in the Church of England at the present day ever hears or thinks of judicial excommunication. But the Church is not free from reproaches on this score. High Churchmen sigh over the loss of the ancient discipline, and are ashamed that the clergy can no longer pretend to rule with the ecclesiastical rod, and dream of the time when erroneous and strange doctrines may again be promptly banished and driven away in the persons of those who profess them, and proud sinners be constrained by salutary fears to put their necks under the foot of the Church. Our supposed laxity is an equal stumbling-block to the Evangelical Dissenters, whose theory of a Church is that it consists exclusively of converted or regenerate men. A Church, according to their idea, ought to be perpetually keeping itself pure by exclusion and rejection. No wonder that they shake their heads at a public Church, which does not know how to define its own members, and cannot say who are in it and who are out of it.

To intimidate and repress immorality, and to cherish the purity of the Church, are undeniably excellent aims, and obligatory on all Christians ; and if the discipline of excommunication were a Divinely appointed or successful method of pursuing them, we could hardly excuse ourselves for not labouring to recover it. If we venture to believe it to be a *Catholicus error* to trust to excommunication, we ought to propose to ourselves other ways of seeking the same ends. I conclude, therefore, with a summary statement of the chief objections to judicial excommunication, and of the better modes of action to be used in its place.

(1.) In the first place, the discipline of exclusion from the Holy Communion is not ordained in Scripture. This was Erastus's chief contention ; and I do not think that any competent critic would deny that he has fairly made out his case. The allegation continues to be an important one ; for when the advocates of the discipline find themselves involved in practical difficulties, they fall back upon the supposed command of God or ordinance of Christ. Bingham may serve as an example, who says, "The difficulty of restoring the ancient discipline in the present posture of affairs is certainly great, but not insuperable ; for discipline is one of God's ordinances in his Church, and he appoints nothing but what is practicable in itself, if men be not wanting on their part to contribute toward the exercise of it."\* But what if it be *not* ordained—in the sense of having been enjoined by Christ or practised by the Apostles ? Now, as to the testimony of Scripture, not only may it be shewn that the texts usually quoted in its favour do not unambiguously enjoin the discipline, but most mighty and conclusive evidence may be brought forward on the other side.

\* "Antiquities," b. xv. c. ix. § 8.

(2.) Secondly, this discipline fosters a kind of sacerdotal power and action which has never been found wholesome in its relation either to religion or to politics. In Episcopal churches the excommunicating authority is absolutely sacerdotal; in other communions it may be loosely described as quasi-sacerdotal. To give to ecclesiastics the power to refuse the ordinances of religion to those whom they may judge to be unworthy, is the most direct way to promote priestcraft and superstition. It is no reproach against an order to say that it does not do well what it is not properly called to do; and all history and experience tend to prove that ecclesiastics, as such, do not discharge judicial functions to the general advantage. Their own power becomes identified in their minds with the cause of religion; and in order to increase their power they are tempted to encourage slavish notions about the Divine ordinances. The rule of priests is fatally injurious to religion as well as to freedom. In voluntary religious associations, democratically governed, excommunication may be nothing more serious than the extrusion of the few by the many; but neither is this kind of "discipline" attractive to the Christian eye. To call ecclesiastical action "spiritual" may be the grossest misnomer; very frequently it is the action of the State that is more truly spiritual, whilst that of the Church is carnal. (1 Cor. ii., iii.)

(3.) Thirdly, *it does not work well*. There is no clear agreement as to its proper scope. The practical working of the discipline of excommunication, in its bearing on Christian life, has always been tentative, arbitrary, and confused. The highest authorities in the primitive times appear to have held that only great and flagrant offences should be punished with excommunication; that none but outward and proved actions were to be thus visited; that there ought to be no pretence on the part of the Church of judging the heart, which could be known to God only. But who could be enthusiastic about excommunicating known murderers and adulterers? The moment excommunication begins to be interesting, it is met by baffling difficulties. Let any one try to devise *rules* for it; he will probably after some experiments confess with Bingham, "To give rules in this case is a nice and tender point, and I had rather it should be done by the wisdom of others than myself." It must be the inevitable tendency of any conceivable system of Church discipline to put the stamp of approval on outward propriety, and to castigate outward lapses. This is a weakness inherent in law, and need not confuse our moral judgment. We all know that the convict in the dock may be less guilty in the sight of God than the judge who has sentenced him. But in the excommunicatory discipline, Law is usurping the functions of the Spirit, and is sure to slay the souls that should not die, and to save the souls alive that should not

live. "Persons are not always corrected by being excommunicated," as Erastus says; "nay, they may be made great hypocrites; and under that guise they are much more harmful than others who are undissemblingly wicked. There is no animal under the sun more hateful to God and all in heaven than a hypocrite." (*Confirmatio*, Book vi.) The Zürich pastors speak touchingly of the risk of quenching the real penitence of some heartbroken sinner by formally excluding him from the places where he might have heard of the Divine love and forgiveness. A mind trained in the school of Christ will surely recoil from a method of judgment which, in the name of God, justifies the Pharisee and drives away the publican and sinner. It is a wonder that Christian thought has not been oftener arrested by that phrase—"Let him be to thee as a heathen man and a publican." In every formulary, in every page of divinity, relating to excommunication, this direction is quoted. And it appears to have been seldom asked by readers of the parable, "Two men went up into the temple to pray," *how* heathens and publicans were treated by Christ and his disciples. We might understand our Lord to say, "Of such a one, assume in word and in act that he is ignorant of, and grievously needs to know, the grace of the Father and the reconciliation wrought by the Son, as if he were a heathen or a publican;" and not so interpret this one dictum as to make it a flat contradiction to all the teaching and all the behaviour of his life. It is a most impressive fact, that the one passage on which the practice of excommunication has been built up is one which, rightly understood, emphatically denounces it.

(4.) Lastly, it *lowers* the sacrament of Holy Communion. This point is repeatedly urged by Erastus and his Zürich friends. They do not like the Communion being made an instrument of penal discipline. It is evident, indeed, that the tender and reverent atmosphere which should brood over the partaking of the Body and Blood of the Lord would be disturbed by the element of castigation. To a pastor holding high views of the sacrament, it must be painful to preside over a gate of admission, and to have to say to his flock, *You* may come in, you others are unworthy and must be kept out.

Those who, with the ideal of a pure Church before their minds, have studied the theory and practice of excommunication as a means of promoting purity, must have been haunted by misgivings such as are thus candidly confessed by Peter Martyr:—

"Hæc de excommunicatione dicere volui, semper meliora paratus audire. Multa enim hæc de re obscura esse video, quæ sæpe infirmiores impediunt, atque hoc vehementer doleo, quod de utopia et republicâ Platonis mihi videor locutus; quæ licet ut pulchra a multis laudentur, nullibi tamen reperiuntur."

But are there not more hopeful ways of striving after the same ideal? The following, at least, are open to us:—

1. We may endeavour to repress vice by the action of law. There are limits to what laws can do for the restraining of immorality, and it is an old delusion to hope that society may be made virtuous by legislation. But the question *how much* may be contributed by law towards this end, depending as it does on varying conditions, needs to be continually reconsidered. It can only be determined for each generation by a mixture of experiment and good sense. There is reason to hope that at this present time much might be accomplished by well-considered enactments for the further diminution of drunkenness, fornication, gambling, theft, violence, mendicancy; and it is very desirable that Christian earnestness and faith should be thrown into the studies and efforts undertaken with that view.

2. We may make cautious use of reproof, in word and act. There are limits to this mode, also, of contending against vice. Judgment and tact are necessary in reproving sin and discountenancing the sinner; otherwise, rumour may be rashly taken for fact, an impracticable censorship may be attempted, or weak folly may be treated as worse than self-regarding formalism. But social disapprobation is a most powerful deterrent, and we are responsible for making the most efficacious use of it against un-Christian conduct. It is a good rule to be more ready to rebuke sin in the rich than in the poor. The sixty-fifth Canon, enjoining the denunciation of offenders, adds well—"especially those of the better sort and condition." At all times the loyal acknowledgment of a high Christian standard will be a practical reproof of self-indulgence and worldliness, a light exposing and putting to shame deeds of darkness.

3. On the part of the clergy, faithful preaching may do much to bring about the best kind of condemnation—*self*-condemnation. In the present day there is little occasion to warn profligate offenders against profaning the Lord's Supper. So far as the Holy Communion is concerned, the irreligious are in the habit of excommunicating themselves. But there is always need to insist on the inward penitence and devotion which alone befit partakers of the Body and Blood of Christ, and to show that communicant purity is the law and ideal of the whole Christian society. In every age the Christian minister, serving at the altar of Christ's sacrifice, is called to protest against the easy compromises by which the world seeks to reconcile itself with Christianity. It is his difficult task to bear a steady witness on behalf of true Christian brotherhood, and against all the tempers and practices which violate it. He must reprove, rebuke, exhort, without ceasing; for to endeavours of this kind no limit is set, until the perfection of the body of Christ be attained.

J. LLEWELYN DAVIES.



## THE FIRST POINT OF THE NEW CHARTER.

### IMPROVED DWELLINGS FOR THE PEOPLE.

MUCH premature and confused talk has been made in the newspapers about what has acquired the name of a "New Social Movement." In these pages there shall not be found, so far as the present writer is concerned, anything which either lord or commoner will disclaim or contradict. Nobody will question that the working classes put forth a number of claims, how divided soever public opinion may be as to the justness of those claims or the best means of meeting those of them which may be agreed upon as just.

It is proposed, therefore, in order to understand clearly what the working classes demand or desire, and to promote a calm consideration of the whole subject-matter, to publish a short series of concise papers on the principal points; beginning, as in the observations which will now follow, with the prime social question of "Improved Dwellings for the People," especially in and around towns of large size and dense population.

Chicago, too late, has made the discovery that it would not have been destroyed by fire had its builders been as careful to eliminate the elements of danger, as they were to introduce those of strength and beauty. Let other cities and other countries take the warning of this vivid and tragical apologue. There are moral as well as material perils, and, great as are the latter, the former are infinitely greater. May we never have a moral conflagration in London, or Birmingham,

or Manchester, or Leeds, or Sheffield, which would suggest by its wide sweep and terrible devouring the fierce flames that have swept down and eaten up the wonderful city of Chicago! But mere wishing will not prevent it. There ought, in every considerable community, to be ready means of arresting and extinguishing a fire. But prevention is better than cure; and of cure all the engines in the world and all the water in the sea fall short when once the flames have burst forth. Let us have, if you please, the best palliatives, the most powerful restraint, that wit can invent or resource supply; but let not reliance upon these ever betray us into the neglect of any precaution against fire, or of any impediment to its spread, that ingenuity is able to suggest or the nature of things makes practicable. Beware of any creature or circumstance that may lay a fire, that may set light to it, that may feed it with fresh fuel, or that may act as a conductor to spread it from the spot in which it began to quarters where it might find no end until all burnable was burnt up.

Who, then, is answerable for the killing lack of proper dwellings for the labouring classes? Those classes who benefit by their labour, to be sure. To this it comes at last. We have heard the blame laid upon "small shopkeepers, speculative builders, and unprincipled cottage-owners;" and surely no gain is more contemptible than that made by taking high rents from hard-working men for tenements far inferior to many a stable, cow-house, dog-kennel, or even pig-stye. Talk of misers and "muck-rakes" (as John Bunyan names money-grubbers), what being can be much more despicable than the man (not a few of them are women!) who grasps at an unconscionable rent for a so-called house, which he studiously keeps down to a non-assessable value in order to exempt it from the rates? Society, however, or the State, or the public, or the corporation, or the parish, or the community, in one or other of its local or general concrete forms, is the back on which the blame ought to be laid for these evasions of duty and extortions of greed. To do one man justice, the Registrar-General is continually warning us of the terrible effects of this culpable, this criminal, state of things. "Well," cries the comfortable cit, over his second bottle of old port, "I consider the City of London the healthiest spot in all the world." No doubt it is healthier than almost any other place in which houses stand so thick on the ground. For one thing, it is uncommonly well aired by the tidal Thames, and perfectly well drained by natural situation and art combined. But men who have known it for the last half-century, and have quietly watched the course of habit, will tell us that it owes its healthiness, and the health of those who frequent it, to the modern custom of simply transacting one's business in it, and, that ended, going to spend the evening and night and early morning at houses, or

in villas, five miles, ten miles, or even twenty miles, in the country. One attentive observer has assured the present writer, that, when he first came to London, fifty-two years ago, the young men in easy circumstances were slim little fellows, rarely higher than five feet six, seldom heavier than nine stone. Any one who has known London for the last ten or twenty years, can say whether the same witness is supported by facts when he describes the youths of the metropolis now rising towards manhood, as tall, broad, well-formed, and full of robust health, and when he attributes these appearances to the habit of sleeping out of town and spending the light evenings in athletic sports and open-air exercises.

And yet, the Registrar-General to this day keeps telling us, that in the "healthiest city in the world" there are districts in which, for the general weekly average of twenty-five deaths among a thousand persons, the mortality rises above fifty; nay, more, ranges between fifty and a hundred. And why? The reply is given in his own words:—"The owners of property in such districts have no regard to sanitary improvement, save to avoid and retard it." It must be confessed, however, that Dr. Lyon Playfair, an equally good judge, is perfectly in the right, when he assigns, as the human reason why, taking the whole kingdom, we have nearly a quarter of a million of persons needlessly sick all the year round, and why the lives of a full half of that number are "ruthlessly sacrificed every year," that "neither our rulers nor our people will become acquainted with, and obey, simple sanitary laws."

There is no substantial difference, however, between the learned Member and the intelligent public officer. We have the former averring confidently, that "no epidemic can resist thorough cleanliness and ventilation;" and we have the latter as confidently foretelling, that "the next great social work of the age must be this—improved dwellings for the industrial classes, and the demolition of all the fever dens of the land." If the Leader of the Opposition in Parliament weighs his words as carefully for the purposes of truth as for those of rhetoric, he goes all the way with these specially instructed witnesses. His opinion on the point and value of health is as strong and clear as his perception of the connection between the hovel and the workhouse. In the *Westminster Review* he is cited as saying, that the State's first duty is to take care of the frame and health of the subject; that the fate of a nation ultimately depends upon the health and strength of its population; and that laws should be passed to secure all this, "and some day they will be." Here is a prophet who has a better chance than most prophets of securing the fulfilment of his own prediction.

As to the facts, they are beyond all doubt. Why, for example,

has it been found necessary at the Horse Guards to lower the standard of recruits? Because, through a series of deteriorating influences beginning at bad times, the breed of Englishmen has miserably gone down. The recruiting standard has been lowered and lowered again; and men at this moment, it is declared, cannot be got of the minimum height. "The present recruiting prospect," it is stated, "is *short* companies to the line regiments, companies of men scarcely exceeding five feet in height." The less said, therefore, about "Battles of Dorking" the better, even after any abatement that may be justly claimed on account of the difficulty of persuading men who know a trade and are in full employ to go into the army.

It is advisable to be extremely cautious in the pronouncement of censures on the affluent and well-to-do classes, remembering, as we are bound to do, the happy, the increasing, if not the already numerous instances in which men and women of high rank and station, of large possessions and means, and of great personal or class influence, are sincerely, earnestly, and actively taking up the cause of the working classes with a serious view to the gratification of their reasonable desires. Several suitable illustrations might be given. On this occasion, one may suffice, especially as it is the most appropriate that occurs to recollection. Take, then, the Artisans', Labourers', and General Dwellings Company. The Dean of Westminster is its President. What Dr. Stanley receives and what he rejects in the way of articles of religious creed, let those who care inquire. To the present writer it is enough to know that he abounds in works of faith and labours of love. What is more, his name at the head of such a company is well adapted to draw after it very many below him in church rank, and not a few, as one would hope, above him. From the three noblemen who constitute the standing Board of Arbitration, Earls Shaftesbury and Lichfield, and Lord Elcho, an equally favourable inference may be drawn as to the disposition, the honest and extending disposition of laymen of rank and influence to encourage and promote a fair and practical consideration of the ascertained claims of the people. When such men as these are found co-operating with a man like Mr. Jacob Bright, not to do more than name Sir Thomas Bazley, Mr. John Cheetham, and that rising Manchester man, Mr. W. R. Callendar, the younger, it is, or ought to be, a sure sign that something good, real, and large is intended.

However, these gentlemen, worthy as they may be, are only helping those who help themselves. But this, according to the adage, is *Godlike*. In fact, the Company under which they hold office, is no more than one of the many forms that the co-operative principle is assuming. This is as it should be. No self-respecting artisan, nor

any one else who truly respects him, would desire to see him indebted for even a suitable abode to any scheme towards the furtherance of which he was not himself a due contributor. We neither like a thousand paupers crammed into one union-house, nor wish to see so many individual paupers lodged in as many separate huts. Against everything like this, the Company under notice effectually guards. Workmen, for example, build workmen's dwellings. The labour given counts for as much, in proportion, as the capital subscribed. "The balances beyond labour are paid to workmen." By this system, disputes are avoided, and arbitrations superseded. The works of the Company afford higher wages than a strike could win, wages, in short, in just proportion to fidelity, industry, and skill. Not that it has not a Board of Arbitration of its own, and one the like to which all England cannot show, consisting, as it does, of three patricians and three plebeians; but that things have worked too smoothly for them to have anything to try and determine. Although the Company has its head-quarters beneath the shadows of Westminster Abbey, Manchester is the scene of its most active operations; and there, as its managers can honestly boast, while, owing to a trade dispute, the Town-hall has stood half-built for a whole twelvemonth, the Company's works in Salford, close by, have proceeded harmoniously and without a single interruption.

If, moreover, it be asked what kind of habitations this Company puts up, the answer is ready and satisfactory. Survey some of those society freeholds on which the occupants have literally erected their own dwellings; and you will find miserable evidence of "the shoemaker's wife being worst shod." Not so with this Company; its houses are well arranged and honestly built. The workmanship is thorough, and the structure devised on the best principles. The enterprise has been the means of eliciting and rewarding special skill and rare ingenuity. The district manager at Manchester has, for example, gained a prize for three most useful household inventions, which have been thoroughly tested, patented in his own name, applied to all the dwellings erected by the Company, and are productive, it is affirmed, in a degree without precedent, of health, convenience, and economy.

This Company, besides all, lays claim to having surpassed both the Peabody trustees and Sir Sydney Waterlow in the benefits conferred. The utmost these latter have been able to accomplish, we are assured, is to put the working man into the *occupancy* of rooms, which cost him two shillings per room per week; while the Company puts him, not only into the occupancy, but into possession, into the actual *ownership* of a five-roomed house, exclusive of a scullery, at a cost of less than one shilling and twopence per room per week, the

payments to extend over a period of fourteen years. The Salts, the Crossleys, the Akroyds, the Masons,\* and others, have done much and have set noble examples; but what they have done has terminated, for the most part, upon their own people. Their liberal conduct may and ought, indeed, to lead to general imitation; but, either by law or by united effort on the part of all classes, something must at once be done that shall be felt in its benefits by the whole labouring class throughout the kingdom. The Company to which attention has been called, ought either to be enabled to do the whole work, or its plan and procedure, if, on examination, found so good as they seem, should be made the model for every town and parish in the island. What does it do? It buys large plots of land, builds model houses, gives to each thorough drainage, ventilation, light, water supply, a separate yard, a "dry-ash closet," and, on no pretence whatsoever, will it suffer beerhouses, taverns, or spirit vaults upon its property. Upon the testimony of Mr. Cawley, M.P., himself a civil engineer, these houses are well built and of good materials. Each has gas as well as water fittings, a cellar with a copper, a place for coals, ventilators in the chief rooms, and the ground-floors formed with cement concrete, excluding damp. This professional opinion is amply confirmed by Mr. John Taylor, surveyor to Lord Egerton.

"The houses," he declares, "are much superior to the general class in that locality, the walls firmly built of good materials, no cracks or other signs of settling, or of soft unburnt bricks. Each has a good cellar under half the block. The upper rooms are of convenient size, lofty and well finished, with ample fittings and cupboards. The ventilation is excellent, vertical apertures with grids being left in the walls to admit a free circulation of air into each room, and also to the bearing and other timbers. The drainage and other sanitary arrangements are good; the lower passages being formed with such inclinations and channels as to draw the surface water clearly off as it falls. The privies are on Macleod's patent dry ash system, each one being furnished with apparatus for riddling ashes and discharging the finer parts into the soil pits, reserving the other for fuel,

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\* Mr. Hugh Mason, of Ashton, has not simply set a noble example, but borne a strong testimony:—"The subject of healthful homes for the people has had my earnest attention for years past. Any one who may come to inspect the dwellings I have erected for my workpeople, will see the ample provision I have made for their moral and social well-being. Ministers may preach, and bishops may declaim on every platform, on every imaginable topic; and Temperance reformers may exhort; but what is a hard-working fellow to do, at the close of a day's toil, when he goes to the hovel in the back street, which is called his 'home?' The real fact is, that you are the pioneers in the war against dirt, disease, and death. Provide the decent habitation. Let those who hire the labourer look upon him as something more than a money-grubbing automaton, without mind or soul; manifest a spark of sympathy for those who are, perforce, absorbed in bread-winning; and surely great and good results will soon be witnessed."

as a source of economy. The interiors were found clean, well furnished, and cheerful-looking, bespeaking the occupants of a respectable and well-to-do class."

It is worthy of note, moreover, that, after the Company's buildings were erected in Salford, the owners of adjoining property were compelled not only to reduce the rents, but also to do repairs they had before persistently refused. And yet these improved dwellings pay well. "The Improved Industrial Dwellings Company, Limited," of which Sir Sydney Waterlow is chairman, has in seven years erected 1,047 improved tenements, yielding a net profit of five per cent. per annum to the shareholders. The Liverpool Corporation likewise have erected a number of cottages for labourers. The borough treasurer submitted a statement of the income and expenditure to the 31st of August last, from which it appears that the cost was £17,928 16s.; the rent £1,365, and the payments £454, leaving a nett income of £911 11s. 11d., giving a percentage of £5 1s. 7d., and it was expected, that, when the basements were let, an additional £200 a-year would be realised. One of the objects of the Corporation in the erection of these houses was to show, that good buildings could be erected and made to pay a remunerative interest on the outlay. Of course, a Corporation or a Company can lease or purchase a large area of land on more reasonable terms, can more economically lay it out, and can build a block or a row of buildings at considerably less cost than single dwellings.

But why, it may be asked by the frivolous and the superficial—why do the people go to such horrid places? Why! because they cannot help themselves. Show them better places, and places within their reach; and, except such as are hopelessly down in the bottomless pit, they will lose little time in flitting. But, having no choice, they reconcile themselves to their fate as well as they know how. The husband and father is not always there, his work calling him elsewhere; but that circumstance too often leads to his being from home when he might be at home, because he has found at the public-house, or in the beershop, a brighter and cleaner place than his own fireside or empty grate. Alas! he buys himself this indulgence at a heavy expense; at the best, an abdication of husbandly and fatherly duties, and a serious deduction from the family fund; at the worst, to which it too frequently comes, by becoming a sot, losing his work, his character, his honour, his reason, or his life. But, apart from aggravations like these, where are the wife and the children? The filthy room which the man abhors and shuns, is the only place they have wherein to spend all the twenty-four hours of the weary and changeless day. She labours in vain to make clean

and comfortable a hovel insusceptible of such qualities. She languishes under the twofold influence of depressed feelings and foul air; and, seeing her children sickly, stunted, and nerveless around her, and the parish or club doctor at the door oftener almost than her husband, she gives it up as a bad job, and, following his bad example, goes and gets her penn'orth of bad gin as often as she can lay hold of the penny.

The observation is become trite, that, if a comparative fraction of the money and pains bestowed upon measures and institutions for the alleviation of actual misery, had been laid out for its prevention, our country and its people would have been in a much better condition than they are. Are pauperism, lunacy, and crime, inevitable? If not utterly eradicated, might they not be very greatly abated? Are there not conditions which as surely foster diligence and providence, good sense and sound judgment, honesty and probity, as conditions of an opposite kind engender and propagate the vices that contrast with those virtues? To confine attention to one point at a time, has not the sort of home in which men and their families are lodged a great deal to do with such questions? Without a healthy body, there cannot long be a healthy mind; and how can there be a healthy body in the case of persons, infantile or adult, huddled together in houses and rooms ill-drained, ill-aired, ill-lighted, ill-supplied with means of order and cleanliness; as, for instance, water and water-closets? Such places are nests of disease, hotbeds of immorality, provocatives to gin-drinking. That most worthy man, the late Prince Consort, could have told us, with arithmetical minuteness, and certainty almost mathematical, the amount of disease, often mortal and always costly, which might have been prevented altogether by building the dwellings of the labouring class with right materials rightly disposed. "Pauperism," says Mr. Disraeli, in one of his pointed sentences, "is less an affair of wages than of dwellings." When, in single rooms, or in mere sheds, at high rents, whole families pig together, male and female, with often persons of both sexes not even members of the family, what is and must be the result? Demoralization at the beginning and crime in the end.

Alas! it is necessary for the working men to be themselves reminded of the real extent of some of those questions in which they are largely supposed to be the only or the chief persons interested. What is the use of debating matters of work and of wages in the presence of poor fellows who have neither; who are dependent upon the most precarious demands for labour, and upon compensations for it still more precarious, or as to which they have not the whisper of a voice? It is to be hoped, however, that the fellow-feeling will

never cease to make them reasonably kind. If they have hardships, hardships which it is scarcely in human nature to endure, though refined, or, rather, though, like steel, at once hardened and attempered to elastic endurance, by the sympathetic passiveness of Christ, the second Adam; scarcely, we say, in improved human nature to endure,—what must be the sufferings of those who have no special skill, upon the conscious possession of which they can take their stand, but are fain to do any odd job, or even break stones on the highway, to save themselves and their families from absolute starvation? Sound and healthful dwellings, it has been reasonably suggested, are required in towns for a class of occupants lower in the downward scale than those who have been hitherto chiefly thought of,—the multitude of persons, namely, unable to pay more than sixpence, ninepence, or a shilling at the outside, in the form of weekly rent. Uncounted numbers require but one room, or, rather, can but afford one, or are prepared, under the pinch of necessity, to confine themselves to one. Such are married couples without children, lone widows, single women, and single men. A part of the Peabody Fund, it is hinted, could not be better applied than to the relief of this crying want; nor, it may be added, could the half-million, which Mr. Godwin has announced as ready to be devoted to suchlike purposes, provided only that the outlay shall not minister to pauperism, be, in part at least, more beneficially applied than to this object; in which case the munificent donor would have reason to believe that he was rescuing hundreds from pauperism, rather than superinducing a pauperizing spirit.

The present Government and Parliament have all the credit they deserve, perhaps more, for what they have done in the matter of education. But mark! if all children between certain points of age are to be drawn into school, what of the children coming from clean and wholesome dwellings to sit side by side with children dragged out of foul and filthy dens of disease? “Is it safe, is it fair,” asks Mr. William Martin, in his able appeal to Lord Derby, “to insist upon the children of decent working people sitting side by side with children issuing from these plague-stricken lodgments?”

Few men are more reliable witnesses on such a subject than Lord Shaftesbury, a man who has looked long and closely into it, and from every point of view. He has recently pronounced the following opinions:—

“There can be no security to society, no honour, no prosperity, no dignity at home, no nobleness of attitude towards foreign nations, unless the strength of the people rests upon the purity and firmness of the domestic system. Schools are but auxiliaries. At home the principles of subordination are first implanted, and the man is trained to be the good citizen.

or new town circle. Into the outer circle the inhabitants of the dismal lanes, crowded alleys, and unwholesome dwellings would be first planted out—each provided with a detached homestead, comfortably but plainly furnished; each provided with a well-stocked garden; each provided with two or more cows, and with two or more pigs; each, in short, provided with the means of full subsistence from the soil.

“3. As much as possible of the five-mile radius of the outer circle would be devoted to farming purposes by tenant-farmers—the rents paid by such tenant-farmers to be applied to the general purposes of the town.

“4. As much as possible of the five-mile radius of the outer circle would be devoted to common land rights—chiefly rights of pasture for the cows of the planted-out and the town families.

“After such a fashion Blackburn would be dealt with by Switzerland and sooner or later, after a like fashion, Blackburn, and all the Blackburns of the United Kingdom, will be dealt with by Parliament—if peace is to be preserved, and our commercial greatness to be maintained.

“For what is the effect—the economical effect—of the restoration of the soil of Switzerland to the people of Switzerland; and the effect of the restoration of the German land of the Rhine valley to the people of the Rhine valley? Listen, the professors in abstract science who fill the chairs of Political Economy in our colleges and universities! Listen, also, the plain-spoken men who fought resolutely under Bright and Cobden! Listen, likewise, the great self-made Manchester middle-class, whose wealth may yet take wing and leave them!

“I am in the silk trade, and want to buy manufactured fabrics. Where can I be best served? I am told, in Switzerland.

“I accordingly take the train to one of the Swiss manufacturing towns; but through ignorance of the ways of Switzerland, meet with an odd reception.

“‘You must not come to Switzerland at this season, nor in autumn. Now we are in our fields planting, and in our vineyards dressing. In the autumn we shall be harvesting grain, and making wine. Better return home at once, and for present use get what you want in Spitalfields or Coventry. In a month’s time we shall be glad to take your orders—at half or even less than half what you have to pay in Spitalfields or Coventry.’

“‘You don’t say so?’

“‘But we do. Our people—we Swiss people—get our living from the land; your Spitalfields and Coventry people get their living from their wages: good times, fair wages: bad times, starvation—or workhouse.’

“‘You surprise me.’

“‘Yes; thank God, our people—we Swiss people—have at last discovered the philosopher’s stone: we find work for everybody: we make every family comfortable, and independent of the vicissitudes of trade and commerce: we dispense with middlemen: we confer the advantages of banking on the poor instead of on the rich, as you do: we also do more—we put in practice compulsions that would be strange to you: we flog the drunkard, the dissolute, and the idle: we select our own public servants, and if they refuse to serve us in the way we wish, we oblige them to leave Switzerland.’

“‘Astounding! Then you don’t trouble yourselves about free-trade, and protection, and Church and State connexion, and contagious diseases, and such matters?’

“‘We care for none of these things.’

“‘And the land?’

“ ‘Generally, it belongs to the towns or municipalities—not to persons: and when a person dies, holding from the town or municipality, the town or municipality exercises its discretion, as the ordinary landowner would do, in continuing the occupation in the same family, or in transferring it to another.’

“ ‘No inconvenience from the practice?’

“ ‘None whatever. If we change the occupation from one family to another—as in a case of death—we provide for the dispossessed family: put the various members in the way of well doing.’

“ ‘Do you advance them money?’

“ ‘No. Our help generally is in kind. We might put the wife of a deceased farmer into the occupation of a dairy, or into the possession of a shop. We do the same for what you would call the widows of the mechanic class. Then young fellows marrying look to the town or municipality for a house, and for the other wherewith to begin the world fairly.’

“ ‘Communism, is it not?’

“ ‘Certainly not. The communistic theory is common rights, common property, and so on: ours is the theory of natural rights—giving the use of a portion of the land to him who seeks to use it: and with the use the means to support himself. We do not recognise the principle of personal property in the land: and beyond this there are really only matters of detail between our practices and yours. We are neither Communists nor Socialists. We are Republicans, trying to do the best for each other individually, and for the Common Good collectively.’

“ ‘And wages: no bother with them—no strikes?’

“ ‘In Switzerland we have no such troubles. Our people have nothing to complain of: and therefore have no occasion to war against each other. The towns or municipalities make it their business to care for those needing to be cared for, and to punish those needing to be punished; and if there is no business doing—an impossibility of course—why, in the absence of wages, each man’s ground and rights of pasture serve to feed him.’

“ ‘Wages: no consequence?’


“ ‘That is our theory: and in its practical working out we trust soon to be able to supply England with every kind of manufactured thing it needs, up to the paper of its Bank of England notes.’

“ ‘You mean to push us to the wall?’

“ ‘We mean no more than to do the best we can for ourselves.’

“ ‘The same thing.’”

GEORGE POTTER.



## GERMAN THEOLOGY: ITS PLACE IN THE HISTORY OF RELIGION.

*History of Protestant Theology, particularly in Germany.* By  
Dr. J. A. DORNER. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark.  
1871.

*History of the Church in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Cen-  
turies.* By K. R. HAGENBACH, D.D. London: Hodder  
and Stoughton. 1870.

*History of Rationalism.* By JOHN F. HURST, D.D. London:  
Trübner & Co. 1867.

AMONG the books of mystical theology which belonged to the era of the pre-Reformation Mystics, there was one called "Theologia Germanica," or "German Theology." It was a great favourite with Luther, by whom it was edited and recommended to the people. Luther's friends were afraid that he might injure his cause by identifying himself with the theology of this book. "We shall be called," they said, "German theologians," and Luther answered bravely, "It is well; German theologians let us be." In tracing the course of religious development in Germany, it is necessary to bear in mind this original connection of the Lutheran Reformation with the theology of the Mystics.

In the middle ages, and within the united fold of the Catholic Church, there existed the same diverse tendencies which were more definitely developed after the Reformation. While Anselm said, "Credo ut intelligam," Abelard answered, "Intelligo ut credam." Anselm took the doctrines of the Church on the authority of the Church, trusting to a verification in the religious experience, while Abelard wished to believe only what was known to be true. The Mystics again, with an inner self-consciousness of the truth of

religion, tried to be independent both of authority and reason. In the depth of their own spirits there was an answer to the divine mysteries. Deep called unto deep. The consciousness of the divine communication refused to be disturbed by any external voice. The soul internally purified and enlightened recognised the truth of the Scriptures or the doctrines of the Church; but its purification and enlightenment proceeded from another source. It might have been helped by these, but essentially it was independent of them.

The religious element in the German Reformation was mainly contributed by Luther himself. It began with that inward struggle for mental peace which ended in a sense of the divine forgiveness. This was realized by faith, after all efforts by means of ecclesiastical prescriptions and external works had failed. But faith as understood by Luther was not believing the Bible or believing the Church. It was not the reception of orthodox doctrines. It was rather an actual realization of the unseen, a feeling of contact with the divine, and a sense of participating in that spiritual strength which makes saints and prophets. This in its foundation was Luther's justifying faith. It came to him through his religious experience in the form of reconciliation. A sense of sin gave him trouble, a sense of divine mercy brought him peace. In Luther's theology this justifying faith in what we may call its scientific form, becomes the first ground of certainty. It is the foundation of all other certainties. It is not preceded by believing the truth of Christianity; but, on the contrary, the truth of Christianity follows from it. In this sense it is the article of "a standing or a falling Church."

So far Luther is at one with the Mystics. Like them he begins with the subjective, and from this proceeds to establish the objective. He is personally conscious of being taken out of a state where all was discordant, and of being brought into a state where all is harmonious. For want of better names he uses the current ecclesiastical language, and calls the one a state of nature, the other a state of grace. But he finds other men who have had the same experience. He finds that such men have existed in all ages. Their existence is a fact. These men constitute the Church. Here is the first passage from the subjective to the objective, and here begins Luther's essential antagonism with the Church of Rome. All his language concerning the ministry and the sacraments must be understood from the point of view that true Christians alone are really members of the Church. The right of performing the offices of the Church belongs to them, springs from them, and, for the sake of order, is by them conferred on the officers of the Church.

The Scriptures being the property of this Church, and the canon itself being determined by the Church, they cannot have an external

or legal authority over the Christian's faith. The subject-matter attests itself to the hearts of men as the Word of God; but the canon in itself as a formal principle is without authority. The Christian consciousness is above it. What Luther called justifying faith was the authoritative criterion of canonicity. On this ground he rejected the Epistle of James, which he supposed to contradict the doctrine of St. Paul, and St. Paul's doctrine he did not take on St. Paul's authority, but because he had himself experienced its truth. Dr. Dorner\* mentions several books, both in the Old and the New Testament, which Luther either rejected altogether or made deuterocanonical. He did not hesitate to admit that the writers of the Bible were not always correct in their statements nor sound in their arguments. The Scriptures contained the Word of God, but they were not themselves that Word, neither in their form nor, altogether, their subject-matter. The Scriptures Luther said are but Christ's servant. He was satisfied to have on his side "the Master and the Lord of Scripture."

These views of the Bible are clearly and frequently enunciated in Luther's writings, but they are never stated systematically or in the way of dogma. It is also true that many passages might be found which did not harmonize with these views. Lessing quotes Luther as calling the Scriptures on one occasion God Himself, and on another the very body of Christ. But Luther's language, beyond that of all other men, is not to be taken in the strictness of the letter. These expressions themselves bear witness of an original tendency to the extravagant and undefined language of the Mystics. Yet his arguments, especially against the Roman Catholics, really assumed the objective certainty and external authority of the Scriptures. Münzer, the leader of the Anabaptists, who rested all truth on the inward light, said that Luther took the same ground as the Roman Catholics, with only this difference, that he substituted the authority of the Bible for that of the Church.

The Reformed Church took up a more decided position than Luther's as to the authority of the Scriptures. This may have been due to the practical character of Zwingle's intellect, or it may have been necessitated by circumstances. The Anabaptists by their lawlessness had brought contempt on immediate inspiration, while the Catholics had an argument easily comprehended by the ordinary mind in the infallibility of the Church. Zwingle regarded the canonical Scriptures as a revelation of the divine will, and at the same time a rule of faith and life. They were a protection against the subjectivity from which Luther started and a refuge from the mere spiritualism of the Anabaptists. Their authority, however,

\* Vol. i. p. 243.

was not even with Zwingle a mere outward law, but a law which became "clear and sure" only to the believer's mind. Zwingle says that all Scripture is not Holy Scripture, nor are all the sacred writers infallible. The religious truth in the Scriptures is the Word of God. But Zwingle rejected the authority of the Church for the canon. He excluded the Apocalypse, on the same ground that Luther excluded some other books. Beginning with the objective, he fell back on the subjective, probably without consciousness of the change. Calvin took up Zwingle's position, but held to it with more consistency. He refused the authority of the Church, on the ground that the Church itself was based on the Scriptures. The authority of the Scriptures depends on the Holy Ghost, who speaks in them, testifying of their truth more clearly than any human evidence could do. It is true that this testimony, in the first instance, is connected with the subject-matter, but the latter, in Calvin's judgment, is inseparable from the form of the Scriptures. The Book, as a book, is inspired. Calvin cannot therefore allow the same freedom of criticism which was allowed by Luther. Dr. Dorner remarks in agreement with this that the chief confessions of the Reformed Churches enumerate the writings which form the canon. This is not done in any Lutheran confession, so that with the Lutheran the inclusion of any book in the canon is not an article of faith.

To the living faith of Luther the voice of God was speaking throughout creation. The Church, tradition, the Bible, the sacrament, were all to him the Word of God. His successors, however, came nearer to the Reformed Churches, till at last the Scriptures not only contained the Word of God, but were themselves the Word of God formally and exclusively. The bond of the Church's union was no more, as with Luther, the sense of contact with the divine, but a written book which became an external rule of faith. To suit this position, it was necessary that there be no question of the canonicity of any of the received books, and the entire contents of the Scriptures must be without the least admixture of error. At this stage the Protestant mind began, we may say, to reflect on its position, and to take an inventory of the contents of Protestantism. It found the objective method of Calvin more convenient, and, indeed, more serviceable, than the method of Luther. The practical mind wants an external law whose authority is the same to all sorts and conditions of men. To meet this want, many things were assumed concerning the Scriptures, and on the basis of these assumptions many arguments were founded systematically and logically. The Holy Spirit was supposed to have committed the office of teaching entirely to the Scriptures. The "self-certainty of faith" yielded to the inspiration of vowel points and Hebrew accents. Before the

close of the seventeenth century this view of the Scriptures was generally received by all Protestant Churches. It was defended by the negative argument that if the Scriptures are not infallible, then we have no infallible authority, and as such an authority was longed for, it was assumed that it must be given. After this conclusion it was quite logical to admit no doubts concerning the books which composed the canon, no various readings nor any uncertainty as to the absolute accuracy of every word and every letter. Calovius said that the writers of Scripture were God's amanuenses, and that the books, even those which were mere history, were the same as if they had been written by Christ's own hand. Nitzsche, the Superintendent of Gotha, proceeded to yet greater extravagance, determining that the Scriptures were not a creature, but that, like God, they were uncreated. By the Scriptures he understood Luther's translation of the Bible, the very typographical errors of which Dr. Dorner says were to be left untouched.

The only protesters against this apotheosis of the Scriptures in the seventeenth century were such Mystics as Jacob Böhme and Pietists like Spener and John Arndt. These men preserved the subjective principle of Luther, but without being able to give an account of it to reason. The Orthodox, on the other hand, had, by a certain kind of reasoning, reasoned themselves into their position. Their real enemy was the Deism which they had themselves evoked. Deism met them on their own ground, and overcame them by the pure force of a clearer and more consistent logic. As a matter of history it is known that Deism came into Germany from England. The books of the English Deists were translated into German. But the ground was prepared. The same causes which had operated in England were at work in Germany. The genesis of Deism was found in the impossibility of proving the Scriptures to be what the Orthodox assumed them to be. Christianity was made to rest on the supposed authority of writings, the early history of which was not absolutely known, and on the certainty of a canon of whose origin nobody knew anything.

There was, however, another factor in Deism which strengthened its position against the Orthodox. This was natural religion, which embraced what may be known of God from nature and reason, independently of the Scriptures. Over against the uncertainty of the sacred books, both as to their history and contents, the Deists placed the certainty of natural religion. Subjectivity or that internal certainty which might have rivalled at least the certainty of natural religion, had been put aside, so that from it no resistance could be made. This was equally true in Germany and in England. The precursors of the Deists were the theologians who applied reason

to theology. Bacon and Locke, Leibnitz and Wolff, wished to confine their methods only to philosophy, or, if they touched theology, to draw the line very clearly between religion natural and revealed. They seem to have supposed that it was possible to awaken the mind to the utmost activity in one sphere, and to confine it there when another sphere impinged on that, and was really inseparable from it. The "*Aufklärung*" dispelled the illusion.

There were, however, in Germany in the eighteenth century theologians who opposed Deism, and yet saw the necessity of admitting the truth concerning the Scriptures. We cannot quite put Bengel in this connection, though he was one of the first who made the critical study of the Bible the great business of his life. He wished to restore the true text, believing that infallibility was connected with the original if it could be found. Bengel proceeded from the Pietists; but he cleared the way for Wetstein and Michaelis, in whose hands the uncertainty, both of the text and the canon, could not be concealed. Rational views of the Bible were taught in many pulpits and universities, but those who taught them were persecuted as unbelievers. Ernesti laid the foundation for a new school of exegesis. He dispelled the illusive halo with which the Scriptures had been surrounded. He cleared away the mist of allegories, and challenged the cloudy images to declare themselves either gods or men. With clear and purified eyes he saw that whatever might be the meaning of inspiration, the Scriptures were written in human language, and by the laws of human language they must be understood. The divine, he said, had not destroyed the human; and who could tell but that by a clear and open recognition of the human the divine might be more manifest? Ernesti was followed by Semler, who had been educated among the Pietists, and who resolutely opposed Deism in every form. Semler early in life felt that the Scriptures had been deified, and that the destruction of this idolatry must be the work of his life. He could find no external certainty as to the number of canonical books, and when he applied the subjective test, he found that he must reject many of the Old Testament and some of the New. Semler did not solve the great question. He did not speak the right word; but he showed the necessity that it should be spoken. He rejected from the canon some books which had quite as good a claim to canonicity as some that were retained. He made, however, the important distinction between what is local and what is permanent in the Scriptures, and he supposed that some of the writers of the New Testament accommodated themselves to the popular ideas and even superstitions of the Jews of their day.

The Orthodox and the Deists were agreed that Christianity cannot be true if the Scriptures are not infallible. The Deists said they

were certain that the Scriptures were full of errors, while Rational Christians said that Bible infallibility was altogether an invention of theologians. The Scriptures did not claim to be infallible, and Christianity did not rest on their supposed infallibility. The subject was first discussed in a complete form by Lessing. In 1774—77 he published the famous "Fragments of a Wolfenbüttel Unknown." Lessing said that he had found the "Fragments" in MS. in the library of Wolfenbüttel, to which he had been appointed librarian. They are part of a work, the original of which is still to be seen in the town library of Hamburg. It was written by Professor Reimarus, and is called a "Vindication of the Rational Worshippers of God." In these "Fragments" there is no levity, no scoffing, no effort to conceal the ultimate meaning. They are rather written with an impressive earnestness and with the utmost frankness. The perspicuity of the language and the elegance of the style have secured them a permanent place among German classics. It was these qualities which made them suitable for Lessing's object. They showed that the Deists really had something to say against Christianity as it was then understood. Reimarus had been educated for the ministry in the Lutheran Church, but he could not reconcile the Theism of reason with what was ascribed to God in the Scriptures.

The "Fragments" were six in number, or seven if we reckon one "On the Toleration of the Deists," which took the form of an introduction. The first was "On the Condemnation of Reason from the Pulpit." The writer finds it true even of the most learned and inquiring men, that they generally keep to the religion in which they were educated. A blind faith is convenient. It is inculcated by the clergy of all nations. For this, however, ministers of the Christian religion have not the example of Christ and his apostles. They established a rational religion, and appealed to reason against the religion of the Pagans. It is true that St. Paul says, concerning the things of God, that they are foolishness to the natural man. But he is not here contrasting the darkness of reason with the light of revelation. The contrast is between the *psychical* or sensuous man and the spiritual man. St. Paul, in an epistle to the Corinthians, speaks of the reason being taken captive to the obedience of Christ. This passage is often misquoted; instead of the words "of Christ," it is generally read *of faith*. But St. Paul is not opposing reason. He only condemns certain false "reasonings" of the Corinthians. Under the figure of a warfare, he describes their reasonings as subdued by the Gospel. It was commonly argued by the clergy that reason had lost its power through the fall. To this the writer of the "Fragment" answers, that the reason of the first men could not have been great, when they listened to the words of the serpent and disobeyed

the clear command of God. The reason of man is not surely weaker now than it was then. It is impossible that we could be so weak as to sin after the similitude of Adam's transgression. The Scriptures lay the foundation of faith in reason. The Lutherans "reason" against election and reprobation, as contrary to the goodness of God. The Reformed "reason" against the ubiquity of Christ's natural body, because it is against the nature of such a body to be in more places than one at the same time; and both Lutheran and Reformed "reason" against transubstantiation, because it contradicts our very ideas of what constitutes bread and wine. The clergy may decry reason, yet they must use it.

The second "Fragment" is on the "Impossibility of a Revelation which all men could receive in a Satisfactory Manner." By "revelation" we are evidently to understand revelation in the ordinary sense of an external or merely objective revelation. It is first supposed as possible that God might give a supernatural revelation to all men at all times. But this would imply continual miracles, which would destroy the established order of nature. It would be against the wisdom of God, who, if divine knowledge was to be given to all men, would give it in a natural way. To work miracles continually would be like teaching men supernaturally where to find fire and water, meat and drink, instead of giving them eyes which they could use for themselves. If all men had lost the use of their eyes by the fall, it is not likely that God would have sent angels to lead men, or indeed have adopted any supernatural way of compensating for the loss of sight. It is more likely, and more in accordance with divine wisdom, that He would at once have restored the use of their eyes. It is also possible that God would have given a supernatural revelation to some persons in every country, from whom all others were to receive it. But here again, as the object is that it should extend to all, the same improbability of frequent miracles is opposed. Moreover, in this case the miracles would not effect their object. Those who received the revelation at second-hand would not receive a divine revelation, but only the testimony of men that such a revelation had been made. The miracles, at first believed by only a few, as the case was with the Jews, would become less credible to those who did not see them. The third case conceivable is that of God revealing himself at certain times, and through certain persons, to one nation. This hypothesis has some advantage over the others, but it supposes that to be done by miracles which could be done through the ordinary working of nature. Moreover, of the evidence of such a revelation not one in a million could have the opportunity of judging, so as to be reasonably convinced of its truth. This is not God's way of acting in the natural world. He does not suspend

matters of great moment on mere accidents. If the revelation in the Bible is to be taken for this one revelation which is necessary for salvation, it was simply impossible that all men could know it. Noah and the patriarchs to whom it was first given took no pains to publish it. They cultivated fields and planted vineyards. Even at the present day only a small number of the human race have heard the Gospel. St. Paul, indeed, speaks of its sound having gone out into all lands, and of its being preached to every creature under heaven. But many maps must have been missing in the apostle's atlas. He doubtless meant that the religion of nature was published in all lands. The voice of God, speaking to the reason of man, is the only Gospel that has been preached to every creature under heaven.

The third "Fragment" is on the "Passage of the Israelites through the Red Sea." The narrative says that there were 600,000 armed men. Reckoning for wives, children, and unarmed, four to every armed man, we have a company of 3,000,000, which probably had 300,000 oxen, with 600,000 sheep and goats. For fodder and baggage they must have required about 5,000 waggons. Pharaoh's army had at least 600 waggons and probably 25,000 cavalry, with 100,000 foot soldiers. These followed close on the Israelites when they encamped on the shore of the Red Sea. The wind blew all night, which probably means till midnight, before the sea was dry. By the first watch—that is, in three hours' time—the Israelites had crossed the sea, and the Egyptians were in the middle of it, with their horses and chariots. The camp of the Israelites is reckoned to have covered at least nine square miles. The argument is, that it was just possible for one person to have walked the distance in three hours, but utterly impossible for such a multitude of people.

In the fourth "Fragment" it is maintained "that the Books of the Old Testament were not written to reveal a Religion." This is shown from their silence as to any future life, which it is assumed must be the object of a supernatural religion. This was written in avowed opposition to Warburton's argument that the legation of Moses must have been divine because he said nothing of immortality, or of rewards and punishments in a life to come. The passages in Job and the Psalms, with some in the Prophets, which are generally supposed to refer to a future life, are explained in another sense. The doctrine, if presupposed in the Scriptures, was certainly either not known or not believed among the Jews. Some of the Old Testament writers plainly deny it. The Jews borrowed it from the Persians, the Greeks, and the Egyptians. In the time of Christ it was believed by the Pharisees, but denied by the Sadducees, who were the old orthodox Jews.

The fifth "Fragment" was on "The History of the Resurrection."

This was the severest piece of criticism that had ever been applied to the gospel histories. St. Matthew's account of the guard appointed by Pilate is not reckoned worthy of belief. It is not only not mentioned by any other evangelist, but no apostle ever speaks of the guard as witnesses of the resurrection. There were many occasions when this might have been of great service to the apostles, especially when they were brought before the Roman governors; but never once do they allude to it. That the body was stolen is more probable than St. Matthew's story of the guard. It is asked why Jesus did not rise in the day-time, when the people might have seen Him? why He did not, after his resurrection, show himself before the officers? why He did not appear in the Temple, or in the public streets? It is strange that all his visits were to his disciples, and that they were made privately and mysteriously. The "Fragment" ends by pointing out ten palpable contradictions in the gospel narratives.

There was an additional "Fragment" published after these five. This was larger than all the others together, and appeared in the midst of the controversy which the others had created. It is generally supposed not to have been written by Reimarus, or, if written by him, to have been intended chiefly to provoke the zealots. The scope of it is, that John and Jesus preached the kingdom of God in the sense understood by the old prophets of the restoration of the grandeur of the Jewish kingdom. The people who heard them, and even Christ's own disciples, always understood it in this sense. But after the failure to make Jesus a temporal king, they began to think of another kingdom, which was not to be on earth, but in heaven.

Lessing published these "Fragments" expressly to have the questions raised in them more thoroughly discussed. He added notes of his own, expressing in many cases his dissent from the writer, and sometimes answering his objections. He rested the certainty of Christianity on the experience of those who have realized its spirit in their own consciousness. A paralytic, he says, who has felt the beneficial effects of the sparks of electricity, is not concerned to know whether its discovery is due to Nollet or to Franklin. The letter is not the spirit, and the Bible is not the religion. Objections against the letter of the Bible are not objections against the spirit of the religion which is in the Bible. Almost in the words of Richard Baxter, Lessing says that the Scriptures contain more than what belongs to religion. There is a human element with the divine. Moreover, Christianity existed before either the gospels or the epistles were written; and it was a long time in existence before the entire canon was formed. It is therefore impossible that the truth of the Christian religion can depend on these writings. It is

not true because it was taught by evangelists and apostles, but they taught it because it is true. These writings could not give it inner truth if it had none in itself. Assaults on the Bible merely affected the outworks of Christianity and did not touch the citadel.

On the first "Fragment," Lessing says that the clergy have entirely ceased to denounce reason. The chief thing heard in the pulpits is its agreement with faith. The common saying now is that revelation is nothing else but a renewed sanction of the religion of reason. The second "Fragment" is admitted to contain a multitude of things that are not to be questioned. Yet surely if a revelation is useful and necessary, it is better that it be given to some and not withheld altogether. The assumption that they only can be saved who have received this revelation is neither, Lessing says, the doctrine of Christ nor the universally acknowledged doctrine of the Church. On the third "Fragment" Lessing referred to the explanation that had often been given that the 600,000 might have been a mistake of the copyist for 600. He said that the miracle of Elijah dividing the waters of the Jordan with his mantle to make a passage for himself, was quite as wonderful as Moses dividing the Red Sea that millions might pass over. He shows the conceivability of the Israelites having made the passage in the time mentioned. On the fourth "Fragment" Lessing admits that the Jews were ignorant of immortality. We may even, he says, go further, and admit that before the Babylonian captivity they had not a right conception of the unity of God. It is certain that the unity which they ascribed to God was not that transcendental metaphysical unity which is the foundation of all natural theology. Or if some did reach it, certainly it was not grasped by the people, who could not be restrained from falling into idolatry and going after strange gods, who were to them also gods, but not so powerful as Jehovah, their national Deity. To his remarks on this "Fragment" Lessing adds the famous treatise on the "Education of the Human Race," which he says had been in circulation among some friends, and from which he confesses that he had himself borrowed some ideas.

By regarding revelation as the education of the race, it is supposed that many difficulties in theology may be removed. By education we educe what is in an individual, and so revelation brings out what is already in the race. Human reason would itself have reached the conclusions of revelation, but it would have required a much longer time. The parallel, however, is preserved. The mode of revelation like that of education is progressive. God begins with the Hebrew race and reveals Himself as "the God of their fathers." By miracles He testifies that He is greater and mightier than any other god. It was not yet time to teach this race the immortality of the soul. They

had not capacity to understand any higher good than temporal prosperity. When the child came of age it was sent into foreign countries. Here it learned the blessings of the home it had left, and yet it found some who had got beyond it in learning, just as some self-educated men surpass those who have been taught at the schools. The Jews learned from the Persians to think of God as "Being of all beings." This, indeed, they might have discovered in their own books had their reason been sufficiently developed, but it was not. Revelation hitherto had guided their reason, and now reason gives clearness to their revelation. Among the Persians and Chaldeans, and in the schools of Alexandria, the Jews learned the doctrine of immortality. There may have been hints of it and allusions to it in their own Scriptures, but they were not clear, and so it never became the creed of more than a section of the Jewish people. The Old Testament was to the Jews like a primer to a child. It only contained what they were to learn as children. It clothed in allegories such abstract truths as creation and the origin of evil. The primer served the childhood of the race, but it was exhausted when Christ came. He tore it from the child's hands. Christ was the first *certain* teacher. Prophecies were fulfilled in Him, He wrought miracles, He revealed the doctrine of the resurrection of the dead. It may not now be possible to *prove* Christ's miracles or his resurrection, or even to know who He was in the mysteries of his nature and person. But these have not the same importance for the recognition of truth which they once had. Christ was the first *practical* teacher, the first who taught men to live here as believers in a life to come. This doctrine is contained in the New Testament, the second primer which was given for the instruction of the race in the second stage of its capacity. The possibility of a third age is mentioned when men will do right without reference to the future, but because it is right. Every individual of the race must travel over the same road of progressive education. To allow time for this it is supposed that men may have lived before, or that they may have opportunities of learning in the eternity that is to come.

The objections of the Deists to Christianity, and the answers to these objections, reached their final stage in the Wolfenbüttel "*Fragments*," and the controversies which followed their publication. The Deists had made an "*Aufklärung*," but the philosophy of Kant, which went again to subjectivity and concerned itself with the nature of reason, *cleared up* a great deal which the Deists took for immovable certainty. Kant's philosophy had no immediate reference to religion, and was so far neither against Christianity nor for it. The service it rendered was an equal benefit to both sides. It cleared the ground, removed the dust, and distinguished between the mountain and the mirage, or

at least determined the conditions under which it was possible to make the distinction. Kant's problem in philosophy was the parallel problem of theology. Philosophers and theologians had been making systems on the assumption that the objective, if not perfectly known, was, at least, perfectly knowable. The Deists contrasted the certainty of their reasonings with the uncertainty of the external evidences of Christianity. Kant showed the uncertainty of their reasonings. To set one uncertainty against another was not to increase the grounds of faith, but it taught men to look deeper into the foundations of what constitutes certainty. It turned the human mind to the examination of itself, and to estimate the value of subjective knowledge. Kant in this was a true German and a Lutheran too, for he shaped into the form of science what had been left indefinite by Luther.

Kant himself rested religion on morality, that is, he found the proper basis of religion in the moral law within which he held to be the most certain of all things. This moral law was God in the conscience. From it Kant learned the doctrine of immortality and of a judgment to come. In Christianity he found the religion which best answered to the moral nature of man. The historical Christ was the ideal whom all men ought to have before them. The Christ was an institution required by the condition of man in the world, and the doctrines of Christianity, such as original sin, moral freedom, and in a sense atonement, corresponded to the facts of man's moral nature. The law in the mind becomes, in Kant's philosophy, the schoolmaster which leads to Christ. But as that philosophy never reaches objective certainty as to the existence of God, much less can it ever reach the certainty of an external revelation.

The religious part of Kant's system was only meagrely expressed by himself. Jacobi exchanged the word morality for faith, but the meaning remained in a great measure the same. This faith was a feeling or inward knowledge of re-creation—a sense of God abiding in the soul. Jacobi says that the great desire of his life had been to attain to certainty on the anticipations of man. He believed in no philosophy except this. The certainty he desired he could only find within in his own spirit. There he found "an absolute knowledge springing directly from the human reason." Revelation was made to man's inmost nature. It was perceived by reason, but never grasped by the understanding. It could not be shaped into a science. It could not become objective without suffering injury and perversion. A revelation from without, however it might be provided with miracles, could never be satisfactory. In Christ and Christianity Jacobi recognised all that the moral nature or higher reason required in us, but before Christianity can be really believed, all that is vital in Christ must become living in us.

Fichte, too, like Jacobi and Kant, found certainty only in subjectivity. For morality or faith, he substituted love as the essential principle or basis of religion. This difference at first sight seems considerable. To many, and even to Fichte himself, it was. Kant and Jacobi had recognised in Christianity, as contained in the whole New Testament, the religion suited to man's nature. Fichte recognised in Christ the absolute perfection of love and purity. But starting as he did with love instead of morality, which with Kant was the sense of an absolute righteousness, he clung to John as the only true evangelist and interpreter of the mind of Jesus. This evangelist alone reports the words in which Jesus announced the principle of certainty—that he who did the will of the Father should know of the doctrine. With Fichte too, as with John, the subjectivity took a mystical form. The knowledge of things divine depended on the union of the soul with God; on the finite passing into the Infinite. Through the deepest philosophy Fichte was led to the faith of the simple Christian, believing in eternal life because he had already realized its blessedness.

In the last section of his work, Dr. Dorner treats of the regeneration of Protestant theology in the nineteenth century. This has been effected by removing the partiality of the objectivity which prevailed from the beginning of the seventeenth century, and the partiality of the subjectivity which began with Kant and reached its climax in Fichte. In his philosophy the intellect of man projected the external world. The I alone existed, or, if it evoked an object, that object was the Infinite in which the I immediately disappeared. To determine the reality both of the subjective and the objective, the finite and the Infinite, their co-existence and mutual relations, was the object of Schelling and Hegel. The same was done by Schleiermacher in the sphere of religion. In this Dorner says, Schleiermacher only returned to the principle of the Reformation—that truth is authenticated to consciousness by the agency of the Holy Ghost. By that agency the contemplation of the historical Christ becomes a divine faith. It is a contact with the divine, and thereby a sense of delivery from sin and of reconciliation with the sinless. German Protestantism, after its long conflict, now rests on the truth of the subject-matter of the Scriptures, but certified through subjectivity leaving the form open to the freest criticism.

The same questions that have been dealt with by the Germans have come up in different forms and at different times in England. Their history is parallel in both countries, but the English mind has been more timid in its treatment of them. Theology with us has never been a science. The Church of England at the Reformation followed the Lutheran confessions, and, like them, had at first no

fixed canon of Scripture. It was not till the reign of Elizabeth, when the second generation of Reformers returned from Switzerland, that the Sixth Article was added to the Articles of Religion. The English Reformation then entered on the Helvetian stage, and rested like Calvin and the Church of Geneva on the objectivity of the Scriptures. The Sixth Article enumerates the canonical books of the Old Testament, and declares canonical those of the New that are "commonly received," describing them as those "of whose authority there never was any doubt in the Church." Here we have a definite canon of Scripture with authority, and on the Scripture the Church itself was based. Nothing was to be taught which could not be "read therein nor proved thereby." The first defenders of Episcopacy, such as Whitgift, Hooker, and Bridges, drew their arguments from reason and antiquity. This was not indeed forbidden by the Article, but the Puritans had an apparent advantage in the simple fact that they rested solely on the Scriptures. The later defendants of Episcopacy appealed to Scripture, but in connection with antiquity as the interpreter of Scripture. All parties kept to the canon, and to the Church only as resting on the canon. The dependence of the Church on the Scriptures was a principle which some Churchmen from their position might have wished to deny; but no such tendency was ever manifested by any of the old theologians of the Church of England. The Puritans intensified the spirit of the Sixth Article. In the Westminster Confession, all the books were enumerated, both of the Old and the New Testaments. They were expressly, even as to their form, declared the "Word of God," and said to be "given by inspiration." In accordance with the doctrine of Calvin, the assurance of their infallible truth is said to come from "the inward work of the Holy Spirit bearing witness by and with the Word in our hearts." It is evident here that the inspired rule of faith is not the subject-matter only but the formal canon.

Towards the end of the seventeenth century some of the Puritans adopted from Buxtorf the doctrine of the inspiration of vowel points and Hebrew accents. The most eminent Churchmen, on the other hand, do not seem ever to have been believers in Bible infallibility. Brian Walton, like Bengel, believed that the original text was infallible, if it could be found. Jeremy Taylor advocated toleration for all sects and opinions, on the express ground of the uncertainty of the Scriptures. Stillingfleet says that in matters of history the writers of the Bible did not require inspiration; and, from internal evidence, he concludes that it was not given, but that the writers were left to their own knowledge. Tillotson reasoned, that if the Scriptures had been infallibly inspired, the same Providence that had taken such care in their composition would have

preserved them without corruption or interpolation. All these writers rested certainty on the inward testimony of the Spirit. This, however, did not extend to the canonicity of books, but only to the truth and divinity of the Christian religion. In the next century the apologists for Christianity against the Deists professed to stand on the infallibility of the Scriptures, and yet they granted almost all that the Deists wished. In England theology made no progress after the Deist controversy.

The books which we have placed at the head of this article give the results of German thinking since the Reformation. It is impossible for us to take another step in theology if we ignore what the Germans have said and done. This presses on us at every hand. It is a normal part of the history and development of Protestantism. We have the alternatives of renouncing Protestantism and inventing for ourselves the idea of a Church on which we may lean so long as it will support us, or we can denounce all German theology as Rationalism, and take our stand on the Scriptures as if the canon were objectively certain and the inspiration of every word infallible. One or both of these is generally done in England. Both methods are empirical—mere inventions that cannot be defended; and the result, Dr. Dorner says, is that we in England are not beyond the danger of a return to Deism. Neither the Church party nor the Bible party can stand on its own ground. They mutually derive their strength from each other's weakness. The Church party, contrary to the old spirit of the Church of England, makes the Bible uncertain, that it may exalt the Church, and the Bible party finds it easy to reduce the Church theory to an assumption which has no other foundation but the desire that it may be true.

The English intellect is essentially empirical and utilitarian. It has never fairly given itself to the study of divinity forgetful of everything but truth. It has never looked in the face the real facts of the universe and of God's government. The first step of its reasoning in religion has always been an assumption that something must be as it is supposed to be, or if not we have no certainty. The German intellect, on the other hand, has never been afraid. It has laid bare every assumption. It has had the deep faith that if God's way be through doubt and difficulty, that way must be followed, just because it is God's way. The men to whom the regeneration of theology is due were mostly men who had been educated for the service of religion, and who preserved through life the character of earnest and devout Christians. At the very time when Fichte was publicly charged with atheism, he never omitted the morning and evening devotions in his family. Lessing was more secular, and his sympathies with the general world were wider, but the influence of

his early education was never effaced. Schleiermacher, too, retained to his last days the Moravian piety which he had learned in his father's house.

In trying to sum up the results of the German regeneration of theology, it is necessary to give the first place to the *doctrine of God*. Dr. Dorner and Professor Hagenbach continue to use the word Pantheism, and even to speak of the systems of Schelling and Hegel as Pantheistic. It is surely time that this word were either better defined or laid aside until a proper definition is found. To take an obscure part of a speculative system, or a system which perhaps in its completeness is but imperfectly understood, and to call it Pantheism, is not the way to make people wiser than they were before. It is notorious that the regenerating elements of German theology have come from what is called Pantheism. Fichte, Herder, and Schleiermacher had to bear the reproach of Pantheism as well as Schelling and Hegel. The old Deists and the old divines who fought the Deists could never rise above the conception of God as a personal Being. He was to them always a man, or at least a Being made in the image of man, dwelling in an inaccessible heaven outside the boundaries of time and space. The great question was, if this Being had ever visited this world or interfered with the order established at creation. The Pantheists, as they were called, opened their eyes upon that order, and saw that God had never been absent from it, that he constituted it, and that in a sense that order was God Himself. This idea was familiar to the Pagan world. Like the self-taught scholars in Lessing's theory of the education of the race, they had outstripped both Christian and Jew. Schiller felt the higher truth of the Pagan idea of God over that of the Deists, and gave open expression to it in the "Gods of Greece." This conception of God as immanent everywhere in nature, changed the very meaning of the words natural and supernatural. Both were within the order of nature. The difference was in the effects, and not in the mode of operation. Revelation itself became conceivable as within the order of nature. It was an education, and the question is still open if we are to consider the education as extending to all by inward revelation, or if, with Lessing, we limit revelation to a special teaching which was to educe in a shorter time what was already in the reason.

With this view of the identity of God and the orderly evolutions both of the natural and the supernatural, corresponds the German doctrine of the Scriptures, as expounded by Dr. Dorner. The certainty of their truth is derived from the Scriptures themselves. The formal principle is declared an insufficient foundation, and with this external evidences become incapable of producing faith. The

truth of Christianity must be felt, and it can only be felt by those whose minds are prepared to feel it. This seems to be reasoning in a circle, as the disposition necessary for conviction is itself produced by the contents of the Scriptures; but it only means that the certainty is mainly inward, or at most it is "subjectively objective." It is a work in the mind, without which "it is not possible to perceive that there is a divine revelation, and that this is deposited in Holy Scripture." It is a matter of faith and not of knowledge. The first thing to be evoked is "not faith in the normative authority or inspiration of Holy Scripture, or of the Apostles, but faith in Christ as the Redeemer; in other words, experience of justification before God through faith in Him." A man who has in himself the experience of being delivered from evil, has no fears when he allows to criticism all its rights. Yea, criticism itself is an act of faith. "This fact of salvation experienced by faith cannot be made untrue by any critical conclusions whatever."

We are not ignorant of the reception which this doctrine of subjectivity commonly meets in England. The objection to it is that after all we may have nothing on which we can really depend. Our minds may only project illusions, and our inner consciousness may have no objective answer in the real world. But we must take the facts of religion as they are. This internal certainty may not be all that we could wish it to be; but we are not on that account to make it less than it is, or invent an external certainty which does not exist. Religion in its true essence has ever come from within. It has been preserved by Mystics and Pietists, and most successfully preached by saints and prophets to whom the conviction of its truth was its power to renew the life. That which a man feels is to him the greatest certainty.

Let Protestant England learn from Protestant Germany that the principle of resting Christianity on the formal canon of Scripture is hopeless. Let all theories of inspiration be dismissed, and the books which compose the Scriptures be received as what they are and what they profess to be. If this were done, the common reason of mankind would reject all such theories as that of Strauss concerning the Gospels, and all imaginary biographies of Jesus, like that by M. Rénan. Every theory concerning the Scriptures would be suspected just according to the measure of the ingenuity with which it is supported. It is time that we in England, especially the clergy and all teachers of religion, should learn the real truth concerning the Scriptures, that every new work on Bible learning may not be, as in recent days it has been, the occasion of a religious panic, and a disturbance to the faith of Christians.

JOHN HUNT.

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
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